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JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 




/cmyo^y ,^yle-€^?^i-€<^yi^ Y^/S'. 



.%.ec^ S'/. 



I.OMDON: BDWARD ARNOL,D. 



JOHN EEDMOND'S 
LAST YEAES 



BY 

STEPHEN GWYNN 



NEW YOEK 

LONGMANS, GBEEN & CO. 

1919 

{All rights reserved] 



PREFACE 

In writing this book, I have had access to my late leader's 
papers for the period beginning with the war. These were 
placed at my disposal by his son, Major William Archer 
Redmond, D.S.O., M.P. I had also the consent of Mrs, 
Redmond to my undertaking the task. But for the book 
and for the opinions expressed in it I am solely responsible. 
No condition having been imposed upon me, it seemed best, 
for many reasons, that it should be written, as it has been 
written, without consultation. 

A writer in whom such a trust has been placed may well be 
at a loss how to express his gratitude, but can never convey 
the measure of his anxiety. From those who cherish Red- 
mond's memory, and especially from those who were nearest 
to him in comradeship and affection, I must only crave 
the indulgence which should be accorded to sincere effort- 
Differences of interpretation there will be in any review 
of past events, and others can claim with justice that on 
many points they were better situated for full understanding 
than was I. Yet for the period which is specially studied, 
if there is failure in comprehension it cannot be excused 
by lack of opjDortunity to be thoroughly informed. 

To readers at large I would say this — that if any sentence 
in these pages be uncandid or ungenerous, it is most unworthy 
to be found in the record of such a man. 

p. C^, 



CONTENTS 

I. INTRODUCTORY . . . . .1 

II. REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN . . . .23 

III. THE HOME RULE BILL OF 1912 . . .62 

IV. THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES . . 90 
V. WAR IN EUROPE ..... 126 

VI. THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES . 152 

VII. THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL . . 218 

VIII. THE CONVENTION AND THE END . . 259 

INDEX ...... 343 

PORTRAIT OF JOHN REDMOND . . Frontispiece 



m 



Shall a mau understand, 
He shall know bitterness because his kind, 
Being perplexed of mind. 
Hold issues even that are nothing mated. 
And he shall give 

Counsel out of his wisdom that none shall hear 
And steadfast in vain persuasion must he live, 
And unabated 
Shall his temptation be. 

John Dbinkwatek, in Ahraham Lincoln. 



JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 



CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTORY 



THE time has not yet come to write the biography 
of John Redmond. Not until the history of the 
pledge-bound Irish Parliamentary party can be treated 
freely, fully and impartially as a chapter closed and 
ended will it be possible to record in detail the life of 
a man who was associated with it almost from its begin- 
ning and who from the opening of this century guided 
it with almost growing authority to the statutory accom- 
plishment of its desperate task ; who knew, in it and for 
it, all vicissitudes of fortune and who gave to it without 
stint or reservation his whole life's energy from earliest 
manhood to the grave. 

But when the war came, unforeseen, shifting all 
political balances, transmuting the greatest political 
issues, especially those of which the Irish question is 
a type, it imposed upon men and upon nations, but above 
all on the leaders of nations, swift and momentous 
decisions. Because that critical hour presented to Red- 
mond's vision a great opportunity which he must either 
seize single-handed or let it for ever pass by ; because he 
rose to the height of the occasion with the courage which 
counts upon and commands success ; because he sought 
by his own motion to swing the whole mass and weight 

2 1 



2 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

of a nation's feeling into a new direction — for all these 
reasons his last years were different in kind from any 
that had gone before ; and as such they admit of and 
demand separate study. Intelligent comprehension of 
what he aimed at, what he achieved, and what forces 
defeated him in these last years of his life is urgently 
needed, not for the sake of his memory, but for Ireland's 
sake ; because until his policy is understood there is 
little chance that Irishmen should attain what he aspired 
to win for Ireland — the strength and dignity of a free 
and united nation. 

It is of Redmond's policy for Ireland in relation to 
the war, and to the events which in Ireland arose out 
of the war, that this book is mainly designed to treat. 
Yet to make that policy intelligible some history is needed 
of the startling series of political develoj)ments which 
the war interrupted but did not terminate — and which, 
though still recent, are blurred in public memory by 
all that has intervened. Further back still, a brief 
review of his early career must be given, not only to 
set the man's figure in relation to his environment, but 
to show that this final phase was in reality no new 
departure, no break with his past, but a true though 
a divergent evolution from all that had gone before. 

Ireland, although so small in extent and population, 
is none the less a country of many and locally varying 
racial strains ; and John Redmond sprang from one of 
the most typical. He was a Wexfordman ; that is to 
say, he came from the part of Ireland where if you 
cross the Channel there is least difference between the 
land you leave and the land you sail to ; where the 
sea-divided peoples have been always to some extent 
assimilated. Here in the twelfth century the first 
Norman- Welsh invaders came across. The leader of 
their first party, Raymond Le Gros, landed at a point 
between Wexford and Waterford ; the town of Wexford 



INTRODUCTORY 3 

was his first capture ; and where he began his con- 
quest he settled. From this stock the Redmond name 
and line descend. 

Thus John Redmond came from an invading strain 
in which Norman and Celt were already blended : and 
he grew up in a country thickly settled with men whose 
ancestors came along with his from across the \^'ater. 
Till a century ago the barony of Forth retained a dialect 
of its own which was in effect such English as men spoke 
before Chaucer began to write ; and even to-day in any 
Wexford fair or market you will see among the strong, 
well-nourished, prosperous farmers many faces and figures 
which an artist might easily assimilate to an athletic 
example of the traditional John Bull. Redmond himself, 
hawk-faced and thick-bodied, might have been taken 
for no bad reincarnation of Raymond Le Gros. To this 
extent he was less of a Celt than many of his country- 
men ; but he was assuredly none the less Irish because 
he was a Wexfordman. The county of his birth was 
the county' which had made the greatest resistance to 
English power in Ireland since Sarsfield and his " Wild 
Geese " crossed to Flanders, Born in 1857, he grew up 
in a country-side full of memories of events then only 
some sixty years old ; he knew and spoke with many 
men who had been out with pike or fowling-piece in 1798. 
Rebel was to him from boyhood up a name of honour ; 
and this was not only a phase of boyish enthusiasm. 
In his mature manhood, speaking as leader of the Irish 
party, he told the House of Commons plainly that in his 
deliberate judgment Ireland's situation justified an appeal 
to arms, and that if rebellion offered a reasonable prospect 
of gaining freedom for a united Ireland he would counsel 
rebellion on the instant. 

But if he was always and admittedly a potential 
rebel, no man was ever less a revolutionary. As much a 
constitutionalist as Hampden or Washington, he was so 
by temperament and by inheritance. The tradition of 



4 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

parliamentary service had been in his family for two 
generations. Two years after his birth his great-uncle, 
John Edward Redmond, from whom he got his baptismal 
names, was elected unopposed as Liberal member for 
the borough of Wexford, where his statue stands in the 
market-place, commemorating good service rendered. 
Much of the rich flat land which lies along the railway 
from Wexford to Rosslare Harbour was reclaimed by 
this Redmond's enterprise from tidal slob. On his death 
in 1872 the seat passed to his nephew William Archer 
Redmond, whose two sons were John and William 
Redmond, with whom this book deals. Thus the present 
Major William Archer Redmond, M.P., represents four 
continuous generations of the same family sent to 
Westminster among the representatives of Nationalist 
Ireland. 

Not often is a family type so strongly marked as among 
the men of this stock. But the portraits show that while 
the late Major " Willie " Redmond closely resembled his 
father, in John Redmond and John Redmond's son there 
were reproduced the more dominant and massive features 
of the first of the parliamentary line. 

To sum up then, John Redmond and his brother came 
of a long strain of Catholic gentry who were linked by 
continuous historic association of over seven centuries to 
a certain district in South Leinster, and who retained 
leadership among their own people. The tradition of 
military service was strong, too, in this family. Their 
father's cousin, son to the original John Edward Redmond, 
was a professional soldier : and their mother was the 
daughter of General Hoey. They were brought up in 
an old-fashioned country house, Ballytrent, on the Wexford 
coast, and the habits of outdoor country life and sport 
which furnished the chief pleasure of their lives were 
formed in boyhood. Their upbringing differed from that 
of boys in thousands of similar country houses through- 
out Ireland only in one circumstance ; they were Catholics, 



INTRODUCTORY 5 

and even so lately as in their boyhood Catholic land- 
owners were comparatively few. 

John Redmond was four years older than his younger 
brother, born in 1861. He got his schooling under the 
Jesuits at Clongowes in early days, before the system 
of Government endowment by examination results had 
given incentive to cramming. According to his own 
account he did little work and nobody pressed him to 
exertion. But the Jesuits are skilful teachers, and they 
left a mark on his mind. It is scarcelj'' chance that the 
two speakers of all I have heard who had the best delivery 
were pupils of theirs — Redmond and Sir William Butler. 
They taught him to write, they taught him to speak 
and to declaim, they encouraged his natural love of 
literature. His taste was formed in those days and it 
was curiously old-fashioned. His diction in a prepared 
oration might have come from the days of Grattan : 
and he maintained the old-fashioned habit of quotation. 
No poetry written later than Byron, Moore and Shelley 
made much appeal to him, save the Irish political ballads. 
But scarcely any English speaker quoted Shakespeare in 
public so often or so aptly as this Irishman. 

From Clongowes he went to Trinity College, Dublin, 
where he matriculated in October 1874 at the age of 
seventeen. His academic studies seem to have been 
half-hearted. At the end of a year his name was taken 
off the College books by hjis father, but was replaced, 
x\t the close of his second year of study, in July 1876, 
it was removed again and for good. 

But apart from what he learnt at school, his real educa- 
tion was an apprenticeship ; he was trained in the House 
of Commons for the work of Parliament. He was a boy 
of fifteen, of an age to be keenly interested, when the 
representation of Wexford passed from his great-uncle 
to his father. Probably the reason why he was removed 
from Trinity College was the desire of Mr. William Red- 
mond to have his son with him in London. Certainly 



6 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

John Redmond was there during the session of 1876, 
for on the introduction of Mr. Gladstone's second Home 
Rule Bill he recalled a finely apposite Shakespearean 
quotation which he had heard Butt use in a Home Rule 
debate of that year. In May 1880 his father procured 
him a clerkship in the House. The post to which he was 
assigned was that of attendant in the Vote Office, so that 
his days (and a great part of his nights) were spent in 
the two little rooms which open off the Members' Lobby, 
that buzzing centre of parliamentary gossip, activity 
and intrigue. Half a dozen steps only separated him 
from the door of the Chamber itself, and that door he 
was always privileged to pass and listen to the debates, 
standing by the entrance outside the magical strip of 
matting which indicates the bar of the House. From 
this point of vantage he watched the first stages of a 
Parliament in which Mr. Gladstone set out with so trium- 
phant a majority — and watched too the inroads made 
upon the power and prestige of that majority by the 
new parliamentary force which had come into being. 

Redmond himself described thus (in a lecture delivered 
at New York in 1806) the policy which came to be known 
as " The New Departure " : 

" Mr. Parnell found that tJie British Parliament in- 
sisted upon turning a deaf ear to Ireland's claim for 
justice. He resolved to adopt the simple yet masterly 
device of preventing Parliament doing any work at all 
until it consented to hear." 

In the task of systematic and continuous obstruction 
Parnell at once found a ready helper, Mr. Joseph Biggar. 
But Parnell, Biggar and those who from 1876 to 1880 
acted generally or frequently with them were only members 
of the body led by Butt ; though they were, indeed, 
ultimately in more or less open revolt against Butt's 
leadersliip. When Butt died, and was at least nominally 
replaced by Mr. Shaw, the growth of Parneil's ascen- 



INTRODUCTORY 7 

dancy became more marked. In the general election of 
1880 sixty Home Rulers were returned to Parliament ; 
and at a meeting attended by over forty, twenty-three 
declared for Parnell as their leader, A question almost 
of ceremonial observance immediately defined the issue. 
Liberals were in power, and Government was more friendly 
to Ireland's claims than was the Opposition, Mr. Shaw 
and his adherents were for marking support of the Govern- 
ment by sitting on the Government side of the Chamber. 
Parnell insisted that the Irish party should be independent 
of all English attachments and permanently in opposi- 
tion till Ireland received its rights. With that view he 
and his friends took up their station on the Speaker's 
left below the gangway, where they held it continuously 
for thirty-nine years. 

Mr. William Redmond was no sujpporter of the new 
policy. As the little group which Parnell headed grew 
more and more insistent in their obstruction, the member 
for Wexford spoke less and less. His interventions were 
rare and dignified. In the debate on the Address in the 
new Parliament of 1880 he acted as a lieutenant to Mr. 
Shaw. Yet he was on very friendly terms with Parnell 
— almost a neighbour of his, for the Parnell property, 
lying about the Vale of Ovoca, touched the border of 
Wexford. 

Mr. William Redmond's career in that Parliament 
was soon ended. In November 1880 he died, and, 
normally, his son, whose qualifications and ambitions 
were known, would have succeeded him. But collision 
between Government and the Parnellite party was already 
beginning. Mr, T. M, Healy, then Parnell's secretary, 
had been arrested for a speech in denunciation of some 
eviction proceedings. This was the first arrest of a 
prominent man under Mr, Forster's rule as Chief Secre- 
tary, and Parnell, with whom in those days the decision 
rested, decided that Mr, Healy should immediately be 
put forward for the vacant seat. In later days he was 



8 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

to remind Mr. Healy how he had done this, ** rebuking 
and restraining the prior right of my friend, Jack 
Redmond." Redmond had not long to wait, however. 
Another vacancy occurred in another Wexford seat, the 
ancient borough of New Ross, and he was returned without 
opposition at a crucial moment in the parliamentary 
struggle. 

That struggle was not only parliamentary. From the 
famine year of 1879 onwards a fierce agitation had begun, 
whose purpose was to secure the land of Ireland to the 
people who worked it. Davitt was to the land what 
Parnell was to the parliamentary campaign : but it was 
Parnell's genius which fused the two movements. 

To meet the growing power of the Land League, Mr. 
Forster demanded a Coercion Bill, and after long struggles 
in the Cabinet he prevailed. Against this Bill it was 
obvious that all means of parHamentary resistance would 
be used to the uttermost. 

They were still of a primitive simplicity. In the days 
before Parnell the House of Commons had carried on 
its business under a system of rules which worked per- 
fectly well because there was a general disposition in 
the assembly to get business done. A beginning of the 
new order was made when a group of ex-military men 
attempted to defeat the measure for abolishing purchase 
of commissions in the Army by a series of dilatory motions. 
This, however, was an isolated occurrence. Any English 
member who set himself to thwart the desire of the 
House for a conclusion by using means which the general 
body considered unfair would have been reduced to 
quiescence by a demonstration that he was considered 
a nuisance. His voice would have been drowned in a 
buzz of conversation or by less civil interruptions. This 
implied, however, a willingness to be influenced by social 
considerations, and, more than that, a loyalty to the 
traditions and purposes of the House, Parnell felt no 
such willingness and acknowledged no such loyalty. 



INTRODUCTORY 9 

" His object," said Redmond in the address already 
quoted, " was to injure it so long as it refused to listen 
to the just claims of his country." The House, realizing 
Parnell's intention, visited upon him and his associates 
all the penalties by which it was wont to enforce its 
wishes : but the penalties had no sting. All the displays 
of anger, disapproval, contempt, all the vocabulary of 
denunciation in debate and in the Press, all the studied 
forms of insult, all the marks of social displeasure, only 
served to convince the Irishmen that they were producing 
their effect. Still, the House continued to act on the 
assumjDtion that it could vindicate its traditions in the 
old traditional way : it was determined to change none 
of the rules which had stood for so many generations : 
it would maintain its liberties and put down in its own 
wsiy those who had the impertinence to abuse them. 
The breaking-point came exactly at the moment when 
Redmond was elected. 

On Monday, Jan. 24th, 1881, Mr. Forster introduced his 
Coercion Bill. It was open, of course, to any member 
to speak once, and once only, on the main motion. But 
every member had an indefinite right to move the adjourn- 
ment of the debate, and on each such motion every member 
could speak again. The debate was carried all through 
that week. It was resumed on Monday, 31st. The 
declaration of Redmond's election was fixed for Tuesday, 
February 1st, in New Ross — there being no contest. A 
telegram summoned him to come instantlj^ after the 
declaration to London. He took the train at noon, 
travelled to Dublin and crossed the Channel. At Holy- 
head about midnight another telegram told him that 
the debate was still proceeding. He reached Euston on 
the Wednesdaj'^ morning, drove straight to the House, and 
there, standing at the bar, saw what he thus described : 

" It was thus, travel-stained and weary, that I first 
presented myself as a member of the British Parliament. 
The House was still sitting, it had been sitting without 



10 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

a break for over forty hours, and I shall nerer forget 
the appearance the Chamber presented. The floor was 
littered with paper. A few dishevelled and weary Irish- 
men were on one side of tlie House, about a hundred 
infuriated Englishmen upon the other ; some of them 
still in evening dress, and wearing what were once white 
shirts of the night before last, Mr. Parnell was upon 
his legs, with pale cheeks and drawn face, his hands 
clenched behind his back, facing without flinching a 
continuous roar of interruption. It was now about 
eight o'clock. Half of Mr. Parnell's followers were out 
of the Chamber snatching a few moments' sleep in chairs 
in the Library or Smoke Room. Those who remained 
had each a specified period of time allotted him to speak, 
and they were wearily waiting their turn. As they 
caught sight of me standing at the bar of the House 
of Commons there was a cheer of welcome. I w as unable 
to come to their aid, however, as under the rules of the 
House I could not take my seat until the commence- 
ment of a new sitting. My very presence, however, 
brought, I think, a sense of encouragement and approach- 
ing relief to them ; and I stood there at the bar with 
my travelling coat still upon me, gazing alternately 
with indignation and admiration at the amazing scene 
presented to my gaze. 

"This, then, was the great Parliament of England ! Of 
intelligent debate there was none. It was one unbroken 
scene of turbulence and disorder. The few Irishmen 
remained quiet, too much amused, perhaps, or too much 
exhausted to retaliate. It was the English — the members 
of the first assembly of gentlemen in Europe, as they 
love to style it — who howled and roared, and almost 
foamed at the mouth with rage at the calm and pale- 
featured young man who stood patiently facing them 
and endeavouring to make himself heard." 

An hour later the closure was applied, for the first 
time in Parliament's history. The records of Hansard 
spoil a story which Redmond was fond of telling — that 
he took his oath and his seat, made his maiden speech 
and was suspended all in the same evening. In point 
of fact he took his seat that Wednesday afternoon, when 
the House sat for a few hours only and adjourned again. 



INTRODUCTORY 11 

Next day news came in that Davitt had been arrested 
in Ireland. Mr. Dillon, in the process of endeavouring 
to extract an explanation from the Government, was 
named and suspended. When the Prime Minister after 
this rose to speak, Mr. Parnell moved : " That Mr. 
Gladstone be not heard." 

The Speaker, ruling that Mr. Gladstone was in posses- 
sion of the House, refused to put the motion. Mr. 
Parnell, insisting that his motion should be put, came 
into collision with the authority of the Chair and was 
formally " named." Mr. Gladstone then moved his sus- 
pension and a division was called — whereupon, under the 
rules which then existed, all members were bound to 
leave the Chamber. On this occasion the Irish members 
remained seated, as a protest, and after the division the 
Speaker solemnly reported this breach of order to the 
House. For their refusal to obey the Irish members 
present were suspended from the service of the House, 
and as a body they refused to leave unless removed by 
physical force. Accordingly, man by man was ordered 
to leave and each in turn rose up with a brief phrase of 
refusal, after which the Sergeant-at-Arms with an officer 
approached and laid a hand on the recusant's shoulder. 
Redmond, when his turn came, said : 

"As I regard the whole of these proceedings as un- 
mitigated despotism, I beg respectfully to decline to 
withdraw." 

That was his maiden speech. Having delivered it, 
" Mr. Redmond," says Hansard, " was by desire of Mr. 
Speaker removed by tlie Sergeant-at-Arms from the 
House." It was a strange beginning for one of the 
greatest parliamentarians of our epoch — and one of 
the greatest conservatives. The whole bent of his mind 
was towards moderation in all things. Temperamentally, 
he hated all forms of extravagant eccentricity ; he loved 
the old if only because it was old ; he had the keenest 
sense not only of decorum but of the essential dignity 



12 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

which is the best guardian of order. Yet here he was 
committed to a policy which aimed deliberately at out- 
raging all the established decencies — at disregarding 
ostentatiously all the usages by which an assembly of 
gentlemen had regulated their proceedings. 

What is more, it was an assemblj^ which Redmond 
found temperamentallj'^ congenial to him— an assembly 
which, apart from its relation to Ireland, he thoroughly 
admired and liked. In 1896, when Irish members were 
fiercely in opposition to the Government, he concluded 
his description of Parliament with these words : 

" In the main, the House of Commons is, I believe, 
dominated by a rough-and-ready sense of manliness 
and fair-play. Of course, I am not speaking of it as a 
governing body. In that character it has been towards 
Ireland always ignorant and nearly always unfair. I 
am treating it simply as an assembly of men, and I say 
of it, it is a body where sooner or later every man finds 
his proper level, where mediocrity and insincerity will 
never permanently succeed, and where ability and honesty 
of purpose will never permanently fail." 

That was no mean tribute, coming from one who held 
himself aloof from all the personal advantages belonging 
to the society whose rules he did not recognize. The 
opinion to which the Irish members of Parnell's following 
were amenable was not made at Westminster ; it did 
not exist there — except, and that in its most rigid form, 
amongst themselves. 

It is worth while to recall for English readers — and 
perhaps not for them only — what membership of Parnell's 
party involved. In the first place, there was a self- 
denying ordinance by which the man elected to it bound 
himself to accept no post of any kind under Government. 
All the chances which election to Parliament opens to 
most men — and especially to men of the legal profession 
— were at once set aside. xA.bsolute discipline and unity 
of action, except in matters specially left open to individual 



INTRODUCTORY 13 

judgment, were enforced on all. These were the essentials. 
But in the period of acute war between the Irish and 
all other parties which was opening when Redmond 
entered there was a self-imposed rule that as the English 
public and English members disapproved and disliked 
the Irishmen an answering attitude should be adopted : 
that even private hospitality should be avoided and that 
the belligerents should behave as if they were quite 
literally in an enemy's country. 

Later, when Mr. Gladstone had adopted the Irish 
cause and alliance with the Liberal party had begun, 
the rigour of this attitude was modified. Many Irish 
members joined the Liberal clubs and went freely to 
houses where they were sure of sympathy. Yet neither 
of the Redmonds followed far in this direction, and 
the habit of social isolation which they formed in their 
early days lasted with them to the end. If John Redmond 
ever went to any house in London which was not an Irish 
home it was by the rarest exception. 

For society, Parnell's party depended on themselves 
and their countrymen and sympathizers. But they were 
in no way to be pitied ; they were the best of company 
for one another. It was a movement of the young, it 
had all the strength and audacity of youth, it was a great 
adventure. A few men from an older generation came 
with them, Mr. Biggar, Justin McCarthy and others. 
But their leader, though older than most of his followers, 
was a young man by parliamentary standards. In 
1880 Parnell was only thirty-three ; and within four 
years more he was as great a power in the House as Mr. 
Gladstone. Some few years back I heard Willie Redmond 
say in the Members' smoking-room, " Isn't it strange 
to think that Parnell would be sixty now if he had lived. 
I can't imagine him as an old man." Yet the accent of 
maturity was on Parnell's leadership ; the men whom 
he led were essentially young. In 1881, when Redmond 
entered Parliament, Mr. Dillon was thirty, Mr. T. P. 



14 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

O'Connor and Mr. Sexton veterans of thirty-three, Mr. 
Healy twenty-six. Mr. William O'Brien (who did not 
come in until 1883) was of the same year as Mr. Dillon. 
Redmond was younger than any of them, being elected 
at the age of twenty-four. Yet nobody then thought it 
surprising that he should be sent in 1882 to represent 
the party on a mission to Australia and the United States 
at a most diflficult time. The Phoenix Park murders had 
created widespread indiscriminating anger against all 
Irish Nationalists throughout the Empire, and Redmond 
found it difficult to secure even a hall to speak in. For 
support there was sent to him his brother, then a youth 
of twenty-one, and feeling ran so strong against the 
two that the Prime Minister of New South Wales (Sir 
Henry Parkes) proposed their expulsion from the colony. 
Nevertheless, Redmond made good. " The Irish working- 
men stood by me," he said, " and in fact saved the situa- 
tion." Fifteen thousand pounds were collected before 
they left the island continent. 

It indicates well the changed conditions to remember 
that when in 1906 Mr. Hazleton and the late T. M. Kettle 
were selected to go on a far less arduous and difficult 
mission to America, there was much talk about the 
astonishing youth of our representatives. Yet both 
were then older than John Redmond was in 1882 — to 
say nothing of his brother, who must have been the most 
exuberantly youthful spokesman that a serious cause 
ever found. 

The Redmonds' stay in Australia, which lasted over 
a year, determined one important matter for both young 
men ; they found their wives in the colony whose Prime 
Minister proposed to expel them. John Redmond married 
Miss Joanna Dalton and his brother her near kinswoman, 
Miss Eleanor Dalton. Willie Redmond was elected to 
Parliament in his absence for his father's old seat — Mr. 
Healy having vacated Wexford to fight and win a sensa- 
tional election in county Monaghan. 



INTRODUCTORY 15 

This early visit to the great transmarine dominions, 
and the ties which he formed there, left a marked impres- 
sion on John Redmond's mind, which was reinforced 
by other visits in later years, and by all the growing 
associations that linked him to life and j)olitics in the 
dominions. Redmond knew vastly more, and in truth 
cared vastly more, about the British Empire than most 
Imperialists. His affection was not based on any in- 
herited prejudice, nor inspired by a mere geographical 
idea. He was attracted to that which he had seen and 
handled, in whose making he had watched so many of 
his fellow-countrymen fruitfully and honourably busy. 
He felt acutel}^ that the Empire belonged to Irish Nation- 
aUsts at least as much as to English Tories. America 
also was familiar to him, and he had every cause to be 
grateful to the United States ; but his interest in the 
dominions was of a different kind. He felt himself a 
partner in their glories, and by this feeling he was linked 
in sympathy to a great many elements in British life 
that were otherwise uncongenial to him — and was, on 
the other hand, divided in sympathy from some who 
in Irish politics were his staunch supporters. He could 
never understand the psychology of the Little Englander. 
" If I were an Englishman," he once said to me, ** I 
should be the greatest Imperialist living.'* From first to 
last his attitude was that which is indicated by a passage 
of his speech on Mr. Gladstone's first Home Rule Bill : 

"As a Nationalist, I may say I do not regard as 
entirely palatable the idea that for ever and a day 
Ireland's voice should be excluded from the councils of 
an Empire which the genius and valour of her sons 
have done so much to build up and of which she is 
to remain a part." ' 

1 This speech is included in "Home Rule: Speeches of John 
Redmond, M.P.," a volume edited in 1910 by Mr. Barry O'Brien. 
It contains also the American addresses quoted in this chapter, and 
a speech to the Dublin Convention in 1907, quoted in the next. 



16 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 



n 

To follow in detail Redmond's career under Parnell's 
leadership would be beyond the scope of this book. Less 
conspicuous in Parliament than such lieutenants of " the 
Chief " as Mr. Sexton, Mr. Dillon and Mr. Healy, John 
Redmond acted as one of the party whips and was in 
much demand outside Parliament as a platform speaker. 
In August 1886 he was once more sent overseas to attend 
the Convention of the Irish Race at Chicago. He had 
to tell his hearers of victory and of repulse. 

" When j^'ou last assembled in Convention, two years 
ago, the Irish party in Parliament did not number more 
than forty ; to-day we hold five-sixths of the Irish seats, 
and speak in the name of five-sixths of the Irish people 
in Ireland. Two years ago we had arrayed against us 
all English political parties and every English statesman ; 
to-day we have on our side one of the great English 
political parties, which, though its past traditions in 
Ireland have been evil, still rejjresents the party of pro- 
gress in England, and the greatest statesman of the day, 
who has staked his all upon winning for Ireland her 
national rights. Two years ago England had in truth, 
in Mitchel's phrase, the ear of the world. To-day, at 
last, that ear, so long poisoned with calumnies of our 
people, is now open to the voice of Ireland. Two years 
ago the public opinion of the world — aye, and even of 
this free land of America — was doubtful as to the justice 
of our movement ; to-day the opinion of the civilized 
world, and of America in particular, is clearly and dis- 
tinctly on our side." 

On the other hand, in England the forces of reaction 
had succeeded. The Home Rule Bill had been defeated 
and the Liberal party broken up. A Government was 
in power whose programme was one of coercion. But 
Ireland, Redmond said, was ready for the fight and con- 
fident that with the weapons at command the enemy 
could be defeated. 



INTRODUCTORY 17 

Who were the enemj', and what the weapon ? Hia 
speech made this plain. 

" Once more Irish landlords have behaved themselves 
with unaccountable folly and stupidity. They have 
once more stood between Ireland and her freedom, and 
have refused even an extravagant price for the land 
because the offer was coupled with the concession of 
an Irish Parliament. So be it. I believe the last offer 
has been made to Irish landlordism. The ultimate 
settlement of this question must now be reserved for 
the Parliament of Ireland, and meantime the people 
must take care to protect themselves and their children. 
In many parts of Ireland, I assert, rent is to-day an 
impossibility, and in every part of Ireland the rents 
demanded are exorbitant, and wiU not, and cannot, 
be paid." 

He was wrong. The settlement of this vast question 
was to be accomplished through the Imperial Parliament, 
not the Irish. Yet it was accomplished in essence by 
an agreement between Irishmen for which Redmond 
himself was largelj'- responsible. 

That settlement, however, merely ratified in 1903 the 
final stage in the conversion of both countries to Parnell's 
policy of State-aided land purchase. Tentative begin- 
nings were made with it under the Government which was 
in power from 1886 to 1892 ; but the main characteristic 
of this period was a fierce revival of the land war. It 
was virulent in Wexford, and in 1888 Redmond shared 
the experience which few Irish members escaped or 
desired to escape ; he was sentenced to imprisonment 
on a charge of intimidation for a speech condemning 
some evictions. He and his brother met in Wexford 
jail, and both used to describe with glee their mutual 
salutation : " Good heavens, what a ruffian you look ! " 
Cropped hair and convict clothes were part of Mr. Balfour's 
resolute government. 

Yet in those days Ireland was winning, and winning 
fast. Mr. Gladstone's personal ascendancy, never stronger 

3 



18 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

than in the wonderful effort of his old age, asserted itself 
more and more. Public sympathy in Great Britain 
was turning against the wholesale evictions, the knocking 
down of peasants' houses by police and military with 
battering-rams. The Tory party sought for a new poli- 
tical weapon, and one day The Times came out with the 
facsimile of what purported to be a letter in Parnell's 
hand. This document implied at least condonation of 
the Phoenix Park murders. 

Other letters equally incriminating were published. 
Parnell denied the authorship, his denial was not accepted ; 
fierce controversy ended in the establishment of one of 
the strangest Commissions of Enquiry ever set up — 
a semi- judicial tribunal of judges. Its proceedings created 
the acutest public interest, drawn out over long months, 
up to the day when Sir Charles Russell had before him 
in the witness-box the original vendor of the letters 
— one Pigott. Pigott's collapse, confession of forgery, 
flight and suicide, followed with appalling swiftness : 
and the result was to generate through England a very 
strong sympathy for the man against whom, and against 
whose followers, such desperate calumnies had been 
uttered and exploited. Parnell's prestige was no longer 
confined to his own countrymen : and the sense of all 
Home Rulers was that they fought a winning battle, 
under two allied leaders of extraordinary personal gifts. 

Then, as soon as it was clear that the attack of the 
Pigott letters had recoiled on those who launched it, 
came the indication of a fresh menace. Proceedings for 
divorce were taken with Parnell as the co-respondent : 
the case was undefended. Mr. Gladstone and probably 
most Englishmen expected that Parnell would retire, 
at all events temporarily, from public life, as, in Lord 
Morley's words, " any English politician of his rank " 
would have been obliged to do. Parnell refused to 
retire ; and Gladstone made it publicly known that if 
Parnell continued to lead the Irish party, his own leader- 



INTRODUCTORY 19 

ship of the Liberal party, " based, as it had been, mainly 
on the prosecution of the Irish cause," would be rendered 
" almost a nullity." The choice — for it was a choice- 
was left to the Irish. To retain Parnell as leader in 
Gladstone's judgment made Gladstone's task impossible, 
and therefore indicated Gladstone's withdrawal from 
public life. To part with Parnell meant parting with 
the ablest leader that Nationalist Ireland had ever found. 
A more heartrending alternative has never been im- 
posed on any body of politicians, and John Redmond, 
unlike his younger brother, was not of those to whom 
decision came by an instinctive act of allegiance. His 
nature forced him to see both sides, but when he decided 
it was with his whole nature. The issue was debated 
by the Irish partj'' in Committee Room 15 of the House 
of Commons, with the Press in attendance. In this 
encounter Redmond for the first time stepped to the front. 
He had hitherto been outside the first flight of Irish 
parliamentarians. Now, he was the first to state the 
case for maintaining Parnell's leadership, and through- 
out the discussions he led on that side. When Parnell's 
death came a few months after the " split " declared 
itself, there was no hesitation as to which of the 
Parnellites should assume the leadership of their party. 
Redmond resigned his seat in North Wexford and con- 
tested Cork city, where Parnell had long been member. 
He was badly beaten, and for some three months the 
new leader of the Parnellites was without a seat in the 
House — though not during a session. Another death 
made a new opening, and in December 1891 his fight 
at Waterford against no less a man than Michael Davitt 
turned for a moment the electoral tide which was setting 
heavily against the smaller group. It was a notable 
win, and the hero of that triumph retained his hold on 
the loyalty of those with whom he won it when the rest 
of Ireland had turned away from him. The tie lasted 
to his death — and after it, for Waterford then chose as 



20 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

its representative the dead leader's son, and renewed 
that choice in the general election of 1918, when other 
allegiances to the old party were like leaves on the 
wind. 

Other ties were formed in these years, which lasted 
through Redmond's life. I have deliberately abstained 
from entering into either the merits or the details of the 
" split.'' But certain of its aspects must be recognized. 
In the division into Parnellites and Anti-Parnellites, 
Parnellites were a small but fierce minority. It needed 
resolution for a man to be a Parnellite, all the more 
because the whole force of the Catholic Church was thrown 
against them, and in some instances disgraceful methods 
were used. One of Redmond's best friends was the 
owner of a local newspaper ; it was declared to be a 
mortal sin to buy, sell, or read his journal. The business 
was reduced to the verge of ruin but the man went on, 
till a new bishop came and graduallj'^ things mended. 
He, like Redmond, was a staunch practising Catholic, 
and later on was the friend and trusted associate of many 
priests ; but he stood for an element in Ireland which 
refused to allow the least usurpation by ecclesiastical 
authority in the sphere of citizenship. 

Willie Redmond won East Clare, as his brother won 
Waterford city, after a turbulent election with the priests 
against him. He gave in that contest, as always, at 
least as good as he got ; but his collision with individuals 
never affected his devotion or his brother's to their 
Church. 

But in social life the estrangements of these days were 
far-reaching, and, at least negatively, so far as Redmond 
was concerned, they were lasting. His existence had 
been saddened and altered shortly before the break up 
by the death of his first wife, which left him a young 
widower with three children. After the " split " the whole 
circle of friends among whom he had lived in Dublin 
and in London was shattered and divided ; and in 



INTRODUCTORY 21 

later life none, I think, of those broken intimacies was 
renewed. 

In Redmond's nature there was a total lack of rancour. 
Clear-sighted as he was, he realized how desperately 
difficult a choice was imposed on Nationalists by Parnell's 
situation, and he knew how honestly men had differed. 
He could command completely his intellectual judgment 
of their action, and there were many whom in later stages 
of the movement he trusted none the less for their diver- 
gence from him at this crisis. But he was more than 
commonly a creature of instinct ; and the associations 
of his intimate life were all decided in these years. His 
affection was given to those who were comrades in this 
pass of danger. The only two exceptions to be made 
are, first and chiefly, Mr. Devlin, who was too young 
to be actively concerned with politics at the time of 
Parnell's overthrow ; and, to speak truth, it is not 
possible to be so closely associated as Redmond was 
with this lieutenant of his, or to be so long and loyally 
served by him, and not to undergo his personal attrac- 
tion. The other exception is Mr. J. J. Mooney, who 
entered Parliament and politics later than the " split," 
but whose personal allegiance to Mr. Redmond was 
always declared. He acted for long as Redmond's secre- 
tary and always as his counsellor — for in all the detail 
of parliamentary business, especially on the side of private 
bill legislation, the House had few more capable members. 
He was perhaps more completely than Mr. Devlin one 
of the little group of intimates with whom Redmond 
loved to surround himself in the country. All the rest 
were old champions of the fight over Parnell's body ; 
but by far the closest friend of all was his brother Willie. 
Their marriages to kinswomen had redoubled the tie 
of blood. 

It should be noted here that Redmond married for 
the second time in 1899, after ten years of widowerhood. 
His wife was, by his wish and her own, never at all in 



22 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

the public eye. All that should be said here is that his 
friends found friendship with him easier and not more 
difficult than before this marriage, and were grateful 
for the devoted care which was bestowed upon their 
leader. She accompanied him on all his political journej'^- 
ings, whatever their duration, and gave him in the fullest 
measure the companionship which he desired. 



CHAPTER II 
REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 



THE Parliament of 1892-5 was barren of results for 
Ireland, being consumed b}^ factious strife, at West- 
minster between the Houses and in Ireland between 
the parties. With Gladstone's retirement it seemed as 
if Home Rule were dead. But thinking men realized 
that the Irish question was still there to be dealt witli, 
and approach to solution began along new lines. When 
Lord Salisbury returned to power in 1895, Land Purchase 
was cautiously extended with much success : the Con- 
gested Districts Board, originally established by Mr. 
Arthur Balfour, was showing good results, and his brother 
Mr. Gerald Balfour, now Chief Secretary, felt his way 
towards a policy which came to be described as " killing 
Home Rule with kindness." A section of Irish Nationalist 
opinion was scared by the menace contained in this 
epigram ; and consequently, when in 1895 Mr. Horace 
Plunkett (as he then was) put forward proposals for a 
conference of Irishmen to consider possible means for 
developing Irish agriculture and Irish industries under 
the existing system, voices were raised against what was 
denounced as a new attempt to divert Nationalist Ireland 
from its main purpose of achieving self-government. 
Mr. Plunkett's original proposal was that a body of four 
Anti-Parnellites, two Parnellites and two Unionists should 
meet and deliberate in Ireland, during the recess. In 
the upshot the Nationalist majority refused to take 
any part ; but Redmond, with one of his supporters, 

23 



24 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

Mr. William Field, served on the " Recess Committee " 
and concurred in its Report, out of which came the 
creation of the Department of Agriculture and Technical 
Instruction. 

In 1896 the Commission on Financial Relations, which 
had been set up by the Liberal Ministry in 1894, reported, 
and its findings produced a state of feeling which for a 
moment promised co-operation between divided interests 
in Ireland. LTnionist magnates joined with Nationalists 
in denouncing the system of taxation, which the Com- 
mission — by a majority of eleven to two — had described 
as oppressive and unjust to the weaker country. 

Redmond was one of the members of this Commission, 
which included also distinguished representatives of his 
Nationalist opponents — Mr. Blake and Mr. Sexton ; and 
he no doubt cherished hopes arising from the resolute 
demands for redress uttered by Lord Castletown and 
other Irish Unionist Peers. Those hopes were soon 
dispelled ; nothing but much controversy came of the 
demand for improved financial relations. Mr. Gerald 
Balfour's schemes were more tangible, and in 1897 
Redmond announced that the Government's proposal 
to introduce a measure of Local Government for Ireland 
should have liis support. The Bill, when it came, ex- 
ceeded expectation in its scope, and Redmond gave it 
a cordial welcome in the name of the Parnellites. The 
larger group, however, then led by Mr. Dillon, declined 
to be responsible for accepting it. 

Later, in the working of this measure, Redmond pressed 
strongly that elections under it should not be conducted 
on party lines and that the landlord class should be brought 
into local administrative work. His advice unfortunately 
was not taken. 

Then followed the South African struggle, and in 
giving voice to a common sentiment against what 
Nationalist Ireland held to be an unjust war the two 
Irish parties found themselves united and telling together 



REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 26 

in the lobby. Formal union followed. By this time the 
cleavage between Parnellite and Anti-Parnellite was 
less acute than that between Mr. Healy's section and 
the followers of Mr. Dillon and Mr, O'Brien. The choice 
of Redmond as Chairman was due less to a sense of his 
general fitness than to despair of reaching a decision 
between the claims of the other three outstanding men. 

The sacrifice to be made was made at Mr. Dillon's 
expense, and he did not acquiesce willingly or cordially. 
The cordiality which ultimately marked his relations 
with Redmond was of later growth — fostered by the 
necessity which Mr. Dillon found imposed on him of 
defending loyally the j)arty's leader against attacks 
from the men who had been most active in selecting him. 

A part of the compact under which Redmond was 
elected to the chair limited the power of the newly chosen. 
He was to be Chairman, not leader ; that is to say, he 
was not to act except after consultation with the party 
as a whole : he was not to commit them upon policy. 
This meant in practice that he acted as head of a cabinet, 
which from 1906 onwards consisted of Mr. Dillon, Mr. 
Devlin and Mr. T. P. O'Connor — the last representing 
not only a great personal parliamentary experience and 
ability, but also the powerful and zealous organization 
of Irish in Great Britain. Redmond adhered scrupu- 
lously to the spirit of this compact. There was only one 
instance in which he took action without consultation. 
But that instance was the most important of all — his 
speech at the outbreak of the war. 

Another thing which governed his conduct in the chair 
of the party, as indeed it governed that of nearly all 
the rank and file, was his horror of the years which 
Ireland had gone through since Parnell's fall. He loathed 
faction and he had struggled through murky whirlpools 
of it ; for the rest of his life he was determined, almost 
at any cost, to maintain the greatest possible degree 
of unity among Irish Nationalists. Yet in the end he 



26 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

unhesitatingly made a choice and took an action which 
risked dividing, and in the last event actually divided, 
Nationalist Ireland as it had never been divided before. 
There were things for which he would face even that 
supreme peril. Deep in his heart there was a vision which 
compelled him. It was the vision of Ireland united as 
a whole. 

All this, however, lay far in the future when he was 
elected to the chair ; for the moment his task was to 
reunite Irish Nationalists, and it began prosperously. 
From the first his position was one of growing strength. 
Irishmen all the world over were heartsick of faction 
and rejoiced in even the name of unity. Redmond made 
it a reality. While leading the little Parnellite party, 
reduced at last to nine, his line of action was comparable 
to that pursued by Mr. William O'Brien from 1910 on- 
wards. It had, to put things mildly, not been calculated 
to assist the leader of the main Nationalist body. In 
1904, Justin McCarthy, then retired from politics, wrote 
in his book on British Political Parties : " Parnell's chief 
lieutenant had shown in the service of his chief an energy 
and passion which few of us expected of him, and was 
utterly unsparing in his denunciations of the men who 
maintained the other side of the controversy. From 
this it was not unnatural to expect difficulties occasioned 
both by the leader's temper and by the temper of those 
whom he led. But men who had been adverse assured 
me that they had changed their opinions and were glad 
to find they could work with Redmond in perfect harmony 
and that his manners and bearing shoAved no signs what- 
ever of any bitter memories belonging to the days of 
internal dispute." 

In truth, the man's nature was kindly and tolerant ; 
courtesy came more natural to him than invective. 
Above all, he was sensitive for the reputation of his 
country in the eyes of the world, and the spectacle of 
Irishmen heaping vilifications on each other always filled 



REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 27 

him with distaste. Whether the taunts passed between 
Nationalist and Unionist or Nationalist and Nationalist 
made little difference to his feeling. With him it was 
no empty phrase that he regarded all Irishmen in equal 
degree as his fellow-countrymen. 

In 1902 he was once more a party to a continued effort 
made by Irishmen outside of party lines to solve a part 
of the national difficulty. The policy of land purchase 
had proved its immense superiority over that of dual 
ownership and had even been introduced on a consider- 
able scale. But its very success led to trouble, because 
on one side of a boundary fence there would be farmers 
who had purchased and Avhose annual instalments of 
purchase money were lower than the rents paid by their 
neighbours on the other side of the mearing. Renewed 
struggle against rent led to new eviction scenes on the 
grand scale ; and by this time landlord opinion was half 
converted to the purchase policy, as a necessary solution. 
The persistency of one young Gal way man, Captain 
John Shawe Taylor, brought about the famous Land 
Conference of 1902, in which Mr. O'Brien, Mr. Healy, 
Mr. Redmond and Mr. T. W. Russell on behalf of the 
tenants met Lord Dunraven, Lord Mayo, Colonel Hutche- 
son Poe and Colonel Nugent Everard representing (though 
not officially) the landlord interest : and the result of 
the agreement reached by this body was seen in Mr. 
Wyndham's Land Purchase Act of 1903. This great 
and drastic measure altered fundamentally the character 
of the Irish problem. Directly by its own effect, and 
indirectly by the example of new methods, it changed 
opinion alike in Ireland and Great Britain. In Ireland 
hitherto, as has been already seen, resistance to Home 
Rule had come primarily from the landlord class, by 
whom the Nationalist desire for self-government was 
construed as a cloak for the wish to revive or reverse the 
ancient confiscations. Now, the land question v/as by 
general consent settled, at least in principle ; in propor- 



28 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

tion as landlords were bought out the leading economic 
argument against Home Rule disappeared. The opposi- 
tion reduced itself strictly to political grounds ; and it 
began to be plain that the true heart of resistance lay 
in Ulster. 

Also, lines of cleavage in the Unionist camp began to 
appear. Already, landlords in the South and West had 
found a common ground of action with representatives 
of the tenants. It was felt, alike in Ireland and England, 
that this precedent might be developed further. 

In England political opinion was much affected by 
the apparent success of an attempt to deal with the Irish 
problem piecemeal. The Congested Districts Board had 
done much to relieve those regions where famine was 
always a possibility ; Local Government had given 
satisfactory results ; and now Land Purchase was hailed 
as the beginning of a new era. The idea of seeing how 
much farther the principle of tentative approach could 
be carried took strong hold of many minds, and the word 
" devolution " came into fashion. 

When it became known that Sir Antony MacDonnell, 
then Under-Secretary at Dublin Castle, had, in consulta- 
tion with Lord Dunraven, drafted a scheme for trans- 
ferring parts of Irish administration to a purely Irish 
authority, a situation rapidly defined itself in which Ulster 
broke away from the more liberal elements in Irish 
Unionism. The Ulster group demanded and obtained 
the resignation of Mr. George Wyndham ; they demanded 
also the dismissal of the Under-Secretary. But Sir Antony 
MacDonnell was not of a resigning temper ; he had not 
acted without authority, and he was defended zealously 
by the Irish members. The section of Liberal opinion 
which adhered rather to Lord Rosebery than to Sir Henry 
Campbell-Bannerman probably drew the conclusion that 
the Irish party were prepared at least to tolerate the 
policy of approaching Home Rule step by step ; and 
beyond doubt they were impressed by the prestige of 



REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 29 

Sir Antony MacDonnell's record and personality. The 
son of a small Irish Catholic landlord, educated at the 
Galway College of the Queen's University, he had entered 
the Indian Civil Service and in it risen to the highest 
point of power. The recommendation that he should 
be brought home to assist in the Government of Ireland 
had come from Lord Lansdowne, then Governor-General 
of India, who knew that the famous administrator of 
the Punjab was a Catholic Irishman of Nationalist sym- 
pathies. He had been accepted by Mr. Wyndham, his 
official chief, "rather as a colleague than as a subordinate." 
Officially and publicly, the credit for the Land Act of 
1903 went to the Chief Secretary, and Mr. Wyndham 
deserves much of it. But no one who knew the two 
men could have doubted that in the shaping of a measure 
involving so wide a range of detail, the leading part must 
have been taken by the Irish Civil Servant who in India 
had acquired most of his fame from a sweeping measure 
of land reform. 

Proposals to alter the method and conduct of Irish 
administration before touching the parliamentary power 
to legislate and to tax came with extraordinary weight 
in coming from such a man ; and the history of the 
previous Home Rule Bills was not encouraging to any- 
one, especially to those who had been members of Mr. 
Gladstone's two last administrations. From the time 
of the Parnell divorce case onwards, the Irish question 
had brought to Liberals nothing but embarrassment 
and embitterment. The enthusiasm for Home Rule 
which grew steadily from 1886 up to the severance between 
Gladstone and Parnell had vanished in the squalid con- 
troversies of the " split." Moreover, now, by the action 
of Mr. Chamberlain, a new dividing line had been brought 
into British politics. The cry of Protection seemed in 
the opinion of all Liberals to menace ruin to British 
prosperity ; the banner of Free Trade offered a splendid 
rallying-point for a party which had known fifteen years 



30 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

of dissension and division. Prudent men thought it 
would be unsafe, unwise and unpatriotic to compromise 
this great national interest by retaining the old watch- 
word on which Gladstone had twice fought and twice 
been beaten. 

It was clear, too, that a Home Rule Bill would provoke 
a direct conflict with the House of Lords and would raise 
that great struggle on not the most favourable issue. 
Statesmen like Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith pro- 
bably believed that a partial measure, an instalment of 
self-government, to which some influential sections of 
the Tory party would not be unfriendly, might have 
strong liopes of passing into law. 

So it came to pass that in the election of 1906 the 
Liberal Party came into power with a majority of un- 
exampled magnitude, but with a Government pledged, 
negatively, not to introduce a Home Rule Bill in that 
Parliament, but, positively, to attempt an Irish settle- 
ment by the policy of instalments. 

In all this lay the seeds of trouble for the Irish leader. 
Liberals have never understood that Ireland will not take 
from them what it would take from the Tories. It wUl 
accept, as a palliative, from the party opposed to Home 
Rule what it will not accept from those who have 
admitted the justice of the national demand. 



II 

'* For myself," said Redmond in his speech to the 
Irish Convention in May 1907, " I have always expressed 
in public and in private my opinion that no half-way 
house on this question is possible ; but at the same time 
I am, or at any rate I try to be, a practical politician. 
In the lodgment this idea of instalments had got in the 
minds of English statesmen I recognized the fact — 
and after all in politics the first essential is to recognize 



REDMOND AS CHAIRMx\N 31 

facts — I recognized the fact that in this Parliament we 
were not going to get a pure Home Rule Bill offered, 
and I consented, and I was absolutely right in consenting, 
that whatever scheme short of that was put forward 
would be considered calmly on its merits." 

This meant that during the whole of the year 1906 
and a part of 1907 the proposal of the new Irish Bill 
was under discussion with the Irish leaders. The course 
of these deliberations was undoubtedly a disappointment. 
Mr. Bryce was replaced by Mr. Birrell as Chief Secretary, 
but the scheme still fell short of what Redmond had 
hoped to attain. Unfortunately, and it was a character- 
istic error, his sanguine temperament had led him to 
encourage in Ireland hopes as high as his own. The 
production of the Irish Council Bill and its reception in 
Ireland was the first real shock to his power. 

Mr. Birrell in introducing the measure spoke with his 
eye on the Tories and the House of Lords. He repre- 
sented it as only the most trifling concession ; he empha- 
sized not the powers which it conveyed but the limitations 
to them. Redmond in following him was in a difficult 
position. He stressed the point that to accept a scheme 
which by reason of its partial nature would break down 
in its working would be ruinous, because failure would 
be attributed to natural incapacity in the Irish people. 
Acceptance, therefore, he said, could not be uncondi- 
tional ; and undoubtedly to his mind it was conditioned 
by his hope of securing certain important amendments, 
which he outlined. None the less, the tone of his speech 
was one of acceptance, and he concluded : 

" I have never in all the long years that I have been 
in this House spoken under such a heavy sense of respon- 
sibility as I am speaking on this measure this afternoon. 
Ever since Mr. Gladstone's Bill of 1886 Ireland has been 
waiting for some scheme to settle the problem — waiting 
sometimes in hope, sometimes almost in despair ; but 
the horrible thing is this, that all the time that Ireland 



32 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

has been so waiting there has been a gaping wound in 
her side, and her sons have had to stand by helpless while 
they saw her very life-blood flowing out. Who can say 
that is an exaggeration ? Twenty years of resolute 
government by the party above the gangway have dimin- 
ished the population of Ireland by a million. No man 
in any posi^ition of influence can take upon Jhimself the 
awful responsibility of despising and putting upon one 
side any device that may arrest that hemorrhage, even 
although he believed, as I do, that far different remedies 
must be applied before Ireland can stand upon her feet 
in vigorous strength. We are determined, as far as we 
are concerned, that these other remedies shall be 
applied ; but in the meantime we should shrink from 
the responsibility of rejecting anything which, after 
that full consideration which the Bill will receive, 
seems to our deliberate judgment calculated to relieve 
the sufferings of Ireland and hasten the day of her full 
national convalescence." 

There is no doubt that the element in him which urged 
him to welcome anything that could set Irishmen work- 
ing together on Irish problems made it almost impossible 
for him to throw aside this chance. It was clear to me 
also that by long months of work in secret deliberation 
the proposals originallj'- set out had been greatly altered, 
so much so that in surveying the Bill he was conscious 
mainly of the improvements in it ; and that in this 
process his mind had lost perception of how the measure 
was likely to affect Irish opinion — especially in view 
of his own hopeful prognostications. At all events, the 
reception of Mr. Birrell's speech, even by Redmond's 
own colleagues, marked a sudden change in the atmo- 
sphere. Some desired to vote at once against the 
measure ; many were with difficulty brought into the 
lobby to support even the formal stage of first reading. 
In Ireland there was fierce denunciation. A Convention 
was called for May 21st. The crowd was so great that 
many of us could not make our way into the Mansion 
House ; and Redmond opened the proceedings by moving 



REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 33 

the rejection of the Bill. In the interval since the debate 
he had been confronted with a definite refusal to concede 
the amendments for which he asked. 

These were mainly two, of principle : for the objection 
taken to the finance of the Bill was a detail, though 
of the first importance. The Bill proposed to hand 
over the five great departments of Irish administration 
to the control of an Irish Council. The decisions of that 
Council were to be subject to the veto of the Lord-Lieu- 
tenant, as are the decisions of Parliament to the veto of 
the Crown. But the Bill proposed not merely to give to 
the Viceroy the power of vetoing proposed action but 
of instituting other action on his own initiative. Secondly, 
the Council was to exercise its control through Com- 
mittees, each of which was to have a paid chairman, 
nominated by the Crown. 

" It would be far better," Redmond had said in the 
House of Commons, " to have one man selected as the 
chairmen of these committees are to be selected, to have 
charge, so far as the Council is concerned, of the working 
of the Department, and then all these chairmen acting 
together could form a sort of organic body which would 
give cohesion, would co-ordinate and give stability to 
the whole of the work. I am afraid that the Government 
seem to have shrunk from that for fear the argument 
would be used against them that they were really creating 
a Ministry." 

That was the real difficulty. A Council subject only 
to a veto on its acts, even though it could neither pass 
a by-law nor strike a rate, would undoubtedly be said 
by the Unionist opposition to be a rudimentary parlia- 
ment. A group of chairmen possessing administrative 
powers like those of Ministers would be labelled a 
Ministry ; and the Liberals who had pledged themselves 
not to give effect to their Home Rule principles were 
sensitive to charges of breach of faith. 

It is a curious fact in politics that the public promise 

4 



34 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

conveyed in the adoption of certain principles is generally 
taken to be on the level of ordinary commercial obliga- 
tion. Failure to keep it jeopardizes a man's reputation 
for political stability, just as failure to pay a tailor's 
bill imperils a man's financial character. But a promise 
to political opponents that you will not give effect to 
your principles stands on the level of a card debt : it 
is a matter of honour to make good ; and on this point 
Mr. Asquith in particular has always shown an adamantine 
resolution. 

From 1907 onwards it was with Mr. Asquith that 
Redmond had chiefly to count. Sir Henry Campbell- 
Bannerman, who, personally, had given no such limiting 
pledges, and who during his two years of leadership 
commanded a respect, an affectionate allegiance, from 
his followers in the Hou^e without parallel at all events 
since Mr. Gladstone's day, was fast weakening in health. 
He lived long enough to give freedom to South Africa, 
the one outstanding achievement of that Parliament ; 
and by the success of that great measure he did more 
to remove British distrust of Home Rule than even 
Gladstone ever accomplished. It was no fault of his if 
Liberalism failed to settle the Irish question at the moment 
when Liberal power reached its highest point. 

The failure of the Council Bill had one good result, 
and one only. It cleared the way for a definite propa- 
ganda on Home Rule. But before this could be under- 
taken it was necessary to pull Nationalist Ireland to- 
gether, for it was once more rent with division and distrust. 
Mr. Healy, who in 1901 had been expelled from the Irish 
party and its organization on the motion of Mr. O'Brien 
and against Redmond's advice, and Mr. O'Brien, who 
had subsequently retired from the party against Red- 
mond's wish, were both of them formidable antagonists ; 
and each was vehement in attack on the main body of 
Nationalists and their leader. It was some time before 
Redmond braced himself to the struggle ; but from the 



REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 35 

opening of the autumn recess in 1907 he undertook a 
campaign throughout Ireland which it would be difficult 
to overpraise. In a series of speeches at chosen centres, 
delivered before great audiences, he laid down once more 
the national demand as he conceived it ; and in each 
speech he dealt with a different aspect of the case for 
Home Rule. 

A formal outcome of this campaign was the re-estab- 
lishment of national unity. Mr. O'Brien and Mr. Healy 
returned to the Irish party for a brief period. But the 
more important result was the re-establishment of 
Redmond's personal position. He had made an effort 
which would have been great for any man, but for him 
was a victory over his own temperament. That tempera- 
ment had in it, negatively, a great lack of personal 
ambition and, positively, a strong love for a quiet life. 
He did his work in Parliament regularly and conscien- 
tiously, always there day in and day out ; and it was 
work of a very exacting kind. This had become the 
routine of his existence and he did it without strain. 
But to go outside it was for him always an effort. He 
hated town life ; but more than this, he hated ceremonies, 
presentations, receptions in hotels, and aU the promis- 
cuous contact of political gatherings. Nevertheless, when 
he came to such an occasion no living man acquitted 
himself better. Apart from his oratory, he had an admir- 
able manner, a dignified yet friendly courtesy which 
gained attachment. In the course of the autumn and 
winter following the Irish Council Bill he must have met 
and been seen by a hundred times more of his adherents 
than in any similar period of his leadership. People all 
over Ireland heard him not only on the public platform 
but in small addresses to deputations, in impromptu 
speeches at semi-public dinners, and all of this strength- 
ened him where an Irish leader most needs to be 
strengthened — in the hearts of the people. The hold 
which he gained then stood to him during the years which 



36 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

followed and up to the outbreak of the war. But it 
could have been still further strengthened, and if am- 
bition had been a motive force in him, he would have 
strengthened it. More than that, if he had realized his 
full value to Ireland, he would have felt it his duty to 
do so. Modesty, combined with a certain degree of 
indolence, made him leave all that contact with the mass 
of his followers which is necessary to leadership to be 
effected through his chief colleagues, Mr. Dillon and 
Mr. Devlin — who, through no will of theirs, became 
rather joint leaders than lieutenants, so far as Ireland 
was concerned. 

Circumstances helped to emphasize this tendency. 
His work lay very greatly in London. Parliament 
occupied every year a longer and longer space. The 
task of platform advocacy all over England was urgent, 
and in England Redmond stood out alone. It was little 
to be wondered at that when each long deferred recess 
came he made it a vacation and not a change of work. 
The seclusion from direct intercourse with the mass of 
his followers which conditions imposed upon him was 
further accentuated by his personal tastes and his choice 
of a dwelling. 

In the early years of the nineteenth century the 
mountain range which runs along the east coast from 
outside Dublin through Wicklow into county Wexford 
was a country difficult of access and unsubdued. Here 
in 1803 Emmet found a refuge, and after Emmet's death 
here Michael Dwyer still held out : Connemara itself 
was hardly wilder or less accessible, till the " military 
road " was run, little more than a hundred years ago, 
from Dublin over the western slopes of Featherbed, past 
Glencree, and through Callary Bog, skirting Glendalough 
and traversing the wild recesses of Glenmalure, so that 
it cuts across the headwaters of those beautiful streams 
which meet in the Vale of Ovoca. From Glenmalure 
the road climbs a steep ridge and then travels in wide 



REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 37 

downward curves across the seaward side of Lugnaquilla 
— fifth in height among Irish mountains. Here, at the 
head of a long valley which runs down to the Meeting 
of the Waters, was built one of the barracks which 
billeted the original garrison of the road. Later, these 
buildings had been used for constabulary ; but with 
peaceful times this grew needless, for there was little 
disturbance among these Wicklow folk, tenants of little 
farms, each with a sheep-run on the vast hills. Nothing 
could be less like the flat sea-bordering lands of the 
Barony of Forth in which the Redmonds spent their 
boyhood than these wild, sweeping, torrent-seamed folds 
of hill and valley ; but the place came to him as part of 
his inheritance from " the Chief." Parnell's home at 
Avondale was some ten miles from here, lying in woods 
beside the Ovoca River ; but the Parnell property 
stretched up to the slopes of Lugnaquilla, and the 
dismantled barrack was used by him as a shooting 
lodge. Here, in the early days before his life became 
absorbed in the masterful attachment which led finally 
to his overthrow, he spent good hours ; and here the 
two Redmonds and those others of his followers who 
were his companions came to camp roughly in this 
strange, gaunt survival of military rule. After Parnell's 
death Redmond bought the barrack and a small plot 
of land about it, and it became increasingly and ex- 
clusively his home in Ireland. It was, indeed, Ireland 
itself for him. In it and through it he knew Ireland 
intimately, felt Ireland intensely and intensively, not 
only as a place, but as a way of being. Ireland to him 
meant Aughavanagh. 

Partly, no doubt, the almost unbroken wildness of 
his surroundings appealed to an element of romance in 
his character, which was strongly emotional though 
extremely reticent. Only an artist would have recog- 
nized beauty in those scenes, for in all Ireland it would 
be difficult to find a landscape with less amenity ; the 



38 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

hill shapes are featureless, without boldness or intricacy 
of line. Redmond, a born artist in words, possessing 
strongly the sense of form, was sensitive to beauty in 
all kinds — yet rather to the beauty that is symmetrical, 
graceful and well-planned. A sailor does not love the 
sea for its beauty, and Redmond loved Ireland as a 
sailor loves the sea — yet with a difference. Ireland to him 
in a great measure was Aughavanagh, and Aughavanagh 
was a place of rest. Ireland is a good country to rest 
in. But it would have been far better for Redmond 
and for Ireland if Ireland had been the place not of his 
rest, but of his work. 

His work was essentially that of an agent of Ireland 
carrying on Ireland's affairs in a strange capital. He 
spent more of his time in London than in Ireland, but 
he was never part of the life of London, never in any 
sense a Londoner. He was part of the life of the House 
of Commons, for that was his place of work ; and when 
he left it he went to Aughavanagh as a man returns from 
the City to his home. This home of his was in no sense 
connected with his active occupations. He was no lover 
of gardening or of farming ; he had none of the Irish- 
man's taste for the overseeing of stock or land ; he 
enjoyed shooting, but he was not a passionate sports- 
man. What was a passion with him — for he sacrificed 
much to it — was rest in the place of his choice. 

It was not a lonely habitation. He was no recluse, 
and when there he was always surrounded by his friends. 
I do not know precisely how one could constitute a list 
of them — but half a dozen men at least came and went 
there as they chose. Mr. Mooney, Mr. Hayden, " Long 
John " O'Connor, Dr. Kenny — these, and above all, 
Paddy O'Brien, the party's chief acting whip — were 
constant there. Some came to shoot, and Willie Redmond 
used to come over from his house at Delgany, where the 
Glen of the Downs debouches seaward ; walking generally, 
for he was the fastest and most untiring of mountaineers : 



REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 39 

very few cared to keep beside him on the hills. Others 
were content to share the daily bathes, morning and 
afternoon, in a long deep pool where the little stream 
tumbling down a series of cascades makes a place to 
dive and swim in. These were the friends of Redmond's 
own generation, and they were also his son's friends ; 
but the two daughters had their allies, and one way or 
another the party was apt to be a big one — very simply 
provided for. When I went there first (in 1907) you 
climbed a narrow stone stair to the first floor ; on the 
left was a dining-room, beyond that a billiard-room ; 
on the right, Redmond's study, and beyond that his 
bedroom. Another flight took you to the upper regions, 
where were two dormitories — the girls to the right, the 
men to the left. Later, he made some alterations, and 
the upstair rooms were subdivided off ; the garden was 
developed ; it became more of a house and less of a 
barrack ; but the character of the life did not change. 
It was most simple, most hospitable, most unconventional 
and most remote. 

Certainly a great part of Aughavanagh's charm for 
him lay in its remoteness. It was seven Irish miles 
up a hilly road from the nearest railway station, post 
office or telegraph station. Aughrim was three hours' 
train journey from Dublin, on a tiny branch line, and 
trains were few. Until motors brought him (to his 
intense resentment) within reach, he was as inaccessible 
as if he had lived in Clare or Mayo. 

So it came to pass that though he knew to the very 
core one typical district of Ireland, and was far more 
closely in touch with a few score of Irish peasants through 
their daily life than any of his leading associates, he was 
yet cut off by his own choice from much that is Ireland 
— and perhaps from much that was most important to 
him. Political opinion is created in the towns, and he 
knew the Irish townsfolk, so far as he could manage it, 
only through his correspondence, and through those 



40 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

business visits to Dublin which he made as few as 
possible. 

If his work had lain, where it should by rights have 
lain, in a ministerial office in Dublin, all would have 
been well. As it was, the deliberate and extreme seclusion 
of his life in Ireland weakened his influence. He was 
far too shrewd not to know this, and far too unambitious 
to care. Work he never shrank from. But the daily 
solicitations of people with personal grievances to lay 
before him, personal interests which they desired him 
to promote, made a form of trouble which in his periods 
of rest from work he refused to undergo. 

The same qualities in him were responsible for his 
persistent refusal to accept private hospitality where he 
went on public business. Whether in Ireland or in 
Great Britain, he must stay at a hotel, and many were 
the magnates of Liberalism whose ruffled feelings it was 
necessary to smooth down on this account. He detested 
being lionized and wanted always, when the public affair 
was over, to get away to his own quarters. 

The demands on him in England for platform work 
were portentous. Every constituency which wanted a 
meeting on the Home Rule question wanted Redmond 
and no other speaker. Of course he could not go to 
one-twentieth of the places where he was asked for ; 
and his objection to going was not the effort involved 
but the impossibility either of indefinitely repeating him- 
self or of finding something new to say each time. " If 
it was in America," he would say, " I would speak as 
often as you asked me " (it was my misfortune to have 
to do the asking), " because they never report a speech." 
The fact is worth noting, for in scores of instances what 
was adduced by opponents as quotation from his utter- 
ances in the United States represented simply some 
American journalist's impression, perhaps less of what 
Redmond said than of what, in the reporter's opinion, 
he should have said. Those who represented him as 



REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 41 

putting one face on the argument in America and another 
in Great Britain did not know the man. " I have made 
it a rule," he said to me more than once, " to say 
the extremest things I had to say in the House of 
Commons." 

However, all the machinery which was employed by 
the opponents of Home Rule to prejudice Ireland's case 
in the British constituencies proved very ineffectual. 
For one thing, the lesson of South Africa had gone home. 
For another, and perhaps a greater, no cause ever had 
a missionary better adapted to the temperament of the 
British democracy. The dignity and beauty of Redmond's 
eloquence, the weight which he could give to an argu- 
ment, his extraordinary gift for simplifying an issue and 
grouping thoughts in large bold masses — all these things 
carried audiences with them. 



Ill 

Between 1908 and 1910 we were still, though with 
rapidly increasing success, trying to get a hearing for 
the Irish question — trying to push it once more to the 
front. The change of leadership from Sir Henry Campbell- 
Bannerman to Mr. Asquith had damped Liberal enthusi- 
asm. We got solid work done for Ireland in the University 
Act of 1908, though Redmond would have preferred a 
university of the residential type, like that in which he 
had himself been an undergraduate. A highly conten- 
tious measure was also carried in the Land Act of 1909. 
But a new power was coming to the front, at once assist- 
ing and thwarting our efforts. Mr. Lloyd George put 
a new fighting spirit into Liberalism : but the objects 
which he had at heart could only be achieved by a great 
expenditure of electoral power, and among those objects 
Irish self-government found only a secondary place. 



42 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

When Mr. Gladstone spoke of liberty he thought of what 
he had helped to bring to Greece, Italy, Bulgaria and 
Montenegro — what he had tried to bring to Ireland. 
When Mr. Lloyd George spoke of liberty, he thought 
of what he wanted to bring to England first, and to 
Ireland by the way ; his conviction that Ireland needed 
self-government was not so deeply rooted as his con- 
viction that the poor throughout the United Kingdom 
needed help. 

Old Age Pensions had been popular, but had not been 
a fighting issue. Mr. Lloyd George provided the fighting 
issue with a vengeance when he set himself to pay for 
them. Unfortunately, Nationalist Ireland had no enthu- 
siasm for the Budget which English Radicalism made 
its flag. A country of peasant proprietors was easily 
scared by the very name of land taxes. But above 
all the Finance Bill dealt drastically, and many thought 
unfairly, with the powerful liquor trade, which in its 
branches of brewing and distilling included the main 
manufacturing interest of southern Ireland, and on its 
retail side was incredibly diffused through the whole 
shopkeeping community. 

The dissident Nationalists saw their chance. Mr. 
O'Brien emerged from one of his periodic retirements to 
lead a whirlwind campaign against the " robber Budget." 
Redmond and our party were obliged to oppose a 
measure which pressed so hard as this undoubtedly did 
on Ireland. Our opposition to the land taxes was with- 
drawn when valuable concessions had been made, but 
no such compromise was considered possible on the 
liquor taxes. On the other hand, it grew clear that 
the measure was likely to produce a conflict in which 
the power of the House of Lords might be challenged 
on the most favourable ground : and for that reason, 
when the third reading was reached, the Irish party 
abstained from voting against it. This course, while 
it facilitated close co-operation with Liberalism in the 



REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 43 

general election which followed, weakened us in Ireland ; 
and eleven out of the eighty-three Nationalist members 
returned in January 1910 ranked themselves as outside 
the party ; though Mr. O'Brien's actual following was 
limited to seven Cork members and Mr. Healy. 



IV 

The action of the Lords in rejecting the Budget of 

1909 had an important personal result. It placed Mr. 
Asquith in a role which no one was ever better qualified 
to fill — that of a Liberal statesman defending principles 
of democratic control menaced after a long period of 
security. The Prime Minister, not the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, now became the protagonist ; and this 
was to Redmond's liking, for he felt that Mr. Asquith 
\yas more concerned with the problems which had 
occupied Gladstone's closing years and Mr. Lloyd George 
with those of a later day. 

Yet in the first grave encounter after the rejection 
of the Budget, Redmond and the leader of the Liberal 
party came to sharp differences. The general election 
had amply justified the advice which was urged by him 
on Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman when the House of 
Lords rejected the Education Bill in 1906 — namely, that 
the Liberal party should take up at once the inevitable 
fight before their enormous strength had been frittered 
away in a series of disappointments. The majority of 
1906 was too swollen to be healthy : owing to the ruling 
out of Home Rule, it included a number of men only 
partial adherents of the full Liberal programme ; and 
a diminution of its proportions owing to the traditional 
swing of the pendulum was certain. But in January 

1910 the losses were more than even sanguine Tory 
prophets predicted. Tories came back equal in strength 



44 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

to the Liberals : Labour was only forty, so that the 
Irish party held the balance in the House. 

The election had been fought expressly on the issue of 
Government's claim to enable a Liberal Government to 
deal with certain problems, among which the Irish 
question occupied the foremost place. It was easy now 
for the Tories to argue that the Government appealing 
to the country on that issue had lost two hundred 
seats. They said : " You have authority to pass your 
Budget — but for these vast unconstitutional changes 
you have no mandate." The temper of their party, 
which had more than doubled its numbers, was very 
high : in the Liberal ranks depression reigned and 
counsels were divided. 

At the beginning of the election Mr. Asquith had made 
a great speech in the Albert Hall in which he outlined 
the Liberal policy. In it he declared that the pledge 
against introducing a Home Rule Bill was withdrawn, 
and that the establishment of self-government for Ireland, 
subject to the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament, 
was among the Government's main purposes. But the 
House of Lords was in the way. 

" We shall not assume office and we shall not hold 
office unless we can secure the safeguards which experi- 
ence shows us to be necessary for the legislative utility 
and honour of the party of progress." 

This was universally taken to mean that he would 
obtain a guarantee that the King would, if necessary, 
consent to the creation of sufficient new peers to over- 
ride the hostile majority. But as the election progressed, 
uncertainties developed and an alternative policy of 
attempting to reform the Upper House was advocated 
in certain quarters. The question arose also as to whether 
the first business of the new House should be to pass the 
Budget which the Lords had thrown out or to proceed 
with the attack on the power of veto. 

Redmond's view on this was not in doubt. At a 



REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 45 

meeting in Dublin on February 10, 1910, he declared in 
the most emphatic manner that to deal with the Budget 
first would be a breach of Mr. Asquith's pledge to the 
country, since it would throw away the power of the 
House of Commons to stop supply. This speech attracted 
much attention, and the memory of it was present to 
many a fortnight later when Mr. Asquith was replying 
to Mr. Balfour at the opening of the debate on the 
Address. The Prime Minister dwelt strongly on the 
administrative necessity for regularizing the financial 
position disturbed by the Upper House's unconstitutional 
action. He indicated also the need for reform in the 
composition of that House. But, above all, he disclaimed 
as improper and impossible any attempt to secure in 
advance a pledge for the contingent exercise of the Royal 
prerogative. 

*' I have received no such guarantee and I have asked 
for no such guarantee," he said. 

The change was marked indeed from the moment 
when he uttered in the Albert Hall his sentence against 
assuming office or holding office without the necessary 
safeguards — an assurance at which the whole vast assembly 
rose to their feet and cheered. Every word in his speech 
on the Address added to the depression of his followers 
and the elation of the Opposition. Redmond followed 
him at once. In such circumstances as then existed, 
it was exceedingly undesirable for the Irish leader to 
emphasize the fact that his vote could overthrow the 
Government : and the least unnecessary display of this 
power would naturally and properly have been resented 
by the Government's following. No one knew this 
better than Redmond, yet the position demanded bold 
action. His speech, courteous, as always, in tone, and 
studiously respectful in its reference to the position of 
the Crown, was an open menace to the Government. He 
quoted the Prime Minister's words at the Albert Hall, 
he appealed to the House at large for the construction 



46 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

which had been everywhere put on them ; and it was 
apparent that he had the full sympathy not only of his 
own party and of Labour, but of most of Mr. Asquith's 
own following. He concluded in these words : 

" If the Prime Minister is not in a position to say that 
he has such guarantees as are necessary to enable him 
to pass a Veto Bill this year, and if in spite of that he 
intends to remain in office and proposes to pass the 
Budget into law and then to adjourn — I do not care for 
how short or how long — the consideration of the Bill 
dealing with the veto of the House of Lords, that is a 
policy which Ireland cannot and will not support." 

The effect on the House was such that no one rose 
to continue the debate. Next day it was resumed, and 
not only Labour speakers, but one after another of the 
Liberals, including some of the Prime Minister's most 
docile, old-fashioned supporters rose and declared that 
Redmond and not the Leader of the House had expressed 
their views. So began a remarkable struggle in which 
the combined forces of the private members — Liberal, 
Labour and Irish — united by a common desire to destroy 
the domination of the Peers, contended against the 
Cabinet's policy of attempting not merely to limit the 
power of veto but to reconstitute the Upper House. In 
such a process men saw that the driving force of the 
majority would waste away and that the composite 
character of their alliance would lead to certain disruption. 

Before the debate on the Address concluded it was 
plain that Redmond had won. From that period on- 
wards his popularity, and, through him, the popularity 
of the party which he led, was immensely increased in 
Great Britain. He was regarded as one of the men 
who had rendered best service to democracy against 
privilege. He himself believed that in this first contest 
Ireland had decided the victory — had decided the over- 
throw of the House which had so long opposed its 
liberties. Labour had then neither the essential leader 



REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 47 

nor the necessary parliamentary strength : Liberalism 
was confused and uncertain at the critical moment. 

Yet in the very process of achieving this success Red- 
mond laid himself open to attack. The Budget was 
regarded with dislike by a very large section of Irish- 
men, and apart from considerations of political strategy 
the Irish members would certainly have voted against 
it. Now, the power was in their hands to defeat it 
jfinally. By so doing they would, of course, justify to 
some degree the unconstitutional action of the Lords ; 
but this consideration did not weigh with Mr. O'Brien 
and Mr. Healy. They accused Redmond of selling the 
real interests of Ireland to keep a Government in office 
which could offer nothing in return but a gambling chance 
of limiting the veto of the Lords. Mr. O'Brien was 
firmly confident that no such measure would ever pass. 
He denounced the bargain, not merely because it was a 
bargain in which Redmond accepted what was in his 
view a ruinous injustice to Ireland, but because it was 
a bargain in which the Irish had been outwitted. This 
line of argument was to be dinned into the ears of Ireland 
during all the remaining years of Redmond's life. The 
only conclusive answer to it was to gain Home Rule. 
If, in the long run, it came to appear that the attackers 
had been right in their contention, and that Ireland 
had never received the expected return, the fault for 
that result lay with Ireland itself no less than with 
England ; it most assuredly did not lie with John 
Redmond. A great weight of responsibility rests on 
those who from the first hour of Ireland's opportunity 
ingeminated distrust to an over-suspicious people. 

For the moment, however, the attack made no head- 
way. Irishmen have a shrewd political sense, and they 
felt that in the struggle to pin Liberal Ministers to the 
true fighting objective Redmond had won. They were 
also delighted to see the Irish party openly exert its 
power — not quite realizing that such exhibitions were 



48 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

against the interest of the democratic alliance, which 
had to undergo a grave test. The Government's vacil- 
lation had rendered another general election necessary 
if the Veto question were to be fought out. 

On April 29th the House adjourned for the Whitsuntide 
recess, after which the crisis was to come with the decision 
of the House of Lords whether to accept or reject the 
Veto Resolution, which had then passed the Commons. 
On May 7th, after a short and sudden illness, King Edward 
died. Both the great English parties were unwilling to 
renew the most acute political struggle of modern times 
at the opening of a new reign, and means of accom- 
modation was sought through a Conference which sat 
first on June 16th and held twenty-one meetings. 
No representative of Ireland was on this body. On 
November 10th it reported that no result had come of 
its efforts, and a new general election was fixed for 
December 1st. 

When the Conference finally broke down Redmond 
was on his way back from America, whither he had gone 
accompanied by Mr. Devlin. Mr. T. P. O'Connor at 
the same time undertook a tour in Canada. The success 
of these missions showed that the interest and the con- 
fidence of the Irish race were higher than at any previous 
period : the ambassadors brought back a contribution 
of one hundred thousand dollars to the election funds, 
and the ship on which they came was saluted by bonfires 
all along the coast of Cork. Ireland, too, was subscribing 
as Ireland had not subscribed since Parnell's zenith : 
and this was an Ireland in which the land-hunger had 
been largely appeased. The theory that Ireland's demand 
for self-government was merely generated by Ireland's 
poverty began to look ridiculous. 

It was the cue of the Tory Press at this moment to 
excite prejudice against the Liberals by representing 
them as the bondslaves of the " dollar dictator " — 
ordered about by an Irish autocrat with swollen money- 



REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 49 

bags from New York. This line of argument did us little 
harm in Great Britain ; in Ireland it improved Redmond's 
position, for it was a useful answer to Mr. O'Brien's repre- 
sentation of him as the abject tool of Liberal politicians. 
The election, on the whole, strengthened our party. 
Mr. Healy was thrown out ; and Mr. O'Brien, though he 
retained the seven seats held by his adherents in Cork, 
failed in two out of three personal candidatures. 

In Great Britain the second election of the year 1910 
had the surprising result of reproducing almost exactly 
the same division of parties : and this added greatly to 
the strength of the Government. The Tory leaders 
now, instead of insisting on a maintenance of the old 
Constitution, went into alternative proposals — including 
the adoption of the Referendum. This was their con- 
structive line ; the destructive resolved itself largely 
into an endeavour to focus resistance on the question 
of Ireland — the purpose for which alone, they said, 
abolition of the veto was demanded. As has often hap- 
pened, action taken by the Vatican gave the opponents 
of Home Rule a useful weapon. The Ne Temere decree, 
promulgated in the year 1908, laid down that any marriage 
to which a Roman Catholic was a party, if not solemnized 
according to the rites of the Church of Rome, should be 
treated as invalid from a canonical point of view. 
Although legally binding, it should be regarded as no 
marriage in the eyes of an orthodox Roman Catholic 
until it was regularized in the manner provided by the 
Church. The case of an unhappy mixed marriage in 
Belfast was exploited with fury on a thousand platforms. 
Another decree, the Mofu Propria, was construed as 
seeking to establish immunity for the clergy from pro- 
ceedings in civil courts. This, however, was of less 
platform value, because no instance could be found of 
a practical application ; whereas the McCann case 
unquestionably gave Tory disputants a formidable 
instrument for evoking the ancient distrust of Roman 

5 



60 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

Catholicism which is so deeply ingrained in the Protestant 
mind. 

In spite of all, the English democracy remained steady 
in its purpose. Party feeling, however, ran to heights 
not known in living memory. In July 1911 the Parlia- 
ment Bill went to the Lords, where it was altered out 
of all recognition. On July 20th Mr. Asquith sent a 
letter to Mr. Balfour stating that the King had guaranteed 
that he would exercise his prerogative to secure that 
the Bill should be passed substantially as it left the 
Commons. On the 24th the extreme section of the 
Tory party, headed by Lord Hugh Cecil, refused to allow 
the Prime Minister a hearing in the House of Commons. 

From an Irish point of view the episode was note- 
worthy. At the outset of this critical session Redmond 
had cautioned his party to abstain from giving provo- 
cation and from allowing themselves to be provoked. 
The counsel was the harder to follow because some of 
the most vehement of the younger Tories sat below the 
gangway, almost in physical contact with Irish members, 
and hot words passed. Still, it was grounded into all 
that we should not allow the great issue then at trial 
to be represented as an Irish quarrel. Our cause was 
linked with the whole cause of democracy as against 
privilege : it was an issue for the whole United Kingdom ; 
and that was never plainer than on this day of July. 
English, Scottish and Welsh members hurled interrup- 
tions and taunts at each other across the floor of the 
House, while Irish members sat watching. Something 
older and more far-reaching than the opposition to Ire- 
land's demand now was felt itself assailed ; and a force 
in which the Irish movement was only one stream of 
many swept against it. Anger in the Tory party was 
not directed against Ireland's representatives ; and an 
odd chance made this plain. The fierce scene in the 
House reached its culmination when Ministers withdrew 
in a body from the Treasury Bench and the two sides 



REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 51 

ot the House stood up, one cheering, the other hooting, 
in opposite ranks. For a moment it seemed as if the 
affair would come to blows, till Mr. Will Crooks, with a 
genial inspiration, uplifted his voice in song : " Should 
auld acquaintance be forgot ? " The tension was re- 
laxed and members moved out in groups — we Irishmen 
necessarily among the Tories. In the movement I saw 
Willie Redmond go up to one of the fiercest among the 
Ulstermen, whose face was dark with passion. Colloquy 
began : " Isn't it a hard thing that you wouldn't let us 
speak ? " The Ulsterman turned : " Not let you speak ? 
My dear fellow, we'd listen to you for as long as you 
liked — it's only these accursed English Liberals." And 
upon this mutual understanding the two Irishmen walked 
down the floor into the Lobby exchanging expressions 
of mutual goodwill and possibly of mutual comprehension. 

This little piece of by-play, so full of Irish nature, 
struck me at the time as something more than amusing 
— as having in it a ray of hopeful significance. But the 
most sanguine imagination would never have foreseen 
the series of events which brought it to pass, not merely 
that these two men should wear the same uniform, on 
a common service, but that the same Gazette should 
publish both their names as enrolled on the same day 
in the French Legion of Honour. On that day Mr. Charles 
Craig was a prisoner in Germany, wounded in a famous 
fight ; and Willie Redmond was in a grave towards 
which Ulster comrades had been the first to carry him. 
There is an Irish saying, " Men may meet, but the 
mountains stand apart." In July 1911 such an asso- 
ciation as the Gazette of July 1917 illustrated would 
have seemed hardly more possible than the meeting of 
the everlasting hills. 

The dramatic crisis of the parliamentary struggle 
between the two Houses of Parliament did not, and 
could not, come in the House of Commons. Its place 
was in the final citadel of privilege, and privilege sur- 



52 JOHN REDMOND'S" LAST YEARS 

rendered on August 10th, when the Bill passed the Lords 
after the most exciting and uncertain division that is 
ever likely to be known. But there were elements in 
the Tory party which did not accept defeat, though 
they had not yet clearly decided on what battleground 
to renew their efforts. For the moment, however, men 
were disposed to pause and take stock of the new situation. 

But at such a time events cannot stand still, and 
almost at the same moment as the Parliament Act was 
carried, the Government took a step which gravely 
affected the Irish party. Payment of members was 
established by a resolution of the House of Commons. 

Irish Nationalist members had always been paid from 
the party fund, that is to say, by their supporters. Pay- 
ment was conditional, not of right, and it was not made 
except when the member was in attendance : it amounted 
only to twenty pounds a month. The new payment 
came from the British Treasury ; it was made irrespec- 
tive of the desire of constituents, or of any other con- 
sideration ; and it amounted to a sum which in a country 
of small incomes sounded very imposing. Unquestion- 
ably the receipt of it weakened the position of the party 
in the eyes of Ireland, and gave a new sting to the charge 
of a bargain. 

All this was clearly discerned in advance, by no one 
more than by Redmond ; and an amendment was moved 
to strike Irish members out of the application of the 
resolution. But the situation was hopelessly involved, 
the Irish party having repeatedly voted for payment of 
members as part of the Radical programme which they 
supported as affecting any normally governed country ; 
and Government refused to make the exception. 

As a result, Redmond's following lost much of the 
prestige which had resulted from scrupulous observance 
of the understanding that no Nationalist member should 
take office under Government. To join the Irish party 
had been, in effect, for most men, to make a vow of 



REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 63 

poverty. Now, on the contrary, it involved acceptance 
of what was in Ireland's eyes a well-paid and un- 
laborious office. The Irish are no less prone than any 
other nation to take a cynical view of these matters. 

Yet assuredly no man ever gave more service for less 
pay than the Nationalist leader, and it was the harder 
because he was a man who liked comfort and had no 
ambition. If at the time of the great " split " he had 
stood down from politics, success would have been assured 
to him at the Bar in Ireland, or, more surely still, and far 
more profitably, at Westminster itself. There never was 
anyone so well-fitted for the work of a parliamentary 
barrister who has to deal with great interests before a 
tribunal largely composed of laymen. No one had the 
House of Commons tone more perfectly than Redmond, 
and no one that I ever heard equalled his gift for making 
a complicated issue appear simple. When he was thrown 
out of Parliament at the Cork election, he thought of 
retirement, mainly for one reason : it would be better 
for his children. Yet, first by personal loyalty to 
Parnell, later by his loyalty to Ireland, he was held firm 
to his task — always a poor man, always knowing that 
it lay in his power, without the least sacrifice of principle, 
to become rich by a way of work less laborious and 
infinitely less harassing than that which he pursued. 

The effect upon the Irish situation produced by the 
payment of members was slow to develop, and obscure. 
But an obvious and grave complication was introduced 
into both British and Irish politics at the moment when 
the democratic alliance had achieved its first great objec- 
tive. Parliament had been in session almost continu- 
ously since the beginning of 1909, with the added strain 
of two general elections thrown in. There was a wide- 
spread desire to clear the autumn of 1911, so that members 
might have some breathing space, and, not less important, 
devote themselves to propagandist work in their con- 
stituencies for the new struggle of carrying measures 



54 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

under the hardly won Parliament Act. Each of these 
measures must involve a fight prolonged over three 
years. 

But this desire ran against the purposes of Mr. 
Asquith's chief lieutenant, whose power and popularity 
were now at their height. Mr. Lloyd George in the 
course of the session had introduced his Insurance Bill, 
and it was welcomed with astonishing effusion from 
both sides of the House. As discussion proceeded, how- 
ever, the complexity and difficulty of its proposals, and 
the number of oppositions which they provoked, became 
so apparent that it was not in human nature for politicians 
at such a crisis to forgo the opportunity. Most of the 
Liberal partj^ would have preferred to drop the Bill 
temporarily and refer it to a Committee of Enquiry. 
Mr. Lloyd George was convinced that this would be fatal 
to his measure, concerning which he was possessed by 
a missionary zeal. Probably when his career comes 
under the study of impartial history it will be perceived 
that never at any moment was he so passionately and 
so honestly in earnest as upon this quest. But it is 
certain that by pursuit of it he created enormous diffi- 
culties in the way of those reforms which the democratic 
alliance at large most desired to achieve. He carried 
his point ; an autumn session followed, in which the 
mind of the electorate was diverted from the Irish ques- 
tion and all other questions except that of Insurance, 
and Parliament itself was jaded to the brink of 
exhaustion. 

The matter was difficult for us in Ireland because, 
owing to the different system of Public Health Adminis- 
tration, many of the most important provisions could 
not apply, and because the Bill as a whole was framed 
to meet the needs of a highly industrialized and crowded 
community. Broadly speaking, it was less desired in 
Ireland than in Great Britain ; and even for Great 
Britain Mr, Lloyd George was legislating in advance 



REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 65 

of public opinion rather than in response to it. Mr. 
O'Brien and his following vehemently opposed the appli- 
cation of the Bill to Ireland ; and the Irish Catholic 
Bishops, by a special resolution, expressed their view to 
the same effect. The Bill, however, had a powerful 
advocate in Mr. Devlin, and the Irish party decided to 
support its extension to Ireland, subject to certain rnodi- 
fications which they obtained. 

Apart from the new unsettlement of public opinion 
which it created both in Great Britain and in Ireland, 
the Insurance Act added to our difficulties on the Home 
Rule question. It was clear already that the question 
of finance lay like a rock ahead. Up to 1908 the proceeds 
of Irish revenue had always given a margin over the 
cost of all Irish services, though that margin had dwindled 
almost to vanishing-point. Old Age Pensions completely 
turned the beam and left us in the^ position of costing 
more than we contributed. Now the outlay on Insur- 
ance added half a million a year to the balance against us. 

Still, difficulties and perplexities were not limited 
to one side. The Tory party were much divided since 
the crisis on the Parliament Act. A section, and the 
most active section, had been violently opposed to the 
surrender on the critical division, and these men were 
profoundly discontented with Mr. Balfour's leadership; 
so Mr, Balfour, yielding to intimations, suddenly re- 
signed. Somewhat unexpectedly, Mr. Bonar Law was 
chosen to succeed him, Mr. Long and Mr. Chamberlain 
waiving their respective claims. 

This choice was of sinister augury. Mr. Law did not 
know Ireland. But, Canadian-born, he came from a 
country in which the Irish factions and theological 
enmities had always had their counterpart ; his father, 
a Presbyterian Minister, came of Ulster stock. All the 
blood in him instinctively responded to the tap of the 
Orange drum. As far back as January 27, 1911, he had 
urged armed resistance to Home Rule. 



S6 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

This was a line which Mr. Balfour did not see his way 
to take, and probably here rather than elsewhere lay 
the reason for the choice of Mr. Bonar Law. The most 
active section of the Tory party — probably a minority, 
for in such cases minorities decide — regarded the passing 
of the Parliament Act as an outrage on the Constitution, 
which should be resisted by any means, constitutional 
or unconstitutional. But no possibility existed of mobil- 
izing a force in Great Britain to fight for the veto of the 
House of Lords, nor again did the resistance to a new 
Franchise Act, or even to Welsh Disestablishment, promise 
to be desperate. In one part only of these islands was 
there material for a form of struggle in which the ballot- 
box and the division lobby might be supplemented, if 
not replaced, by quite other methods of political war. 
The Tory party saw in Ulster their best fighting chance. 
There was no use in telling them that they jeopardized 
the British Constitution ; from their point of view the 
British Constitution — as they had known it — was already 
gone ; it was destroyed in principle and must be either 
restored or refashioned according to their mind. 

This temper, with the attitude towards parliamentary 
tradition which it produced, rendered the political history 
of the next two and a half years unlike any other in the 
history of these countries. The main purpose of this 
book is to record and illustrate Redmond's action during 
the period which began with the opening of the Great 
War. But since that action was conditioned by the 
circumstances preceding the war — since in two notable 
ways it aimed at a solution of the fierce political struggle 
which the war interrupted — the political history con- 
nected with the passage of the Home Rule Bill through 
Parliament must be outlined in detail, with avoidance, 
so far as may be, of a controversial tone. 



REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 57 



It is however necessary, before closing this preliminary 
review, to take some account of Redmond's relation to 
his party, and, in general, of the working of the parlia- 
mentary machine. Difficulties were imposed on him and 
on the party from 1910 onwards by our very success. 

Electoral chances had placed us apparently in the 
position of maximum power. From January 1910 on- 
wards we had a Government committed to Home Rule, 
yet so far dependent on us that we could put it out at 
any moment. Yet this was by no means an ideal state 
of affairs. The Government's weakness was our weak- 
ness, and they were liable to the reproach tliat they 
never proposed a Home Rule measure except when they 
could not dispense with the Irish vote. Still, from this 
embarrassing position we achieved an extraordinary 
result. Right across our path was the obstacle of the 
House of Lords. It was not an impassable barrier for 
measures in which the British working classes were keenly 
interested — for it let the Trades Disputes Bill go through ; 
but it was wholly regardless of Irish and of Welsh popular 
opinion. Under Redmond's leadership we smashed the 
House of Lords. The English middle class instinct for 
compromise was asserting itself, when he took hold 
and gave direction to the great mass of popular indigna- 
tion which the hereditary chamber had roused against 
itself. 

Yet guiding action in an alliance of which he was not 
the head was delicate work. A clumsy speaker in debate 
might do infinite mischief. When a party is in opposition, 
all its members can talk, and are encouraged to talk, 
to the utmost ; little harm can be done to one's own 
side by what is said in criticism of measures proposed. 
Support and exposition is a much more ticklish business. 
Add to this the fact that under the fully developed system 



58 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

of parliamentary obstruction — that is, of using discussion 
to prevent legislation from being put through — the best 
service that a member can render to Government is to 
say nothing, but vote. 

The tactics of limiting discussion to chosen speakers 
in important debates and of discouraging sharply any 
intervention which might help to delay a division were 
pushed further in the Irish party than elsewhere. We 
were there under different conditions from the rest ; our 
objective was as clearly defined as in a military operation : 
and we all understood the position. We recognized also 
that negotiation must be a matter for Redmond and 
his inner cabinet of three, and that many things could 
not be usefully discussed in a body of seventy men. But 
the net result was that the bulk of the party lost interest 
in their work, and, which was worse, that Ireland lost 
interest in the bulk of the party. It followed, not un- 
naturally, that the constituencies held one voting machine 
to be as good as another, and they did not generally 
send any men who could have been of service in debate. 
They did not any longer see their members heading a 
fiery campaign against rents, or flamboyant in attack 
on the Government ; they heard very little of them at 
all. They knew little and cared less about the work of 
education in British constituencies, which had to be 
carried on through the mouths of Irish members. 

Redmond has often been blamed, but quite unjustly, 
for failure to attract men of talent into his ranks. Parnell 
had that power. He had, and used, the right of suggest- 
ing names. But under the constitution of the United 
Irish League (originally the work of Mr. William O'Brien 
when reunion was accomplished in 1900) the machinery 
of local conventions was set up and no interference with 
their choice was permitted to the central directorate — 
which could only insist that a man properly selected 
must take the party pledge. Whether this machinery 
was inevitable or no, cannot be argued here ; but Red- 



REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 59 

mond himself complained repeatedly in public that it 
worked badly. Candidates were often chosen purely 
for local and even personal considerations, and seldom 
with any real thought of finding the man best fitted 
to do Ireland's work at Westminster. 

This evil, for it was an evil, resulted from the political 
stagnation in a country where one dominant permanent 
issue overshadowed all others. There being no Unionist 
candidature possible in the majority of constituencies, 
any contest was deprecated — and from some points of 
view rightly — as leading to possible faction between 
Nationalists. The choice of a member really fell into 
too few hands ; the electorate as a whole was not suffi- 
ciently interested. Nevertheless, several able men came 
into our ranks, and under the conditions it was not possible 
to utilize their talents fully, as they would have been 
utilized had we been in opposition, not in support of 
the Government. More could have been done, however, 
to give them their opportunity, and the responsibility 
for not varying the list of speakers rests on Redmond. 
It was his policy to avoid personal intervention, and to 
leave such choices to be settled by proposals from the 
party itself. This was a real limitation to his excellence 
as leader — for leader he was. 

There was, however, an even more important limitation 
arising out of his personal temperament. As chairman, 
I never expect to see his equal. He had the most perfect 
public manners of any man I have known, whether in 
dealing with some vast assembly or small confidential 
gathering. The latter type of meeting is the more difficult 
to handle, and nothing could exceed his gift for presiding 
over and guiding debate. He could set out a political 
situation to his party with extraordinary force and 
lucidity. He could also, when he chose, so present an 
issue as to suggest almost irresistibly the conclusion which 
he desired — and this was how he led. Where he came short 
in the quality of leadership was in the personal contact. 



60 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

His relations with all his followers in the party were 
courteous and cordial ; yet without the least appearance 
of aloofness he was always aloof. He did not invite 
discussion. It needed some courage to go to him with 
a question in policy, and if you went, the answer would 
be simply a " Yes " or " No." He lacked what Lord Morley 
attributed to Gladstone, " the priceless gift of throwing 
his mind into common stock." No one thought more 
constantly, or further ahead ; but he could not, rather 
than would not, impart his mind by bringing it into 
contact with others. Men like being taken into their 
leader's confidence, and he knew this and, I have reason 
to believe, knew the disability which his temperament 
laid upon him. Yet he never made an effort to combat 
it, partly I think from pride, for he hated everything 
that savoured of earwigging ; he was not going to put 
constraint upon himself that his following might be 
more enthusiastic. There was no make-believe about 
him, and he was never one who liked discussion for 
discussion's sake. 

Profoundly conservative, he had no welcome for novel 
points of view. I cannot put it more strongly than by 
saying that he was more apparently aware of the qualities 
which made T, M. Kettle difficult to handle in his team 
than of those which made that brilliant personality an 
ornament and a force in our party. A more serious 
aspect of this conservatism was the separation which 
it produced between him and the newer Ireland. He 
welcomed the Gaelic League and disliked Sinn Fein, 
but undervalued both as forces : he was never really in 
touch with either of them. Ideally speaking, he ought 
to have seen to it that his party, which represented mainly 
the standpoint of Parnell's day, was kept in sympathy 
with the new Young Ireland. 

But from the point of view of those who shared his 
outlook — and they were the vast majority, in Ireland 
and in the party — Redmond's essential limitation, as a 



REDMOND AS CHAIRMAN 61 

leader, was that he lacked the magnetic qualities which 
produce idolatry and blind allegiance. What his followers 
gave him was admiration, liking and profound respect. 
No less than this was strictly due to his high standard 
of honour, his scorn of all personal pettiness, his control 
of temper. In twelve years I heard many complaints of 
the manner in which things were managed in the party : 
I scarcely ever remember to have heard anyone complain 
of him. He was always spoken of as " The Chairman " ; 
no one attributed to him sole responsibility ; and he 
was the last on whom any man desired to lay a fault. 
Yet when it came, as it often did, to a question of 
weighing advices one against the other, there was no 
mistake how men's opinions inclined. He had taught 
his party by experience to have almost implicit confidence 
in his judgment ; and by this earned confidence he led 
and he ruled. 



CHAPTER III 
THE HOME RULE BILL OF 1912 

THE year 1912, in which the straight fight on Home 
Rule was to begin, opened stormily. Mr. Churchill 
was announced to speak under the auspices of the Ulster 
Liberal Association in the Ulster Hall at Belfast, It was 
the hall in which his father. Lord Randolph Churchill, 
had used the famous phrase " Ulster will fight and Ulster 
will be right." Belfast was determined that the son 
should not unsay what the father had said in this conse- 
crated building ; it would be, as an Ulster member 
put it in the House of Commons, " a profanation." On 
this first round, Ulster won ; Mr. Churchill spoke at 
Belfast, but not in the Ulster Hall. There were angry 
demonstrations against him ; his person had to be 
strongly protected and he went away from the meeting 
by back streets. It was noticeable that no such pre- 
cautions were needed for Redmond, who attended the 
meeting and walked quite unmolested through the crowd. 
The British electorate, as a whole, was somewhat scan- 
dalized by the exhibition of so violent a temper ; but 
the education of the British electorate was only beginning. 
Congestion of business from the previous session deferred 
the introduction of the Home Rule Bill till April. Great 
demonstrations for and against it were held in advance. 
In Dublin on March 31st was such a gathering as scarcely 
any man remembered. O'Connell Street is rather a 
boulevard than a thoroughfare ; it is as wide as Whitehall 
and its length is about the same. On that day, from the 
Parnell monument at the north end to the O'Connell 
monument at the south, you could have walked on the 

62 



THE HOME RULE BILL OF 1912 63 

shoulders of the people. Four separate platforms were 
erected, and Redmond spoke from that nearest to the 
statue of his old chief. He dwelt on the universality of 
the demonstration ; nine out of eleven corporations 
were represented officially by their civic officers ; pro- 
fessional men, business men, were all fully to the fore. 
But one section of his countrymen were conspicuously 
absent. To Ulster he had this to say : 

" We have not one word of reproach or one word of 
bitter feeling. We have one feeling only in our hearts, 
and that is an earnest longing for the arrival of the day 
of reconciliation." 

A feature of that gathering, little noted at the time, 
assumes strange significance in retrospect. At one plat- 
form Patrick Pearse, then headmaster of St. Enda's 
school, spoke in Irish. What he said may be thus roughly 
rendered : 

" There are as many men here as would destroy the 
British Empire if they were united and did their utmost. 
We have no wish to destroy the British, we only want 
our freedom. We differ among ourselves on small points, 
but we agree that we want freedom, in some shape or 
other. There are two sections of us — one that would 
be content to remain under the British Government in 
our own land, another that never paid, and never will 
pay, homage to the King of England. I am of the latter, 
and everyone knows it. But I should think myself a 
traitor to my country if I did not answer the summons 
to this gathering, for it is clear to me that the Bill which 
we support to-day will be for the good of Ireland and 
that we shall be stronger with it than without it. I am 
not accepting the Bill in advance. We may have to 
refuse it. We are here only to say that the voice of 
Ireland must be listened to henceforward. Let us unite 
and win a good Act from the British ; I think it can 
be done. But if we are tricked this time, there is a 
party in Ireland, and I am one of them, that will advise 



64 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

the Gael to have no counsel or dealings with the Gall 
[the foreigner] for ever again, but to answer them hence- 
forward with the strong hand and the sword's edge. Let 
the Gall understand that if we are cheated once more 
there will be red war in Ireland." 

The platform where Pearse spoke was set up within 
a stone's throw of the General Post Office in which, four 
years later, he was to give effect to the words he spoke 
then and to earn his own death in undoing the work of 
Redmond's lifetime. At that moment no one heeded 
his utterance, nor the speech, also in Irish, of Professor 
John MacNeill from another platform, which went, as 
its speaker was destined to go, half the way with Pearse. 

But Redmond never attempted to conceal the existence 
of this element in Ireland. Speaking on the introduction 
of the Home Rule Bill on April 11th, he dealt at the very 
opening with the charge that the Irish people wanted 
separation and that the Irish leaders were separatists in 
disguise : 

" I will be perfectly frank on this matter. There 
always has been, and there is to-day, a certain section 
of Irishmen who would like to see separation from this 
country. They are a small, a very small section. They 
were once a very large section. They are a very small 
section, but the men who hold these views at this moment 
only desire separation as an alternative to the present 
system, and if you change the present system and give 
into the hands of Irishmen the management of purely 
Irish affairs, even that small feeling in favour of separa- 
tion will disappear ; and if it survives at all, I woidd 
like to know how under those circumstances it could be 
stronger or more powerful for mischief than at the present 
moment." 

Sincerer words were never spoken, nor, I think, a better 
justified forecast. Where Redmond and all of us were 
wrong was that we underestimated the possibility of 
accomplishing what Pearse ultimately accomplished, even 



THE HOME RULE BILL OF 1912 65 

when assisted by the widespread disillusionment and 
sense of betrayal which was the atmosphere of 1916. 

But no one in Ireland in 1912 thought of a separatist 
rebellion. What was on all tongues was the possibility 
of physical resistance to Home Rule. The debate on 
the first reading went by with little reference to this 
contingency, but Mr. Bonar Law closed his speech on that 
note. He had attended the great counter-demonstration 
in Belfast which followed ours in Dublin and had seen 
in it " the expression of the soul of a people." 

** These people look upon their being subject to an 
executive Government taken out of the Parliament in 
Dublin with as much horror, I believe with more horror, 
than the people of Poland ever regarded their being put 
under subjection by Russia ; they say they will not 
submit except by force to such government. These 
people in Ulster are under no illusion. They know they 
cannot fight the British Army. But these men are 
ready, in what they believe to be the cause of justice 
and liberty, to lay down their lives." 

Bloodshed, if bloodshed there was to be, was antici- 
pated in Ulster only, and the resistance indicated at this 
point was purely passive. But even after the Bill had 
been introduced, Tories entertained the hope that a 
Nationalist Convention might save them trouble and 
reject what the Government offered. Even Mr. O'Brien, 
however, had given the Bill a lukewarm approval, and 
at this moment Redmond's prestige stood very high. 
When the Convention assembled, he utilized that advantage 
to the full. These assemblies presented a problem which 
might intimidate the most capable chairman. Theoreti- 
cally deliberative, they had at least a representative 
character ; all branches of the United Irish League, all 
branches of the Hibernians and Foresters, all county 
and district councils sent up their chosen men, to whom 
were added such clergy as chose to attend. The result 
was a mass of over two thousand persons packed into 

6 



66 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

a single room ; they deliberated in the physical con- 
ditions of a crowd ; hearing was difficult, disorder only 
too easily brought about, I have seen one of these 
Conventions sharply divided in opinion, and counting 
of votes would have been impossible. On this day, 
howevei;, there was only on© opinion ; the business was 
to mamfest support and to strengthen the leader's hand. 
Redmond at the outset laid down the proposition that 
it was their " duty " as Nationalists to accept vv^hat he 
described as a far better Bill than Gladstone ever offered. 
He further indicated the need for a resolution that the 
question of supporting, proposing or rejecting amend- 
ments should be left to the Irish party. This was 
promptly carried by acclamation. All decisions were 
unanimous that day. 

But before this or any other resolution was put to 
the Convention, Redmond asked the multitude there to 
give, what they gave most willingly, a welcome to Mr. 
Gladstone's grandson, who as a young member of Parlia- 
ment had just voted for the Bill. The greeting which he 
received showed that Ireland had not forgotten what 
Gladstone's last years had been. 

In the first of his speeches upon the Bill, Sir Edward 
Grey, a survivor from Gladstone's Ministry, said, as he 
threw a glance back over the struggle from 1886 to 1893 : 

" Two things stirred me at the time ; they stir me 
still. One is Mr. Gladstone's intense grip of the fact 
that there was a national spirit in Ireland, and the 
splendour of the effort he made in his last years to 
acknowledge and reconcile that spirit. The other is the 
Irish response to Mr. Gladstone. It was not the assent of 
mere tacticians who had gained an advocate and a point. 
It was genuine, warm and living feeling, a response of 
gratitude and sympathy the same in kind and as living 
as his own." 

If Redmond's task from 1912 onwards was not light- 
ened by the existence of any such genuine, warm and 



THE HOME RULE BILL OF 1912 67 

living feeling for any of Mr. Asquith's Ministry, perhaps 
Ireland is not to blame. There was no intense grip of 
any fact in the Government's attitude, and on one 
cardinal point they were unstable as water. Sir Edward 
Carson, in opposing the introduction of the Bill, had used 
the words : " Wh^t argument is there that you can 
raise for giving Home Rule to Ireland that you do not 
equally raise for giving Home Rule to that Protestant 
minority in the north-east province ? " Redmond, fol- 
lowing him, made one of his few false moves in debate. 
" Is that the proposal ? Is that the demand ? " he 
asked. Sir Edward Carson shot the question at him : 
" Will you agree to it ? " Seldom does the House see a 
practised speaker so much embarrassed ; Redmond in 
confusion passed to another topic. He was soon to be 
confronted with that same line of reasoning, pushed not 
dialectically by an opponent, but as a step in parliamentary 
negotiation from the Treasury Bench. Mr. Churchill, who 
introduced the Second Reading, made it apparent that 
the demonstration in Belfast had not been wasted on 
him. 

" Whatever Ulster's rights may be," he said, " they 
cannot stand in the way of the whole of the rest of Ireland. 
Half a province cannot impose a permanent veto on the 
nation. The utmost they can claim is for themselves. 
I ask, do they claim separate treatment for themselves ? 
Do the counties of Down and Anti' n and Londonderry, 
for instance, ask to be excepted from tiie scope of this 
Bill ? Do they ask for a parliament of their own, or 
do they wish to remain here ? We ought to know." 

This was to proceed at once into the region of a bargain. 
Mr. Gladstone, with his grip on the existence of a national 
spirit in Ireland, would have known that concession on 
such point was a very different matter from some altera- 
tio 1 in the financial terms or in the composition of the 
Parliament. It admitted, in fact, the contention that 
Ireland was not a nation but a geographical expression. 



68 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

As soon as the Bill went into Committee, the result 
was seen. The first serious amendment proposed to 
exclude the four counties, Antrim, Down, Armagh, and 
Derry, and it was moved from the Liberal benches. Three 
Liberal speakers supported it in the early stages of a 
debate which lasted to the third day — -and on the division 
the majority, which had been 100 for the Second Reading, 
fell to 69. Mr. Churchill did not vote — nor, although 
this was not then so apparently significant, did Mr. 
Lloyd George. 

Thus from the very first the point of danger revealed 
itself. By the mere threat of a resistance which could 
only be overcome through the use of troops, Ulster had 
made the first dint for the insertion of a wedge into the 
composite Home Rule alliance, and into the Cabinet 
itself. All this had been gained without any tactical 
sacrifice, without even anything like a full disclosure 
of the force which lay behind this line of attack. 

Nor was the full extent of weakness revealed. In 
such a case, much depended on the personality of the 
man who moved the amendment, and Mr. Agar-Robartes 
was one of the most whimsically incongruous figures in 
the Government ranks. Twentieth-century Liberahsm 
wears a somewhat drab and serious aspect, but this ultra- 
fashionable example of gilded youth would have been 
in his place among the votaries of Charles James Fox. 
The climax of his incongruity was a vehement and rather 
antiquated Protestantism ; he was, for instance, among 
the few who opposed the alteration of the Coronation 
oath to a formula less offensive to Catholics. Nobody 
doubted that his Cornish constituents would endorse 
whatever he did, for the House held few more popular 
human beings, but no one took him very seriously as a 
politician. This particular view of his certainly made 
no breach between him and his inseparable associate, 
Mr. Neil Primrose, who, as time went on, took as strong 
a line against Ulster's claims as Agar-Robartes did for 



THE HOME RULE BILL OF 1912 69 

them. — Sunt lacrimce rerum. I remember vividly in 
August 1914 the sudden apparition of this pair, side 
by side as always, in their familiar place below the gang- 
way, but in quite unfamiliar guise, for khaki was still 
new to the benches. The two brilliant lads — for they 
were little more — have gone now, swept into the abyss 
of war's wreckage ; the controversy which divided them 
remains, virulent as ever. 

Agar-Robartes stuck to his guns and voted against 
the Bill henceforward ; the other Liberals who supported 
him were ultimately brought into the Government lobby. 
What had really mattered was Mr. Churchill's speech on 
the Second Reading. Captain Pirrie, one of Redmond's 
few closely attached friends outside the Irish party, 
bound, I think, far more in affection to the Irish leader 
than to his own chiefs, complained angrily of the Govern- 
ment's evasive reticence. This brought up the Prime 
Minister, whose speech was brief and direct : 

" This amendment proceeds on an assumption which 
I believe is radically false, namely, that you can split 
Ireland into parts. You can no more split Ireland into 
parts than you can split England or Scotland into parts." 
When Sir Edward Carson had spoken, the Ulster leader's 
speech enabled Redmond to point out that Ulstermen 
refused to accept this proposal as a means by which 
Ulster might be reconciled to Home Rule, but were ready 
to vote for it simply as a wrecking amendment. General 
opinion on both sides of the House agreed that the amend- 
ment made the Bill impossible ; and the majority held 
that therefore Ulster must give way. Ulster, on the 
other hand, held that therefore there must be no Home 
Rule Bill. But there was a Liberal element evidently 
not convinced that Home Rule might not be possible 
with Ulster excluded. Mr. Birrell admitted that the 
plan of segregating a portion had been considered, but 
had been rejected, on the merits, as unworkable. Still 
he professed himself open to conviction. The argument 



70 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

which Mr, Bonar Law decided to use was a threat. 
Government are saying to the people of Ulster, he said, 
" Convince us that you are in earnest, show us that you 
will fight, and we will yield to you as we have yielded 
to everybody else." Captain Craig, following, said that 
the Prime Minister anticipated that Ulster's objection 
would after a few years be merely a ripple on the surface. 
" If the right honourable gentleman has challenged this 
part of his Majesty's dominions to civil war, we accept 
the challenge." 

This temper soon had ugly expression. On June 29th 
an excursion party of the Ancient Order of Hibernians 
(the Roman Catholic counterpart to the Orange Order) 
met with another excursion party of Protestants, mainly 
Sunday-school children, at a place called Castledawson. 
Taunts were exchanged and one of the Hibernians tried 
to snatch a flag from the other procession ; so a dis- 
turbance began in which some of the children were hurt 
and many frightened. This discreditable incident was 
magnified with all the rancour of partisanship — as in 
the state of feeling must have been expected. But the 
reprisals were startling. All Catholics were driven out 
of the Belfast shipyards ; many were injured, and over 
two thousand men were still deprived of work on July 
12th, when the Unionist party held a great meeting at 
Blenheim. Mr. Bonar Law, facing for the first time a 
vast typical gathering of his supporters, said that, on 
a previous occasion, when speaking as little more than 
a private member of Parliament, he had counselled action 
outside constitutional limits. Now, he emphasized it 
that he took the same attitude as leader of the Unionist 
party. 

" We shall use any means — whatever means seem to 
us to be most likely to be effective — any means to deprive 
them " (the Government) " of the power they have usurped 
and to compel them to face the people whom they have 
deceived. The Home Rule Bill in spite of us may go 



THE HOME RULE BILL OF 1912 71 

through the House of Commons. There are things 
stronger than parliamentary majorities. I can imagine 
no length of resistance to which Ulster will go in which 
I shall not be ready to support them, and in which they 
will not be supported by the overwhelming majority of 
the British people." 

Sir Edward Carson said on behalf of Ulster : 

" It will be our duty shortly to take such steps — and, 
indeed, they are already being taken — as will perfect 
our arrangements for making Home Rule absolutely 
impossible. We will shortly challenge the Government 
to interfere with us if they dare. We will do this regard- 
less of consequences, of all personal loss and inconvenience. 
They may tell us, if they like, that this is treason." 

Well might Mr. Bonar Law say in returning thanks 
that this day " would be a turning-point in their political 
history." 

Moderate opinion was by no means glad to have 
reached this turning-point, and The Times rebuked Mr. 
Law for his violence. But, tactically, the Unionists 
were right : they had a Government indisposed to action 
and they made the most of their opportunity. Mr. 
Churchill again took up the conduct of the controversy, 
and in the recess proceeded to outline a policy which 
he described as federal devolution. The Prime Minister 
had said you could no more split Ireland into parts than 
England or Scotland. But Mr. Churchill argued that, 
in the interest of efficiency, England must be divided 
into provincial units with separate assemblies ; that 
Lancashire, for instance, had on many matters a very 
different outlook from that of Yorkshire. He did not 
draw the conclusion ; but it was not difficult to infer 
that Mr. Churchill was at least as ready to give separate 
rights to Ulster as to any group of English counties, and 
was equally ready to pitch overboard the Prime Minister's 
argument for refusing partition in Ireland. 

In the meantime Ulster's preparations continued. It 



72 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

was indicated that they would bear a religious character, 
and the Protestant Churches were deeply involved. The 
proposal of a Covenant was made public in August, though 
the actual signing of it was deferred to *' Ulster Day," 
September 28th. Sir Edward Carson was provided mth 
a guard carrying swords and wooden rifles, and in one 
instance dummy cannon made a feature of the pageant. 
These things excited a good deal of derision, and the 
language of the Covenant was held to be only " hypo- 
thetical treason." The main words were : 

" We stand by one another in defending for ourselves 
and our children our cherished position of equal citizen- 
ship in the United Kingdom and in using all means which 
may be found necessary to defeat the present conspiracy 
to set up a Home Rule Parliament in Ireland." 

The Covenant in that committed the signatories to 
no breach of the law ; it was only a pledge to refuse to 
recognize the authority of a Parliament not yet in being. 
All Ulster's proceedings might so far be dismissed, as 
the Attorney-General, Mr. Rufus Isaacs, dismissed them, 
as being " a demonstration admirably stage-managed, 
and led by one of great histrionic gifts." The threats 
of the use of force, said the Attorney-General, would not 
turn them aside by a hair's-breadth. Mr. Asquith, 
equally vigorous in his sjoeech, was less decisive in his 
conclusions. Speaking at Ladybank on October 5th, 
he denounced " the reckless rodomontade of Blenheim, 
which furnishes forth the complete grammar of anarchy." 
But he was careful to point out that there was no 
demand for separate treatment for Ulster, and that Irish 
Unionists were simply refusing to consent to Home 
Rule under any conditions. He refrained from saying 
how a demand for separate treatment of Ulster would 
be dealt with if it were made. 

When Parliament resumed its sittings, in a temper 
much heated by all the challenge and controversy of the 
recess, Mr. Lloyd George pushed this line of argument 



THE HOME RULE BILL OF 1912 73 

a shade further. He argued that Sir Edward Carson 
himself persisted in treating Ireland as a unit. 

*' Until Ulster departs from that position there is no 
case. Ulster has a right to claim a hearing for separate 
treatment ; she has no right to say, ' Because we do 
not want Home Rule ourselves the majority of Irishmen 
are not to have Home Rule.' " 

Yet upon the balance of events, Unionists were probably 
disappointed. A very strong British feeling against Sir 
Edward Carson and his Belfast following had been gener- 
ated by the expulsion of Catholics from the shipyards 
and in general by the advocacy of civil war. In October 
1912 several notable men who had previously counted 
as Unionists — Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, Sir Frederick 
Pollock, Sir J. West-Ridgway — all declared for Home Rule. 
Exasperation against the incidence of the new Insurance 
Act lost the Government votes at every by-election ; but 
the Irish cause on the whole gained ground, and the 
chief cause of that advance was the respect universally 
felt for Redmond's personality and leadership. On 
November 22nd he attended a huge meeting of the 
National Liberal Federation at Nottingham along with 
the Prime Minister and received a wonderful welcome. 
The step was novel. Never since Parnell's work began 
had the leader of the Irish people stood on the same 
platform in Great Britain with the leader of any English 
party. It was, however, the return of a compliment, 
for Mr. Asquith had come to Dublin in the summer and 
there spoken along with the Irish leader. Moreover, a 
recent incident had shown how necessary it was to 
maintain the closest co-operation ; a snap division on 
November 11th had inflicted defeat on the Govern- 
ment and occasioned loss of perhaps a fortnight's 
parliamentary time. 

But in the very act of thus strengthening his hold 
on the British electorate, Redmond gave ground to those 
in Ireland who desired to represent him as a mere tool 



74 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

of the Liberal party, a pawn in Mr. Asquith's game. 
Foreseeing this evil did not help to combat it, and on the 
whole it was Redmond's inclination to take a sanguine 
view of his country's good sense and generosity. 

The Committee stage of discussion lasted beyond the 
end of the year. On the finance arrangements Redmond 
had to face fierce opposition from Mr, O'Brien's party, 
which was endorsed by the Irish Council of County 
Councils, Here difficulties were inevitable, and attack 
was easy either for the Unionists, who pressed the argu- 
ment that Ireland was to be started on its career of self- 
government with a subsidy of some two millions per 
annum from Great Britain, or for the O'Brienites, who 
urged that the country was already overtaxed in pro- 
portion to its resources, that it needed large expenditure 
for development, and that the possible budget indicated 
by the Bill left no serious possibility for reducing taxes 
or for undertaking even necessary expenditure. Redmond, 
on the other hand, was bound to conciliate the vested 
interests of civil servants, officials in all degrees, and the 
immense police force. Retrenchment on the vast area 
of unproductive expenditure which Castle government 
had created could only be hoped for at a very distant 
date. He could not therefore promise substantial 
economy ; nor could he argue for a further increase of 
subsidy without playing into the Tories' hands. On all 
this detail of the measure, the attack in debate was bound 
to be very powerful. 

So far as Great Britain was concerned, the reply of 
Home Rulers was tolerably effective. In 1886 it had 
been feasible to propose Home Rule with an Imperial 
contribution of two and a half millions. By 1893 the 
possible margin had dropped heavily, and Mr. Gladstone 
had foretold that within fifteen years Ireland would absorb 
more money for purely Irish services than Irish taxation 
produced. This prophecy had been fulfilled to the letter, 
and everyone saw that to continue the Union meant 



THE HOME RULE BILL OF 1912 75 

increasing this charge automatically. It was better to 
cut the loss and at least say that it should not exceed 
a fixed figure. 

But in Ireland men dwelt always on the Report of 
the Financial Relations Commission, which had repre- 
sented the balance as heavily against England and the 
account for overtaxation of the poorer country as reach- 
ing three hundred millions. No man quoted this docu- 
ment oftener than Redmond, and none was a firmer 
believer in its justification. But he realized, as his 
countrymen did not, that such a claim could never hope 
for cash settlement, that its value was as an argument 
for the concession of freedom upon generous terms. How 
could he urge that the terms proposed were ungenerous, 
when Great Britain offered to pay the cost of all Irish 
services — amounting to a million and a half more than 
Irish revenue — and to provide over and above this a 
yearly grant of half a million, dropping gradually, it is 
true, but still remaining at a subsidy of two hundred 
thousand a year so long as the finance arrangements 
of the Bill lasted ? 

Nevertheless, these arrangements were bad ones, and 
this was where the Bill was most vulnerable on 
its merits ; for self-government without the control 
of taxation and expenditure is at best an unhopeful 
experiment. 

But in the public mind at large only one difficulty 
bulked big, and that was Ulster, Men on both sides 
began to be uneasy about the consequences of what 
was happening, and this temper reflected itself in the 
House. On New Year's Day 1913, at the beginning of 
the Report stage. Sir Edward Carson moved the exclu- 
sion of the province of Ulster. His speech was in a new 
tone of studied conciliation. But, as the Prime Minister 
immediately made clear, there was no offer that if this 
concession were made opposition would cease. It was 
merely recommended as the sole alternative to civil 



76 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

war. Redmond, in following, let fall an obiter dictum on 
the position of the Irish controversy : 

" No one who observes the current of popular opinion 
in this country can doubt for one instant that if this 
opposition from the north-east corner of Ulster did not 
exist, Home Rule would go through to-morrow as an 
agreed Bill." 

For this reason, he said, he would go almost any length 
within certain well-defined limits to meet that section 
of his fellow-countrymen. His conditions were, first, 
that the proposal must be a genuine one, not put forward 
as a piece of tactics to wreck the Bill, but frankly as 
part of a general settlement of the Home Rule question ; 
secondly, that it must be of reasonable character ; and 
thirdly, not inconsistent with the fundamental principle 
of national self-government. Ulster's present proposal, if 
accepted, carried with it no promise of a settlement ; 
it was unreasonable as proposing to strike out of Ireland 
five counties with Nationalist majorities. But finally, 
on a broader ground, it destroyed the national right 
of Ireland. 

*' Ireland for us is one entity. It is one land. Tyrone 
and Tyrconnell are as much a part of Ireland as Munster 
or Connaught. Some of the most glorious chapters con- 
nected with our national struggle have been associated 
with Ulster — aye, and with the Protestants of Ulster 
— and I declare here to-day, as a Catholic Irishman, 
notwithstanding all the bitterness of the past, that I am 
as proud of Derry as of Limerick. Our ideal in this 
movement is a self-governing Ireland in the future, when 
all her sons of all races and creeds within her shores will 
bring th«ir tribute, great or small, to the great total of 
national enterprise, national statesmanship, and national 
happiness. Men may deride that ideal ; they may say 
that it is a futile and unreliable ideal, but they cannot 
call it an ignoble one. It is an ideal that we, at any 
rate, will cling to, and because we cling to it, and because 



THE HOME RULE BILL OF 1912 77 

it is there, embedded in our hearts and natures, it is an 
absolute bar to such a proposal as this amendment makes, 
a proposal which would create for all times a sharp, eternal 
dividing line between Irish Catholics and Irish Protestants, 
and a measure which would for all time mean the partition 
and disintegration of our nation. To that we as Irish 
Nationalists can never submit." 

Later in the debate, Mr. Bonar Law admitted quite 
frankly the argument against treating all Ulster as 
Unionist, and he proceeded to suggest that any county 
in Ulster might be given power to decide whether or 
not it should come into the new Parliament. It was 
plain, however, and Mr. Churchill made it plainer, that 
the Unionist leader did not speak for Ulster ; Ulster's 
intention was still to use its own opposition to Home 
Rule as a bar to self-government for the whole of Ireland. 

Equally was it plain that the plebiscite by counties 
would not be unacceptable to Mr. Churchill. 

The proposal for the exclusion of the entire province 
was defeated by a majority of 97 and the Third Reading 
was carried by 110. A few days later the city of Derry 
returned a Home Ruler, and the Ulster representation 
became seventeen for the Bill and sixteen against. This 
dramatic change produced a considerable effect on British 
opinion. Redmond, speaking at a luncheon given to 
the winner, Mr. Hogg, indicated the lines on which he 
was disposed to bargain. He would be willing to give 
Ulster more than its proportional share of representation 
in the Irish Parliament. 

The debate in the House of Lords was marked by certain 
speeches which showed that public opinion had moved 
considerably. Lord Dunraven declared for the Second 
Reading, though pressing all the line of objection to the 
Bill which had been taken by Mr. O'Brien and his party. 
He heaped scorn also as an Irishman upon " this 
absurd theory of two nations which is only invented to 
make discord where accord would naturally be." Lord 



78 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

MacDonnell, whose administrative experience could no 
Inore be questioned than his genius for administration, 
held that though amendment was needed the framework 
of the Bill was good, and that urgent necessity existed 
for the change to self-government. He alluded to the 
opinion expressed by Mr. Balfour in 1905^ that the proper 
way of reforming Dublin Castle was by increasing the 
power of the Chief Secretary and his Under-Secretary, 
and thereby getting a stronger grip on the various 
departments of the " complicated system " prevailing. 
" I thought so too," said Lord MacDonnell, who in 1905 
as Under-Secretary had tried his hand at this reform. 
" It was one of the illusions that I took with me to Ireland 
twenty years ago — but I am now a wiser man. . . . My 
observation of the Boards had convinced me before I 
left Ireland that no scheme of administrative reform 
which depends on bureaucratic organization for its success, 
or which has not behind it a popular backing, has the 
least chance of success in an attempt to establish in 
Ireland a government that is satisfactory to the Imperial 
Parliament or acceptable to the Irish people." — This was 
a repudiation of the Irish Council Bill of 1907 by its main 
author. 

Lord Grey, a vivid and attractive personality, declared 
strongly for " such a measure of Home Rule as will give 
the Irish people power to manage their own domestic 
affairs." It was a conviction that had been forced upon 
him by his experience of Greater Britain. " Practically 
every American, every Canadian, every Australian is a 
Home Ruler." But the settlement must proceed upon 
federal lines ; his ideal for Ireland was the provincial 
status of Ontario or Quebec, linked federally to a central 
parliament at Westminster. 

The most significant speech, however, came from the 
Archbishop of York. Disclaiming all party allegiance, 
Dr. Lang claimed to express " the opinions of a very 
large number of fair-minded citizens." He admitted that 



THE HOME RULE BILL OF 1912 79 

there was an Irish problem, which could not be solved 
by " a policy however generous of promoting the economic 
welfare of Ireland," " Some measure of Home Rule is 
necessary not only to meet the needs of Ireland 
but the needs of the Imperial Parliament." This Bill, 
however, in his opixiion, was ill-adapted to th© latter 
purpose. It would he a block rather than a relief to 
the congestion of business. But these objections were 
*' abstract and academic " in face of the real govern- 
ing fact. 

" The figure of Ulster, grim, determined, menacing, 
dominates the scene. . . . We may not like it. Frankly, 
I do not like it. It carries marks of religious and racial 
bitterness and suspicion. It uses language about dis- 
obedience to the law which must provoke disquiet and 
dislike in the minds of all who care for the good govern- 
ment of the country. I am not competent, because I 
have not shared in the experience of the history of the 
Ulster people, to decide whether or not their fears are 
groundless. All these things seem to me to be beside 
the point. If Ulster means to do what it says, then the 
results are certainly such as no citizen can contemplate 
without grave concern. ... I admit, everyone must 
admit, that there are circumstances in which a Govern- 
ment is entitled and bound to run this kind of risk. At 
the present time I think we all feel that there is a call 
upon Governments to stiffen rather than to slacken 
their determination in the presence of threats of dis- 
obedience or disorder. I will go further and admit that 
there is one condition which would justify in my mind 
His Majesty's Government in running the risk of the 
forcible coercion of Ulster. That condition is that they 
should have received from the people of this country 
an authority, clear and explicit, to undertake that risk. 
It is perfectly true that the Prime Minister gave notice 
that if his party were returned to power they would be 
free to raise again the question of Home Rule, but there 



80 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

is a great difference between the abstract question of 
Home Rule and a concrete Home Rule Bill." 

That speech undoubtedly represented the temper pre- 
vailing in the class of balancing electors which is so large 
in England. Some of us who read it at the time recog- 
nized how far the long struggle for autonomy had pre- 
vailed, but also how strong were the forces which no 
argument could reach. Men like Dr. Lang might be 
offended, even shocked by the action of those who claimed 
to be England's garrison in Ireland ; but they would 
be very slow to use force against such a section, although 
quite ready to justify coercion of the Irish majority. 
Yet what impressed Redmond was the advance made, 
rather than the revelation of what resistance remained. 
He had been more than thirty years an advocate of 
Ireland's cause ; and now by the spokesman of the im- 
partial educated mind of England the justice of that 
cause was admitted. The argument that a general 
election was necessary, or would be efficacious in solving 
the problem, was one with which he felt well able to 
contend. In that speech the Archbishop of York admitted 
his impression that in by-elections there had been " much 
more of Food Taxes and the Insurance Act than of Home 
Rule." 

On the other hand, for Ulster such a speech had the 
plainest possible moral : Ulster's game was to become 
more grim, more determined, more menacing. The 
Home Rule controversy had now resolved itself into 
a question whether Ulster really meant business. Sir 
Edward Carson set himself to make that plain beyond 
yea or nay. 

In a speech delivered in Belfast, at the opening of a 
new drill hall, he asked and answered the question, " Why 
are we drilling ? " He and his colleagues did not recog- 
nize the Parliament Act, he said ; a law passed under it 
would be only an act of usurpation, a breach of right. 
"We seek nothing but the elementary right implanted 



THE HOME RULE BILL OF 1912 81 

in every man : the right, if you are attacked, to 
defend yourself." 

Ulster was going to stand by its Covenant. 

" When we talk of force, we use it, if we are driven 
to use it, to beat back those who will dare to barter away 
those elementary rights of citizenship which we have 
inherited. ... Go on, be ready, you are our great army. 
Under what circumstances you have to come into action, 
you must leave with us. There are matters which give 
us grave consideration which we cannot and ought not 
to talk about in public. You must trust us that we will 
select the most opportune methods of, if necessary, taking 
on ourselves the v/hole government of the community 
in which we live. I know a great deal of that will in- 
volve statutory illegality, but it will also involve much 
righteousness." 

Some of the questions which needed grave considera- 
tion were suggested by happenings that followed hard 
on this speech. Much ridicule had been poured on the 
drillings with dummy muskets. Ulster evidently decided 
to push the matter a step further. A consignment of 
one thousand rifles with bayonets, in cases marked 
" electrical fittings," was seized at Belfast on June 3, 1913. 
Other incidents of the same nature followed. It was 
argued, by those who sought to represent the whole 
campaign as an elaborate piece of bluff, that the weapons 
were useless and that they were deliberately sent to 
be seized. A feature which scarcely bore out this view 
was that one consignment was addressed to the Lord- 
Lieutenant of an Ulster county who was also an officer 
in the Army, A justice of the peace, or an officer, to 
whom a consignment of arms had been sent for a National- 
ist organization would have been ordered to clear himself 
in the fullest way of compHcity, and even of sympathy, 
or he would have forfeited his commission. The noble- 
man involved, however, made no explanation, and was 
probably never officially asked to do so. 

7 



82 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

it was commonly believed in the House of Commons 
that at some point, if not repeatedly, Government con- 
sulted the Irish leader or his principal advisers as to 
whether measures of repression should be undertaken 
against Ulster. No such consultation took place. But 
the opinion prevailing among the leading Nationalists 
was no doubt known or inferred. Mr. Dillon, speaking 
on June 16, 1914, when the danger-point had been clearly 
reached, justified the previous abstinence from coercion. 

" I have held the view from the beginning that it would 
not have been wise policy for a Government engaged in 
the great work of the political emancipation of a nation 
to embark on a career of coercion. I knew, and knew 
well, all the difficulties and all the reproaches that the 
Government would have to face if they abstained from 
coercion. It is a difficult and almost unprecedented 
course for a Government to take, and it is, as the 
Chief Secretary said, a courageous one. But with all 
its difficulties and dangers it is the right course. We 
who have been through the mill know what the effect 
of coercion is. We know that you do not put down 
Irishmen by coercion. You simply embitter them and 
stiffen their backs." 

It is therefore unquestionable that the decision to do 
nothing had Redmond's approval. Whatever may be 
thought of that policy, one factor was assuredly under- 
estimated — the effect produced on the public mind by 
the spectacle of highly placed personages defying the 
law and defying it with impunity. It was possible to 
argue that a conviction for hypothetical treason would 
be difficult to secure and that failure in a prosecution 
would only encourage lawless conduct. But Privy Coun- 
cillors who made preparations for prospective rebellion 
and remained Privy Councillors were a new phenomenon. 
The public thought, and it was apparent that the public 
would think, that Government was afraid to quarrel 
with what is called Society. Society shared that belief 



THE HOME RULE BILL OF 1912 83 

and began to extend its influence in a new direction. 
No Government can permit itself to be defied without 
general relaxation of discipline, and the effects extended 
themselves to the Army. At a meeting on July 12th 
in Ulster a telegram was read out from " Covenanters " 
in an Ulster regiment, urging " No surrender until ammu- 
nition is spent and the last drop of blood." In his speech 
on that occasion Sir Edward Carson declared that every 
day brought him at least half a dozen letters from British 
officers asking to be enrolled among the future defenders 
of Ulster. One officer, he said, having signed the Cove- 
nant, was ordered to send in his papers and resign his 
commission. The officer refused to do so, and after a 
short time was simply told to resume his duty. 

" We have assurance from the Prime Minister," said 
Sir Edward Carson, " that the forces of the Crown are 
not to be used against Ulster. Government know that 
they could not rely on the Army to shoot down the people 
of Ulster." 

Later events in Ireland furnished a grim commentary 
as to what the Army would be willing, and would not 
be willing, to do in the way of shooting down in Ireland ; 
and such words as these of Sir Edward Carson were 
destined to be among the chief difficulties which Redmond 
had to encounter when he sought to lead Ireland into 
the war. 

At the meeting of that day, delegates were present 
from a British League to assist Ulster in her resistance. 
Behind this new quasi-military organization stood now the 
whole of one great party. Sir Edward Carson trans- 
mitted a message from Mr. Bonar Law in these words : 

" Whatever steps we may feel compelled to take, 
whether they be constitutional, or in the long run whether 
they be unconstitutional, we will have the whole of the 
Unionist party under his leadership behind us." 

Later in the autumn, on the first anniversary of Ulster 
Day, there was formally announced the formation of an 



84 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

Ulster Provisional Government, with a Military Committee 
attached to it. A guarantee fund to indemnify all who 
might be involved in damaging consequences was set on 
foot, and a million sterling was indicated as the necessary 
amount to be obtained. 

In the meantime signs of distress came from the Liberal 
camp. Mr. Churchill, in speeches to his constituents, 
renewed the suggestions for partition. More notable 
was a letter from Lord Loreburn, who had till recently 
been Lord Chancellor, and who was known as a steady 
and outspoken Home Ruler. He appealed in The Times 
of September II, 1913, for a conference between parties 
on the Irish difficulty. Irish Nationalist opinion grew 
profoundly uneasy, and Redmond at Limerick on October 
12th set out his position with weighty emphasis. He 
referred to the fact that during the summer he himself, 
assisted by Mr. Devlin, had followed Sir Edward Carson 
and other Ulster speakers from place to place through 
Great Britain, and on the same ground had stated the 
case for Home Rule. He claimed, and with justice, a 
triumphant success for this counter-campaign. 

" The argumentative opposition to Home Rule is dead, 
and all the violent language, all the extravagant action, 
all the bombastic threats, are but indications that the 
battle is over." 

Still, he was too old a politician, he said, not to build 
a bridge of gold to convenience his opponents' retreat, 
provided that the fruits of victory were not flung away. 
Mr. Churchill had told the Ulstermen that there was 
no demand they could make which would not be matched, 
and more than matched, by their countrymen and the 
Liberal party. On this it was necessary to be explicit. 

" Irish Nationalists can never be assenting parties to 
the mutilation of the Irish nation ; Ireland is a unit. 
It is true that within the bosom of a nation there is 
room for diversities of the treatment of government 
and of administration, but a unit Ireland is and Ireland 



THE HOME RULE BILL OF 1912 86 

must remain. . . . The two-nation theory is to us an 
abomination and a blasphemy." 

These were carefully chosen words, and they indicated 
a possible acceptance of the proposal that Ulster should 
have control of its own administration in regard to local 
affairs, but that Irish legislation should be left to a common 
parliament. 

This plan Sir Edward Grey described as his " personal 
contribution " to a discussion of possibilities which had 
been inaugurated by a notable speech from the Prime 
Minister, At Ladybank, on October 25th, Mr. Asquith 
invited " interchange of views and suggestions, free, 
frank, and without prejudice." Nothing, however, could 
be accepted which did not conform to three governing 
considerations. First, there must be established " a 
subordinate Irish legislature with an executive responsible 
to it " ; secondly, " nothing must be done to erect a 
permanent and insuperable bar to Irish unity " ; and 
thirdly, though the process of relieving congestion in the 
Imperial Parliament could not be fully accomplished by the 
present Bill, Ireland must not be made to wait till a 
complete scheme of decentralization could be carried out. 
The second of these conditions was plainly the most 
significant. It was taken to mean that " county option " 
— the right for each county to decide whether it would 
come under a Home Rule Government — would not create 
" a permanent and insuperable " obstacle, since each 
county could be given the opportunity to vote itself 
in at any time. Redmond's next important speech in 
England showed by its emphasis that he felt a danger. 
He denounced " the gigantic game of bluff and black- 
mail " which was in progress. The proposed exclusion 
of Ulster was not a proposition that could be considered. 
It would bring about, he thought, the ruin of Ulster's 
prosperity. " For us it would mean the nullification 
of our hopes and aspirations for the future." It would 
stereotype an old evil in the region where it still existed. 



86 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

What Ulster really feared, he said, was the loss, not of 
freedom or prosperity, but of Protestant ascendancy. 

This was the truth ; Protestant ascendancy, which in 
his boyhood had existed throughout all Ireland, was in 
consequence of the Irish party's work dead in three 
provinces. It remained and must remain in Ulster, 
where Protestants were a majority, but it would be 
qualified if that region came under the control of a parlia- 
ment elected by all Ireland. That was and is the true 
reason of Ulster's resistance to national self-government. 
What he would concede and what he would reject, Red- 
mond indicated in general words : " There is no demand, 
however extravagant and unreasonable it may ajopear to 
us, that we are not ready carefully to consider, so long 
as it is consistent with the principle for which generations 
of our race have battled, the principle of a settlement 
based on the national self-government of Ireland. I 
shut no door to a settlement by consent, but ... we 
will not be intimidated or bullied into a betrayal of 
our trust." 

It was noted at that time that he had said nothing 
to rule out Sir Edward Grey's proposal, which would 
have left the local majority predominant in Ulster's own 
affairs ; and on December 4th Sir Edward Grey spoke 
again, showing a firmness that was the more impressive 
because of his habitual moderation of tone. One thing, 
he said, was worse than carrying Home Rule by force, 
and that would be the abandonment of Home Rule. Two 
suggestions had been made — a proposal for the temporary 
exclusion of Ulster and a plan for giving to Ulster admin- 
istrative autonomy. Neither had been received by Ulster 
" in a spirit which seemed likely to lead to a settlement. 
. . . Was it a settlement by consent they wanted, or 
was their aim simply the destruction of the Bill ? " 

This emphasized what Redmond had said a few days 
earlier at Birmingham, when he declared that the fight 
against Home Rule was not an honest one, that its real 



THE HOME RULE BILL OF 1912 87 

purpose was to defeat the Parliament Act and restore 
to the Tory party its special control over the legislative 
machine. 

The facts were plain on the surface. The Tories 
clamoured for a fresh general election, urging that the 
electors never realized that the Liberal programme in- 
volved civil war. But to concede this claim indirectly 
defeated the Parhament Act, which would then have 
broken down at the first attempt to apply it. What 
added to the insincerity of the argument was Ulster's 
repeated refusal to be influenced by the result of any 
election. Under no circumstances, speaker after speaker 
from Ulster declared, would they submit to Home Rule. 
The prospect of civil war remained, with only one limi- 
tation. Mr. Bonar Law undertook that if a general 
election took place and the Liberals again came back, 
the British Unionist party would not support Ulster in 
physical resistance. They would, however, continue to 
oppose a Home Rule Bill by all constitutional means. 

Nevertheless, the English disposition to compromise 
was already operating. Mr. Asquith was the last of 
mankind to make a quixotic stand for principle, arid 
the most disposed to pride himself on a practical recog- 
nition of realities. His Government was in rough water. 
During the summer Mr. Lloyd George's transaction in 
Marconi shares had been magnified by partisan rancour 
into a crime. Much more serious was the split with 
Labour, which led to the loss of seat after seat at by- 
elections, when the allied forces which stood behind the 
Parliament Act attacked each other and let the Tories 
in. The Women's Franchise agitation was also coming 
to its stormiest point. 

Redmond's part was one of extraordinary difficulty. 
The cause for which he stood was one affecting the interests 
of only a small minority of the total electorate concerned 
in the struggle which now spread over both islands. The 
Irish problem belonged in reality to the Victorian era ; 



88 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

those in the British electorate whom it could stir to 
enthusiasm were stirred by a memory, not by a new gospel. 
Normally, but for the chance of Parnell's overthrow, it 
would have been solved in Gladstone's last years. For 
most Liberals, for all Labour men, the fact that it had 
passed beyond the sphere of argument meant a lack of 
driving force. It was a part of accepted Liberal ortho- 
doxy ; minds were centred rather on those social con- 
troversies in which Mr. Lloyd George was the dominant 
figure, and upon which opinion had not yet crystallized. 

Further, the cry of Protestant liberties in danger, the 
cause of Protestants who conducted their arming to the 
accompaniment of hymns and prayer, made inevitably 
a searching appeal to the feelings of an island kingdom 
where the prejudice against Roman Catholics is more 
instinctive than anywhere else in the world. Looking 
back on it all, I marvel not at the difficulties we encoun- 
tered, but at the success with which we surmounted 
them ; and the great element in that success was Redmond's 
personality. His dignity, his noble eloquence, his sin- 
cerity, and the large, tolerant nature of the man, won 
upon the public im.agination. His tact was unfailing. 
In all those years, under the most envenomed scrutiny, 
he never let slip a word that could be used to our dis- 
advantage. This is merely a negative statement. It is 
truer to say that he never touched the question without 
raising it to the scope of great issues. Nothing petty, 
nothing personal came into his discourse ; he so carried 
the national claim of Ireland that men saw in it at once 
the test and the justification of democracy. 

That is why the Irish cause, instead of being a mill- 
stone round the neck of the parhamentary alliance, was 
in truth a living cohesive force. But in order to keep 
it so it must be pleaded, not as a question for Ireland 
only but for the democracy of Great Britain and, in a 
still larger sense, for the Commonwealth of the British 
Empire. 



THE HOME RULE BILL OF 1912 89 

Liberal statesmen in their desire to simplify their own 
task underestimated altogether the difficulty which their 
professed short-cuts to the goal — or rather, their attempted 
circuits round obstacles — created inevitably for the Irish 
leader. They did not realize that his genuine feeling — 
based on knowledge — for the British democracy at home, 
and still more for its offshoots overseas, was unshared 
by his countrymen, stiU aloof, still suspicious, and daily 
impressed by the spectacle of those who most paraded 
allegiance to British Imperialism professing a readiness 
to tear up the Constitution rather than allow freedom 
to Ireland. Liberal statesmen did not understand that 
Redmond could only justify to Ireland the part which 
he was taking if he won, and that he and not they must 
be the judge of what Ireland would consider a defeat. 
In all probability, also, they overrated his power and that 
of the party which he led. They did not guess at the 
potency of new forces which only in these months began 
to make themselves felt, and which in the end, breaking 
loose from Redmond's control, undid his work. A new 
phase in Irish history had begun, of which Sir Edward 
Carson was the chief responsible author. 



CHAPTER IV 
THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 

THE first stir of a new movement in Nationalist 
Ireland outside the old political lines came from 
Labour — from Irish Labour, as yet unorganized and 
terribly in need of organization. On August 26, 1913, 
a strike in Dublin began under the leadership of Mr. 
Larkin. It had all the violence and disorder which is 
characteristic of economic struggles where Labour has 
not yet learned to develop its strength ; it opened new 
cleavages at this moment when national union was most 
necessary : it was fought with the passion of despair by 
workers whose scale of pay and living was a disgrace 
to civilization ; and after five months it was not settled 
but scotched, leaving dark embers of revolutionary hate 
scattered through the capital of Ireland. 

One incident showed some of the consequences ready 
to spring, even in England itself, from the action taken 
in Ulster. Mr. Larkin at the end of October 1913 was 
sentenced to six months' imprisonment for sedition and 
inciting to disturbance. A fierce outcry ran through 
the Labour world in Great Britain ; by-elections were 
in progress, and Government was angrily challenged with 
having one law for the rich and another for the poor, 
one law for Labour and another for the Unionist party. 
To this pressure Government yielded, and Mr. Larkin 
was liberated after a few days in jail. 

But in Ireland more formidable symptoms soon made 
themselves manifest. Captain J. R. White, son of Sir 
George White, the defender of Ladysmith, was a soldier 
by hereditary instinct and had won the Distinguished 



THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 91 

Service Order in South Africa. But some strain in his 
composition answered to other calls, and upon Tolstoyan 
grounds he ceased to be a soldier, without ceasing to be 
a natural leader of men. His first public appearance 
was at a meeting in London in support of Home Rule 
addressed by a number of prominent persons who were 
not Roman Catholics. But his interests were plainly 
not so much Nationahst as broadly humanitarian ; free- 
dom for the individual soul rather than for the nation 
was his object : and he suddenly enrolled himself among 
Mr. Larkin's allies. His proposal was outlined to a great 
assembly of the strikers gathered in front of Liberty 
Hall : Mr. Larkin set it out. They must no longer be 
*' content to assemble in hopeless haphazard crowds " 
but must " agree to bring themselves under the influences 
of an ordered and sympathetic discipline." " Labour in 
its own defence must begin to train itself to act with dis- 
ciplined courage and with organized and concentrated 
force. How could they accomplish this ? By taking a 
leaf out of the book of Carson. H Carson had permission 
to train his braves of the North to fight against the 
aspirations of the Irish people, then it was legitimate 
and fair for Labour to organize in the same militant way 
to preserve their rights and to ensure that if they were 
attacked they would be able to give a very satisfactory 
account of themselves." 

Thus began in a small sectional manner a national 
movement which led far indeed. Mr. O'Cathasaigh, 
from whose Story of the Irish Citizen Army I quote, attri- 
butes the failure of that purely Labour organization 
chiefly to the establishment of the Irish Volunteers. 

This was a development which Redmond on his part 
neither willed nor approved, yet one which in the cir- 
cumstances was inevitable. Who could suppose that 
the formation of combatant forces would remain a mono- 
poly of any party ? There was no mistaking the weight 
which a hundred thousand Ulster Volunteers, drilled 



92 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

and regimented, threw into Sir Edward Carson's advocacy. 
As early as September 1913, during the parliamentary 
recess, Redmond received at least one letter — and possibly 
he received many — urging him to raise the standard of 
a similar force, and pointing out that if he did not take 
this course it might be taken by others less fit to guide 
it. The letter of which I speak elicited no answer. It 
was never his habit to reply to inconvenient communi- 
cations — a policy which he inherited from Parnell, who 
held that nearly every letter answered itself within six 
months, if it were let alone. Certainly in this case it 
so happened. Long before six months were up, facts 
had made argument superfluous. 

Wisdom is easy after the event, and few would dispute 
now that the constitutional party ought either to have 
dissociated itself completely from the appeal to force, 
or to have launched and controlled it from the outset. 
Neither of these lines was followed, and the responsi- 
bility for what was done and what was not done must 
lie with Redmond. Yet, as I read it, the key to his 
policy lay in a dread, not of war, but of civil war. To 
arm Irishmen against each other was of all possible 
courses to him the most hateful. It opened a vision of 
fratricidal strife, of an Ireland divided against itself by 
new and bloody memories. 

Moreover, though he had, as the world came to know, 
soldiering in his blood — though the call to war, when 
he counted the war righteous, stirred what was deepest 
in him — by training and conviction he was essentially 
a constitutionalist : he realized profoundly how strong 
were the forces behind constitutionalism in Great Britain, 
how impregnable was the position of British Ministers if 
they boldly asserted the law with equality as between 
man and man. Where he was mistaken was in his esti- 
mate of the Government with which he had to deal, and 
especially of Mr. Asquith. Speaking to his constituents 
early in the New Year of 1914 he said, " The Prime 



THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 93 

Minister is as firm as a rock, and is, I believe, the strongest 
and sanest man who has appeared in British politics in 
our time." The verdict of history might have borne 
out this judgment had Mr. Asquith never been forced 
to face extraordinary times. In the event, it was Mr. 
Asquith's lack of firmness and failure in strength which 
drove Redmond into belated acceptance of a policy 
modelled on Sir Edward Carson's. 

As early as July 1913 the demonstrations in Ulster 
led to discussion of a countermove among young men in 
Dublin. But there was no public proposal, until at the 
end of October Professor MacNeill, Vice-President of 
the Gaelic League, published an article in the League's 
official organ calling on Nationalist Ireland to drill and 
arm. The first meeting of a provisional committee 
followed a few days later. Support was asked from all 
sections of Nationalist opinion ; but, as a whole, members 
of the United Irish League and of the Ancient Order of 
Hibernians, who constituted the bulk of Redmond's 
following, refused to act. Still, about a third of the 
committee were supporters of the parliamentary party ; 
they included Professor Kettle, who was from 1906 to 
1910 among its most brilliant members. It was, however, 
significant that the Lord Mayor, a prominent official 
Nationalist, refused the use of the Mansion House for 
a meeting at which it was proposed to start the enrolment 
of Irish Volunteers. As a result, the venue was changed 
to the Rotunda, and so great enthusiasm was shown that 
the Rink was used for the assembly. Even that did not 
suffice for half the gathering. Three overflow meetings 
were held, and four thousand men are said to have been 
enrolled that evening. 

Yet the movement did not spread at once with rapidity. 
By the end of December recruits only amounted to 
ten thousand. For this two causes were answerable. 
The first was the honourable refusal of the committee 
to allow companies to be enrolled except according 



94 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

to locality. They would have no sectional companies 
of Sinn Fein volunteers, of United Irish League Volun- 
teers, of Hibernian Volunteers. All must mix equally 
in the ranks. The second was the fear of most National- 
ists that by joining an organization with which the national 
leader was not identified they might weaken his hand. 
This operated, although the declared intention of the 
organization was to strengthen Redmond's position. 
At Limerick in January Pearse said : "In the Volunteer 
movement we are going to give Mr. Redmond a weapon 
which will enable him to enforce the demand for Home 
Rule." 

Briefly, for several months the numbers of the new 
force did not show that the whole of Nationalist Ireland 
was in support of it. Ireland was waiting for a sign 
from Redmond, and it did not come. The events which 
literally drove Irish constitutional Nationalists into fol- 
lowing Ulster's example had still to occur. 

There was, however, a wide extension of the cadres 
of the organization, and it was being spread by men 
some of whom — like Professor MacNeill — dissented from 
Redmond's attitude of quiescence, while some were 
general opponents of the whole constitutional policy. 
They covered the country with committees, recruited, 
it is true, from all sections of Nationalist Ireland. But 
it was inevitable that the element who distrusted Red- 
mond, and whose distrust he reciprocated, should attain 
an influence out of all proportion to its following in the 
country. 

Government's action — and this sentence will run like 
a refrain through the rest of this book — contributed 
largely to strengthen the extremists and to weaken 
Redmond's hold on the people. During eleven months 
the Ulster Volunteers had been drilling, had been import- 
ing arms, and no step was taken to interfere. Within 
ten days after the Irish Volunteer Force began to be 
enrolled, a proclamation (issued on December 4, 1913) 



THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 95 

prohibited the importation of military arms and ammuni- 
tion into Ireland. A system of search was instituted. 
But the Ulstermen were already well supplied. Redmond 
was blamed for not forcing the withdrawal of the pro- 
clamation. He controlled the House of Commons, it 
was said. This was the line of argument constantly 
taken by dissentient Nationalists ; and it was true that 
he could at any moment put the Government out. Critics 
did not stop to ask for whose advantage that would be. 
Government by issuing this proclamation had effected 
no good : they had embarrassed their chief ally, and 
they had laid the foundation for an imposing structure 
of incidents which grew with pernicious rapidity into a 
monumental proof that law, even under a Liberal admin- 
istration, has one aspect for Protestant Ulster and quite 
another for the rest of Ireland. 

But in England at the beginning of the fateful year 
1914 the Irish Volunteers had not yet become recognized 
as a factor in the main political situation. An attitude 
of mind had been studiously fostered which found crude 
expression soon after the House met. One of the Liberal 
party was arguing that Ulster had made Home Rule 
an absolute necessity, because Nationalists would have 
" fourfold justification if they resisted in the way you 
have taught them to resist the Government of this country 
in maintaining the old system," " They have not the 
pluck," interjected Captain Craig, the most prominent 
of the Ulster members. The present Lord Chancellor, 
Mr. F, E, Smith, was voluble in declarations that Nation- 
alists would " neither fight for Home Rule nor pay for 
Home Rule," These taunts did not ease Redmond's 
position, especially as it became plain that Ulster's threat 
of violence had succeeded. 

Mr. Asquith, referring to the " conversations " between 
leaders which had taken place during the winter, said 
that since no definite agreement had been reached the 
Government had decided to reopen the matter in the 



96 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

House. This meant, as Redmond pointed out with 
some asperity, that the Prime Minister had accepted 
responsibility for taking the initiative in making pro- 
posals to meet objections whose reasonableness he did 
not admit. The Opposition, he thought, should have 
been left to put forward some plan. 

Yet Redmond's attitude, and the attitude of the 
House, was considerably affected by an unusual speech 
which had been delivered by the Ulster leader. 

Sir Edward Carson, as everyone knows, is not an Ulster- 
man, and the chief of many advantages which Ulster 
gained from his advocacy was that Ulster's case was 
never stated to Great Britain as Ulstermen themselves 
would have stated it. It is not true to say that Ulster- 
men by habit think of Ireland as consisting of two nations, 
for all Ulstermen traditionally regard themselves as 
Irish and so have always described themselves without 
qualification. But it is true to say that Ulster Protes- 
tants have regarded Irish Catholics as a separate and 
inferior caste of Irishmen. The belief has been ingrained 
into them that as Protestants they are morally and 
intellectually superior to those of the other religion. 
Their whole political attitude is determined by this con- 
viction. They refuse to come under a Dublin Parliament 
because in it they would be governed by a majority whom 
they regard as their inferiors. It is in their deliberate 
view natural that Roman Catholics should submit to be 
controlled by Protestants, unnatural that Protestants 
should submit to be controlled by Roman Catholics. 

It does not express the truth to say that Sir Edward 
Carson was adroit enough to avoid putting this view of 
the case to the electors of Great Britain or to the House 
of Commons. Temperamentally and instinctively, he 
did not share it. He was a Southern Irishman who at 
the opening of his life held himself, as not one Ulsterman 
in a thousand does, perfectly free to make up his mind 
for or against the maintenance of the Union. He reached 



THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 97 

the conclusion not only that Home Rule would be dis- 
astrous for Ireland, for the United Kingdom, and for 
the British Empire, but that it would mean for Irishmen 
the acceptance of an inferior status in the Empire. As 
citizens of the United Kingdom, he held, they were more 
honourably situated than they could be as citizens of 
an Irish State within the Empire. This was an attitude 
of mind which Ulster could endorse, although it did not 
fully represent Ulster's conviction : but this was the 
case which Sir Edward Carson always made on behalf 
of Ulster, and he made it as an Irishman whose personal 
interests and connections lay in the South of Ireland, 
not in the North. His argument was the more persuasive 
because it was based on a view of Ireland's true interest — 
not of Ulster's onlj^^ ; and it was the harder on that account 
for Redmond to repel peremptorily. More than this, 
between him and Redmond there was an old personal 
tie. The Irish Bar is a true centre of intercourse between 
men of varying political and religious beliefs, and as 
junior barristers Edward Carson and John Redmond 
went the Munster circuit together. 

All this lay behind the appeal which on February 11, 
1914, was implied rather than expressed in the novel 
phrase and still more unaccustomed tone of a con- 
summate orator. 

" Believe me," Sir Edward Carson said, " whatever 
way you settle the Irish question " (and that phrase 
threw over the cry of " No Home Rule "), " there are 
only two ways to deal with Ulster. It is for statesmen 
to say which is the best and right one. She is not a part 
of the community which can be bought. She will not 
allow herself to be sold. You must therefore either 
coerce her if you go on, or you must in the long run, by 
showing that good government can come under the Home 
Rule Bill, try and win her over to the case of the rest 
of Ireland. You jDrobably can coerce her — though I 
doubt it. If you do, what will be the disastrous conse- 

8 



98 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

quences not only to Ulster, but to this country and the 
Empire ? Will my fellow-countryman " — and at this 
emphatic word, which jettisoned absolutely the theory 
of two nations, the speaker turned to his left, where 
Redmond sat in his accustomed place below the gangway 
— " will my fellow-countryman, the leader of the Nation- 
alist Party, have gained anything ? I will agree with 
him — I do not believe he wants to triumph any more 
than I do. But will he have gained anything if he takes 
over these people and then applies for what he used to 
call — at all events his party used to call — the enemies 
of the people to come in and coerce them into obedience ? 
No, sir ; one false step taken in relation to Ulster will, 
in my opinion, render for ever impossible a solution of 
the Irish question. I saj^ this to my Nationalist fellow- 
countrymen, and, indeed, also to the Government : you 
have never tried to win over Ulster. You have never 
tried to understand her position. You have never alleged, 
and can never allege, that this Bill gives her one atom 
of advantage." 

Then, carried away by the course of his argument, an 
angry note came into his voice, and before a minute had 
passed we were back in the old atmosphere. He accused 
us of wanting " not Ulster's affections but her taxes." 

Well might Redmond say when he rose that Sir Edward 
Carson had been heard by all of us with very mixed 
feelings. " I care not about the assent of Englishmen," 
he said ; " I am fighting this matter out between a fellow- 
countryman and myself, and I say that it was an un- 
worthy thing for him to say that I am animated by these 
base motives, especially after he had lectured the House 
on the undesirability of imputing motives." 

On the personal note Redmond was to the full as 
effective as his opponent, and his speech of that day 
was memorable. It was also very much more to the 
taste of the Liberal rank and file than what came from 
their own front bench. " We do not by any means 



THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 99 

take the tragic view of the probabilities or even the 
possibilities of what is called civil war in Ulster," he 
said ; and added that the House of Commons ought, in 
his opinion, " to resent as an affront these threats of civil 
war." Yet in the end he promised, for the sake of 
peace, "' consideration in the friendliest spirit " (not very- 
different from acceptance) of any proposals that the 
Government might feel called upon to put forward. 

It is noteworthy'' that in this jjrolonged debate there 
was no reference to the new fact of a second volunteer 
force. But on February 12th a question was asked 
about it. On the 17th there was allusion to another 
growing element of danger — the discussions among officers 
of the Army of a combined refusal to serve against Ulster. 
All these factors must have weighed with Redmond and 
with his chief colleagues in their discussions with the 
Government during the next three weeks. " Friendly 
consideration " passed into acceptance on March 9th, 
when Mr. Asquith, introducing the Home Rule Bill for 
its passage in the third consecutive session (as required 
by the Parliament Act), outlined the proposed modifi- 
cations in it. They involved partition. But the exclusion 
was to be optional by areas and limited in time. 

The proposal to take a vote by counties had, it will 
be remembered, been originally suggested by Mr. Bonar 
Law, and in following the Prime Minister he could not 
well repudiate it. The test, however, which he now put 
forward was whether or not the proposals satisfied Ulster : 
and he fixed upon the time-limit of six years as being 
wholly unacceptable. Redmond, on the other hand, while 
declaring that the Government had gone to " the extremest 
limits of concession," said that the proposals had one 
merit : they would " elicit beyond doubt or question by 
a free ballot the real opinion of the people of Ulster." 
This indicated his conviction that if Home Rule really 
came the majority in Ulster would prefer to take their 
chances under it ; the proposal of exclusion being merely 



100 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

a tactical manoeuvre to defeat Home Rule by splitting 
the Nationalists. 

Its efficacy for that purpose was immediately demon- 
strated. Mr. O'Brien followed Redmond with a virulent 
denunciation of " the one concession of all others which 
must be hateful and unthinkable from the point of view 
of any Nationalist in Ireland." Opposition from Mr. 
O'Brien and from Mr. Healy was no new thing. But 
by acceptance of these proposals the Nationalist leader 
made their opposition for the first time really formidable. 
Telegrams rained in that March afternoon — above all 
on Mr. Devlin, from his supporters in Belfast, who felt 
themselves betrayed and shut out from a national triumph 
which they had been the most zealous to promote. From 
this time onward the position of Redmond personally 
and of his party as a whole was perceptibly weakened. 
Especially an alienation began between him and the 
Catholic hierarchy. It was impossible that the clergy 
should be well disposed towards proposals which, as Mr. 
Healy put it, would make Cardinal Logue a foreigner 
in his own cathedral at Armagh. 

Yet upon the whole the shake to Redmond's power 
was less than might have been exi^ected — largely, no 
doubt, because the offer was repelled. Sir Edward Carson 
described it as " sentence of death with stay of execution 
for six years." With a great advocate's instinct, he 
fastened on the point in the Government's proposal 
which was least defensible. 

In my opinion these modifications of the Bill were 
never adequately discussed in the meetings of the Irish 
party. All was done between the Government and 
Redmond's inner cabinet, consisting of Redmond himself, 
Mr. Dillon, Mr. Devlin and Mr. T. P. O'Connor. The 
negotiations were most delicate and difficult, and above 
all secrecy is hard to maintain when a body of over seventy 
men, each keenly concerned for the view of his consti- 
tuents, comes to be consulted. Yet I think it a pity 



THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 101 

that the party never thrashed this question out. Once 
the principle of option was admitted, a great deal had 
to be considered. Voting must be a referendum either 
to the province as a whole, to the constituencies separ- 
atelj^ or to local units of administration. A referendum 
by constituencies was as impossible as one by parishes : 
for instance, Mr. Devlin's West Belfast, out of the city's 
four divisions, would certainly have voted to remain 
under the Irish Parliament, and an absurd situation 
would have resulted. The choice lay between a vote 
by counties or by the province as a whole. In the pro- 
vince, three counties out of nine were as predominantly 
Nationalist as any part of Leinster. In two others, 
Tyrone and Fermanagh, Nationalists were about 55 per 
cent, of the electorate. But the bulk of the poj^ulation 
of Ulster resided in four counties of the north-east, so 
that Protestants over the whole province had a majority 
of some two hundred thousand. An appeal to the pro- 
vince, therefore, might involve the exclusion from Home 
Rule of a very large area which was thoroughly National- 
ist. On the other hand, every scheme of exclusion had 
in view the possibility of the excluded area changing 
its mind on the question after a short trial. To separate 
the four overwhelmingly Protestant counties was to set 
up a bodj^ in which a change of vote would be much 
harder to bring about than in the province. As a matter 
of statesmanship there was much to be said for closing 
with the LTlstermen's original demand that the province 
should come in or stay out as a whole. It satisfied Ulster's 
sentiment and lessened the chances of crystallizing a 
Protestant block of excluded territory, which would tend 
to become less and less Irish. 

The answer to this was that Nationalists would never 
consent and did never consent to the possibility of per- 
manent exclusion for any part. Insistence on the time- 
limit was from this point of view a matter of absolute 
principle. Yet many believed then, and believe now, 



102 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

that if any part of Ulster were excluded by legislation 
it would certainly come in voluntarily after a short period. 
On the other hand, if any part were excluded even for 
a year, it was difficult to believe that it could ever be 
brought in except by its own consent. The view, how- 
ever, to which we were committed (with the party's 
general approval), was expressed by Redmond at the 
customary St. Patrick's Day Nationalist banquet in 
London. 

" To agree to the permanent partition of Ireland would 
be," he said, " an outrage upon nature and upon history." 
He quoted a phrase used by Mr. Austen Chamberlain, 
who had described it as " the statutory negation of 
Ireland's national claim." But, he argued, no such 
sacrifice of principle had been made. The demand of 
Nationalists was for a Parliament for the whole of Ireland, 
having power to deal with " every purely Irish matter." 
Temporary limitations of this demand had already been 
accepted. 

" We have agreed, as Parnell agreed in the Bill of 1886, 
and as we all agreed in the Bill of 1893, that the power 
of dealing with some of the most vital of Irish questions 
should not come within the purview of the new Parlia- 
ment for a definite number of years." The control of 
police, for instance, was reserved to the Imperial Parlia- 
ment in all those Bills for a term of years. But this did 
not mean that Parnell or we abandoned Ireland's right 
to manage her own police. Reservation of the police 
in perpetuity would have been impossible to accept. 
In the same way, said Redmond, " the automatic ending 
of any period of exclusion is for us a fixed and immutable 
principle." 

To maintain this conformity with national sentiment 
great advantages were sacrificed. The whole debates 
of this period turned on the question of the time-limit. 
If it had never been raised, opposition would still have 
existed, but the fact would have been plain from the 



THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 103 

outset that Protestant Ulster claimed to dictate not 
only where it had the majority, but where the majority 
was against it. Redmond probably believed that the 
opinion of Nationalists in the North could not be brought 
to consent to abandonment of the time-limit. If so, 
he probably underrated, then as always, the influence 
he possessed. It is always easy to persuade Irishmen 
that if you are going to do a thing you should do it 
*' decently." What is more, a real effect could have 
been produced on much moderate opinion in Ulster by 
saying to Ulster : " Stay out if you like, and come in 
when you like. When you come in, you will be more 
than welcome." But the decision for this course would 
have needed to be taken before the proposals were made, 
since any attempt to enlarge them was bound to renew 
and intensify the inevitable storm of Nationalist dissent. 
Whatever the proposal, it should have been absolutely 
the last word of concession. 

If a clear proposal of local option by counties without 
time-limit had been put before Parliament and the elec- 
torate, I do not think our position in Ireland would have 
been worse than it was made by the proposal of temporary 
exclusion, and it would have been greatly strengthened 
in Parliament and in the United Kingdom. All moderate 
men, and many pronounced Unionists, were becoming 
uneasy under the perpetual menace of trouble. Events 
which now followed rapidly turned the uneasiness into 
grave anxiety, but did not turn it to the profit of the 
Government, 

The policy which was adopted in Mr. Asquith's pro- 
posal of March 9th was the policy which Mr. Churchill 
had pushed from the first introduction of the Home Rule 
Bill, even when it was formally disavowed by the Prime 
Minister. Contemptuous rejection of it by the Ulster- 
men when it was proposed was not calculated to strengthen 
Mr. Churchill's personal position, or to soothe his temper, 
and on March 14th he made a speech at Bradford which 



104 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

very greatly stirred public feeling. If Ulster really 
rejects the offer, said Mr. Churchill, *' it can only be 
because they prefer shooting to voting and the bullet 
to the ballot." Should civil war break out in Ulster, 
the issue would not be confined to Ireland : the issue 
would be whether civil and parliamentary government 
in these realms was to be beaten down by the menace 
of armed force. Bloodshed was lamentable, but there 
were worse things. If the law could not prevail, if the 
veto of violence was to replace the veto of privilege, 
then, said the orator, " let us go forward and put these 
grave matters to a proof." 

When Mr. Churchill next appeared in the House of 
Commons, a great outburst of cheering showed what a 
volume of feeling had found expression in his speech. 
Redmond came to the St. Patrick's Day banquet under 
the impression of that scene, and he spoke with a confi- 
dence which gives to his words a tragic irony to-day. 
He cited " the superb speech of Mr. Churchill " as evidence 
that " what is our last word is also the last word of the 
Government." 

" If the Opposition have spoken their last word," he 
said, " the Bill will now proceed upon its natural course. 
It will proceed rapidly and irresistibly, and in a few short 
weeks become the law of the land." 

The weeks have lengthened into years, and so much 
has happened in them that I keep no clear memory of 
that evening, though I was present. But it represented 
the temper of the time, among Home Rulers, and more 
particularly among Irish Nationalists, who generally 
held the opinion that the military preparations in Ulster 
were, as Mr. Devlin called them, " a hollow masquerade." 

We saw the other side of the picture on Thursday, 
March 19th, when a Vote of Censure was moved. Mr. 
Bonar Law launched on the House of Commons a new 
and sinister suggestion. 

" What about the Army ? If it is only a question of 



THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 105 

disorder, the Army I am sure will obey 5^011, and I am sure 
that it ought to obey you ; but if it really is a question 
of civil war, soldiers are citizens like the rest of us." 

Sir Edward rose immediately the Prime Minister had 
replied to Mr. Bonar Law, and his speech was furious. 
" In consequence of the trilling with this subject by 
the Prime Minister and the provocation, which he has 
endorsed, by the First Lord of the Admiralty last Satur- 
day, I feel I ought not to be here but in Belfast," he 
said ; and he indicated his intention of proceeding there 
as soon as he had spoken. What he had to say chiefly 
concerned the Army, and the preparations which were 
being made at the War Office for the despatch of troops 
to Ulster. He suggested that there was the intention 
to provoke an attack so that there might be " pretext 
for putting them down." 

" You will be all right. You will be no longer 
cowards. The cowardice will have been given up. 
You will have become men in entrenching yourselves 
behind the Army. But under your direction they will 
have become assassins." 

With these words — memorable in connection with 
what happened later, but not in Ulster — the Ulster leader 
left the House, followed by Captain Craig. Fridaj^'s 
papers were of course full of the debate. At noon on 
that day, March 20, 1914, General Sir Arthur Paget, 
Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, held a meeting with the 
officers at the Curragh and received the intimation that 
the majority of them would resign their commissions 
rather than go on duty which was likely to involve a 
collision with Ulster. 

It seems only fair in dealing with this whole incident 
to print here an account of what happened, written from 
the soldier's point of view, by the man who was the spokes- 
man and leader of the resigning officers — Brigadier (now 
Lieutenant) General Sir Hubert Gough.^ 

* Manchester Gxiardian, February 4, 1919 



106 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

' " I never refused to obey orders. On the contrary, 
I obeyed them. I was ordered to make a decision — namely, 
to leave the Army or ' to undertake active operations 
against Ulster.' These were the very words of the terms 
offered. As I was given a choice, I accepted it, and chose 
the first alternative, and as a matter of fact I have a letter 
in existence written the night before the offer was made 
by Sir A. Paget to my brother, saying : ' Something is 
up ' (we had been suddenly ordered to a conference). 
' What is it ? If I receive orders to march North, of 
course I will go.' " 

' All the officers of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade took the 
same line ' (continues the correspondent of the Manchester 
Guardian) ' and resigned. This decision seems not to have 
been exjjected by the authorities, ajid caused great pertur- 
bation. General Gough was urged by Sir Arthur Pagert 
to withdraw the resignation. Sir Arthur Paget told them 
that the operations against Ulster were to be of a purely 
defensive nature. Unfortunately, Sir Arthur Paget based 
his appeal on expediencj;^ and private interest, and not 
sufficiently on the call of public duty. This failed to 
influence the officers. They persisted in their resigna- 
tions, and only finally withdrew them on receiving a 
written undertaking from the War Office that they would 
not be again presented with the alternative of resigning 
or attacking Ulster.' 

The Irish Party had no guess at the inner aspect of 
the occurrence. Naturally, but regrettably, we were 
the section of the House which had least touch with 
what was thought and felt in barrack-rooms and regi- 
mental messes. Naturally, but most regrettably, the 
opinion of the Army regarded us traditionally as a hostile 
body ; and at this time every effort to accentuate that 
belief was made by the political party with which the 
Army had most intercourse and connection. 

Writing now, as I ho]3e I may write without offence, 
of a state of things not far off in time, but divided from 
us of to-day b}'' the marks of a vast upheaval, it can be 
said that the old professional Army was a society governed 
in an extraordinary degree by tradition. Part of that 



THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 107 

tradition was that the Army had no politics ; and as 
everyone knows, the man who says he has no politics 
is in practice almost invariably a Conservative. In the 
Army, usage was at its strongest — stronger even than 
at a public school ; it was almost bad manners, " bad 
form," to hold political of)inions differing from those of 
your mess. Political discussion was sharplj^ discouraged ; 
but this never meant that a man might not express 
vehemently the prevailing opinion. On the broad facts 
it was inevitable that the prevailing opinion should be 
unfriendly to Irish Nationalists. Irish Nationalists had 
taken passionately the line of opposition to the South 
African War ; they had been sharply critical of all the 
minor campaigns in which the Army had been engaged 
for repression or for conquest during the whole period 
since Parnell began his leadership. In Ireland itself, 
every man who reflected for a moment saw at the Curragh 
the very embodiment of that force which had maintained 
for over a hundred j^^ears a Government which had not 
the consent of the governed ; and unless he was one of 
those who regarded themselves as " England's faithful 
garrison in Ireland," protestations of enthusiasm for 
the armed forces of the Crown could not be the natural 
expression of his feelings. 

Yet mingled with the Nationalists' attitude of estrange- 
ment from the forces which upheld a detested system of 
government there was a deep-seated pride in the exploits 
of Irish troops ; and no man ever felt this more strongly 
than Redmond. He seldom spoke of the distinguished 
men he met, but again and again I remember hearing 
him mention with pleasure some talk over a dinner-table 
with this or that famous soldier— Sir John French (as 
he then was), for instance. It was happiness for him to 
find himself on friendly terms with the service to which 
so many sentiments bound him. The Curragh incident 
was to him more than a grave political event ; it pained 
him beyond measure that this opposition should be 



108 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

headed by a representative of one of the Irish families 
most famous for their military record. In the debates 
which dealt with all this matter he said no word, and 
he kept our party silent — a wise course, and one to which 
every instinct prompted him. 

In its political aspect, this action of General Gough 
and the fifty officers allied with him revealed a new and 
formidable impediment on the path to Home Rule ; 
yet it was one of those barriers which rally forces rather 
than weaken them, and in surmounting which, or sweep- 
ing them aside, a new impetus may be gained. The 
incident was first discussed in the House on Monday, 
March 23rd, and continued to dominate all other questions 
for several days. From the Labour benches Mr. John 
Ward (now Colonel), who had been a private soldier, gave 
the first indication of the volume of resentment. His 
speech, remarkable in its power both of phrasing and 
of thought, was delivered quite unexpectedly in a thin 
House ; but its effect was electrical. Later, Mr. J. H. 
Thomas spoke in the same strain. When a railway 
strike was threatened, the soldiers had been called out 
and had come without a murmur. Was the Army to 
be used against all movements except those under the 
patronage of the Tory party ? If so, he would tell his 
four hundred thousand railway men to equip themselves 
to defend their own interests. 

These speeches set people tliinking very gravely, but 
their effect was to increase the confidence of Home Rulers 
— the more so as Sir Edward Grey, in one of his rare 
moments of emphasis, declared his determination to go 
as far as either speaker if the case which they fore- 
shadowed should arise. But new occurrences disquieted 
the public ; the bungling which had characterized deal- 
ings with the officers at the Curragh was not ended there. 
General Gough received a document from Colonel Seely, 
Secretary of State for War, countersigned by Sir John 
French and Sir Spencer Ewart, the military heads of 



THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 109 

the War Office ; and this document was in part disavowed 
by the Cabinet. The two Generals resigned and Colonel 
Seely followed their example. I have never seen the 
House of Commons so completely surprised as on the 
afternoon when the Prime Minister announced that he 
himself would succeed to the vacant office. The surprise 
passed at once into a feeling of immense relief, very widely 
shared by all parties. The right thing had been done 
in the right way, and it was clear that Mr. Asquith pos- 
sessed enormous authority, if he chose to assert it. 

The effect of all these happenings was immediately 
perceptible in the resumed discussion on the Home Rule 
Bill. Mr. Dillon, speaking on the second day, said : 
"Yesterday for the first time I heard this question 
debated in a spirit of reasonableness and conciliation 
and with an evident desire on both sides to reach an 
agreement." A proposal frequently put forward from 
the Tory side suggested exclusion until a federal arrange- 
ment for the United Kingdom could be completed. The 
official Tory demand was for either a referendum or a 
general election. But, as Redmond pointed out when 
he spoke on the fourth and last day of the debate, any 
proposal for a settlement must be a settlement which 
Ulster would accept, and Ulster declared that it would 
not be influenced by any vote of the British people or 
by any Act of Parliament. In a passage of very genuine 
feeling he indicated what Ulster might do to assist him 
in securing for Ulster the extremest limit of concession : 

" Anything which would mean burying the hatchet, 
anything which would mean the consent of these Ulster- 
men to shake hands frankly with their fellow-countrymen 
across the hateful memories of the past, would be wel- 
comed with universal joy in Ireland, and would be gladly 
purchased by very large sacrifices indeed. If the right 
honourable and learned gentleman (Sir Edward Carson) 
would say to me, ' We are both Irishmen ; we both love 
our country ; we both hate — and I am sure this is 



110 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

absolutely true of both of us — we both hate all the 
old sectarian animosities, all the old wrongs, all the old 
memories which have kept Irishmen apart ; let us come 
together and see what we can do for the welfare of our 
common country, so that we can hand down to those 
who come after us an Ireland more free, more peaceful, 
more tolerant, an Ireland less cursed by racial and 
religious differences ' ; if an appeal like that were made 
to me, I say without the smallest hesitation that there 
are no lengths that Nationalist Ireland would not be 
willing to go to assuage the fears, allay the anxieties,. and 
remove the prejudices of their Ulster fellow-countrymen. 

" But, alas ! that is not the position. Even the per- 
manent exclusion of Ulster is not put forward as the price 
of reconciliation ; it is simply put forward as the one 
and sole condition upon which they will give up their 
avowed intention of levying war upon their feUow- 
countrymen." 

He dealt with the federal proposal, and once more 
avowed his desire for that solution. " I have been all 
my political life preaching in favour of federalism." 
But he could not consent that the exclusion of Ulster 
should be prolonged indefinitely pending a settlement 
on federal lines, nor consent to any " watering down 
of the powers in the present Home Rule Bill." 

What remained then, if Ulster would not accept the 
offer ? Nothing but " to proceed calmly with the Bill." 
Threats of civil war he discounted. Disturbances there 
would probably be ; but when the first Home Rule 
Bill was defeated, there were weeks of the most terrible 
riots in Belfast. The House could not afford to be 
deterred from any course by threats of violence ; and 
he was confident that the Bill would pass into law and 
profoundly confident it would never be revoked. 

He gave his reasons for that confidence in a passage 
almost autobiographical in character — if only because 
it made the House realize how completely this man's 



THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES HI 

whole adult life had been devoted to this one long service, 
and how far the labours of our party had achieved their 
purpose. 

" In a sense I may say I have lived my whole life within 
these walls. I came in here little more than a boy, and 
I have grown old in the House of Commons, and in the 
long space of years which have passed since then I have 
witnessed the most extraordinary^ transformation of the 
whole public life of this country, and I have witnessed 
an almost miraculous change in the position and the 
prospects of the Irish National Cause. When I came to 
this House, Irish Nationalist members, in a sense, were 
almost outcasts. Both the great British parties — there 
was no Labour party then — divided on everything else, 
were united in hostility to the national movement and 
the national ideal. Home Rule seemed hopelessly out 
of the range of practical politics. There were only a 
handful of men in this whole House of Commons besides 
us who were in favour of any measure of Home Rule for 
Ireland. Outside, the public opinion of this country 
was ignorant, and it was actively hostile, and we found 
it impossible to gain the ear of the democracy of England 
for the voice of Ireland. All that has vanished into thin 
air. All that has radically changed. The change has 
been slow and gradual, but it has been continuous and 
sure. Such a change as that can never be reversed. 
You might as well talk of the world going back to the 
days before electricity or petrol as hope to bring back 
the prejudices and the ignorance of the masses of the 
people in this country about Ireland, as they existed in 
the past." 

His confidence was strong and it communicated itself 
to Ireland. But whatever could be said to shake confi- 
dence was said by Mr. O'Brien and Mr. Healy, who 
denounced the Bill as worthless when linked to the plan 
of even temporar}^ partition, and declared that, whatever 
the Government might say at present, we had not yet 



112 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

reached the end of their concessions. On the division 
they and their party abstained, so that the majority 
dropped to 77. 

Up to this point it is still true to say that the Nationalist 
party were constant to their faith in strictly constitutional 
action. But a new development was imminent. On the 
night of Friday to Saturday, April 24th-25th, Ulstermen 
brought off their first overt act of rebellion. They seized 
the ports of Larne and Donaghadee, cut off telephone 
and telegraph, landed a very large quantity of rifles 
and ammunition, and despatched them to everj^^ quarter 
of the province by means of a great fleet of motor-cars 
which had been mobilized for the occasion. It was a 
clean and excellent piece of staff work, planned by a 
capable soldier and carried out under military direction : 
and the Tory Press hailed it with no less enthusiasm 
than was elicited by the most important victories in the 
recent war. 

One coastguard, running to give the alarm, died of 
heart failure : otherwise there was no casualty. The 
police and customs officers were confronted with force 
majeure and submitted without show of resistance. The 
Prime Minister, in answering a question as to the action 
which he proposed to take, used these words : 

" In view of this grave and unprecedented outrage 
the House may be assured that His Majesty's Government 
will take without delay appropriate steps to vindicate 
the authority of the law and protect officers and servants 
of the King and His Majesty's subjects in the exercise 
of their legal rights." 

The Opposition was noticeably silent, and next day 
some embarrassment was apparent when they proceeded 
with a previously arranged Vote of Censure on the 
Government for the military and naval movements in 
connection with which the Curragh incident had occurred. 
The sum of these movements amounted to despatching 
four companies to points in Ulster at which very large 



THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 113 

stores of arms and ammunition were lying under very 
small guard — and at one of which there was a battery of 
field guns with no protecting infantry. It was regarded as 
at least possible that the stores might be rushed by " evil- 
disposed persons, not fully under the control of their 
leaders." It was also regarded as possible that the 
movement of these com]Danies might be resisted and 
that much larger operations might be thereby involved. 
The stationing of the Fleet opposite the Belfast coast 
was part of the measures taken against this latter 
contingency. 

All this preparation was denounced as a conspiracy 
organized by Mr. Churchill with intent to provoke re- 
bellion and put it down by a massacre. In view of the 
important military operation which Ulster had just carried 
out against the Crown, Mr. Churchill was not without 
justification in comparing the motion to a vote of censure 
by the criminal classes on the police. Yet, after much 
hard hitting in speech, he once more led the way in retreat 
from the Government's position. Sir Edward Grey had 
declared, speaking for the Government, that beyond the 
six years' limit they could not go. Mr. Churchill him- 
self had declared the Government's offer would be 
and should be their last word. Yet now, avowedly on 
his own account, and not speaking for the Cabinet, he 
proposed that a new negotiation should be opened with 
Sir Edward Carson. 

This proposal elicited no response, and the debate 
continued that day in a line of violent recrimination. 
But next day Sir Edward Carson rose and affirmed that 
he had previously declared his willingness to advise 
Ulster to close with a proposal giving exclusion until 
a Federal scheme had been considered, when the whole 
matter should be reviewed " in the light of the action 
of the Irish Parliament and how they got on." Now 
he said : 

" I shall try to make an advance on what I said before. 

9 



114 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

I will say this — and I hope the House will believe me, 
because, though I do not want to be introducing my 
own personality into it, I am myself a southerner in 
Ireland — I would say this : That if Home Rule is to pass, 
much as I detest it, and little as I will take any respon- 
sibiHty for the passing of it, my earnest hope, and indeed 
I would say my most earnest prayer, would be that the 
Government of Ireland for the South and West would 
prove, and might prove, such a success in the future, 
notwithstanding all our anticipations, that it might be 
even for the interest of Ulster itself to move towards 
that Government, and come in under it and form one 
unit in relation to Ireland. May I say something more 
than that ? I would be glad to see such a state of things 
arising in Ireland, in which you would find that mutual 
confidence and goodwill between all classes in Ireland 
as would lead to a stronger Ireland as an integral unit 
in the federal scheme. While I say all that, that depends 
upon goodwill, and never can be brought about by 
force." 

Redmond remained silent ; but months later it became 
known that he had taken action to foster this new spirit. 
He advised the Prime Minister not to proceed with the 
prosecution which had been threatened against the Larne 
gun-runners. But at the same time he urged upon 
Government that they should withdraw the proclamation 
against importing arms : and for this he had good reason. 
The Larne affair had rendered the movement in support 
of the Irish Volunteers irresistible, and Redmond had 
decided to throw himself in with it. 

The result was an amazing upward leap in the numbers 
of the Volunteers. On June 15th a question brought 
out that they were estimated at 80,000 against 84,000 
of the Ulster force ; but the Nationalist body was in- 
creasing at the rate of 15,000 a week. By July 9th they 
were reckoned (on police information) at 132,000, of 
whom nearly forty thousand were Army reservists. 



THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 115 

These facts now dominated the situation. It was now 
abundantly clear that if passing Home Rule meant 
civil war, so also would the abandonment of Home Rule. 
On June 16th Lord Robert Cecil raised a debate on the 
new danger. In that debate words were quoted from 
Sir Roger Casement, one of the most active promoters 
of the movement : " When you are challenged on the 
field of force, it is upon that field you must reply." Mr. 
Dillon, who exulted in the " splendid demonstration of 
national sentiment shown in the uprising of the National 
Volunteers," urged strongly that the growth of a rival 
body was not a menace to public order but an added 
security. The armed Ulstermen would be " much slower 
to break the peace " when they realized the certainty 
of formidable resistance — and this, be it said, was no 
ungrounded observation. Yet at the same time the 
very success of the Volunteer movement was disquieting 
Redmond. He was not in the same position as Sir 
Edward Carson, who from the first had directed, presided 
over, and controlled the raising and equipment of his 
force ; and unless the force were to be a menace to his 
leadership, he must secure control. As Mr. Bulmer 
Hobson puts it in his History of the Irish Volunteers : 

" The Volunteers had men in their ranks who were 
political followers of Mr. Redmond's, and men who were 
not, and who never had been. The latter were willing 
to help him if he had been ready to help them ; they 
would have made terms with him, but were not prepared 
to be merely absorbed into his movement." 

The strength of Redmond's position lay in the fact 
that the vast majority of the enrolled men looked to him 
as their leader : his weakness, in that the committees 
under which enrolment had taken place were largely 
composed of the extremist section. He now determined 
to unite the Volunteers with the parliamentary party 
as the Ulster Volunteers were linked with Sir Edward 
Carson and his civilian organization. 



116 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

The men with whom he had to deal were principally 
Professor MacNeill and Sir Roger Casement. His first 
proposal was to replace the existing Provisional Com- 
mittee by another, consisting of nine members, with Pro- 
fessor MacNeill, who was regarded as a general supporter 
of Redmond's, in the chair. Oddly enough, the negotia- 
tions broke down because Redmond nominated Michael 
Davitt's son along with Mr. Devlin and his own brother 
to be representatives. The young Davitt had at an 
early stage expressed dissent from the movement, and 
this, coming from his father's son, left bitter resentment. 
The existing Committee now proposed to call a National 
Convention of the Volunteers. Such a body would 
clearly have become a rival, and a powerful rival, to the 
National Convention of a purely citizen type, and Redmond 
felt himself forced to take drastic action. In a public 
letter dated June 9th he wrote : 

" I regret to observe the controversy which is now 
taking place in the Press on the Irish National Volunteer 
movement. Many of the writers convey the impression 
that the Volunteer movement is, to some extent at all 
events, hostile to the objects and policy of the Irish 
party. I desire to say emphatically that there is no 
foundation for this idea, and any attempts to create 
discord between the Volunteer movement and the Irish 
party are calculated in my opinion to ruin the Volunteer 
movement, which, properly directed, may be of incal- 
culable service to the National Cause. 

" Up to two months ago I felt that the Volunteer 
movement was somewhat premature, but the effect of 
Sir Edward Carson's threats upon public opinion in 
England, the House of Commons, and the Government ; 
the occurrences at the Curragh Camp, and the successful 
gun-running in Ulster, have vitally altered the position, 
and the Irish party took steps about six weeks ago to 
inform their friends and supporters in the country that 
in their opinion it was desirable to support the Volunteer 



THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 117 

movement, with the result that within the last six weeks 
the movement has spread like a prairie fire, and all the 
Nationalists of Ireland will shortly be enrolled. 

" Within the last fortnight I have had communications 
from men in all parts of the country, inquiring as to the 
organization and control of the Volunteer movement, 
and it has been strongly represented to me that the 
Governing Body should be reconstructed and placed on 
a thoroughly representative basis, so as to give confidence 
to aU shades of National opinion." 

Redmond's proposal was that to the existing Committee 
there should be added twenty-five representative men 
from different parts of the country, nominated at the 
instance of the Irish party and in sympathy with its 
policy and aims. Failing this, he intimated that it would 
be " necessary to fall back on county control and govern- 
ment until the organization was sufficientlj'" complete 
to make possible the election of a fully representative 
Executive by the Volunteers themselves." 

The intimation was not at once accepted. An order 
was issued calling on the Volunteers to elect additional 
representatives by counties to be added to the Committee. 
Redmond at once publicly declared that this amounted 
to refusal of his offer, and he put the issue very plainly. 
The Provisional Committee was originally self-constituted 
and had been increased only by co-option. The majority 
of its members, he was informed, were not supporters 
of the Irish party : of the rank and file at least 
95 per cent., he said, were supporters of the Irish 
party and its policy. 

" This is a condition of things which plainly cannot 
continue. The rank and file of the Volunteers and the 
responsible leaders of the Irish people are entitled, and 
indeed are bound, to demand some security that an 
attempt shall not be made in the name of the Volunteers 
to dictate policy to the National party, who, as the 
elected representatives of the people, are charged with 



118 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

the responsibility of deciding upon the policy best calcu- 
lated to bring the National movement to success. 

" Moreover, a military organization is of its very nature 
so grave and serious an undertaking that every responsible 
Nationalist in the country who supports it is entitled 
to the most substantial guarantees against any possible 
imprudence. The best guarantee to be found is clearly 
the presence on the Governing Body of men of proved 
judgment and steadiness." 

As a last word he renewed his threat of calling on his 
supporters to organize separate county committees inde- 
pendent of the Dublin centre. This was carrying matters 
with a high hand, and the fact that he succeeded proves 
the greatness of his prestige at the moment. The Com- 
mittee in a published manifesto accepted his terms, but 
accepted them with declared regret, and eight of the 
original members seceded. Among them was Patrick 
Pearse, with whom went three others who suffered death 
in Easter week two years later. 

All this was a disastrous business, and the worst part 
of it lay in the public avowal of divided councils. More- 
over, a committee so constituted could not, and did not, 
operate efficiently. The original members were primarily 
interested in the Volunteer Force ; the added ones 
primarily in the parliamentary movement. Nearly all 
of the latter — selected for their " proved judgment and 
steadiness " — were men past middle age ; and of the 
whole twenty-five Willie Redmond alone subsequently 
bore arms. 

There was indeed an undertying difference of principle. 
Redmond knew well, and all parliamentarians with him, 
that under the terms of the Home Rule Bill no army 
could be raised or maintained in Ireland without the 
consent of the Imperial Parliament. The original Volun- 
teer Committee laid it down as an axiom that the 
Volunteer Force should be permanent ; they were, as 
Casement put it, " the beginning of an Irish army." 



THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 119 

Sir Edward Carson's policy had produced a new 
mentality among Irish Nationalists, and it made many 
take Redmond's constitutionalism for timidity. 

But in the eyes of the world and of Ireland generally, 
Redmond was just as much as Sir Edward Carson the 
accredited and accepted leader of his Volunteer organi- 
zation, and to him the Volunteers looked for provision 
of arms and equipment. One of his chief preoccupations 
in those months was with this matter, and it explains 
his desire to have the procla^mation against the import 
of arms withdrawn. The Larne exploit had proved the 
futility of it ; articles by Colonel Repington in The Times 
testified to the completeness of the provision which had 
been made for Ulster. But smuggling is always a costly 
business, and Nationalists were hampered by the cost. 
More than that, there was ground for suspicion that 
the scales were not equally weighted as between Ulster 
and the rest of the country. On June 30th Redmond 
wrote a letter to the Chief Secretary repeating his case 
for withdrawal of the proclamation. It is all memorable, 
but especially the warning which concludes the following 
passages from it : 

" In the South and West of Ireland, not only are the 
most active measures being taken against the importa- 
tion of arms, but many owners of vessels are harassed 
unnecessarily. 

" The effect of this unequal working of the proclama- 
tion has been grave amongst our people, and has tended 
to increase both their exasperation and their apprehensions. 

" The apprehensions of our people are justified to the 
fullest. They find themselves, especially in the North, 
faced by a large, drilled, organized and armed body. 
Furthermore, the incident at the Curragh has given 
them the fixed idea that they cannot rely on the Army 
for protection. The possession of arms by Nationalists 
would, under these circumstances, be no provocation 
for disorder, but a means of preserving the peace by 



120 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

confronting one armed force with another, not helpless 
but, by being armed, fully able to defend themselves. 

" Finally, we want to call your most serious attention 
to the grave and imminent danger of a collision between 
Nationalists and the police in the effort to import arms. 
The police in the South and West might not be so passive 
as they were in the recent affair at Larne, and there 
might be serious conflicts, and even loss of life, and from 
this day forward every day which the proclamation is 
enforced as strictly as it is now against the Nationalists 
brings increased danger of disastrous collision between 
the police and the people." 

Within a fortnight a minor incident illustrated the 
" unequal working " referred to in the first of these points. 
General Richardson, who commanded the Ulster Force, 
had issued on July 1st an order authorizing all Ulster 
Volunteers to carry arms openly and to resist any attempt 
at interference. In Ulster accordingly no search was 
ever attempted. But on July 15th Mr. Lawrence Kettle, 
brother to Professor Kettle, who had from the first been 
a prominent official of the Volunteers, was returning in 
his motor from the electric works at the Pigeon House ; 
he was stopped by the police and his car searched for 
arms. Such an occurrence in Ulster would have been 
held to Justify immediate rebellion, and would have been 
carefully avoided. In Dublin there was no such avoidance 
of provocation. 

Yet the avoidance of anything which might precipitate 
strife was indeed in these days most desirable. June 28th 
saw the murder of the Archduke at Sarajevo. The 
European sky grew rapidly overcast. Days passed, and 
the possibility of civil war was exchanged for the near 
probability of European war which might find the British 
Empire divided against itself. 

It was necessary in the highest interests of State for 
the Government to make an effort to compose the cause 
of so much violent faction, which might at any moment 



THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 121 

assume acute form. The Amending Bill, introduced in 
the House of Lords with the Government's offer embodied 
in it, had been altered by the Peers in a manner which 
Lord Morley described as tantamount to rejection. In 
this shape it was to come before the House of Commons 
on July 20th. But on that Monday, when the House 
reassembled after the weekly holiday, the Prime Minister 
rose at once and announced in tones of no ordinary 
solemnity that the King had thought it right to summon 
representatives of parties both British and Irish to a 
Conference next day at Buckingham Palace, over which 
Mr. Speaker would preside. 

Redmond in two brief sentences guarded his attitude. 
He disclaimed all responsibility for the policy of calling 
the Conference and expressed no opinion as to its chances 
of success. The invitation had reached him and Mr. 
Dillon in the form of a command from the King, and as 
such they had accepted it. 

Some may remember how radiantly fine were those 
far-off days in July which led us up to the brink of such 
undreamt-of happenings. On the Tuesday night I was 
sitting alone on the Terrace, when Redmond came out. 
For once, he was in a mood to talk. His mind was full 
of the strangeness and interest of that first day's Confer- 
ence — a council, or parley, so momentous, so unprece- 
dented. It touched what was very strong in him — the 
historic imagination. He told me how the King had 
received them all, stayed with them for some intercourse 
of welcome, and had been specially marked in his courtesy 
to Redmond himself, who had of course never before 
been presented to him. Then, he had accompanied 
them to the room set apart for their deliberations and 
had left them with their chairman, the Speaker. When 
I think over Redmond's description of the Sovereign's 
personality, it seems to me that he was describing one so 
paralysed, as it were, by anxiety as to have lost the 
power of easy, genial and natural speech. But the 



122 JOHN REDMOND'S L^ST YEARS 

dominant thought in his mind did not concern King 
George. One figure stood out — Sir Edward Carson. 
" As an Irishman," Redmond said, *' you could not help 
being proud to see how he towered above the others. 
They simply did not count. He took charge absolutely." 

As I gathered, the eight members sat four on each 
side of a long table, with the Speaker at the head. The 
Irish leaders were on his right and left, and the discussion 
was chiefly between them. 

It turned mainly on the question of the area to be 
excluded. Enormous trouble had been taken, and Red- 
mond told me later that a great map in relief had been 
constructed, showing the distribution of Protestant and 
Catholic population. This brought out with astonishing 
vividness the contrast : the Catholics were on the mountains 
and hill-tops, the Protestants down along the valley lands. 

Nothing could be more cordial, Redmond said, than 
Sir Edward Carson's manner to him. They met as old 
friends, and I believe that when they parted, one asked 
the other that they should have " one good shake-hands 
for the sake of old times on the Munster circuit." But 
it was clearly recognized that there was a point beyond 
which neither of them could take his followers, and these 
points could not be brought to meet. Even if adjustment 
had been possible on the question of time-limit, neither 
would give up the debatable counties, Tyrone and 
Fermanagh, in which the Nationalists had a clear though 
small majority of the population, but in which the Ulster 
Volunteer organization was very strong. On Friday, July 
24th, Mr. Asquith announced the failure of the attempt. 
" The possibility of defining an area for exclusion from 
the operation of the Government of Ireland Bill was con- 
sidered, and the Conference being unable to agree either 
in principle or in detail on such an area, it concluded." 

An incident which did not lack significance was that 
on the second day of these meetings Redmond, returning 
with Mr. Dillon along Birdcage Walk to the House, was 



THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 123 

recognized by some Irish Guards in the barracks, who 
raised a cheer for the Nationalist leaders which ran all 
along the barrack square. The Army was not all disposed 
to take sides with Ulster and against the Nationalists. 

But parts of it were. The collision between forces of 
the Crown and Irish Volunteers trying to land arms, 
which Redmond had foretold and deprecated in his letter 
of June 30th, was fated to occur. 

On Saturday, July 25th, five thousand Ulster Volunteers, 
fully armed, with four machine guns — in short, an infantry 
brigade equipped for active service — marched through 
the streets of Belfast, no one interfering. On Sunday, 
the 26th, a private yacht sailed into Howth harbour 
with eleven hundred rifles on board and some boxes of 
ammunition. By preconcerted arrangement a body of 
some seven hundred Irish Volunteers had marched down 
to meet the yacht. These men took the rifles, and with 
them set out to march back in column of route to Dublin. 
Two thousand rounds of ammunition were with them in 
a truck-cart, but none was distributed. 

Meanwhile the telephones had been busy. The Assistant- 
Commissioner of Dublin Police, Mr. Harrel, an energetic 
officer, was informed, and he acted instantly. The 
Under-Secretary, permanent official head of Dublin Castle, 
was at his Lodge in the Phoenix Park some two miles 
distant : Mr. Harrel informed him of what was happening 
and was ordered to meet him at the Castle. But Mr. Harrel 
was not content to delay. He called out what police he 
could muster, some hundred and eighty men, and judging 
that they would be insufficient, decided on his own 
authority to requisition the military. At the Kildare 
Street Club he found the Brigadier-General in command 
of the troops in Dublin, and this officer immediately 
ordered out a company of the King's Own Scottish 
Borderers. With this force of soldiers and police Mr. 
Harrel proceeded to a point on the road from Howth 
to Dublin and blocked the way. When the body of 



124 JOHN REDMOND'8 LAST YEARS 

Volunteers reached him, he demanded the surrender of 
their rifles. This was refused. He then ordered the 
police to disarm the men. A scuffle followed, in which 
nineteen rifles were seized. Some of the Volunteers 
without orders fired revolvers, and by this firing two 
soldiers were slightly wounded. One Volunteer received 
a slight bayonet wound. 

Then there was a stop and a parley, and the Volunteer 
leaders threatened to distribute ammunition. While the 
parley lasted the Volunteers in rear of the column dis- 
persed, carrying their rifles, leaving only a couple of ranks 
drawn across the road in front, who blocked the view. 
When Mr. Harrel perceived what was happening, he 
ordered the soldiers to march back to Dublin and took 
the police with him. 

By this time wild rumours had spread through the 
city, and on the way back the troops were mobbed. They 
were pelted with every kind of missile and many were 
hurt, though none seriously ; and it understates the 
truth to say that they were in no danger. They had 
their bayonets, and from time to time made thrusts at 
their assailants. At last, on the quays, at a place called 
Bachelor's Walk, the company was halted, and the officer 
in command intended, if necessary, to give an order for 
a few individual men to fire over the heads of the crowd. 
But the troops had lost their temper, and without order 
given a considerable number fired into the crowd. Three 
persons were killed and some thirty injured. 

The first that I knew of these events was on the Monday, 
when I got the paper at a station in Gloucestershire, on 
my way to the House. The railwaj^-carriage was full 
of casual English people, and I have never heard so much 
indignant comment on any piece of news. " Why should 
they shoot the people in Dublin when they let the Ulster- 
men do what they like ? " That was the burden of it. 
It is easy to guess what was felt and thought and said 
in Dublin and throughout Ireland. 



THE RIVAL VOLUNTEER FORCES 125 

What Redmond said in the House of Commons is char- 
acteristic of his attitude. He demanded that full judicial 
and military inquiry into the action of the troops should 
be held, and that proper punishment should be inflicted 
on those found guilty. 

" But," he said, " really the responsibility rests upon 
those who requisitioned the troops under these circum- 
stances. So far as the troops are concerned, I deplore 
more than I can say that this has occurred — this incident 
calculated to breed bad blood between the Irish people 
and the troops. I deplore that. I hope that our people 
will not be so unjust as to hold the troops generally respon- 
sible for what, no doubt, taking it at its worst, was the 
offence of a limited number of men." 

I do not think any soldier could have wished for a 
fairer or more friendly statement ; and a chance assisted 
to realize his hope that the troops generally would not 
be held responsible. One of the killed was a woman 
whose son was a Dublin Fusilier. This man published 
a letter in the Press calling on all Dublin Fusiliers and 
all soldiers who sympathized with him to attend the 
funeral. It was well that the populace should feel on 
such a matter as this that all the troops were not against 
them ; and well that they should be counselled by the 
leader of their nation to be reasonable in the direction 
of their resentment. 

This whole incident should never be forgotten by those 
who are disposed to judge the Irish harshly for what 
they did, and did not do, in the succeeding years. Above 
all, it should be remembered that the news of it, terribly 
provocative in itself to any people, but tenfold pro- 
vocative by reason of the contrast which it revealed as 
compared with the treatment of Ulster, was published to 
the world less than ten days before Redmond had to 
face the question, What should Ireland do in the war ? 



CHAPTER V 
WAR IN EUROPE 



r~riHE week which began on Monday, July 27th, was 
_JL feverish and excited. Formal discussion on the 
occurrences at Clontarf and Bachelor's Walk was confined 
to the Monday ; but each day had a stormy scene during 
question- time arising out of it. The Amending Bill from 
the Lords was to have been taken on Tuesday, but Mr. 
Asquith postponed it till Thursday, to get a calmer atmo- 
sphere. When Thursday came, it was postponed again 
and indefinitely. " We meet," said the Prime Minister, 
" under conditions of gravity which are almost unparalleled 
in the experience of any one of us." It was therefore 
necessary to " present a united front and be able to speak 
and act with the authority of an undivided nation." 
To continue the Home Rule discussion must involve 
the House in acute controversy in regard to " domestic 
differences whose importance to ourselves no one in any 
quarter of the House is disposed to disparage or belittle." 
The Leader of the Opposition assented. Two sentences 
in his speech have importance. The first laid it down 
that this postponement should not " in any way pre- 
judice the interests of any of the parties to the con- 
troversy." The second indicated that he spoke not 
only for the Unionist party but for Ulster. 

It is very difficult now, after all that has crowded in 
upon us, jading the sensitive recipient surface of memory, 
to reconstitute the frame of mind in which we passed 
those days. One thing I clearly remember, perhaps worth 

126 



WAR IN EUROPE 127 

noting for its significance. In a division lobby, probably 
on the Wednesday night, I came in touch with a friend, 
then a subordinate member of the Government, who 
had been among the keenest advocates of our cause. 
I asked how he thought things were going. My question 
had reference to our affairs, which had been for so many 
months the dominant issue ; but he answered with 
reference to the European situation, as if that alone 
existed. Looking back, it seems to me strange that 
one should have been so engrossed in any preoccupation 
as in reality to ignore the vast and imminent possibilities . 
Yet, after all, I believe my case was typical of many. 
For us Irish, this was the crucial point, the climax of a 
struggle which had been intense and continuous now 
for a period of four years — which in its wider sense had 
gone on, with ebb and flow, yet always in progress during 
the whole adult lifetime of our leader and his principal 
colleagues. For more than us, for scores of Labour men 
and Liberals, it had become almost a fixed belief that 
European war was only a nightmare of the imagination. 
War in the Balkans, war possibly in the East of Europe, 
we could think of ; but war flinging the complex organi- 
zation, so potent yet so delicate, of great and fully civilized 
States into the melting-pot — that we never really believed 
in. Prophets of finance, prophets of the labour world, 
had told us the thing was impossible. Even our most 
recent experience, the irruption of armed forces into the 
political arena, had contributed to fix in our minds the 
view that all armaments were merely in terrorem, part 
of a gigantic game of bluff. 

In a world organized as was Europe in 1914 on the 
basis of universal military service, it is dangerous, not 
only materially but morally and intellectually, to be as 
the people of these islands were, segregated from all 
military experience. We were almost like children in 
a magazine of explosives : we knew, of course, that there 
were dangerous substances about us ; but we did not 



128 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

realize how suddenly and irretrievably the whole thing 
might go off. 

I do not know how Redmond gauged the situation. 
But he spent the end of the week in town, and must have 
been less unprepared than was one like myself, who during 
the Saturday, Sunday and the Monday Bank Holiday 
was away in a most peaceful country-side, remote from 
news. Even on the Tuesday, the instant bearing on our 
own questions and our own lives of what we read in the 
newspapers was not clear to me. There was to be a 
debate, of course ; but only when I saw the attendants 
setting chairs on the floor of the House itself — a thing 
which had not been done since Gladstone introduced 
his second Home Rule Bill — did I grasp the fact that 
something wholly unusual was expected. 

My strong impression is that the House as a whole was 
in great measure unprepared for what it had to face. 
You could feel surprise in the air as Sir Edward Grey 
developed his wonderful speech. Men, shaken away 
from all traditional attitudes, responded from the depths 
of themselves to an appeal which none of us had ever 
heard before. 

Having failed to secure my place on the Irish benches, 
I was sitting on one of the chairs close by the Sergeant 
at Arms, just inside the bar of the House, so that I saw 
at once both sides of the assembly : there were no parties 
that day. The Foreign Secretary's speech, intensely 
English, with all the quality that is finest in English 
tradition, clearly did not in its opening stages carry the 
House as a whole. Passages struck home, here and 
there, to men not to parties, kindling individual senti- 
ments. Appeal to a common feeling for France did not 
elicit a general response ; but here and there in every 
quarter there were those who leapt to their feet and 
cheered, waving the papers that were in their hands ; 
and the two figures that stand out most vividly in my 
recollection were Willie Redmond, our leader's brother, 



WAR IN EUROPE 129 

and Arthur Lynch. We were in a very different 
atmosphere already from the days of the Boer War. 

It was not until the speaker reached in his statement 
the outrage committed on Belgian neutrality that feeling 
manifested itself universally. Appeal was made to the 
sense of honour, of fair play, of respect for pledges, by 
a man as well fitted to make such an appeal as ever 
addressed any audience ; and it was the case of Belgium 
that made the House of Commons unanimous. 

Later in the evening speeches from the Radical group 
made it clear that unanimity was not yet definitive. 
Labour was hesitant ; Germany had still to complete Sir 
Edward Grey's work. With this disposition in England 
itself, what was likely to be the feeling in Ireland ? No- 
body, I think, expected that anything would be said from 
our benches. There had been no consultation in our party, 
such as was customary and almost obligatory on important 
occasions. I have said before that Redmond's position 
was by understanding and agreement that of chairman, 
not of leader. Mr. Dillon, by far the most important 
of his colleagues, was away in Ireland. Any action that 
Redmond took he must take not merely in an unusual 
but in a new capacity, as leader, at a great moment, 
acting in his own right. 

Neither had there been any consultation between him 
and the Government. He knew only what the general 
public knew. Parts of Sir Edward Grey's speech were 
to him, as to the other members of the House, a surprise 
at many points. At one point it certainly was. After 
summing up the situation, first in relation to France, 
then in relation to Belgium, the Foreign Secretary, speaking 
with the utmost gravity, foretold for Great Britain terrible 
suffering in this war, " whether we are in it or whether 
we stand aside." He made it clear that the island safety 
was not unchallengeable ; there could be no pledge to 
send an expeditionary force outside the kingdom. Then, 
with a sudden lift of his voice, he added : " One thing I 

10 



130 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

would say : the one bright spot in the very dreadful 
situation is Ireland. The position in Ireland — and this 
I should like to be clearly understood abroad — is not a 
consideration among the things we have to take into 
account now." 

The history of this passage is strange. All who heard 
assumed that the speaker relied on definite promises. 
Such a promise had been given, from one party. The 
Ulster leader had, with the sure instinct for Ulster's 
interest which guided him throughout, conveyed to 
the Government through Mr. Bonar Law an assurance 
that they could count on Ulster's imperial patriotism. 
Ulster, so far as pledges went, was the bright spot. Where 
Germany had counted on finding trouble for Great 
Britain, no trouble would be found. But Sir Edward 
Grey at that moment of his career was lifted perhaps 
beyond himself, certainly to the utmost range of his 
statesmanship. He was a chief member of the Ministry 
which had brought to the verge of complete statutory 
accomplishment the task which the Liberal party inherited 
from Gladstone. He knew — his words have been already 
quoted — what Ireland's gratitude to Gladstone had been 
even for the unfinished effort ; and now, in this crucial 
hour, he counted upon Ireland. From Ulster, which 
had its bitter resentment, assurances were needed : but 
if Ulster were contented to fall into line, then all was 
well with Ireland. Speaking as one who had done his 
part by Ireland, with the confidence that counts upon 
full comradeship he assumed the generosity of Ireland's 
response. That did not fail him, sudden and unfore- 
seen though the challenge came — for it was an appeal 
and a challenge to Ireland's generosity. 

When the notable words concerning Ireland were 
spoken, Redmond turned to the colleague who sat next 
him, one of his close personal friends, and one of his wisest, 
most moderate and most courageous counsellors. He 
said : " I'm thinking of saying something. Do you 



WAR IN EUROPE 131 

think I ought to ? " Mr. Hay den answered, " That 
depends on what you are going to say." Redmond said : 
" I'm going to tell them they can take all their troops 
out of Ireland and we will defend the country ourselves," 
" In that case," said Mr. Hayden, " you should certainly 
speak." Redmond leant over to Mr. T. P. O'Connor, 
who sat immediately below him, and consulted him also. 
Mr. O'Connor was against it. Though the war had no 
more enthusiastic supporter, he thought the risk too 
great. It was just a week and a day since Redmond 
had moved an adjournment to consider the occasion 
when Government forces were turned out to disarm 
Irish Volunteers, and when troops fired without order 
on a Dublin crowd. Ireland was still given over to a 
fury of resentment, issuing not alone in speeches but in 
active warlike preparation. On Sunday, August 1st, 
memorial masses for the victims were held up and down 
the country. In Belfast there was a parade of four 
thousand Irish Volunteers ; and finally, at a point on 
the Wicklow coast, some ten thousand rifles were landed 
and distributed in defiance of Government and its 
troops. Now, forty-eight hours after these demonstra- 
tions, would the Irish leader ask his countrymen to 
blot from their minds and from their hearts so 
recent and so terrible a wound ? Would he attempt 
to change the whole direction of a nation's feeling ? 
The boldest and the most generous might well have 
hesitated. Redmond did not. 

This is not to say that he spoke without full reflection. 
He always thought far ahead ; and in these tense days 
of waiting upon rumour, he must have pondered deeply 
upon all the possibilities — must have had intuition of 
what this opportunity, England's difiiculty, might mean 
for Ireland. Other minds were on the same trail. In 
the Dublin papers of that morning were two letters of 
moment — one of them from Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. 

" The chief point which has divided Protestant Ulster 



132 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

from the rest of Ireland," he wrote, " is that Nationalists 
were not loyal to the Empire." Then, recalling briefly 
the extent to which Irish Nationalists had helped in 
creating that Empire, he went on : " There is no possible 
reason why a man should not be a loyal Irishman and a 
loyal Imperialist also. ... A whole-hearted declaration 
of loyalty to the common ideal would at the present 
moment do much to allay the natural fears of Ulster and 
to strengthen the position of Ireland. Such a chance 
is unlikely to recur. I pray that the Irish leaders may 
understand its significance and put themselves in a 
position to take advantage of it." 

The other letter, written from a different standpoint, 
was signed by Mr. M. J. Judge, a most active Irish Volun- 
teer who had been wounded in the scuj63e on the way 
back from Howth. " England," he said, " might inspire 
confidence by restoring it. She could bestow confidence 
by immediately arming and equipping the Irish Volunteers. 
The Volunteers, properly armed and equipped, could 
preserve Ireland from invasion, and England would be 
free to utilize her ' army of occupation ' for the defence 
of her own shores." 

Redmond could not have seen either of these letters, 
but those two trains of thought were blended in his speech 
— which was less a speech than a supreme action. It 
was the utterance of a man who has a vision and who, 
acting in the light of it, seeks to embody the vision in a 
living reality. 

Mr. Bonar Law followed Sir Edward Grey with a few 
brief sentences of whole-hearted support. Then Redmond 
rose, and a hush of expectation went over the house. 
I can see it now, the crowded benches and the erect, solid 
figure with the massive hawk-visaged head thrown back, 
standing squarely at the top of the gangway. Wliile 
he spoke, as during Sir Edward Grey's speech, the cheering 
broke out first intermittently and scattered over the 
House, then grew gradually universal. Sitting about 



WAR IN EUROPE 133 

me were Tory members whom I did not know ; I heard 
their ejaculations of bewilderment, approval and delight. 
But in the main body of the Unionists behind the front 
Opposition bench papers were being waved, and when 
Redmond sat down many of these men stood up to cheer 
him. In five minutes he had changed the whole atmosphere 
of domestic politics in regard to the main issue of contro- 
versy. — Here is the speech : 

" I hope the House will not think me impertinent 
to intervene in the debate, but I am moved to do so a 
great deal by that sentence in the speech of the Foreign 
Secretary in which he said that the one bright spot in 
the situation was the changed feeling in Ireland. Sir, 
in past time, when this Empire has been engaged in these 
terrible enterprises, it is true that it would be the utmost 
affectation and folly on my part to deny that the sympathies 
of Nationalist Ireland, for reasons deep down in the 
centuries of history, have been estranged from this country. 
But allow me to say that what has occurred in recent 
years has altered the situation completely. I must not 
touch upon any controversial topic, but this I may be 
allowed to say — that a wider knowledge of the real facts 
of Irish history has altered the view of the democracy 
of this country towards the Irish question, and I honestly 
believe that the democracy of Ireland will turn with 
the utmost anxiety and sympathy to this country in 
every trial and danger with which she is faced. 

" There is a possibility of history repeating itself. The 
House will remember that in 1778, at the end of the 
disastrous American War, when it might be said that 
the military force of this country was almost at its lowest 
ebb, the shores of Ireland were threatened with invasion. 
Then a hundred thousand Irish Volunteers sprang into 
existence for the purpose of defending those shores. At 
first, however — and how sad is the reading of the history 
of those days ! no Catholic was allowed to be enrolled in 
that body of Volunteers ; yet from the first day the Catholics 



134 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

of the South and West subscribed their money and sent 
it for the army of their Protestant fellow-countrymen. 
Ideas widened as time went on, and finally the Catholics 
of the South were armed and enrolled as brothers-in-arms 
with their fellow-countrymen. May history repeat itself ! 
To-day there are in Ireland two large bodies of Volunteers, 
one of which has sprung into existence in the North and 
another in the South. I say to the Government that 
they may to-morrow withdraw every one of their troops 
from Ireland, Ireland will be defended by her armed 
sons from invasion, and for that purpose the armed 
Catholics in the South will be only too glad to join arms 
with the armed Protestant Ulstermen. Is it too much 
to hope that out of this situation a result may spring 
which will be good, not merely for the Empire, but for 
the future welfare and integrity of the Irish nation ? 
Whilst Irishmen are in favour of peace and would desire 
to save the democracy of this country from all the horrors 
of war, whilst we will make any possible sacrifice for that 
purpose, still, if the necessity is forced upon this country, 
we offer this to the Government of the day : They may 
take their troops away, and if it is allowed to us, in 
comradeship with our brothers in the North, we will 
ourselves defend the shores of Ireland." 

It needed no gift of prophecy to be certain that such 
a speech would be popular in the House of Commons, 
and many Unionists that day were almost aggrieved 
that Sir Edward Carson had not risen at once to reply 
to the offer in the same spirit. They did not realize the 
difficulty of the Ulster leader's position. To admit and 
welcome the unity of Ireland was to give away Ulster's 
case. To accept the Nationalist leader's utterance as 
sincere, still more to assume that Ireland as a whole 
would endorse it, was to weaken, if not to give away, 
Ulster's best argument, and from that hour to the end 
of the war Sir Edward Carson was most loyal to Ulster's 
interests. 



WAR IN EUROPE 135 

Further, it is conceivable that by some who cheered 
it the speech may have been misunderstood. Yet it is 
not probable that many who heard Redmond believed 
that in order to serve England he was flinging away 
Ireland's national claim, to the successful furtherance 
of which his whole life had been devoted. The Unionist 
party as a whole certainly understood that to accept 
Redmond's offer in the spirit in which it was made meant 
accepting the principle of Home Rule : and on that 
afternoon in August they were not unready to accept it. 
They felt, for the speech made them feel, that a great 
thing had happened. Yet they might well be pardoned 
for some scepticism as to how the utterance might be 
taken in Ireland, and how it would issue in action. A 
famous Nationalist said some ten days later : " When 
I read the speech in the paper, I was filled with dismay. 
Now I recognize that it was a great stroke of statesman- 
ship which I should never have had the courage to 
advise." 

Redmond's instinct had been right. He trusted in 
the appeal to national pride and to the sense of national 
unity. Ireland was perfectly willing, and he knew it, to 
give loyal friendship to England on the basis of freedom. 
But the test of freedom had now come to be the right to 
bear arms, and this was a proposal that Ireland should 
undertake her own defence. Ireland was sick of the 
talk of civil war, and this was a proposal that Ulstermen 
and the rest should make common cause. It was an 
appeal addressed by an instinct, which was no less subtle 
than it was noble, to what was most responsive in the 
best qualities of Irishmen. None the less it was a states- 
man's utterance addressed to a people politically quick- 
minded ; Ireland saw as well as Redmond himself that 
what stood in the way of Ireland's national aspiration 
was the opposition of one section of Irishmen. To that 
extent, and to that extent only, was the speech political 
in its purpose. Whatever made for common action made 



136 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

for unity ; and whatever made for unity made for Home 
Rule. That is the key to Redmond's attitude throughout 
the war — perhaps also to Sir Edward Carson's. 



The response from Nationalist Ireland had not long 
to be waited for — although the inquest on the victims 
of the Bachelor's Walk tragedy was in progress on the 
very day when Redmond's speech appeared in the Press. 
Waterford Corporation instantly endorsed their member's 
utterance, and throughout the week similar resolutions 
were passed all over the country, Unionist members of 
these bodies joining in to second the proposals. In Cork, 
the City Council had before it a resolution condemning 
the Government for its attempt to disarm the Irish 
Volunteers, and calling for stringent penalties on the 
offenders in the Bachelor's Walk affair : the resolution 
was withdrawn and one of hearty support to Redmond's 
attitude adopted. 

Yet Irish opinion did not go so far as Mr. William 
O'Brien, who proposed the complete dropping of the 
Home Rule Bill till after the war, in order to bring about 
a genuine national unity. The action of the Offaly corps 
of Volunteers, for instance, was typical. They agreed 
to offer their services gladly on two conditions : first, 
that the Home Rule Bill should go on the Statute Book ; 
secondly, that the Volunteers should be subsidized and 
equipped by Government. 

But it was assumed in Ireland that no question arose 
about the safety of the Bill, and people gave themselves 
to the new emotion. Troops were cheered everywhere 
at stations and on the quays : National Volunteers and 
local bands turned out to see them off. Even the battalion 
of King's Own Scottish Borderers, which had been confined 



WAR IN EUROPE 137 

to barracks since the events of July 26th, was cheered 
like the rest as it marched down to the transports ready 
for it.i 

This was the attitude of the general populace. Broadly 
speaking, Redmond's speech pleased the people. It 
was welcomed by generous-minded men in another class, 
who responded at once in the same spirit. Lord Monteagle 
wrote : " Mr. Redmond has risen nobly to the occasion " ; 
Lord Bessborough, that he trusted all the Unionists in 
the South would at once join the Irish Volunteers. The 
Marquis of Headfort, the Earls of Fingall and of Desart, 
Lord Powerscourt, Lord Langford, all chimed in with 
offers of help. Mr. George Taaffe wrote : "I thank 
God from the bottom of my heart that to-day we 
stand united Ireland." In county Wexford sixty young 
Protestants came in a body to join up, led by a very 
Tory squire. 

It should be clearly noted that while Redmond's aim 
was to make this Ireland's war, in which Irishmen should 
serve together without distinction of North or South, 
all that he asked of the land in his speech of August 4th 
was that the Volunteers should undertake duties of home 
defence. This was precisely what Sir Edward Carson 
had asked of Ulster. On August 14th, in a letter to the 
Press, the commander of a Fermanagh battalion of Ulster 
Volunteers wrote : *' No one will be asked to serve outside 
Ulster until Sir Edward Carson notifies that he is satisfied 

I This fact was verified for me oddly enough. When the 16th 
Division went to France, it was put through the usual period of 
apprenticeship with trained troops, and ovtr brigade was attached 
for training to the Scottish Fifteenth Division. Two companies 
of our battalion of the 6th Connaught Rangers were attached to 
the 8th and 9th K.O.S.B. I met two officers who had been in 
Dublin on July 26th, and it was one of these who told me of the 
cheering. Perhaps I may add that the relations between oxir 
Connaught Rangers and the Scots were most friendly, and that 
we found probably a hundred Irish Catholics in that battalion — 
Irishmen living in the North of England who had at once rushed 
to enlist in the nearest corps available. 



138 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

with the attitude of the Government with regard to the 
Home Rule Bill and Ulster." 

Redmond neither could nor did ask any man to serve 
outside Ireland till he was satisfied with the Government's 
attitude in regard to Home Rule. In the first days of 
the war, however, the critical question for him was to 
know how his offer of assistance from the Volunteers 
would be accepted by the Government, and at the outset 
all promised favourably. On August 8th a telegram 
was sent to the Lord-Lieutenant : 

" His Majesty's Government recognize with deep grati- 
tude the loyal help which Ireland has offered in this 
grave hour. They hope to announce as soon as possible 
arrangements by which this offer can be made use of to 
the fullest possible extent." 

That unquestionably represented the mind of Mr. Asquith 
and his civilian colleagues. But a new power had trans- 
formed the Cabinet. Lord Kitchener, refusing to accept 
the post of Commander in Chief, had insisted on becoming 
Secretary of State for War. 

No one is likely to underestimate Lord Kitchener's 
value at that hour. But probably no one now will dispute 
that the political control which this soldier obtained was 
excessive and was dangerous. Years of fierce faction 
had shaken the public confidence in politicians, and a 
soldier was traditionally above and beyond politics. 
But in Lord Kitchener's case the soldier was certainly 
remote from and below the regions of statesmanship. 
Narrow, domineering, and obstinate, he was a difficult 
colleague for anyone ; and for a Prime Minister with so 
easy a temper as Mr. Asquith he was not a colleague but 
a master. He claimed to be supreme in all matters relating 
to the Army, and in such a war this came near to covering 
the whole field of government. It most certainly covered 
the question of dealing with the Irish Volunteers and 
with the Ulster Volunteers, which meant in reality the 
whole question of Ireland. 



WAR IN EUROPE 139 

Immediately on Lord Kitchener's appointment Redmond 
had an interview with him. Redmond's report was 
that he had been most friendly — and most limited in 
his expectations. " Get me five thousand men, and I 
will say ' Thank you,' " he had said. " Get me ten 
thousand, and I will take off my hat to you." Yet the 
very smallness of the estimate should have been a note 
of warning to us ; it indicated a cynical view of Ireland's 
response to Redmond's public declaration. 

On the question of the Volunteers he made friendly 
promises. As the Sirdar in Egypt he had been used to 
giving fair words to native chiefs. There is not the least 
reason to suppose that Lord Kitchener would have felt 
bound to show Redmond his real mind. 

The truth was that Lord Kitchener held in respect 
to Ireland the traditional opinions of the British Army. 
Nobody could blame the professional soldier for dislike 
and distrust of Irish Nationalist politicians generally ; 
but when at such a crisis a professional soldier, by no means 
conspicuous for breadth of mind, came to hold such a 
position as Lord Kitchener seized, the result was certain 
to be disastrous for Irish policy unless Liberal states- 
manship exercised a strong control over him. Neither 
Mr. Asquith nor Mr. Birrell was hkely to do this. 

Two views were taken of the proposal to encourage 
and utilize the Irish Volunteers. The first view was that 
Volunteers of any kind were a superfluous encumbrance 
at a moment when the supreme need was for men in the 
actual fighting-line ; that encouragement of Volunteers 
gave an excuse for shirking war ; and further, that 
Volunteers outside the State's control were a danger ; 
that the danger was increased when there were two rival 
Volunteer forces which might fly at each other's throats ; 
and that it was a matter for satisfaction that one of these 
forces should be very greatly inferior to the other in 
point of arms and equipment, so that considerations of 
prudence would lessen the chance of collision. This 



140 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

satisfaction was greatly heightened by the reflection 
that the armed force was thoroughly loyal to the Empire 
and could be trusted to assist troops in the case of any 
attack upon the Empire begun by the other — a contingency 
which should always be taken into account. 

This line of thought was certainly Lord Kitchener's. 
He had no distrust of Irish soldiers in ordinary regiments ; 
no professional soldier ever had. But he had a deep 
distrust of a purely Irish military organization under 
Irish control. At the back of Lord Kitchener's mind 
was the determination " I will not arm enemies." This 
was the very negation and the antithesis of the second 
view, which was Redmond's. 

Redmond's aim was to win the war, no less than Lord 
Kitchener's. But if Lord Kitchener realized more clearly 
than other men in power how far-reaching would be 
the need for troops, Redmond realized also far more 
than the men in power how vital would be the 
need for America. He saw from the first, knowing 
the English-speaking world far more widely than per- 
haps any member of the Government, that the Irish 
trouble could not limit its influence to Ireland only. 
Greater forces could be conciliated for war purposes by 
reconciliation with Ireland — by bringing Ireland heart 
and soul into the war — than the equivalent of many 
regiments. Yet even from the narrower aspect of finding 
men, he regarded the same policy as- essential. He 
assumed that recruiting in Ireland must always be volun- 
tary — at any rate a matter for Ireland's own decision : 
the question was how to get most troops. Knowing 
Ireland, he recognized how complete was the estrangement 
of its population from the idea of ordinary enlistment. 
The bulk of the population were on the land, and in 
Ireland, as in Great Britain, " gone for a soldier " was 
a word of disgrace for a farmer's son. More than that, 
the political organization of which he was head had in- 
culcated an attitude of aloofness from the Army because 



WAR IN EUROPE 141 

it was the Army which held Ireland by force. Enlistment 
had been discouraged, on the principle that from a military 
point of view Ireland was regarded as a conquered country. 
A test case had arisen over the Territorial Act, which 
was not extended to Ireland, any more than the Volun- 
teer Acts had been. We had voted against Lord Haldane's 
Bill on the express ground that it put Ireland into this 
status of inferiority and withheld from Irishmen that 
right to arm and drill which was pressed upon English- 
men as a patriotic duty. We had explicitly declared 
then in 1907 that our influence should and must be used 
against enlistment. 

These facts of history had not merely produced in 
Ireland an attitude of mind hostile to the idea, so to say, 
of the British Army as an institution, though the individual 
soldier had always been at least as popular as anyone 
else. They had produced a population extraordinarily 
unfamiliar with the idea of armament. The old Volunteers 
and the Territorials had at least conveyed to all ranks 
of society in Great Britain the possibility of joining a 
military organization while remaining an ordinary citizen. 
In the imagination of Ireland, either you were a soldier 
or you were not ; and if you were a soldier, you belonged 
to an exceptional class, remote from ordinary existence. 
To cross that line was a far greater step to contemplate 
with us than in England. Redmond reckoned, and reckoned 
rightly, that to bring Irishmen together in military forma- 
tions, learning the art of war, was the best way to combat 
this disinclination to enter the Army — this feeling wiat 
enlistment meant doing something " out of the way," 
something contrary to usage and tradition. He reckoned 
that the attitude of Nationalist Ireland would alter to- 
wards a Government which put arms in their hands on 
their own terms ; and that with a great war on foot a 
temper of adventure and emulation would very soon 
draw young men flocking to the ranks in which they 
could see the reality of war. That was Redmond's policy 



142 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

and it was the statesman's. Nationalist Ireland was 
perfectly ready to adopt the ideals which moved the 
British Empire at home and overseas in the war : but 
first the British Empire must show that it respected the 
ideals of Nationalist Ireland. The Empire's statesmen 
did so : the British democracy did so : but Lord Kitchener 
stood in the way. 

From Ulster, it was clear that immediate cordial co- 
operation could not be anticipated. Yet Redmond had 
implicit faith in the ultimate effect of comradeship in 
danger, and here we know he was right. He was to pay 
a heavy price in blood for the seal set upon that bond ; 
but in the end the seal was set. For the moment, Ulster 
as a whole was sullen and distrustful. Feeling that to 
admit the good faith of Nationalists jeopardized their own 
political cause, they belittled what in the interests of 
the common weal it would have been wise even to over- 
value. At the outset " An Ulster Volunteer " wrote to 
the papers " Let us all unite as a solid nation " ; but such 
an utterance was exceptional. Hardly less exceptional 
was the line taken by " An Officer of National Volunteers " 
who wrote, " If the necessity arose to-morrow and the word 
went out from Headquarters, the National Volunteers 
would be prepared to fight to the very death in defending 
the homes and liberties of France and England." " For 
Ireland Only " was a motto much inculcated in those 
days among the Irish Volunteers. Suspicion on the one 
side bred estrangement on the other ; and every hour 
lost increased the mischief. 

Moreover, in spite of the generous action taken by 
outstanding individuals, the general mass of Unionist 
opinion was grudging and uncordial. A friend who was 
then closely in touch with it described to me the attitude 
of Dublin clubs : " They were almost sorry Redmond 
had done the right thing." Such men were part of Ireland, 
and aU Ireland was remote from war. For them, now 
as always, Home Rule was the paramount consideration, 



WAR IN EUROPE 143 

and none could deny that the prospects for Home Rule 
were immensely improved by Redmond's action. In 
these days, when an end of the conflict was expected in 
three months, when every check to the Germans was 
magnified out of all reason, there was no sense of the 
relative value of issues. Everywhere in Unionist society 
and in the Irish Unionist Press there was ungenerous 
and unfriendly criticism which did much harm. 

Two things could have checked these forces for evil. 
The first would have been an immediate decision to make 
Home Rule law. This would have put an end to the 
pestilent growth of suspicion among Nationalists, and it 
would have enabled Redmond to launch at once his appeal 
for soldiers. The other would have been a decision to 
make good the pledge contained in the Government's 
message to Lord Aberdeen and to accept in some practical 
way the offered service of the Volunteers. 

The latter of these courses involved no controversy 
with Ulster, and to it Redmond first addressed himself. 
He made constant appeals in private to Ministers ; he 
was angry and disappointed over the delay : and after 
a week he thought it necessary to raise the matter in the 
House. He asked the Prime Minister whether British 
Territorials were to be sent to Ireland to replace the 
troops which had been withdrawn — a step which would 
have been equivalent to a rejection of his offer. On this 
point he received satisfaction ; Territorials would not 
be sent. He asked then if the Prime Minister could not 
say at once what steps would be taken to arm and equip 
the Volunteers. Mr. Asquith's reply emphasized the 
great difficulty which stood in the way. *' I do not say," 
he added, ** that it is insuperable." The first part was the 
voice of Lord Kitchener ; the second, the voice of the 
Government which had sent the telegram of August 8th. 

In the War Office the desire to give the National Volun- 
teers as far as possible what they wanted did not exist, 
and the Government, who had that desire, had not the 



144 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

determination to enforce it. Such a position can never 
be for long concealed. Let it be remembered, too, that 
all through these days there was proceeding in Dublin 
a public inquiry into the events of the Howth gun-running 
and the affray at Bachelor's Walk, and some measure 
of Redmond's difficulties may be obtained. 

Nevertheless, his policy was winning : and when 
Parliament rose for an adjournment, he spent his first 
Sunday in Ireland motoring to Maryborough, where he 
inspected a great muster of Volunteers, and was able to 
speak to them with gladness of the response to his appeal. 

" From every part of Ireland I have had assurances from 
the Irish Volunteers that they are ready to fulfil this 
duty : and from every part — perhaps better and happier 
still — evidences of a desire on the part of men who in the 
past have been divided from us to come in at this hour 
of danger." 

He told his audience how a battalion of that famous 
regiment, the Inniskilling Fusiliers, had been escorted 
through the town of Enniskillen, in which Orange and 
Green have always been equally and sharply divided, by 
combined bodies of the Irish and Ulster Volunteer Forces. 
Then turning to the question of equipment, and reminding 
them that the proclamation against importing arms had 
been withdrawn, he announced that he had secured 
several thousand rifles to distribute. ^ He went on then 
to pledge himself — it must be said with characteristic 
overconfidence — as to the intentions of the Government : 
" The Government — which has withdrawn its troops from 
Ireland and which has refused to send English Territorials 
to take their place — is about to arm, equip and drill a 
large number of Irish Volunteers." Very soon, he told 
them, every man in the force would have a rifle — and this 
involved a grave responsibility, and the need for discipline 
in the work which was laid upon them, 

I Bought in Belgium by John O'Connor M.P, and T. M Kettle, 
after the Germans had entered Brussels. 



WAR IN EUROPE 145 

" I wish them God-speed with their work. It is the 
holiest work that men can undertake, to maintain the 
freedom and the rights and to uphold the peace, the order 

and safety of their own nation. You ought to be proud 

you, the sons and the grandsons of men who were shot 
down for daring to arm themselves — you ought to be 
proud that you have lived to see the day when with the 
good will of the democracy of England you are arming 
yourselves in the light of heaven." 

The note of exultation in this passage rings again and 
again through his utterances. He saw, or thought he 
saw, the symbol of achieved liberty in the muster of 
young men, ready to take up the sword, and no longer 
branded with the name of felons for so doing. Nor was 
he alone in his rejoicing. The host at that meeting was a 
great Irish landlord, Colonel Sir Hutcheson Poe. He, 
upon reading Redmond's speech of August 4th had 
written to the Press saying that since he was too old to 
serve he was taking steps to arm and equip a hundred 
National Volunteers. Now, in Redmond's presence, ad- 
dressing a body of the Volunteers, he told them what 
he thought of Redmond's action. 

" That five minutes' speech did more to compose our 
differences, to unite all Irishmen in a bond of friendship 
and good will, than could have been accomplished by 
years of agitation or by a conference, however well-inten- 
tioned it might be." 

That was a notable tribute from one of the eight men 
who formed the historic Land Conference of 1902 ; and 
Sir Hutcheson Poe was not the man to rest on compli- 
mentary expressions. He set to work at once to promote a 
memorial praying for joint action between Ulster and the 
Irish Volunteers and for settlement of the political question 
which alone prevented such action. 

Unhappily, this was not easy of accomplishment. When 
the House reassembled after its adjournment of a fortnight, 
negotiations were resumed, with the result that on August 

U 



146 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

31st the Prime Minister asked for a fresh adjournment 
for ten days, at the end of which time the Government 
hoped to be able to produce satisfactory proposals as to 
the Irish and Welsh BUls. Redmond felt himself obliged 
to enter a protest. It had been agreed that the circum- 
stances of the war should not be allowed to inflict political 
injury on any party in the House ; and he would give 
the friendliest consideration to any proposal for giving 
to the Opposition what they might have gained by a 
discussion on the Amending Bill. 

" But we must emphatically say that any proposal 
which would have the effect of depriving us of the enact- 
ment of the Irish measure — and I presume I may say 
the same with reference to the Welsh measure — an enact- 
ment to which we were entitled practically automatically 
when the circumstances of the war arose, would do infinite 
mischief, and would be warmly resented by us. 

" Just let me say one word more. There has arisen 
in Ireland the greatest opportunity that has ever arisen 
in the history of the connection between the two countries 
for a thorough reconciliation between the people of 
Ireland and the people of this country. There is to-day, 
I venture to say, a feeling of friendliness to this country, 
and a desire to join hands in supporting the interests 
of this country such as were never to be found in the past ; 
and I do say with all respect, that it would be not 
only a folly, but a crime, if that opportunity were in any 
degree marred or wasted by any action which this country 
might take. I ask this House — and I ask aU sections 
of the House — to take such a course as will enable me to 
go back to Ireland to translate into vigorous action the 
spirit of the words I used here a few days ago." 

An angry scene followed. Mr. Balfour asked whether 
" it was possible decently to introduce subjects of acute 
discussion in present circumstances " — ^in other words, 
whether all mention of Home Rule must not be postponed 
till after the war. This provoked hot debate, checked 



WAR IN EUROPE 147 

only by a strong appeal from the Prime Minister. But 
the general effect was not reassuring to Ireland. The 
contrast with the Tsar's prompt grant of autonomy to 
Poland was sharply drawn. Nobody rated high the 
chances of an amicable agreement. On September 
4th Sir Edward Carson outlined his views in Belfast. 
Home Rule " will never be law in our country." But 
** in the interests of the State and of the Empire we will 
postpone active measures." This indicated sufficiently 
that in his judgment the Bill might become law, and 
that they would not be encouraged to set up immediate 
resistance. The Prime Minister, as chief Minister of the 
nation, must be supported in the war at all costs. 

Next day, renewing at Coleraine his appeal for recruits, 
he said : 

" We are not going to abate one jot or tittle of our 
opposition to Home Rule, and when you come back from 
serving your country you will be just as determined as 
you will find us at home." 

This was the answer to Redmond's proposal of fraterniza- 
tion. Clearly Sir Edward Carson had made up his mind 
that he could not prevent the passage of the Bill, and he 
decided upon the strongest course, which was to advocate 
unlimited support to the war. Any other course would 
have been ruinous to his cause, which depended always 
upon a profession of the extremest loyalty. Yet only 
a strong man, confident in his leadership, could have 
taken this line at a moment when Ulstermen were about 
to feel that all their preparations were wasted and that 
the game had been won against them by a paralysing 
chance. 

Before the House reassembled there was a meeting at 
the Carlton Club ; a report communicated to the Press 
attributed these words to Sir Edward Carson — they are 
typical of the tone of the time : 

" We asked for no terms and we got none. We did 
not object to go under the War Office. We did not make 



148 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

speeches calculated to humbug or deceive while we meant 
to do nothing." 

On September 15th Government announced its inten- 
tions. Both Bills were to be placed on the Statute Book, 
but their operation deferred till the end of twelve months, 
or, if the war were not then over, till the end of the war. 
During the suspensory period Government would introduce 
an Amending Bill. Mr. Asquith made a flattering reference 
to Sir Edward Carson's action in appealing to his organi- 
zation for recruits, and admitted that " it might be said 
that the Ulstermen had been put at a disadvantage by 
the loyal and patriotic action which they had undertaken." 
— This meant that their preparations for resistance to Mr. 
Asquith's Government were disorganized. — He proceeded 
to promise that they should never have need of such 
preparations ; they should get all the preparations aimed 
at without having to use them. 

" I say, speaking again on behalf of the Government, 
that in our view, under the conditions which now exist — 
we must all recognize the atmosphere which this great 
patriotic spirit has created in the country — the employ- 
ment of force, any kind of force, for what you call the 
coercion of Ulster, is an absolutely unthinkable thing. 
So far as I am concerned, and so far as my colleagues 
are concerned — I speak for them, for I know their 
unanimous feeling — that is a thing we would never 
countenance or consent to." 

This utterance has dominated the situation from that 
day to this. Ulster had organized to rebel, sooner than 
come under an Irish Parliament ; and had refrained 
from rebellion because the Great War was in progress. 
For this reason Ulster should never be coerced, no matter 
what might happen. Sir Edward Carson's line of action 
had secured an enormous concession : he might have 
gone back to his people and said, *' We have won." But 
he was strong enough to represent it as a new outrage, 
which they for the sake of loyalty must in the hour of 



WAR IN EUROPE 149 

common danger submit to endure. By this course, 
risky for himself, he vastly improved their position in 
all future negotiation. — After a violent speech from 
Mr. Bonar Law the Tory party walked out of the House 
in a body. 

Redmond rose at once. He denounced the view that 
Ireland had gained an advantage, or desired to gain one. 
The Prime Minister had at every stage assured him that 
the Bill would be put on the Statute Book in that session, 
and therefore it was unjust to say that his loyalty was 
only conditional ; he had asked for nothing that was 
not won in advance. Now, instead of an Act to become 
immediately operative, Ireland received one with at least 
a year's delay. Yet this moratorium did not seem to 
him unreasonable. 

" When everybody is preoccupied by the war and 
when everyone is endeavouring — and the endeavour will 
be made as enthusiastically in Ireland as anywhere else 
in the United Kingdom — to bring about the creation of 
an Army, the idea is absurd that under these circumstances 
a new Government and a new Parliament could be erected 
in Ireland." 

Further, it gave time for healing work. The two things 
that he cared for most " in this world of politics " were : 
first, that " not a single sod of Irish soil and not a single 
citizen of the Irish nation " should be excluded from the 
operation of Irish self-government ; secondly, that no 
coercion should be applied to any single county in Ireland 
to force their submission. 

The latter of these ideals was cast up to him by many 
in Ireland, first in private grumblings, afterwards with 
public iteration. He saw and admitted, what these 
critics urged, that the one aspiration made the other 
impossible of fulfilment, for the moment. Would it 
be so, he asked, after an interval in which Ulstermen 
and other Irishmen, Nationalist and Unionist, would be 
found fighting and dying side by side on the battlefield 



150 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

on the Continent, and at home, as he hoped and believed, 
drilling shoulder to shoulder for the defence of the shores 
of their own country ? 

On that hint he renewed his appeal to the Ulster Volun- 
teers for co-operation and regretted that he had got no 
response from them. More than that, he urged that his 
appeal to Government had got no response. " If they 
had done something to arm, equip and drill a certain 
number at any rate of the National Volunteers the re- 
cruiting probably would have been faster than it had been." 
Alluding to the taunts at Ireland's shirking which had 
been bandied about in interruptions during the debate, 
he recalled the stories which already had come back from 
France of Irish valour ; of the Munster FusiHers who 
stood by their guns all day and in the end dragged them 
back to their lines themselves ; the story told by wounded 
French soldiers who had seen the Irish Guards charge 
three German regiments with the bayonet, singing a 
strange song that the Frenchmen had never heard before — 
" something about God saving Ireland." 

" I saw these men," said Redmond, " marching 
through London on their way to the station ; they 
marched here past this building singing ' God save 
Ireland ! ' " 

But he could not rest his claim, and had no inten- 
tion of resting it, merely on the prowess of the Irish 
regulars already in the army. 

" Speaking personally for myself, I do not think it is 
an exaggeration to say that on hundreds of platforms in 
this country during the last few years I have publicly 
promised, not only for myself, but in the name of my 
country, that when the rights of Ireland were admitted 
by the democracy of England, Ireland would become 
the strongest arm in the defence of the Empire. The 
test has come sooner than I, or anyone, expected. I tell 
the Prime Minister that this test will be honourably met. 
I say for myself that I would feel myself personally 



WAR IN EUROPE 151 

dishonoured if I did not say to my fellow-countrymen as 
I say to them here to-day, and as I will say from the 
public platform when I go back to Ireland, that it is their 
duty, and should be their honour, to take their place 
in the fighting-line in this contest." 

That was a clear pledge. The Home Rule Bill received 
the Royal Assent on September 18th. But before the 
seal was affixed Redmond's manifesto to the Irish people 
was in aU the newspapers. It was his call to arms. 



CHAPTER VI 
THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 



AT the ending of the long session of Parliamen '^ 
1914 there was a curious scene in the House 
Commons, where members were crowded to assist at 
the formal passing of the Irish and Welsh Bills. On the 
adjournment, Mr. Will Crooks, from his seat on the front 
bench below the gangway, called out, " Mr. Speaker, 
would it be in order to sing ' God save the King ' ? " 
and without more ado uplifted his voice and the House 
chimed in. There must have been strange thoughts in 
the minds of Redmond, of Mr. Dillon, and others of the 
Irish, standing in the places where they had fought so 
long and bitter a battle, where they had been so often 
the object of fierce reproaches, whence they had hurled 
back so many taunts, now to find themselves the centre 
of congratulation, and joined with English members in 
singing on the floor of the House that national anthem 
which in Ireland had been for decades a symbol of 
ascendancy, rigidly tabooed by every Nationalist. 

When the singing ended, Mr. Crooks's genial voice rose 
again. " God save Ireland ! " he shouted. 

" And God save England too ! " Redmond answered. 

That exchange of words outside the period of debate 
is, contrary to usage but very properly, recorded in 
Hansard. 

From this time forth Redmond was on his trial. He 

had given pledges ; he must make good to Ireland and 

make good to Great Britain. For the first, since Home 

isia 



THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 153 

Rule could not be brought into operation, he must secure 
recognition of the National Volunteers, must establish 
and regularize their status ; for the second, he must 
obtain recruits as Ireland's contribution to the war. 
The two proposals were in his view — and indeed were in 
reality — inseparably connected. For both, in order to 
succeed, he needed to have the cordial support of his 
feUow-countrymen ; for both, he needed whole-hearted 
co-operation from the British Government. It would 
be too much to say that Ireland backed him cordially ; 
but for the limitation of Ireland's response the fault 
lay chiefly and primarily with the Government, which 
failed him completely. The War Office could not actually 
and directly oppose his effort to raise troops ; what they 
could do was to hamper him by the adoption of wrong 
methods and the refusal of right ones. Yet in that part 
of his task which involved making good to England, 
lajdng England and the Empire under a debt of living 
gratitude, his appeal was made to Ireland, and he succeeded 
so far that only Ireland herself could have destroyed 
his work. But on the other point, which involved gaining 
satisfaction for Ireland, the appeal was made to Govern- 
ment and the refusal was complete. It was worse than 
absolute, for it was tainted with bad faith, Mr, Asquith 
as Prime Minister accepted the mutual covenant which 
Redmond had proposed, and allowed Lord Kitchener 
to disallow fulfilment of it. 

Redmond's view was not limited to Ireland's interest. 
No man living in these islands felt more keenly for the 
great underlying principles at issue in the war. His 
mission, as he conceived it, was to lead Ireland to serve 
those principles. But it was futile to suppose that he 
could secure for England all that England expected of 
Ireland if he could obtain from England nothing of what 
Ireland asked, Redmond wanted recognition for the 
Volunteers chiefly as a basis upon which Ireland could 
feel that she was building an Irish army worthy of her 



164 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

record in arms ; and this army would be no mean assistance 
to the nations allied against Germany's aggression. Con- 
sidering all the facts which have to be set out, the true 
cause for wonder is not the limitation but the extent of 
his success. 

There was neither delay nor uncertainty in his exposition 
of Ireland's duty. Quite literally, he seized the first 
chance that came to his hand. He left London on the 
evening when the Act was signed, motored to Holyhead, 
as he liked to do, in the big car which his friends had 
presented to him — it was the only material testimonial 
which he ever received — and crossed by the night boat, 
driving on in the morning to Aughavanagh, When he 
reached the Vale of Ovoca he found a muster of the East 
Wicklow Volunteers. These were the nearest thing to 
him in all the force — his own friends and neighbours 
from the Wicklow hills. Aughrim, his post-town at the 
foot of his own particular valley, had its company, com- 
manded by a friend of his, the local schoolmaster — typical 
of what was best in the Volunteers, a keen Gaelic Leaguer, 
tireless in work for the old language and old history. 
This man, well on in the forties, but mountain-bred and 
hardy, had thrown himself into the new movement — 
little guessing that a few months would see him a private 
in the British Army, or that he would come with honour 
to command a company of a famous Irish regiment on 
the battlefields of a European war. 

If it had been only for the sake of Captain MacSweeny 
(he was then, of course, only a captain of Volunteers), 
I think Redmond would have stopped. But it was a 
gathering of many friends, who pressed him to speak 
at a moment when his heart was full. Grave results 
followed from what he said that day ; but a week sooner 
or later he was bound to say these things, and the results 
were bound to follow. Here is the pith of his utterance : 

** I know that you will make efficient soldiers. Efficient 
for what ? Wicklow Volunteers, in spite of the peaceful 



THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 155 

happiness and beauty of the scene in which we stand, 
remember this country at this moment is in a state of 
war, and the duty of the manhood of Ireland is twofold. 
Its duty is at all cost to defend the shores of Ireland 
from foreign invasion. It has a duty more than that, 
of taking care that Irish valour proves itself on the field 
of war as it has always proved itself in the past. The 
interests of Ireland, of the whole of Ireland, are at stake 
in this war. This war is undertaken in defence of the 
highest principles of religion and morality and right, 
and it would be a disgrace for ever to our country, a 
reproach to her manhood, and a denial of the lessons of 
her history, if young Ireland confined their efforts to 
remaining at home to defend the shores of Ireland from 
an unlikely invasion, or should shrink from the duty of 
proving on the field of battle that gallantry and courage 
which have distinguished their race all through all its 
history. I say to you, therefore, your duty is twofold. 
I am glad to see such magnificent material for soldiers 
around me, and I say to you : go on drilling and make 
yourselves efficient for the work, and then account for 
yourselves as men, not only in Ireland itself, but wherever 
the firing-line extends, in defence of right and freedom 
and religion in this war." 

On the following Thursday Mr, Asquith, as Redmond 
had publicly urged him to do, came to Dublin and spoke 
at the Mansion House with the Lord Mayor in the chair. 
Mr. Dillon and Mr. Devlin, as well as Redmond, were 
on the same platform and spoke also. The papers of 
September 25th, which reported the speeches of this 
notable gathering, contained also a manifesto from twenty 
members of the original Committee of the Volunteers, 
definitely breaking with Redmond's policy and taking 
his speech to the Wicklow Volunteers as their cause of 
action. Having recited a version of the facts which led 
up to the inclusion of Redmond's nominees on the Com- 
mittee, it continued : 

'* Mr. Redmond, addressing a body of Irish Volunteers 
on last Sunday, has now announced for the Irish Volunteers 
a policy and programme fundamentally at variance with 



156 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

their own published and accepted aims and objects, but 
with which his nominees are, of course, identified. He 
has declared it to be the duty of the Irish Volunteers to 
take foreign service under a Government which is not 
Irish. He has made this announcement without con- 
sulting the Provisional Committee, the Volunteers them- 
selves, or the people of Ireland, to whose service alone 
they are devoted." 

The next paragraph announced the expulsion of Red- 
mond's nominees and the reconstitution of the Committee 
as it existed before their admission. Six resolutions 
followed. It is noteworthy that the attitude taken up 
with regard to autonomy was simply " to oppose any 
diminution of the measure of Irish self-government 
which now exists as a Statute on paper," and to 
repudiate any " consent to the legislative dismember- 
ment of Ireland." There was no word of an Irish 
Republic and no explicit claim beyond immediate 
operation for the Home Rule Act. 

Ireland's attitude towards the war was defined by a 
resolution : 

" To declare that Ireland cannot, with honour or 
safety, take part in foreign quarrels otherwise than 
through the free action of a National Government of 
her own ; and to repudiate the claim of any man to 
offer up the blood and lives of the sons of Irishmen and 
Irishwomen to the service of the British Empire while 
no National Government which could speak and act 
for the people of Ireland is allowed to exist." 

Mr. Asquith, when he spoke on Thursday night, must 
have been informed that this split was imminent, and he 
spoke with a view to that situation. He said : 

" Speaking here in Dublin, I address myself for a moment 
particularly to the National Volunteers, and I am going 
to ask them all over Ireland — not only them, but I make 
the appeal to them particularly — to contribute with 
promptitude and enthusiasm a large and worthy con- 
tingent of recruits to the second new army of half a 



THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 157 

million which is now growing up, as it were, out of the 
ground. I should like to see, and we all want to see, an 
Irish Brigade — or, better still, an Irish Army Corps. 
Don't let them be afraid that by joining the colours they 
will lose their identity and become absorbed in some 
invertebrate mass, or what is perhaps equally repugnant, 
be artificially redistributed into units which have no 
national cohesion or character. 

" We shall, to the utmost limit that military expediency 
will allow, see that men who have been already associated 
in this or that district in training and in common exercises 
shall be kept together and continue to recognize the 
corporate bond which now unites them. One thing 
further. We are in urgent need of competent officers, 
and when the officers now engaged in training these 
men prove equal to the test, there is no fear that their 
services will not be gladly and gratefully retained. But, 
I repeat, gentlemen, the Empire needs recruits and needs 
them at once. They may be fully trained and equipped 
in time to take their part in what may prove to be the 
decisive field in the greatest struggle of the history of 
the world. That is our immediate necessity, and no 
Irishman in responding to it need be afraid he is jeopard- 
izing the future of the Volunteers. 

" I do not say, and I cannot say, under what precise 
form of organization it will be, but I trust and I believe 
— indeed, I am sure — that the Volunteers will become a 
permanent, an integral and characteristic part of the 
defensive forces of the Crown. 

" I have only one more word to say. Though our 
need is great, your opportunity is also great. The call 
which I am making is backed by the sympathy of your 
fellow-Irishmen in all parts of the Empire and of the 
world. . . . There is no question of compulsion or bribery. 
What we want, what we ask, what we believe you are 
ready and eager to give, is the freewill offering of a free 
people." 

This was a double pledge as to Redmond's two objects. 
It promised, first, that every inducement should be given 
to join a corps distinctively Irish and having national 
cohesion and character ; secondly, that the Volunteers 
should obtain recognition as part of the defensive forces 



158 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

of the Crown. Over and above this was an assurance of 
enormous importance. There was to be no question of 
compulsion. Nothing was asked, nothing would be asked, 
but *' the freewill offering of a free people." 

Lord Meath followed, a representative figure of Unionist 
Ireland and a most zealous promoter of recruiting. Then 
Redmond spoke, and as usual dwelt on Ireland's contri- 
bution to the forces of the Regular Army so far actually 
engaged, which was fully adequate in numbers. " As 
to quality, let Sir John French answer for that, and let 
my friend and fellow-countryman Admiral Beatty from 
Wexford speak from Heligoland." — Nothing gave him 
more pleasure at all times than to dwell on the personal 
achievement of Irishmen ; his voice kindled when he 
named such names. — He went on to give confident assur- 
ance, having in it the note of defiant answer to the revolt 
which had been raised : 

" I tell the Prime Minister he will get here plenty of 
recruits and of the best material. We will maintain 
here in Ireland intact and inviolate our Irish National 
Volunteers, and in my judgment that body of Volunteers 
will prove to be an inexhaustible source of strength to the 
new army corps and the new army that is being created." 

Then, with disdainful reference to the " little handful 
of pro-Germans " who had " raised their voices in Ireland," 
he declared that it would be no less absurd to consider 
them representative than to take General Beyers and not 
General Botha as expressing the sentiments of South Africa. 

Yet, as we know, the danger in South Africa was serious, 
and South Africa possessed freedom, not the promise of 
freedom. General Botha had what Redmond was denied 
— power to act and act promptly. In Ireland the menace 
was far less grave at this moment, but it was destined to 
become overpowering because Redmond lacked the power 
to deal with the situation in his own way. Already 
much had been lost. Between the declaration of war 
and the passage of the Home Rule Bill more than six 



THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 169 

weeks had been allowed to elapse in which nothing was 
done in response to Redmond's proposal, except the 
purely negative decision that Territorials should not be 
sent to garrison Ireland, This inevitably strengthened 
the hand of those who never liked the offer he had made. 
From the first an accent of dissent from the new policy 
was plainly distinguishable in what came from the Com- 
mittee of the Volunteers. Mr. Bulmer Hobson says of 
the famous speech of August 4th : 

" This statement amounted to an unconditional offer 
of the services of the Irish Volunteers to the English 
Government, and was made without any consultation 
with the Volunteers themselves. The first that members 
of the Provisional Committee heard of their being offered 
to the Government was when they read it in the news- 
papers, and Mr. Redmond's nominees on the Committee 
were as much surprised as the older members. At the 
next meeting of the Standing Committee, held a couple 
of days later, the nominated members strove hard to 
induce us to endorse Redmond's offer. The utmost they 
could get, however, notwithstanding their clear party 
majority, was a statement of ' the complete readiness 
of the Irish Volunteers to take joint action with the 
Ulster Volunteer Force for the defence of Ireland.' 
Further than that the older members of the Committee 
declined to go. This statement in reality committed, and 
was meant to commit, the Volunteers to nothing, though 
it was interpreted by the Press as a complete endorse- 
ment of Mr. Redmond's policy." 

At the beginning of the war, there were two strong 
currents of desire in the Volunteer body and its backers. 
One sought that the Volunteers should retain complete 
freedom of action and in no way be brought under the 
War Office. The other craved to see them trained and 
armed with the least possible delay. Colonel Moore,i 

^ Lieutenant -Colonel Maurice Moore, C.B., an officer who had 
served with distinction in South Africa, and whose father, George 
Henry Moore, had been a famous advocate in Parliament of Tenant 
Right and Repeal, 



160 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

who was the chief of their military staff at this time, 

says Mr. Hobson, saw no way of accomplishing the latter 

object without the assistance of the military authorities. 

Other men, who had come in since Redmond's speech, 

impressed on the public that without legal recognition 

from the Crown no Volunteer could act against the Germans 

in case of a landing without exposing himself and others 

to the penalties which Germany was inflicting in Belgium 

wherever the civilian population fired a shot. As a 

result, negotiations were opened in August 1914 with the 

Irish Command, and Colonel Moore, in concert with 

General Paget's staff, drew up a scheme for training the 

Irish and Ulster Volunteers and for using them when 

trained for a short term of garrison duty in Ireland. The 

scheme was submitted to the Provisional Committee, who 

added conditions designed to lead to rejection by the War 

Office ; and in the upshot Colonel Moore's proposals 

were refused by Lord Kitchener on one side and by the 

Standing Committee of Volunteers on the other. 

Redmond was of course aware of the failure of this 

scheme, and took up the matter personally. He wrote 

to the Chief Secretary : 

House of Commons, 
September 9, 1914. 

Private. 
My Dear Mr. Birrell, 

I am very anxious to put shortly before you 
on paper my views with reference to the Volunteer 
question, which we discussed with the Prime Minister 
to-day. I take so strong a view on the subject that I 
think I must ask you to show him this letter and to urge 
upon him the importance of getting the War Office to 
move. I know the influences that are at work in the 
War Office throwing cold water on the Volunteers and 
causing intense dissatisfaction in Ireland by unnecessary 
delays. 

What I suggest should be done is this : 
There are two separate questions : (1) Recruits ; 
and (2) Volunteers for Home Defence. 



THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 161 

The first absolutely depends upon the way in which 
the second is treated. If the existing Volunteer organi- 
zation is ignored and sneered at and made little of, 
recruiting in the country will not go ahead. 

On the other hand, if the Volunteers are properly 
treated, I believe that recruiting will go ahead. 

Now, my suggestion is this : that an announcement 
should be made immediately that the War Office are 
taking steps to assist in the equipment and arming and 
instructing of a certain number of the Irish Volunteers 
for Home Defence, and that this will be done without 
interfering in any way with the character or organization 
of the existing Volunteer Force. 

Carrying out this programme will really not stand 
in the way of the preparing of the new Army. All that 
is required is a few thousand rifles, and there are plenty 
of them in the military stores in Ireland at this moment 
which are not being used and will not be used, because 
they are too old, in the training of the recruits, but which 
would be quite suitable for making a beginning at any 
rate in the drilling of the Volunteers. It might be stated 
that they would be replaced by better weapons gradually, 
as soon as the rush was over. 

A few instructors should be placed at the disposal 
of the Volunteers.^ 

If this is done, intense satisfaction will be given all 
through the country, and the pride and sentiment of the 
Volunteers will be touched, and the appeal for recruits 
generally through the country, and even in the ranks of the 
Volunteers themselves, will, I am confident, be responded to. 

But, as I have said, if this course is not taken, in- 
evitably recruiting will flag. 

I would earnestly beg of you to take this matter 
vigorously in hand, so that some satisfactory announce- 
ment may be made before I return to Ireland next week. 

Very truly yours, 

Right Hon. A. Bibeell, M.P. J- ^' REDMOND. 

^ Rifles were really not available, nor competent instructors. 
But the essential was recognition. A grant towards equipment 
should have been given, and possibly other assistance. We secured 
several thousand rifles in Belgium about this time. For instructors, 
any old crippled veterans paid by Government would have con- 
veyed the sense of recognition. 

12 



162 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

Mr. Asquith's speech on September 24th was at least 
an indication that the Prime Minister desired to act in 
the spirit of Redmond's suggestions. The Chief Secre- 
tary was of the same disposition. But neither of them 
was able to control the imperious colleague who now had 
taken charge of the Army, and who in the most critical 
moment thwarted effectually the designs of Liberal 
statesmanship in Ireland. 

After Redmond's death an " Appreciation " published 
in The Times (with the signature " A. B.,") by Mr. Birrell, 
contained this passage : 

" He felt to the very end, bitterly and intensely, the 
stupidity of the War Office. Had he been allowed to 
deflect the routine indifference and suspicion of the War 
Office from its old ruts into the deep-cut channels of Irish 
feelings and sentiments, he might have carried his country- 
men with him, but he jumped first and tried to make 
his bargain afterwards and failed accordingly. English 
people, as their wont is, gushed over him as an Irish 
patriot and flouted him as an Irish statesman. Had he 
and his brother been put in charge of the Irish Nationalist 
contingents, and an Ulster man, or men, been put in a 
corresponding position over the Irish Protestant con- 
tingents, all might have gone well. Lord Kitchener, who 
was under the delusion that he was an Irishman no less 
than Redmond, was the main, though not the only 
obstacle in the path of good sense and good feeling." 

Yet it is, to say the least, not clear why Lord Kitchener 
should have been allowed to be an obstacle. Redmond 
was not fortunate in his allies. He had set an example 
of generous courage ; it was not followed by British 
statesmen. 

From the very outset of his campaign in Ireland he 
had two hostilities to meet. The first was that of the 
section which had always been opposed to him — the 
Unionist party. Into this block he had already driven 
a wedge. The Irish Times, its principal organ in the 
South and West, was now backing him heartily, and, as 



THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 163 

has been seen, not a few leading Unionists were doing 
their utmost to assist. But the real opposition, that 
of Ulster, was in no way conciliated. On September 
28th, " Covenant Day," a great meeting was held at which 
the Ulstermen denounced what they called the Govern- 
ment's treachery, and declared their implacable deter- 
mination never to submit to Home Rule. Mr. Bonar 
Law for the British Unionists proclaimed that whereas 
heretofore his party were willing to be bound by the 
verdict of a general election, they now withdrew that 
condition, and without any reservation would support 
Ulster in whatever course it chose to adopt. 

In a purely partisan sense these speeches, and this 
attitude, did Redmond no harm in his campaign with 
Nationalists. When a certain section of Home Rulers 
were clamouring that he had been tricked and betrayed 
by the Government, had given aU and got nothing, it 
was a good rejoinder to point to the fact that in Ulster's 
opinion the opportunity had been used to gain an unfair 
victory for Home Rule. But Redmond from the outbreak 
of the war had no concern with party or partisan argu- 
ments. He wanted a real truce, an end of bitterness, 
in Ireland. 

There was, moreover, a feature of the Ulster propa- 
ganda in these days which disturbed him. General 
Richardson, a retired Indian officer, who had chief com- 
mand of the Ulster Volunteer Force, in appealing for 
recruits, urged the Volunteers " to recollect the events of 
March last and what the Navy and Army did for Ulster. 
They came to the help of Ulster in the day of trouble, 
and would come again." He added his assurance to the 
Volunteers that " when the war was over, and their ranks 
were reinforced by some 12,000 men, thoroughly well 
trained and with vast field experience, they would return 
to the attack and relegate Home Rule to the devil." 

It did not assist Redmond in gaining recruits for the 
Army that a general officer should represent the services 



164 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

as trusty and proven allies of gentlemen whose leading 
idea in life was to relegate Home Rule to such a destina- 
tion. The average Nationalist civilian did not easily dis- 
criminate between what was said by a retired oJB&cer out 
of commission and what was said by officers in uniform. 
There was a tendency to regard General Richardson as 
speaking of right for the Army — for which Nationalist 
recruits were desired. 

The Liberal Government could not help Redmond to 
allay Ulster or Unionist hostility. One thing they could 
do ; they could ensure that whatever concession or 
privilege was extended to those who followed Sir Edward 
Carson should be equally accorded to those who followed 
Redmond. This one thing which they could have done 
they did not do. They allowed the War Office to 
increase the arrogance of the Ulstermen and to weaken 
Redmond's hand, by giving Ulster special privileges, 
which inevitably created jealousy and suspicion in 
Nationalist Ireland — as shall be shown in detail. 

But first it is necessary to indicate the other element 
of hostility — far more serious than that of Ulster, because 
it challenged Redmond's leadership. It was that of the 
extremist group, which rapidly began to welcome German 
successes, not for any love to Germany but because it 
could not conceive of any hope for Ireland except in 
the weakening or destruction of British power. These 
men, as has been already seen, had acquired an influence 
in the Volunteer Force out of all proportion to their 
numbers, owing to the fact that the Irish party had stood 
aloof from the movement in its early stages. Professor 
MacNeill said later that but for the Gaelic League and 
the Gaelic Athletic Association there would have been 
no Irish Volunteers. The bulk of both these bodies 
was always antagonistic to the parliamentary move- 
ment. When their opposition openly declared itself, in 
consequence of the East Wicklow speech, Redmond 
was not sorry to have a clear issue raised, involving a 



THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 165 

formal breach. In a public letter to Colonel Moore he 
wrote that he read " this extraordinary manifesto with 
feelings of great relief," because communications from 
all parts of the country had forced him to the conclusion 
that so long as the signatories to this document remained 
members of the governing body, " no practical work 
could be done to put the Volunteer organization On a 
real business basis." 

By a real " business basis " he meant that the Volun- 
teers should be made a defensive force to act in concert 
with the troops engaged in the war. That was the clear 
issue. You must be for the troops or against them. 
In these days the official attitude of those who signed 
the dissenting manifesto was that Ireland should be 
neutral. But at such a crisis, as Mr. Dillon said in a 
telling phrase, a man who calls himself a neutral '* is 
either an enemy or a coward." 

It became only too clear later that we had to do with 
a body of men who were enemies and were certainly not 
cowards. Their number at this moment was difficult 
to determine. What immediately revealed itself was 
that the vast majority of the Volunteers, when choice 
was forced on them, adhered to Redmond. 

The case of my own constituency, Galway City, may 
be given as typical, though rather of the towns than 
of the country. The country-side was apathetic ; the 
towns were both for and against Redmond's policy. In 
Galway, Sinn Fein had a strong hold on the college of 
the National University, but, on the other hand, the depot 
of the Connaught Rangers was just outside the city at 
Renmore, and that famous corps had many partisans ; 
whUe in the fishing village of the Claddagh nearly every 
man was a naval reservist. 

I came to Galway on the day the Home Rule Bill was 
signed and attended a couple of Volunteer drills, where 
I noted the activity of some young men going round 
with a password : " For whom will you serve ? " " For 



166 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

Ireland only." After the publication of the dissenting 
manifesto a Committee was called, and I obtained leave 
to be present. There was a sharp discussion, and at 
the finish the vote was a tie, whether to support Redmond 
or the dissentients. This did not at all please me or 
my friends, so we determined to have a big general 
meeting to see on which side public support really lay. 
Everybody was invited, and a great many people could 
not get into the hall ; this mattered the less because 
the Sinn Feiners cut the electric wires leading to the 
building and plunged us in darkness ; luckily, it was a 
fine night, and we took the meeting outside with great 
success. A couple of interruptions were drastically dealt 
with, and complete peace then prevailed. Two of the 
four county members were among the many speakers, 
and the last man to address the meeting was a wounded 
Connaught Ranger back from the line. We cheered for 
the Rangers, and then we cheered for the King ; the 
local band was present, but unable, though quite willing, 
to assist at this point. " Isn't it a pity," the chief 
bandsman said to me, " there was three of us knew the 
tune well, but they've all gone to the front, and not a 
one of us ever heard it." 

But as a net result the original Volunteer organization 
was killed. The pick of the young and keen who were 
with us went off to the war ; the young and keen who 
stayed kept up an organization with very different pur- 
poses. There was plenty of material in Galway and 
everywhere else to build up a volunteer corps such as 
Redmond desired to see ; but the organizing spirits 
were in the opposite camp, and our friends did not 
interest themselves in what seemed to be a kind of play- 
acting when such serious business was afoot in the world. 
Had they been set to duties of coast patrol, under officers 
who were available on the spot, and given clear recogni- 
tion as part of the defensive forces, their body would 
have been alive and active ; as it was, it atrophied and 



THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 167 

grew inert. Broadly speaking, the same was true all 
over the country. Redmond was wilHng to make bricks 
for the War Office to build with ; they insisted that he 
should make them without straw. 

Facts directly connected with recruiting ultimately 
convinced the British public that the War Office had 
spoilt a great opportunity in Ireland. But the funda- 
mental blunder, the deep-seated cause which undermined 
the force of Redmond's appeal, was the refusal of recog- 
nition to the National Volunteers and the failure to 
fulfil the promise held out in Mr. x4squith's Dublin 
speech. 



II 

The other respects in which the War Office crippled 
the Nationalist efforts after recruiting were matters of 
detail, not of principle. The first and best help which 
Redmond might expect would have come from his col- 
leagues in the party ; and all the recruiting authorities 
in Ireland should have been directed to secure that help 
locally. No such step was taken. No attempt was 
made to enlist Nationalists of position as patrons of the 
recruiting campaign. In Catholic Nationalist districts 
it was the rule rather than the exception to select gentle- 
men of the Protestant Church, and of strong Unionist 
opinions, as recruiting officers. If Catholic Nationalists 
had been selected as the official agents to assist in raising 
the Ulster Division, there would have been an outcry, 
and very rightly ; it would have been contrary to common 
sense. But the War Office, always even obsequiously 
ready to consider the Ulstermen's point of view, com- 
pletely lacked sympathy for that of the majority in 
Ireland. In some cases the choice of a man locally 
unpopular on public grounds afforded — to speak plainly 
— an excuse for those leading Nationalists who were 



168 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

loath to depart from all the tradition of their lifetime. 
Some of Redmond's colleagues held that they had been 
** extreme men " all their lives, and they thought it too 
hard that they should be expected to ask Irishmen to 
join the English Army, Yet these same men would have 
worked enthusiastically for the Volunteers, and by sym- 
pathy for their comrades who went out could have been 
led into a very different attitude. 

Many of them, too, felt an honourable scruple about 
asking others to do what they could not do themselves. 
As a parliamentary group we were under a singular 
disability. In its early days the Irish party had been, 
what Sinn Fein is now, a party of the young. But so 
strong was the tie of gratitude that service in its ranks 
became an inheritance, and in most cases a man once 
elected stayed on till he died or resigned. By 1914, of 
all parties in the House we had by far the largest propor- 
tion of men over military age. I question whether three 
out of the seventy could have passed the standard then 
exacted — for two or three of the younger men were 
medically unfit. In these circumstances the War Office 
would have been well advised to waive a regulation or 
two to facilitate matters ; but the rigour of the rules 
was maintained. One of my colleagues, a man in the 
early forties, offered to join as a private ; he was refused. 
In my own case a similar refusal was based on Lord 
Kitchener's personal opinion against that of the Under- 
Secretary for War, to whom, as a personal friend, I had 
written ; it took nearly six months to get the decision 
altered ; and by that time the value of example was 
much depreciated. The beginning was the chance to 
give a lead. 

Far graver was the intolerable delay in forming a 
corps which should appeal definitely to Irish national 
and Nationalist sentiment. The First Army included 
one Irish Division — the Tenth, destined to a splendid 
history, under a popular commander, Sir Bryan Mahon ; 



THE RAISING OP THE IRISH BRIGADES 169 

but it had no specially Nationalist colour, so to &Sij, and 
no connection with the Irish Volunteers. Redmond 
wanted the counterpart of what had been readily 
granted to Sir Edward Carson ; and this was what 
Mr. Asquith had outlined in his speech at Dublin. The 
Sixteenth Division already existed ; its commander was 
appointed on September 17th. But the first step to 
give it the desrred character was not taken without long 
delay, and much heart-burning and confusion resulted. 

Part of the confusion is attributable to the fact that 
Redmond, in his desire to touch the historic memories 
connected with the famous corps which attained its crown- 
ing glory at Fontenoy, always spoke of "a new Irish 
Brigade." But at the Mansion House meeting Mr. 
Asquith spoke of something more than a brigade — an 
army corps ; and Redmond, following him, instantly 
accepted the idea. " I used the word ' brigade ' in my 
ignorance — I meant an Irish army corps." There was 
always present to his mind the hope that in some larger 
formation the Ulster Division might find itself shoulder 
to shoulder with other Irish troops. 

Yet intending recruits were puzzled, and Lord Meath, 
writing to Redmond on October 10th that he had formed 
a Recruiting Committee in Dublin " for the purpose of 
endeavouring to raise the Irish Army Corps for which 
you spoke," reported that men came in asking to know 
where was the Irish Brigade, and refused to join anything 
else. Lord Meath suggested that Redmond should 
obtain from Lord Kitchener " an official declaration 
sanctioning the enlistment of Irishmen in an Irish Brigade, 
or Irish Army Corps, consisting exclusively of Irish 
officers and men." He wrote again on the 14th, asking 
that the Prime Minister himself should be approached, 
and on the 17th, in reply to some communication from 
Redmond : "I hope you will insist on some official and 
unmistakable statement that your request has been 
granted." 



170 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

The tone of these letters, coming from no fire-eating 
Nationalist but the staunchest of Unionist peers, is 
sufficient proof that Lord Kitchener's action or inaction 
was resented by those who knew Ireland and had the 
best interests of Ireland at heart. The IrisJi Times 
wrote in the same sense ; and on October 19th a formal 
attack was launched in the Daily Chronicle, which drew 
a sharp contrast with the treatment accorded to Ulster. 
" Up to this hour," the writer said, " the Irish Division 
asked for by Mr. Redmond has been refused sanction 
by the War Office." This was an overstatement, but 
it was true that up to this time such a belief naturally 
prevailed, because the War Office could not be induced 
to make the desired announcement that sanction had 
been given. Moreover, although the concession had been 
made, it was made in a very different way from that 
used in dealing with Sir Edward Carson. Redmond 
had no voice whatever in the organization. The choice 
of a divisional commander was of infinite importance ; 
and it fell upon Lieutenant- General Sir Lawrence Parsons, 
K.C.B., an artillery officer of great distinction, a man 
of wide general knowledge and culture and of strongly 
marked individuality. Yet his individuality did not 
make him easy for Redmond to work with. He was 
not simply a typical professional soldier of the old Army ; 
he was an idealist in his profession ; and part of the 
professional soldier's idealism is to resent and despise 
political considerations. He recognized that Redmond 
had spoken and acted vaih. a statesman's vision ; he 
failed to recognize that in many matters political tactics 
are necessary to carry out a statesman's plan. Also, 
it was very difficult for him or for any other professional 
soldier to realize that recruiting, under such conditions 
as then prevailed, was a politician's task, not a soldier's, 
even in Great Britain ; and that this was tenfold more 
true of Ireland. 

The point requires to be emphasized, because it applies 



THE RALSING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 171 

to a greater personage — Lord Kitchener himeelf. I 
boliovo that Lord Kitchener honestly desired the success 
of Redmond's mission. To my personal knowledge he 
sent for one officer long known to him and took him from 
a command in which ho was comfortably placed and 
sent him, against his will, to raise one of our })attalions 
in a difficult area. The choice was absolutely sound, 
and success was achieved by methods which did not 
always follow strictly the letter of King's Regulations. 
But these departures fiom rule were quite in accordance 
with the spirit of the old Army, and Lord Kitchener was 
ready to stand over any of them. He would do the best 
he could for our division on the old linos. He would, 
I am certain, have said that he had done the best thing 
possible for it in appointing to the command an Irishman 
who was a first-rate soldier and a first-rate man to super- 
vise the training of troops. So far as my judgment is 
able to go, the credit for making the Sixteenth Division 
what it was when we went to France belongs chiefly to 
the divisional general under whom wo trained. 

General Parsons had the gift, which appears to be 
rare in soldiers, of imparting ideas not merely about 
discipline but about the art of war ; and he had an 
enthusiasm which communicated itself. But these were 
the qualities of the soldier in his own sphere, with which 
Redmond had no contact. What Redmond knew was 
the writer of letters which now lie before mo. Running 
through them all is the tone of a soldier in authority 
who accepts assistance from a friendly, influential, well- 
meaning but imperfectly instructed civilian. There is 
no recognition of the fact that Redmond was the acco})tcd 
leader of a Volunteer Force numbering over a hundred 
thousand men ; no glimpse of any perception that morally, 
and almost oflicially, Redmond was the accredited head 
of the nation in whose name the division was being raised 
— a nation to which the statutory right of self-government 
had just boon accorded. 



172 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

The whole position was extraordinary. Legally and 
theoreticallj^ Redmond was a simple member of Parlia- 
ment. Practically and morally, he was the head of Ire- 
land, exactly as Botha was of South Africa ; and he was 
trying to do without legal powers what Botha was doing 
by means of them. He was far more than the Leader 
of the Opposition in Great Britain ; for in Ireland there 
really was no Government. Moral authority, which must 
proceed from consent of the governed, the Irish Govern- 
ment had not possessed for many a long day ; but its 
legal status had been unimpeachable. Now even that 
was gone ; it was merely a stop-gap contrivance, carrying 
on tUl the Act of Parliament should receive fulfilment ; 
and, as a bare matter of fact, it was powerless. No 
operative decision of any moment was taken or could 
be taken at this moment in Ireland. Everything was 
referred to the Cabinet, and that body had no power 
to carry out a popular policy in Ireland. 

Redmond had put forward a policy which they had 
accepted in principle. It could only be carried out 
through him, and for success he must be consulted in 
detail. Neither Lord Kitchener nor General Parsons 
in fact recognized the status which this implied. They 
were prepared to listen to suggestions from him ; they 
were not prepared to accept guidance, as they must have 
done had he been Prime Minister of the country. 

It was impossible that Redmond's attitude in dealing 
with General Parsons should not imply some sense of 
the position which he held ; equally impossible, from the 
temper and mentality of the man, that there should not 
be in General Parsons's letters an underlying assertion 
that in military matters the military must decide. 

The correspondence between the two men opened by 
a letter from Sir Lawrence Parsons, who had just estab- 
lished his headquarters at Mallow ; and its chief purpose 
was to direct Redmond's attention to the fact that an 
Irish Division was a much finer and nobler unit than an 



THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 173 

Irish Brigade. Two points in it, however, are of interest. 
" I have been appointed by Lord Kitchener," said General 
Parsons, " because I am an Irishman and understand 
my countrymen." Also, " 1 have had a considerable 
share in selecting the officers of the Division, almost 
all Irishmen of every political and religious creed." 

What lay behind the first of these sentences was a 
profound conviction that the writer thoroughly under- 
stood the necessities of the situation. That was a 
disastrous mistake. To understand Ireland at such a 
moment was difficult for anyone, impossible for a man 
who had not been in close touch with the mental condi- 
tion produced by all these extraordinary happenings. 
The effect of the preparations for rebellion in Ulster, 
of the Curragh incident, and of the collision between 
troops and people in Dublin — the effect of the existence 
of a permitted Nationalist Volunteer Force — the effect 
of Redmond's appeal : these were three completely 
novel and conflicting currents in the stream of Irish Hfe. 
Nobody could hope to estimate these developments from 
a general view, however intelligent, of Irish history and 
character, nor even from the most intimate and sympa- 
thetic acquaintance with Irish troops of the old Army. 

A proof of the unhappy lack of comprehension is 
furnished by the second sentence I have quoted. General 
Parsons had been most rightly aUowed by the War Office 
to assist in selecting officers for the Division. But it 
had never occurred to either party to consult Redmond 
on this critical matter. Does anyone suppose that 
Sir Edward Carson had no voice in the staffing of the 
Ulster Division ? He had at all events received from 
the first a clear promise that all professional soldiers 
who had been officers in the Ulster Volunteers would 
be officers in the Division, and that any who had been 
mobilized should be restored to their associates in the 
Division. 

General Parsons brought to this whole matter the 



174 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

fine principle that no man's religious or political beliefs 
should stand in his way. He omitted to consider the 
effect produced on the situation by the fact that the 
Ulster Division had been actually allowed to exclude all 
Catholics, as such, and to accept no officer who was not 
politically in sympathy with Unionist Ulster. Redmond 
had not the least wish to exclude either Protestants or 
Unionists ; he wanted all Irishmen on an equality. But 
he was bound by common sense and by a perception of 
realities to desire that Protestants and Unionists should 
not appear to monopolize the command. 

Not one of the three brigadiers appointed was generally 
known in Ireland, personally or by his connections. One 
was an Englishman. Of the officers originally appointed 
not one in five was a Catholic. No Catholic commanded 
a battalion, scarcely half a dozen were field officers. The 
only Catholic field officer appointed to the Division who 
had been prominently connected with the Volunteers 
was Lord Fingall, and he had severed his connection 
with that body. 

All this was a terrible blunder. Whether it was wise 
or unwise to allow the formation of a division having 
the peculiar character of the Ulster Division may be 
argued — but certainly Redmond never took exception 
to it, and no man who ever saw these Ulstermen in the 
field can regret its inception. But once it was formed, 
its existence created a situation which had to be recog- 
nized. An equivalent ought to have been given ; but 
no genuine attempt to do this was made. 

In replying to Sir Lawrence Parsons, Redmond raised 
no controversy as to what had been done ; he was, indeed, 
not cognizant of the facts. But he addressed himself 
from the first to making friendly suggestions. 

Amongst other things he referred to an appeal which 
Sir Lawrence Parsons had addressed to the women of 
Ireland, that they should provide regimental colours for 
the battalions of the Division. This appeal was promptly 



THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 175 

met, to Redmond's great delight — delight which was 
soon changed into vexation, for the War Office stepped 
in, declared the proceeding irregular, and prohibited the 
holding of colours by any temporary battalion. General 
Parsons was obliged to publish an explanation which 
must have been galling to himself, and which went far 
to confirm the impression that the War Office, with all 
its preoccupations, had time to keep an unfriendly eye 
on the Nationalist recruiting effort. 

Another trivial matter led to prolonged and irritating 
controversy. Towards the end of October the Belfast 
and Dublin papers announced that the Army Council 
had approved of "an Ulster badge similar to that worn 
by Ulster Volunteers " as a cap badge for all troops in 
the Ulster Division. It was pointed out that this would 
have the effect of preserving the identity of the Ulster 
Division. Immediately, and not unnaturally, the demand 
for a similar concession was put forward on behalf of 
the Sixteenth Division. General Parsons was opposed, 
as any old soldier would be, to a variation in the distin- 
guishing marks of old and famous regiments. He did 
not allow for the fact that we needed to attract new 
soldiers in masses — men who as yet knew nothing of 
regimental tradition. Still, he co-operated in forwarding 
Redmond's desire, which was to meet a widely spread 
sentimental demand. Now that the war is over, many 
soldiers argue that there is no reason in the nature of 
things why Irish regiments should not have a clearly 
distinguishing uniform, as the Scots or the Colonials do. 
In the last months, when recruiting was a matter of 
urgency. Colonel Lynch induced the War Office to consent 
to equipping an Irish Brigade with a completely dis- 
tinctive dress ; unhappily the pattern was (after several 
months) still under discussion when the war ended. I 
have little doubt that from the point of view of recruiting 
even the badge, to say nothing of a distinctive uniform, 
would have been an asset ; I have no doubt at all that 



176 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

the refusal of it was a set-back, because it was a refusal 
given after a discussion and correspondence which lasted 
from November till February. The most interesting 
point, however, is that Lord Kitchener found time to 
occupy himself repeatedly with this question in the period 
between the first and second battles of Ypres. If his 
intervention had been judicious, it would have been as 
impressive as the spectacle of a battery elephant stopping 
in action to pick up a pin with his trunk. 

On one point Redmond's representations, heartily 
backed by General Parsons, were successful. Catholic 
chaplains, of whom no adequate number were at first 
provided for Irish troops, were secured. It is pleasant 
to note that Lord Roberts, who before the war had been 
vehement on the Ulster side, used his personal influence 
to support this application. A month or two later, when 
death came to the veteran, dramatically, among the 
troops in France, Redmond told the House of Commons 
how on that question Lord Roberts had met him in the 
friendliest way and endeavoured to arrange for attending 
the great meeting at the Dublin Mansion House. 

On another matter Redmond was able to assist the 
equipment of the Division. He suggested, and General 
Parsons fully admitted the value of, regimental bands ; 
but the War Office made no grants for them. Redmond 
drew upon a large sum which had been placed at his dis- 
posal by a private individual to further his campaign, 
and all our battalions were indebted to him for their 
fife and drum equipment. There was, in short, no detail 
in which he was not wiUing and anxious to assist the 
Division and its commander. But the friction between 
the two men was unmistakable. 

The most serious cause of it was the line taken by 
General Parsons about the appointment of officers. He 
laid down a rule, which I think would have had excellent 
results if enforced throughout the whole of the new 
armies, that no man should be recommended for a 



THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 177 

commission without previous military experience, and that 
candidates lacking that experience must put in a period 
of service in the ranks. He set apart a special company 
in one battalion, the 7th Leinsters, to which such men 
should be sent, so that while drilling and exercising 
with the rest of the battalion, and enjoying no special 
privilege, they ate and slept and lived together in their 
own barrack rooms. 

Yet the obstacle thus set up deterred a good many 
of the less zealous, who could not understand why that 
should be made a condition in the Irish Division which 
was not so in the Ulster Division — nor, indeed, so far as 
I know, anywhere else at that time. Men who had been 
officers of Ulster Volunteers got their commissions as a 
matter of course ; the officer of National Volunteers 
had to prove his competence in the cadet company. 
General Parsons fully admitted this difference of treat- 
ment, and justified it by saying to Redmond that in 
consequence of it he would be very sorry to change officers 
with the Ulster Division. One cannot refuse to admire 
such a spirit ; but he ought to have asked himself whether 
it was fair to impose a handicap on Redmond's efforts. 
Everything turned on getting representative young men 
from the Volunteers, and from the correspondence it 
appears that few were coming from the South and West. 
From the North they poured in. In our 47th Brigade, 
the 6th Royal Irish Regiment was mainly composed of 
Derry Nationalists ; the 7th Leinsters and the 6th Con- 
naught Rangers were almost to a man followers of Mr. 
Devlin from Belfast. 

Next after Redmond, Mr. Devlin was the man to 
whom our Division owed most. But the first and the 
main impetus came from Redmond himself. He spoke 
on October 4th at Wexford, the capital of his native 
county ; on the 11th at Waterford, his own constituency ; 
on the 18th at Kilkenny, the constituency of his close 
friend Pat O'Brien. A week later he was at Belfast 

13 



178 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

and in the glens of Antrim, among the Nationalists of 
Ulster. Then Parliament kept him for a few weeks ; 
in December he was back, and spoke at Tuam and in 
Limerick. Everywhere the Volunteers turned out in 
great numbers to receive him ; and to them his appeal 
was primarily addressed. 

At Wexford he laid stress on Mr. Asquith's pledge 
that the Volunteers should remain as a recognized per- 
manent force for the defence of the country, and this 
led him to raise frankly the question of control. Who 
should liave authority over Volunteers in a State ? 
Surely the elected and responsible government. But 
pending Home Rule, " the policy and control of the 
Volunteers must rest with the elected representatives 
of the country." 

More generally, he reminded them that he had always 
ispoken of the possibility of some great political con- 
vulsion that might destroy their plans. " Nothing but 
an earthquake can now prevent Home Rule," he had 
said. " The outbreak of this overwhelming war might 
easily have overwhelmed Home Rule. But we have 
survived it." 

And he went on to argue that the delay might be a 
blessing in disguise. Civil war between Irishmen had 
always seemed to him an impossibility. That impossi- 
bility was now universally admitted. In a passage of 
unusual heat he denounced the " so-called statesmen " 
who came over unasked to our country to inflame 
feelings — as Mr. Bonar Law had done ; and he appealed 
to all sections " to enable us to utilize the interval before 
a Home Rule Parliament assembles to unite all Irishmen 
under a Home Rule Government." 

At Waterford he was largely occupied with repelling 
the charge that he and his colleagues had made a bargain 
with the Government to ship Irish Volunteers overseas 
to fight whether they would or no. This was the line on 
which opposition was developing, and it was assisted by 



THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 179 

articles in the English Press, which laid it down that 
unless the Irish furnished a sufficiency of recruits, Home 
Rule should be repealed. 

An extension of this argument, that Redmond was 
buying Home Rule with the blood of young Irishmen, 
raised the question whether Home Rule was worth the 
price. While the Bill was not yet law, it was a flag, a 
symbol. Once it became an Act, men's attitude changed ; 
they turned to criticizing what they had got ; and one 
powerful newspaper, bitterly hostile to the Parliamentary 
party, expended much ingenuity in exaggerating the 
limitations of what had been gained. While one set of 
critics endeavoured to show how miserable was the price 
obtained, another dwelt on the unrighteousness of making . 
such a bargain without Ireland's consent. In Redmond's 
speech at Kilkenny there was a note of resentment. 
He refused at any great crisis to consider " what might 
please the gallery or the crowd, or might spare him the 
insults of a handful of cornerboys." 

But the kernel of all his thought was put into one 
sentence by him at Belfast. " The proper place to guard 
Ireland is on the battlefields of France." It was from 
Belfast after this meeting that the first striking demon- 
stration of response came — organized and inspired by 
Mr. Devlin. On November 20th nearly a full battalion 
of recruits, many National Volunteers, entrained for 
Fermoy ; a week later they were followed by another 
great detachment. The example spread ; and when 
Redmond spoke at Limerick on December 20th, the 
Irish Times in a friendly leading article admitted that 
" the National Volunteers were now coming forward in 
large numbers and the Irish Brigade was going to be a 
credit to the country." This was a very different note 
from that which had come from Unionist quarters at 
earlier stages. 



180 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 



III 

So far as recruiting went, Redmond had won. He was 
sure of making good to England. But in what concerned 
making good to Ireland, he had no progress to report. 
He stated that already nearly 16,500 men from the Volun- 
teers had joined the Army, and he could not understand 
why Government was so chary of giving assistance to 
train and equip this force. There was no doubt as to 
the mass of men available. Figures supplied by the 
police to the Chief Secretary estimated that between 
September 24th, when the split took place, and October 
31st, out of 170,000 Volunteers, only a trifle over 12,000 
adhered to Professor MacNeill. 

But in Dublin the opponents were nearly 2,000 out 
of 6,700 ; and two strong battalions went almost solid 
against Redmond. These battalions, along with the 
Citizens' Army, were destined to alter the course of Irish 
history. It was specially true of them, but true gener- 
ally of all the minority who left Redmond, that they were 
kept together by a resolute and determined group who 
had a clear purpose. 

The " Irish Volunteers," as the dissentients called 
themselves, were made to feel that they were a minority, 
and an unpopular minority in more than one instance. 
In Galway, when they turned out to parade the streets, 
they were driven off with casualties — retaliation for their 
interference with our meeting in September. In Dundalk 
there was a somewhat similar occurrence. But they 
got more than their own back one day in November 
by a bold coup — forerunner of many. Ninety rifles 
belonging to the National Volunteers were being moved 
in a cart from one place to another. Half a dozen men 
armed with revolvers held up the cart and its driver and 
carried off the rifles. At their Convention, held in the 
end of October, Professor MacNeill said : " They would 



THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 181 

go on with the work of organizing, training and equipping 
a Volunteer force for the service of Ireland in Ireland, 
and such a force might yet be the means of saving Home 
Rule from disaster, and of compelling the Home Rule 
Government to keep faith with Ireland without the 
exaction of a price in blood." 

That forecast has not as yet realized itself ; and many 
of us think that the chief achievement of this section 
has been to turn to waste a heavy price that was paid 
in blood by other men for the sake of Ireland. But 
unquestionably they were, though the minority, far more 
of a living reality than the mass of the original force — 
and for a simple reason. Their purpose, whether good 
or bad, was within their own control. The purpose of 
the majority was to carry out Redmond's policy — which 
was to make the Volunteers part of an Irish army of 
which the striking force was designed to defend Ireland 
on the battlefields of Flanders. But to carry out that 
policy the National Volunteers must be accepted as a 
purely local Irish military organization for home defence 
— controlled, in the absence of a popularly elected Irish 
Government, by the elected Irish representatives. The 
War Office thwarted that policy. Lord Kitchener would 
not accept it. He continued to be of the opinion that 
by equipping Redmond's followers he would be arming 
enemies. 

It is worth noting that one of the ablest and most 
detached students of Irish affairs was wholly on Redmond's 
side. Lord Dunraven, appealing on behalf of " the new 
Irish Brigade," pointed out that both sides of Redmond's 
policy must be accepted. " No scheme which fails to 
take some account of the National Volunteer Force can 
do justice to what Ireland can give," he wrote. But 
was there everywhere a desire to do justice to what 
Ireland could give — and was willing to give ? Redmond 
was warned in those days by an influential correspondent 
in England that a deliberate policy was being pursued 



182 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

by the opponents of Home Rule, who undoubtedly had 
strong backing in the War Office. The National Volun- 
teers were to become the objects of derision and contempt, 
which would extend to himself. By keeping the Volun- 
teers out of active participation in war service, it could 
be proved that Redmond did not speak for Ireland or 
represent Ireland ; that the Irish were raising unreal 
objections so as to keep an excuse for avoiding danger. 
It was urged on him that he should press for the extension 
of the Territorial Act to Ireland and endeavour to bring 
his men in on this footing. 

There were two difficulties in the way of this scheme 
which nevertheless attracted him strongly. The first 
was that enlistment in the Territorials for home service 
had been stopped— so that the proposal had little advan- 
tage, if any, over enlistment in the Irish brigades. The 
second was due to the Volunteers themselves, many of 
whom, though willing to serve in the war, were unwilling 
to take the oath of allegiance. 

There were limits to the length to which Redmond 
felt himself able to go, and he never dealt with this 
objection by argument. The example which he set was 
plain to all. He joined in singing " God save the King," 
in drinking the King's health, and at Aughavanagh now 
he flew the Union Jack beside the Green flag. He was 
willing to take part in any demonstration which implied 
that Nationalist Ireland under its new legal status accepted 
its lot in the British Empire fully and without reserve. 
It was superfluous for him to argue that Nationalists 
might consistently take the oath of allegiance when 
Nationalists were pledging their lives in the King's service 
beside every other kind of citizen in the British Empire. 

Over and above his own example was the example 
of his brother and his son. On November 23rd Willie 
Redmond addressed a great meeting in Cork and told 
them, " I Avon't say to you go, but come with me." He 
was then fifty-three — and for most men it would have 



THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 183 

been " too late a week." But no man was ever more 
instinctively a soldier, and to soldiering he had gone by 
instinct as a boy. He was an officer in the Wexford 
Militia for a year or two, till politics drove him out of 
that service and drew him into another. Now he went 
to the war gravely but joyfully. I think those days 
did not bring into relief any more picturesque or 
sympathetic figure. 

One thing ought to be said. Mr. Devlin wished to 
join also, but Redmond held that he could not be spared 
from Ireland, where his influence was enormous ; and 
he was placed in a somewhat unfair position, even though 
everyone who knew him knew that his chief attribute 
was personal courage. But he was indispensable for the 
work which had to be done, of helping at this strange 
crisis to keep Ireland peaceful and united at a time when 
Government was at its lowest ebb of authority. 

Trouble threatened. On October 11th, the anniversary 
of Parnell's death, three bodies of Volunteers turned out 
in Dublin — the National Volunteers, the Irish Volunteers, 
and the Citizen Army. A collision occurred which might 
easily have become serious. This passed off, but early 
in December the Government suppressed three or four 
of the openly anti-British papers, which were, of course, 
still more virulent against Redmond. They reappeared 
under other names. But a meeting of protest against 
the suppression was held outside Liberty Hall. Mr. 
Larkin had, by this time, gone to America. His chief 
colleague, Mr. James Connolly, who was the brain of the 
Irish Labour Movement, presided, and at the close de- 
clared that the meeting had been held under the protection 
of an armed company of the Citizen Army posted in the 
windows and on the roof of Liberty Hall. Had the police 
or military attempted to disperse the meeting, he said, 
" those rifles would not have been silent." 

Ulster was not the only place where armed men thought 
themselves entitled to resist coercion. 



184 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

Dublin was the more dangerous because the war, which 
created so much employment in Great Britain, brought 
no new trade to Ireland, outside of Belfast. Agriculture 
prospered, but the towns knew only a rise of prices. 
Redmond began with high hopes, which Mr. Lloyd George 
fostered, of rapidly-developing munition works, which 
would at the close of hostilities leave the foundation for 
industrial communities. Here again, however, Redmond's 
representations were in vain. When the heavy extra 
tax on beer and spirits was levied by the first supple- 
mentary Budget, he opposed it angrily : 

" You are doing some shipbuilding at Belfast, you 
are making a few explosives at Arklow, you are bujdng 
some woollen goods from some of the smaller manufac- 
turers, but apart from that, the bulk of the hundreds 
of millions of borrowed money which you are spending 
on the war is being spent in England and in increasing 
the income of your country." 

This tax on alcohol would curtail the most important 
urban industry of the South and West of Ireland, and 
he feared that it was the old story of crushing Ireland's 
trade under the wheel of British interests. 

Here again Redmond could only plead with the Irish 
Government that they, in their turn, should plead with 
the Imperial authorities. He should have been able to 
act in his own right as the head of an Irish Ministry, 
knowing the importance of providing employment at 
such a time. He saw the need and how to meet it ; but 
he had none of the resources of power. As compared 
with the other men who occupied, in the public eye, a 
rank equivalent to his — with General Botha, for instance 
— he was like a commander of those Russian armies 
which had to take the field against Germans with sticks 
and pikes. 

Yet power he had — -power over the heart and mind of 
Ireland — the power which was given him by the response 



THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 185 

to his appeal. From January onwards the Sixteenth 
Division grew steadily and strongly. Recruiting began to 
get on a better basis. The appointment of Sir Hedley Le 
Bas in charge of this propaganda brought about a healthy 
change in methods. Appeals were used devised for Ireland, 
and not, as heretofore, simple replicas of the English 
article. Heart-breaking instances of stupidity were still 
of daily occurrence, but imagination and insight began 
to have some play ; and there was no longer the complete 
separation which had existed between the effort of 
Redmond and his colleagues and the effort of men like 
Lord Meath. In January Willie Redmond was posted 
to his battalion, the 6th Royal Irish, at Fermoy, where 
the 47th Brigade had its headquarters. In his case, as 
in my own, there had been much avoidable and most 
undesirable delay ; but his presence with the Division 
was worth an immense deal. There was delay also about 
his younger namesake, John Redmond's son — who was 
for a long time refused a commission in the Division 
in whose formation his father had played so great a part. 
Naturally, trained speakers who had joined the Division 
were utilized for recruiting purposes. Willie Redmond 
did comparatively little of this work. It is no light job 
to take over command of a company, if you mean really 
to command it ; and with him, from the moment he joined 
everything came second to his military duty. But 
private soldiers have a less exacting time, and there was 
scarcely one week of my three months in the 7th Leinsters 
in which I did not spend the Saturday and Sunday 
on this business — ^generally in company with the most 
brilliant speaker, taking all in all, that I have ever heard. 
Kettle, then a lieutenant in the battalion, was wit, essayist, 
poet and orator : whether he was most a wit or most 
an orator might be argued for a night without conclusion ; 
but as talker or as speaker he had few equals. He was 
the son of a veteran Nationalist, who had taken a lead 
in Parnell's day ; but the farmer's son had become the 



186 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

most characteristic product of Ireland's capital, which, 
rich or poor, squalid or splendid, is a metropolis — a centre 
of many interests, a forcing-house of many ideas. Nothing 
in Ireland is less English than Dublin, and its tone differs 
from that of England in having active sympathy with 
the continental mind. 

Kettle was always to some extent in revolt against 
the theories of the Gaelic League, which he thought 
tended to make Ireland insular morally as well as 
materially. He was a good European because he was a 
good Irishman ; and because he was both, he was, though 
largely educated in Germany, a fierce partisan of France. 

More than ail this, he had seen with his own eyes the 
actual martyrdom of Belgium. Sent out by Redmond 
to purchase rifles, he was in the country when Antwerp 
was occupied, and he wrote with passion of what he 
heard, of what he saw. Louvain to him was more than 
a mere name. All the Catholic in him, and all the Irish 
Catholic, for Ireland's association with Louvain was 
long and intimate, rose up in fury ; he went through 
Ireland carrying the fiery cross. 

Everywhere we went we had friendly and even 
enthusiastic audiences ; the only place where I met any 
suggestion of hostility was at Killarney, and there it 
took the form of avoiding our meeting. We were cheered 
and encouraged — but we did not get many recruits, so 
to say, on the nail. Yet they came, generally dribbling 
in afterwards. From one small meeting in county 
Waterford we came away badly disappointed, having 
thought an effect was made, yet we did not take a single 
man. I heard later that within the next fortnight thirty 
men from that parish had come in by ones and twos to 
sign on — but at a town several miles away. Local pres- 
sure, personal not political, was against us, especially 
that of the mothers ; and there was a shyness about 
taking this plunge into the unknown. 

One exception stands out, in my mind, unlike the 



THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 187 

general run of these gatherings. It was the first field 
day of our brigade, when, dressed in the khaki that had 
at last been served out, we mustered on the race-course 
at Fermoy, five thousand strong ; and I went from the 
review to the train for Waterford. There was no mis- 
taking the temper of Redmond's constituency ; we got 
men there in hundreds, including a score or so of cadets 
— young men of education — for our special company of 
the Leinsters, which was filling up fast. 

At that meeting we had one force with us which was 
not often active on our side. The Bishop of Waterford 
was strong for the war ; the leading parish priest of the 
town took the chair and spoke straight and plain, while 
one of the Regulars, a Carmelite friar, made a speech 
which was among the most eloquent that I have ever 
listened to. 

At the beginning of April I was gazetted to a lieutenancy 
in the 6th Connaught Rangers, and began to know the 
Division from another aspect. Broadly speaking, the 
men with whom I had been sharing a hut were Nationalist 
by opinion and by tradition — though by no means all 
Catholics. There were Unionists, but they were few. 
In the society which I now joined — a joint mess of the 
Royal Irish and the Rangers — matters were different. 

The personnel of the 6th Royal Irish was strongly 
characteristic of the old Army. The commanding officer, 
Curzon, was of Irish descent, but of little Irish associa- 
tion ; his second in command was an Irish Protestant 
gentleman of a pleasant ordinary type. The senior 
company commander was an Englishman. As an offset, 
Willie Redmond had one company, and another was 
commanded by an ex-guardsman, who had been a chief 
personage in the Derry Volunteers, and brought so many 
of them with him that General Parsons gave him a 
captaincy straight off. 

In my own battalion, no Catholic had then the rank of 
captain. The colonel and the adjutant belonged to well- 



188 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

known families in the North of Ireland, deeply involved 
in Covenanting politics. My own company commander 
was a very gallant little Dublin barrister, who, before 
the war, had exerted on English platforms against Home 
Rule the gift of racy eloquence which he now devoted 
to recruiting. Not half a dozen of the subalterns would 
have described themselves as Nationalists. 

It is easy to see how aU this could be represented, and 
was represented, to the outside public of Ireland. From 
the inside, one thing was clear. In our battalion every 
man desired the success of the Division, and more par- 
ticularly of the Connaught Rangers, absolutely with a 
whole heart. Anything said or done that could have 
offended the men — practically all Catholic and Nationalist 
— would have drawn the most condign chastisement 
from our commanding officer. I never heard of any 
man or officer in the battalion who would have desired 
to change its colonel ; we were fortunate, and we knew 
it. There was very little political discussion, and what 
there was turned chiefly on the question how far Redmond 
might be held to speak for Ireland. So far as Redmond 
himself was concerned, I think there were few, if any, 
who did not count it an honour to meet him — and some 
who had never been won to him before were won to him 
for his brother's sake. 

Looking back on it all, it is clear to me that a change 
wrought itself in that society. I do not know one sur- 
vivor of those men who does not desire that accomplish- 
ment should be given to the desire of those whom they 
led. In not a few cases one might put the change higher ; 
some opinions as to what was good for Ireland were 
profoundly affected. 

Yet this also is true. The atmosphere of the mess 
was one in which Willie Redmond found himself shy 
and a stranger. He had lived all his life in an intimate 
circle of Nationalist belief. Knowing the other side in 
the House of Commons, where many of his oldest friends 



THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 189 

and the men he liked best (Colonel Lockwood comes 
most readily to my mind) were political opponents, he 
had nevertheless always lived with people in agreement 
with his views ; and you could not better describe the 
atmosphere of our mess than by saying that it was a 
society in which every one liked and respected Willie 
Redmond, but one in which he never really was himself. 
He was only himself with the men. 

In short, so far as the officers were concerned, our 
Division was not a counterpart to the Ulster Division ; 
it was not Irish in the sense that the other was Ulster. 
No attempt was made to make it so, and General Parsons 
would have quite definitely rejected any such ideal — 
though less fiercely than he would have repudiated the 
idea of handicapping a man for his opinions or his creed. 
Yet manjT- persons without design, and some with a 
purpose, spread broadcast the belief that Catholics and 
Nationalists as such were relegated to a position of 
inferiority in the command of this Catholic and Nationalist 
Division. 

The worst of our difficulties lay in the long inherited 
suspicions of the Irish mind. At a recruiting meeting 
one would argue in appealing to Nationalists that the 
Home Rule Act was a covenant on which we were in 
honour bound to act, and that every man who risked 
his life on the faith of that covenant set a seal upon it 
which would never be disregarded. The listeners would 
applaud, but after the meeting one and another would 
come up privately and say : " Are you sure now they 
aren't fooling us again ? " The Sinn Fein propaganda, 
always shrewdly conducted, did not fail to emphasize 
the pronouncement of the Tory Press that there should 
be no Home Rule because Ireland had failed to come 
forward ; or to point the moral of Mr. Bonar Law's 
excursion to Belfast, with its violent asseveration that 
Ulster should be backed without limit in opposition to 
control by an Irish Parliament. Ireland, always suspect, 



190 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

has learnt to be profoundly suspicious ; and suspicion 
is the form of prophecy which has most tendency to 
fulfil itself. 

In one part of the Irish race, however, this cold para- 
lysis of distrust had no operation. The Irish in Great 
Britain, always outdoing all others in the keenness of 
their Nationalism, were nearer the main current of the 
war, and were more in touch with the truth about English 
feeling. They had a double impulse, as Redmond had ; 
they saw how to serve their own cause in serving Europe's 
freedom ; and their response was magnificent. Mr. 
T. P. O'Connor probably raised more recruits by his 
personal appeal than any other man in England. 

A great part of Redmond's correspondence in these 
months came from Irishmen in England who were joining 
as Irishmen, and who had great difficulty in making their 
way to our Division. Many thousands had already 
enlisted elsewhere ; hundreds, at least, tried to join the 
Sixteenth Division, and failed to get there. But there was 
one instance to which attention should be directed. In 
Newcastle-on-Tyne a movement was set on foot to raise 
Tyneside battalions, including one of Irish. Mr. O'Connor 
went down, and the upshot was that four Irish battalions 
were raised. They were in existence by January 1, 1915, 
when General Parsons was already writing that unless 
Irishmen could be found to fill up the Division, we must 
submit to the disgrace of having it made up by English 
recruits. The obvious answer was to annex the Tyneside 
Irish Brigade. Redmond, moreover, held that to bring 
over this brigade to train in Ireland, and to incorporate it 
bodily in the Sixteenth Division, would please the Tyneside 
men — for a tremendous welcome would have greeted them 
in their own country — and would have an excellent effect 
on Irish opinion generally. But the proposal was rigor- 
ously opposed by the War Office. It was argued that 
these men had enlisted technically as Northumberland 
Fusiliers and Northumberland Fusiliers they must remain. 



THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 191 

In reality, as far as one can judge, the War Office were 
penny wise and pound foolish. " We have got these 
men," they said, " and we have a promise from Redmond 
to fill a Division. Why relieve him of one- third of his 
task ? " 

Redmond knew, and we all knew, that the essential 
was to get our Division complete and into the field at 
the earliest possible moment. He had confidence that 
once they got to work they would make a name for them- 
selves, which would be the best attraction for recruits. Let 
it be remembered that at this moment popular expecta- 
tion put the end of the war about July. When I joined 
the Rangers in April 1915, our mess was full of young 
officers threatening to throw up their commissions and 
enlist in some battalion which would give them the chance 
of seeing a fight. We could not expect to move to France 
before August, and by that time all that we could hope 
would be to form part of the army of occupation. Rumour 
was rife, too, that the Division would be broken up and 
utilized for draft-finding, that it would never see France 
as a unit. All this talk came back to Redmond and 
increased his anxiety to make the work complete. 

He held, and I think rightly, that the whole machinery 
of recruiting worked against us ; that every officer had 
instructions to send no man to the Sixteenth Division who 
could be got into a draft-finding reserve battalion. Know- 
ing what we know, I cannot blame them ; but the game 
was not fairly played. A man would come in and say 
he wanted to join the Irish Brigade. " Which regiment ? " 
Often he might not realize that a brigade was made up 
of regiments, but if he knew and answered, for instance, 
" The Dublins," he was more likely than not to be shipped 
off to the Curragh, where the reserve of the regular 
battalions was kept, instead of to Buttevant, where our 
Dublins were in training. 

Still, with all our troubles, things were marching ahead 
in that April of 1915 ; recruits were coming in to the 



192 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

tune of 1,500 a week. Then came a political crisis and 
the formation of a Coalition Government. Redmond 
was asked to take a post in it. The letter in which the 
invitation was conveyed made it clear that the post 
could not be an Irish office. 

Redmond refused. He said to me afterwards that 
under no conditions did he think he could have accepted. 
But he added, " If I had been Asquith and had wished 
to make it as difficult as possible to refuse, I should 
have offered a seat in the Cabinet without portfolio 
and without salary." 

He was well aware how many and how unscrupulous 
were his enemies in Ireland ; he was not prepared to 
give them the opportunity of saying that he had got 
his price for the blood of young Irishmen and the betrayal 
of his principles. Even apart from the question of salary, 
the tradition against acceptance of office under Govern- 
ment till Ireland's claim was satisfied would have been 
very hard to break. Yet Redmond saw fully how dis- 
astrous would be the effect on Irish opinion if he were 
not in the Government and Sir Edward Carson was. 

Knowing Ireland as he did, he knew that the accept- 
ance of Sir Edward Carson as a colleague would be taken 
in Ireland to imply that the Government had abandoned 
its support of Home Rule. Ireland would assume that 
the Ulster leader would not come in except on his own 
terms. Redmond made the strongest representations 
that he could to the Prime Minister to exclude both 
Irish parties to the unresolved dispute. But Sir Edward 
Carson in those days was making himself very disagree- 
able in the House of Commons and Mr. Asquith, as usual, 
followed the line of least resistance. 

The effect of the Coalition as formed was seen when 
recruiting in Ireland dropped from 6,000 in April-May 
to 3,000 in May-June. It stayed at the lower figure 
for several months, till it was raised again by efforts for 
which Redmond was chiefly responsible. I do not know 



THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 193 

whether Sir Edward Carson's presence in the Attorney- 
General's office, or his absence from the Opposition 
benches in debates, was worth ten thousand men ; but 
that is a small measure of what was lost in Ireland by 
his inclusion. 



IV 

The formation of the Coalition Government marks the 
first stage in the history of Redmond's defeat and the 
victory of Sir Edward Carson and Sinn Fein. 

Of what he felt upon this matter, Redmond at the 
time said not a word in public. Six months later, on 
November 2, 1915, when a debate on the naval and 
military situation was opened, he broke silence — and his 
first words were an explanation of his silence. He had 
not intervened, he said, in any debate on the war since 
its inception. " We thought a loyal and as far as possible 
silent support to the Government of the day was the best 
service we could render." This silence had been main- 
tained " even after the formation of the Coalition " — 
when the Irish view had been roughly set aside, and 
when the personal tie to the Liberal Government with 
which he had been so long allied had been profoundly 
modified. He claimed the credit of this loyalty not 
merely for himself but for the whole of his country. 
" Since the war commenced the voice of party controversy 
has disappeared in Ireland." 

This was pushing generosity almost to a stretch of 
imagination, for the voice of party controversy had not 
been absent from the Belfast Press, nor had it spared 
him. But he was speaking then, and he desired that 
the House should feel that he spoke, as Ireland's spokes- 
man ; he claimed credit for North and South alike in 
the absence of all labour troubles in war supply. " The 
spectacle of industrial unrest in Great Britain, the 

14 



194 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

determined and unceasing attacks in certain sections of 
the Press upon individual members of the Government and 
in a special way upon the Prime Minister, have aroused 
the greatest concern and the deepest indignation in 
Ireland," he said. " Mr, Asquith stands to-day, as before 
the war, high in the confidence of the Irish people." 
The " persistent pessimism " had effected nothing except 
to help in some measure " that little fringe which exists 
in Ireland as in England, of men who would if they could 
interfere with the success of recruiting." 

No doubt there was an element of policy, of a fencer's 
skill, in all this. Sir Edward Carson had not maintained 
silence and certainlj'' had not spared the Prime Minister. 
But in essence Redmond was relying on the plain truth. 
He had pledged support and he gave it to the utmost 
of his power, even at his peril. Mr. Birrell in the 
posthumous " Appreciation " which has been already 
quoted has this passage : 

*' Although it was not alwaj^'s easj'' to do business with 
him, being very justly susj^icious of English politicians, 
he could be trusted more implicitly than almost everj'' 
other politician I have ever come in contact with. Ho 
was slow to pass his word, but when he had done so, 
you knew he would keep it to the very letter, and what 
was almost as important, his silence and discretion could 
be relied upon with certainty. He was constitutionally 
incapable of giving anybody away who had trusted him." 

Nothing but considerations of loj'-alty had kept him 
publicly silent in the months of this year when so much 
was done, and so much left undone, against his desire 
and his judgment. In June, the Sixteenth Division was 
within 1,000 of completion. The shortage existed in one 
brigade — the 49th — which had been formed of battalions 
having their recruiting areas in Ulster — two of the Royal 
Irish Fusiliers, one of the Inniskillings and one of the 
Royal Irish Rifles. The conception had undoubtedly 
been to provide for the Nationalists of Ulster. But, as 



THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 195 

it proved, these men vastly preferred to enlist in units 
which were not associated with the avowedly Unionist 
Division, all of whose battalions belonged to one or other 
of these three regiments ; and the 49th Brigade was 
not nearly up to strength. The Tenth Division was now on 
the point of readiness for the field ; but when the final 
weeding out of unfit or half trained men was completed 
its ranks were 1,200 short. The War Office decided to 
draw, not on both the other Irish Divisions, but on the 
Sixteenth only, and only upon the deficient brigade. 
When the offer of immediate service was made, every man 
in its four battalions volunteered, and the Tenth Division 
was completed ; but the Sixteenth was thrown back, 
and the discouraging rumour that it was to be only used 
as a reserve gained a great impetus. Redmond was very 
angry. He wrote to Mr. Tennant demanding that at 
least the Division's deficiency should at once be made 
up, by giving to us the full product of one or two weeks' 
recruiting in Ireland. Nothing of the kind was done 
to meet his request. 

It was, however, some compensation to think that 
at least one of our purely Irish formations was going to 
take the field ; and we hoped that its fortunes might 
remedy a complaint which began to be loudly made — 
that credit was withheld from the achievements of Irish 
troops. 

The main source of this grievance was the publication 
of Admiral de Robeck's despatch concerning the first 
landing at Gallipoli. In the original document, a schedule 
was given showing the detail of troops told off to each 
of the separate landings ; and the narrative, in which 
a sailor spoke with frank enthusiasm of the desperate 
valour shown by soldiers, was written with constant 
reference to the detail given. As some evil chance willed, 
the narrative mentioned by name several of the regiments 
engaged ; but when it came to describe the forlorn hope 
at *' V " Beach, it dealt fully with the special difficulties, 



196 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

and said in brief but emphatic phrase, " Here the troops 
wrought miracles." The War Office, in editing the 
despatch for publication, suppressed the schedule, as 
likely to give information to the enemy, so that in this 
case it did not appear to whom the praise applied. 

Certain things are unbelievable. No officer and no 
man that ever lived could from a partisan feeling against 
Ireland have sought to rob regiments who had done 
and suffered such things as the Dublins and Munsters 
did and suffered at " V " Beach of whatever credit could 
be given to them. Yet in such times as we were living 
in, the unbelievable is readily believed, and men saw 
malice in the suppression of what could not long be 
secret : Ireland had too many dead that day. What 
made the suggestion more incredible only gave a poignancj- 
to resentment, for Admiral de Robeck was an Irishman, 
with his home some few miles from the regimental depot 
of the Dublins. 

Two things, however, should be said. If only in fair- 
ness to Admiral de Robeck, the explanation should 
instantly have been given : it was never given in full 
until he came before the Dardanelles Commission, many 
months later, and it has not been officially published to 
this hour. And further, whoever edited the despatch 
was presumably a soldier, and knew how jealous soldiers 
are, and how jealous their friends are for them, of everj' 
word that goes to the recognition of such service. The 
effect of omitting the schedule ought to have been fore- 
seen. 

Even before the middle of August, when angry letters 
over this despatch were appearing in the Irish Press, 
other news began to come to Ireland, ill calculated 
to help recruiting. The Tenth Division had come into 
action, but under the unluckiest conditions. When the 
great attempt was made to cut across the peninsula by 
a renewed push from Anzac and by a new landing at 
Suvla Bay, the Irish were among the reinforcements 



THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 197 

told off for that surprise. But from lack of room on the 
island bases it was considered impossible to keep them 
together as a division, and one brigade, the 29th, lay 
so far off that it could not be brought into the con- 
certed movement on Suvla. It was therefore sent 
separately to Anzac, and joined in with the Australians. 
Broken up by regiments and not operating as a unit, 
it furnished useful support ; but no credit for what the 
men did could go to Ireland. The other two brigades, 
the 30th and 31st, were left under the command of 
their divisional general and were to attack on the left 
of the bay. But owing to some defect in exploration 
of the coast-line, the movement was not so carried out ; 
six battalions out of the eight were landed on the south 
of the bay and were attached to the right-hand force. 
Thus, in the actual operations Sir Bryan Mahon had 
under his command only two battalions of his own men. 
The remaining six operated under the command of the 
divisional general of the Eleventh Division, who delegated 
the conduct of the actual attack to one of his brigadiers. 
It is sufficient to say that immediately after the action 
both these officers were relieved of their commands. 
The same fate befell the corps commander under whose 
directions this wing of the concerted movement was 
placed. 

In face of these facts it would be absurd to deny that 
the troops were badly handled. They suffered terribly 
from thirst, and the suffering was in large measure pre- 
ventive. The attack was a failure. All the success 
achieved was the capture of Chocolate Hill, and the 
Irish claim that success. It is disputed by other regi- 
ments. This much is certain : the Irish were part of 
the troops who carried the hill, and at nightfall, when 
the rest were withdrawn to the beach, the Irish were 
left holding it. 

But they had paid dearly, and in the days which 
followed many more were sacrificed in the hopeless effort 



198 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

to retrieve what had been lost when the surprise attack 
failed. The loss fell specially on a picked battalion, 
the 7th Dublins, which had grown up about a footballers' 
compan}^, the very flower of young Irish manhood. Grief 
and indignation were universal when tales of what had 
happened began to come through. 

But of all this Redmond said no word in public. He 
threatened disclosure in debate at one period ; yet on 
a strong representation from Mr. Tennant — ^in whose 
friendliness, as in the Prime Minister's, he had confidence 
— he refrained. To this abstention he added the most 
practical proof of good will. Lord Wimborne, now Lord- 
Lieutenant, seriously concerned at the continued drop 
in recruiting, which had not shown any sign of recovery 
since the Coalition Government was formed, came to 
him with the proposal for a conference on the subject. 
Li pursuance of this suggestion Redmond went to 
London, where an interview took place between him and 
Lord Kitchener, Mr. Birrell and Mr. Tennant assisting. 
Redmond put in a memorandum stating his complaints, 
and thrashed out the subject to satisfactory conclu- 
sions on all points that directly affected recruiting. 
The conference ultimately met at the Viceregal Lodge 
on October 15th. It included the Primate of All Ireland, 
Lord Londonderry, Lord Meath, Lord Powerscourt, Sir 
Nugent Everard, the O'Conor Don and Colonel Sharman 
Crawford, the Lord Mayors of Dublin, Belfast and Cork, 
and Redmond. The military were represented by Major- 
General Friend, commanding the troops in Ireland, with 
whom Redmond always had the most cordial relations. 

Only those who understand something of Irish tradition 
will realize how great a departure from established usage 
it was for Parnell's lieutenant and successor to take part 
formally in a meeting at the Viceregal Lodge — or indeed 
to cross its threshold for any purpose. But Redmond 
always had the logic of his convictions. As part of a 
compact, he was helping to the best of his power the 



THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 199 

Government which must carry on till Home Rule could 
come into operation ; and here as elsewhere he was ready 
to mark his conviction that the enactment of Home Rule 
had made possible a complete change in his attitude. 

Among his papers is a very full note of what passed 
on this occasion. It is confidential, but one may note 
the extreme friendliness of attitude as between Redmond 
and the Ulster representatives, and also the fact that 
the operative suggestions agreed on were proposed first 
by Redmond himself. They were the result of his inter- 
view with Lord Kitchener. Recruiting in Ireland should 
no longer be left to voluntary effort, but a Department 
should be formed corresponding to that over which Lord 
Derby had been appointed to preside in Great Britain ; 
and the Lord-Lieutenant himself should accept the posi- 
tion of its official head, and should appoint or nominate 
some man of known business capacity to preside over 
the detail of organization. Redmond pressed also that 
the country should be told definitely what Lord Wim- 
borne had told the conference, that the need was for a 
total of about 1,100 recruits per week. 

He insisted also very strongly on the publication of 
a letter which Lord Kitchener at his instance had written 
to the conference. Its last paragraph read : 

" The Irish are entitled to their full share of the com- 
pliments paid to the rest of the United Kingdom for 
their hitherto magnificent response to the appeal for 
men ; but if that response is to reap its due and only 
reward in victory, the supply must be continued." 

Over 81,000 recruits had been raised in Ireland since 
the war started — a period of eighty-two weeks. Viewed 
in comparison with Lord Kitchener's original anticipa- 
tions, the result might well be called " magnificent." 
But it Vv'as necessary to maintain the same weekly 
average, and for four months the figure had been much 
below this. The result of the new campaign was to 
raise nearly 7,500 men in seven weeks. 



200 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

In the campaign thus launched, as Redmond so 
keenly desired, under the joint auspices of Ulstermen, 
Southern Unionists and Nationalists, one circumstance 
attracted attention. It was proposed to hold a great 
meeting at Newry, the frontier town where Ulster 
ma ches with the South — a centre in which recruiting 
had been singularly keen and successful. The scheme 
was to unite on one platform the Lord-Lieutenant, 
Redmond and Sir Edward Carson. Sir Edward Carson, 
however, " did not think the proposal would serve 
any useful purpose," and the meeting was held without 
him, in December 1915. 

By this time the Sixteenth Division was under orders 
for France. We had been since September in training 
at Blackdown, near Aldershot ; and here Redmond was 
one of several distinguished visitors who came to see 
us and address the troops. He came down also un- 
officially more than once, for his brother had a pleasant 
house among the pine-trees — where he guarded, or was 
guarded by, the brigade's mascot, the largest of three 
enormous wolfhounds which, through John Redmond, 
were presented to the Irish Division. 

Towards the end of the year new rumours were afloat. 
The 49th Brigade had never been made up to strength, 
and there were stories that a non-Irish brigade was to 
be linked up with us. Letters from two commanding 
officers of the 49th Brigade illustrate the extent to which 
Redmond had come by all ranks to be regarded as our 
tutelary genius ; to him they appealed for redress, fearing 
that they would be turned into a reserve brigade. The 
matter was settled at last to his content and theirs by a 
decision that the two brigades which were ready should 
gD out in advance, to be folloAved by the 49th ; and we 
entrained accordingly on December 17th, 

Sir Lawrence Parsons wrote to Mr. Birrell : "As the 
last train-load moved out of Farnborough station the 
senior Railway Staff Officer came up to me and said, 



THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 201 

* Well, General, that is the soberest, quietest, most 
amenable and best disciplined Division that has left 
Aldershot, and I have seen them all go.' " The compli- 
ment was well paid to General Parsons, and it may 
have been some consolation for a sore heart : that keen 
spirit had to be content to be left behind. Major-General 
W. B. Hickie, C.B., who had greatly distinguished him- 
self in France, now took over command. It would be 
disingenuous to say that John Redmond was not content 
with this change ; but his brother was deeply impressed 
by the hardship inflicted on a gallant soldier. 

The Ulster Division had preceded us by three months. 
All three Irish Divisions were now in the field, and reserve 
brigades were established to feed them. Redmond could 
feel that in great measure his work was done, and that 
he could await the issue in confidence. 

He wrote at this time, in a preface contributed to 
Mr. MacDonagh's book The Irish at the Front, a passage 
of unusual emotion which tells what he thought and 
felt upon this matter. 

"It is these soldiers of ours, with their astonishing 
courage and their beautiful faith, with their natural 
military genius, carrying with them their green flags 
and their Irish war-pipes, advancing to the charge, their 
fearless officers at their head, and followed by their 
beloved chaplains as great-hearted as themselves — bring- 
ing with them a quality all their own to the sordid modern 
battlefield — it is these soldiers of ours to whose keeping 
the Cause of Ireland has passed. It was never in holier, 
worthier keeping than with these boys offering up their 
supreme sacrifice of life with a smile on their lips because 
it was given for Ireland." 

He wrote this when fresh from a sight of troops in the 
field. This visit took place in November 1915, and he 
was full of the experience when he came down to say 
good-bye before we went out. Nothing in all his life had 
approached it in interest, he said to me. The diary of 



202 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

his tour is prefixed to Mr. S. P. Ker's book. What the 
Irish Regiments Have Done — but it conveys little, except 
this dominant impression : '* From the Irish Commander- 
in-Chief himself right down through the Army one meets 
Irishmen wherever one goes." On that journey he got 
the same welcome from Ulstermen as from his own 
nearest countrymen in the Royal Irish Regiment. 



One thing at least Redmond gained, I think, from his 
visit to the front — the sense that with the British Army 
in the field he was in a friendly country. He never had 
that sense with regard to the War Office. Running all 
through this critical year 1915 is the history of one long 
failure — his attempt to secure the creation of a Home 
Defence force in Ireland. Given that, he would be confi- 
dent of possessing the foundation for the structure of 
an Irish Army — an army which would be regarded as 
Ireland's own. Without it, the whole fabric of his eiforts 
must be insecure. He desired to build, as in England 
they built, upon the voluntary effort of a people in whom 
entire confidence was placed. In the War Office un- 
doubtedly men's minds were set upon finding a regular 
supply of Irish troops by quite other metliods — by the 
application of compulsion. 

Redmond saw to the full the danger of attempting 
compulsion with an unwilling people ; it was a peril 
which he sought to keep off, and while he lived did keep 
off, by securing a steady flow of recruits, by gaining a 
reasonable definition of Ireland's quota, and by exerting 
that personal authority which the recognition of his 
efforts conferred upon him. I do not think he was with- 
out hope of a moment when Ireland might come, as 
Great Britain had come by the end of this year, to 



THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 203 

recognize that the voluntary system levied an unfair toll 
on the willing, and that the community itself should accept 
the general necessity of binding its own members. But 
before this could be even dreamed of as practicable, 
the whole force of Volunteers, North and South, must 
feel that they were trusted and recognized, a part in 
the general work. 

The practical organization of the great body at his 
disposal was under discussion between him and Colonel 
Moore from February 1915 onwards ; and the idea was 
mooted th^at by introducing the territorial system Ulster 
Volunteers and National Volunteers might be drawn 
into the same corps. This, however, was for the future ; 
the immediate need was to extend the arming and training 
under their own organization. Redmond learnt at once 
that Lord Kitchener was against this ; that he pointed 
to the existence of another armed force in the North of 
Ireland and argued that to create a second must mean 
civil war ; that he believed revolutionary forces to exist 
in Ireland which Redmond could not control and perhaps 
did not even suspect. Those who then thought with 
Lord Kitchener can say now that events have justified 
his view. They omit to consider how far those events 
proceeded from Lord Kitchener's refusal to accept 
Redmond's judgment. 

Of the danger Redmond was fully aware. " I under- 
stand your position to be," Mr. T. P. O'Connor wrote to 
him in January 1915, " that unless your plan as to the 
Irish Volunteers is adopted we are face to face with a 
most critical and dangerous situation in Ireland." Just 
as fully was he convinced of the way to meet it. In 
February, replying indignantly to Sir Reginald Brade, 
who had complained that Irish recruiting was " distinctly 
languid," he enumerated the points at which the War 
Office had failed to act on his own advice, and urged once 
more, in the first instance, his original policy of employing 
both Ulster and Nationalist Volunteers for Home Defence. 



204 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

" If the two bodies of volunteers were trusted with the 
defence of the country under proper military drill and 
discipline, the result would unquestionably be that a 
large number of them would volunteer for the front. 
Recruiting can best be promoted by creating an atmo- 
sphere in which the patriotism of the younger men of 
the country can be evoked, and we have done a good 
deal already in this direction." 

On April 4th a display was made of the force available. 
A review was held in the Phoenix Park of 25,000 men-^ 
splendid material, but half of them with neither arms 
nor uniform. The Unionist Press was friendly in its 
comments upon the statement which Redmond supplied 
after the parade, claiming that these men should be 
utilized for Home Defence. That day was Easter Sunday 
of 1915. No one guessed then what the next Easter 
was going to bring about. 

On April 19th I find him writing officially to Mr. Birrell, 
seeking the Chief Secretary's influence with the War 
Office, and claiming, what was the truth, that the Irish 
Command shared his view. But at the moment recruit- 
ing was increasing weekly and the War Office were in 
no mood to make further concessions than those by 
which the improvement had been brought about. Then 
came the Coalition, and the consequent reduction of 
recruiting from close on 7,000 to 3,000 a month ; and in 
July the i^djutant- General, Sir Henry Sclater, of his 
own motion approached Redmond. He suggested a 
meeting between Redmond and the War Office, with 
Sir Matthew Nathan and General Parsons in attendance. 
Redmond agreed to the proposal, but formulated his 
views in a lengthy memorandum. The first three points 
dealt with matters directly concerning the Sixteenth 
Division, but in the fourth, weighty emphasis was laid 
on the suggestion of recruiting Volunteers for Home 
Defence. Sir Henry Sclater's reply omitted completely 
all reference to this last — an omission on which Redmond 



THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 205 

commented sharply. He elicited the official answer that 
by urging men to join on a special enlistment for home 
service the numbers who would join for general service 
would be reduced. This was diametrically opposite to 
Redmond's view, and he said so, and urged again that 
the Irish Command was of his opinion. 

The proposed conference resolved itself — to Redmond's 
indignation — into a discussion of Redmond's memorandum 
between the Adjutant-General and Sir Lawrence Parsons. 
Only in September, when at Lord Wimborne's instance 
he interviewed Lord Kitchener, did he have the oppor- 
tunity of raising the matter by direct speech. Lord 
Kitchener then declared himself willing to admit that 
on the question whether enlistment for Home Defence 
would promote or retard recruiting, Redmond's Judgment 
was probably more valuable than his own, and he 
promised to review the question of Home Defence again 
in the light of it. But of this promise nothing came. 

Meantime Redmond was being warned that the Volunteer 
organization as it stood had exhausted its usefulness ; 
its enthusiasm was gone — a natural result of having no 
purpose. A new opening seemed to be created by the 
Bill which Lord Lincolnshire introduced to recognize 
a Volunteer Force in Great Britain which should perform 
military duties under the War Office control. Redmond 
hoped to see this carried with an extension of it to Ireland, 
and this was the practical proposal with which he con- 
cluded his speech when, on November 2nd, for the first 
time in that year, he raised in debate the questions 
to which so much of his time and thought had been 
given. 

How was the Irish recruiting problem to be dealt with ? 
He declared himself absolutely against compulsion, to 
impose which would be " a folly and a crime " unless the 
country was " practically unanimous in favour of it." 
The voluntary system had never had fair play — at all 
events in Ireland. 



206 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

" It is a fact, which has its origin in history, and which 
I need not refer to more closely — it is a fact that in the 
past recruiting for the British Army was not popular 
with the mass of the Irish people. But when the war 
broke out, my colleagues and I, quite regardless, let 
me say, of the political risks which stared us in the face, 
instantly made an appeal to those whom we represented 
in Ireland, and told them that this was Ireland's war 
as well as England's war, that it was a just war, and 
that the recent attitude of Great Britain to Ireland had 
thrown upon us a great, grave duty of honour to the 
British Empire. We then went back from this country, 
and we went all through Ireland. I myself, within the 
space of about a month after that, made speeches at 
great public meetings in every one of the four provinces 
of Ireland. We set ourselves to the task of creating in 
Ireland — creating, mind you — an atmosphere favourable 
to recruiting, and of creating a sentiment in Ireland 
favourable to recruiting. I say most solemnly, that in 
that task we were absolutely entitled to the sympathy 
and the assistance of the Government and the War Office. 
I am sorr}^ to say we got neither." 

He disclaimed all imputation upon the Prime Minister 
or the Under-Secretary, Mr. Tennant — exceptions which 
pointed the reference to Lord Kitchener. 

" The fact remains that when we were faced with 
that difficult and formidable task, practically every 
suggestion that wo made, based on the strength of our 
own knowledge of what was suitable for Ireland and 
the conditions there, was put upon one side. The gentle- 
men who were responsible for that evidently believed 
that they knew what was suited to the necessities of 
Ireland far better than we did. A score of times, at 
least, I put upon paper and sent to the Government and 
the War Office my suggestions and my remonstrances, 
but all in vain. Often, almost in despair, I was tempted 
to rise in this House and publicly tell the House of 
Commons the way in which wo were hampered and 
thwarted in our work in Ireland. I refrained from doing 
so from fear of doing mischief and from fear of doing 
harm. To-day I am very glad that I so refrained, because 



THE RAISING OP THE IRISH BRIGADES 207 

in spite of these discouragements, in spite of this thwart- 
ing and embarrassing, and in spite of the utterly faulty 
and ridiculous system of recruiting that was set on foot, 
we have succeeded, and have raised in Ireland a body 
of men whose numbers Lord Kitchener, in his letter to 
the Irish conference, declared were magnificent." 

He quoted the Unionist Birmingham Post for the 
saying that what had happened in Ireland was " a 
miracle." From the National Volunteers 27,054 men 
had joined the colours ; from the Ulster Volunteers 
27,412. In both forces there must be many left who 
could not leave Ireland, yet might be utilized in Ireland. 

" It may be remembered that the very day the war 
broke out I rose in my place in this House and offered 
the Volunteers to the Government for Home Defence. 
I only spoke, of course, of the National Volunteers. I 
was not entitled to speak for the Ulster Volunteers, but 
I suggested that they and we might work slioulder to 
shoulder. From that day to this the War Office have 
persistently refused to have anything to sa}^ to these 
Volunteers. The Prime Minister, a few days after I 
spoke, in answer to a question told me that the Govern- 
ment were considering at that moment how best to 
utilize these Volunteers. They have never been utilized 
since, A few days after I made my speech I went myself 
to the War Office, and as a result of my interviews there 
I submitted to the Government a scheme which would 
have provided them at once with 25,000 men. If that 
offer had been accepted, not 25,000, not 50,000, but 100,000 
men would have been enlisted for Home Defence within 
the month. But no, it was obstinately refused. I hear 
that aa hon. member below mo is now apparently in- 
clined to take the point that the War Office took. The 
War Office said that would interfere with recruiting in 
Ireland. Of course, we know Ireland better than the 
hon. member. We know our difficulties in Ireland. We 
do not believe that it would. On the contrary, we believe 
that it would have promoted recruiting. We believe 
that the enlistment of these men, their association in 
barracks and in camp, with the inevitable creation and 
fostering of a military spirit, would have led to a large 



208 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

number of volunteers for foreign service. Our views 
counted for nought. In this instance they were not 
only our views. These views had the approval of the 
Irish Command, and from the purely military point of 
view the Irish Command was in favour of some such 
scheme as I had outlined, and the reason was plain. 
They have to provide, and are providing to this day, 
20,000 to 25,000 men from the Regular Army for the 
defence of the coasts of Ireland — guarding the coast, 
guarding piers, railways, bridges, and so forth. If these 
men of ours had been taken up, within two or three months 
of training and in camp they would have been able to 
do this work, and would have done it ever since, and 
would thereby have released from 20,000 to 25,000 men. 
That is the chief reason, I fancy, why the Military Com- 
mand in Ireland were in favour of this idea. But to 
this moment the refusal continues. I see that an un- 
official Bill was introduced by the Marquess of Lincoln- 
shire into the House of Lords doing, to a great measure, 
for England and Wales what we have been asking should 
be done for Ireland. I claim that that Bill shall be 
extended to Ireland." 

The Volunteer Bill came to the House of Commons 
in a form making it applicable to Ireland. There it 
was opposed by Sir Edward Carson, who demanded 
that no man of military age should be accepted as a 
volunteer unless he consented to enlist for general service 
if called. This killed the Bill. 

Sir Edward Carson was of opinion that the necessities 
of the case demanded universal compulsory service ; 
and conscription was already in sight. With that prospect 
Redmond's anxiety became very grave. 

On November 15th he wrote his mind to the Prime 

Minister : 

House oi" Commons, 

_ . . November 16, 1915. 

Private. 

My Dear Mr. Asquith, 

I have been in a state of great anxiety for some 
time on the question of a possible Conscription Bill, and 
I have discussed the matter fully with Mr. BirreU, who 



THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 209 

knows my views, and who, no doubt, has communicated 
them to you. 

I think it well, however, to shortly put, in writing, 
our position. 

In your Dublin speech you asked the Irish people for 
" a free offering from a free people," and the response 
ha8 been, taking everything into account, in the words 
of Lord Kitchener, " magnificent." 

Recruiting is now going on at a greater rate than 
ever in Ireland, and it would be a terrible misfortune 
if we were driven into a position on the cjuestion of con- 
scription which would alienate that public opinion which 
we have now got upon our side in Ireland. 

The position would, indeed, be a cruel one, if con- 
scription were enacted for England, and Ireland excluded. 

On the other hand, I must tell you that the enforce- 
ment of conscription in Ireland is an impossibility. 

Faced with this dilemma, if a Conscription Bill be 
introduced, the Irish party will be forced to oppose it as 
vigorously as possible at every stage. 

I regret having to write you in this way, but it is 
only right that I should be quite frank in the matter. 

Very truly yours, 

J. E. Redmond. 

Rt. Hon. H. H. Asquith, M.P., 
Prime Minister. 

Assurances reached him that the first tentative Bill 
for compelling unmarried men to enlist would only be 
introduced to fulfil a pledge given by Mr. Asquith in 
connection with the Derby Scheme, and that as the 
Derby Scheme had not applied to Ireland, the pledge 
also had no bearing there. By December 21st the matter 
was raised in the House of Commons. Redmond, after 
the Prime Minister had spoken, defined what he was 
careful to call " my personal view" on the question of 
compulsory service. 

" I am content to take the phrase used by the Prime 
Minister. I am prepared to say that I will stick at 
nothing — nothing which is necessary, nothing which is 
calculated to effect the purpose— -in order to end this 

16 



210 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

war." He added : " That is the view, I am certain, of 
the people of Ireland." 

The whole question was presented by him as " one 
of expediency and necessity, not of principle." From 
that standpoint he declared himself unconvinced that 
the adoption of compulsion in any shape was either 
expedient or necessary. It was inexpedient because it 
would " break up the unity of the country " — unnecessary 
because they had already many more men than they 
could either train or equip. In Ireland, a limited task 
had been defined, to keep up the necessary reserves for 
fifty-three battalions of infantry, and he pointed to the 
fact that so far the new organization of recruiting was 
producing the stipulated flow. 

On these grounds, he said, the Irish party would oppose 
the measure, and on January 5th that opposition was 
offered, though Ireland was excluded from the Bill. But 
the first division showed a majority of more than ten 
to one for the proposal ; and in face of that, when the 
House returned to the discussion, Redmond declared that 
Irish opposition must cease — especially in view of the 
support given by the responsible leaders of Labour. 
Sir Edward Carson, following, pressed him to go one 
step farther and accept the inclusion of Ireland in the 
Bill. Nothing, he said, could do so much to conciliate 
Ulster. This was the first time that any suggestion of 
this possibility had come from that quarter, and it came 
in backing a suggestion which Redmond could not accept. 
I was not present at the debate, and it is hard to judge 
of such matters from the printed record, but the im- 
pression on my mind is that the suggestion was made 
without any desire to embarrass. A few days later, in 
the Committee stage, an Ulster member moved an 
amendment which would have included Ireland. Mr. 
Bonar Law, speaking for the Government, advised against 
it — on the ground of expediency ; it would not be an 
easy thing to put this measure into operation in Ireland. 



THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 211 

Sir Edward Carson spoke later and counselled the dropping 
of the amendment. With matters in this stage Redmond 
spoke very fully to the House, recognizing the absence 
of all partisan tone in the speeches of Ulster members. 
He had long felt, he said, that " if conscription came, 
Ireland's whole attitude towards the war was likely to 
suffer cruel and unjust misrepresentation," because it 
must emphasize a difference between the two countries. 
Conscription in Ireland would be "impracticable, un- 
workable and impossible." Instead of leading to the 
increase in the supply of men it would have the opposite 
effect. 

" It would most undoubtedly paralj^'se the efforts of 
myself and others who have worked unsparingly — and 
not unsuccessfully — since the commencement of the war, 
and would play right into the hands of those who are 
a contemptible minority among the Nationalists of 
Ireland, and who are trying — unsuccessfully trying — to 
prevent recruiting and to undermine thus the position 
and power of the Irish party because of the attitude we 
have taken up." 

He complained once more of the Government's failure 
to utilize the Volunteers and of the damping effect which 
had resulted from the non-fulfilment of Mr. Asquith's 
words. Yet Ireland was doing all that was asked of 
it — maintaining the reserves of Irishmen for Irish regi- 
ments at the front. — This was true at the moment ; but 
the Sixteenth Division had scarcely yet begun to come 
into the line and the Ulster Division, during its first few 
months, suffered slight casualties. In point of fact, how- 
ever, the bare rumour of conscription had checked 
recruiting, and Redmond was guarded in his terms. It 
was, he said, " on the whole very satisfactory, and in the 
towns amazing " ; but he admitted that the country 
districts had not given an adequate response. 

But he made now an appeal to the House as a 
whole to lift the consideration of this whole matter on 



212 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

to broad lines, to view it on the plane of statesmanship. 
If five years earlier anyone had foretold that in a 
great war Ireland would send 95,000 volunteer new 
recruits to fight by the side of England, would he not 
have been regarded as a lunatic ? *' The change in 
Ireland has been so rapid that men are apt to forget its 
history." That was a true saying ; his own success 
had created difficulties for him. Once more he quoted 
the example of the other statesman in the Empire whose 
position had most analogy with his own. "I honestly 
believe," he said, " that General Botha's difficulties 
were small compared with those we had to confront in 
Ireland. ... It is true to say at this moment that the 
overwhelming sentiment of the Irish people is with the 
Empire for the first time." 

That was his claim, and in that month of January 1916 
he was fully entitled to make it ; and the House, I think, 
recognized his justification. His speech has in it the 
ring of confidence, of assurance that he would be taken 
at his word. 

" Rest satisfied," he said ; "do not try to drive Ire- 
land." Wise words, and they were not unwisely listened 
to. There was no room for doubting this man's earnest- 
ness when he went on to tell how he himself had recently 
met Irish troops in the field, and had then pledged him- 
self to them to spare no effort in raising the necessary 
reserves for their ranks among their own countrymen. 
*' Trust us," he said to the House, indicating himself 
and his colleagues, " trust us to know, after all, the best 
methods. Do not carp at Irish effort, and do not belittle 
Irish effort." Then they might count on loyal and 
enduring support till the great struggle was ended. 

That speech, as I read it, marks the highwater-line 
of Redmond's achievement. His statesmanship in the 
counsels of the Empire had prevailed for his own country. 
The Home Rule Act was on the Statute Book, and though 
not in legal operation it was present in all minds ; and 



THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 213 

now on a supreme issue — the blood-tax — Ireland's right 
to be treated as self-governing was recognized in fact. 
The argument which underlay implicitly Redmond's 
whole contention was never set out ; it was contentious, 
politically, and he wisely avoided it. He spoke for a 
nation to which autonomy had been accorded by statute ; 
he preferred men to feel for themselves rather than be 
asked to admit that no self-governing nation will submit 
voluntarily to the imposition of the blood-tax without 
its own most formal consent. All that he said was, in 
effect : You have Ireland with you for the first time, 
by our assistance ; do not destroy our power to continue 
that assistance, do not alienate Ireland. In the counsels 
of the Empire his argument prevailed ; and during the 
early months of 1916 the relations between Great Britain 
and Ireland were better and happier than at any time 
of which history holds record. An utterance from one 
Irishman, and the general response to it, showed this 
in extraordinary degree. 

Our Division, or rather two brigades of it, had detrained 
in France on the 19th of December ; the first impression 
as we shook ourselves together for the march to strange 
billets was the sound of guns. Scattered about in different 
villages lying round Bethune, our battalions passed the 
next two months in the usual training before we should 
take up our own sector of the line, and we saw little 
or nothing of each other. March foimd us engaged, 
though still only attached by companies to more seasoned 
troops, in some rough crater-fighting on the ugly mine- 
riddled stretch between Loos and HuUuch. It was when 
we were marching out from broken houses about the 
minehead at Annequin that we first met again our old 
stable companions, the Royal Irish — and that I first 
saw Willie Redmond in France at the head of his company. 

He was on foot as always, for he never could be per- 
suaded to ride while the men were marching, and I never 
saw more geniality of greeting on any countenance than 



214 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

was on his when he came up with outstretched hand to 
where I was sitting by the roadside — for we had halted 
to see them go by. Hero was a man utterly in his element, 
radiant literally in the enthusiasm of his devotion. He 
refused to listen to our talk of the bad time we had been 
through in the place where they were to succeed us (and 
in two winters of that war I never saw worse) ; all his 
talk was of the good time which we should have in the 
billets we were going to, which they had just left. Back 
there, in and about AUouagne, they rejoined us ; and 
I remember dining with him in his company mess and 
hearing his eulogies of the splendid fellows that his com- 
pany officers were. Then, about the time we moved 
up into trenches, our first leaves began and he got home 
in March. Naturally, he looked in at the House of 
Commons, and realized for the first time how uneasy 
well-informed persons in the lobbies were about the 
chances of the war. Everybody who ever came home 
from the front must have experienced the effect of that 
strange transition from unquestioning confidence to 
worried anxiety ; but Willie Redmond was the only man 
who ever adequately gave expression to it. 

It was on the eve of St. Patrick's Day, and the Army 
Estimates were under discussion in a very thin House 
— a wrangling, fault-finding debate. In the middle of it 
Willie Redmond got up, and said that as he was not 
likely to be there again, he had one or two things to say 
which he thought the House would be glad to know. 
Speaking as one of the oldest members, who had all but 
completed his thirty-third year in Parliament, he told 
them that every soul in the House should be i^roud of 
the troops — not of the Irish troops, but of the troops 
generally — because more than anj^thing else of the 
splendid spirit in which they were going through the 
privations and dangers,- — which he described with passion. 
If he were to deliver a message from the troops, he knew 
well what it would be : 



THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 215 

" Send us out the reinforcements which are necessarj^ 
and which are naturally necessary. Send us out, as we 
admit you have been doing up to this, the necessary 
supplies, and when you do that, have trust in the men 
who are in the gap to conduct the war to the victory 
which everyone at the front is confident is bound to come. 
' And when victory does come,' the message would run 
on, ' you in the House of Commons, in the country, and 
in every newspaper in the country, can spend the rest 
of your lives in discussing as to whether the victory has 
been won on proper lines or whether it has not.' Nothing 
in the world can depress the spirits of the men that I 
have seen at the front. I do not believe that there was 
ever enough Germans born into this world to depress 
them. If it were possible to depress them at all, it can 
only be done by pursuing a course of embittered con- 
troversy in this country — as to which was the right way 
or the wrong way of conducting affairs at the front. When 
a man feels that his feet are freezing, when he is standing 
in heavy rain for a whole night with no shelter, and when 
next morning he tries to cook a jjiece of scanty food over 
the scanty flame of a brazier in the mud, he perhaps sits 
down for a few minutes in the day's dawn and takes up 
an old newspaper, and finds speeches and leading articles 
from time to time which tell him that apparently every- 
thing is going wrong, that the Ministers who are at the 
head of affairs in this country, upon whom he is depend- 
ing, are not really men with their hearts in the work, but 
are really more or less callous and calculating mercen- 
aries, who are not directing affairs in the best way, but 
are simply anxious to maintain their own salaries. I 
say that when speeches and articles of that kind are found 
in the newspapers they are calculated, if anything is or 
can be so calculated, to depress the men who are at the 
front." 



Then came a few words in praise of the Irish troops 
and in deprecation of the failure to recognize some of 
their services ; a confident assurance that, " whether they 
are remembered or not," the Sixteenth Division would do 
their duty, with an equal assurance that the Ulster men 
would do as well as they — -and he reached to his conclusion : 



216 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

" Since I went out there I found that the common 
salutation in all circumstances is one of cheer. If things 
go pretty well and the men are fairly comfortable, they 
say ' Cheer ! ' If things go badly, and the snow falls 
and the rain comes through the roof of a billet in an 
impossible sort of cow-house, they say ' Cheer ! ' still 
more. All we want out there is that you shall adopt 
the same tone and say * Cheer ! ' to us." 

It is not too much to say that this speech was received 
with a cry of gratitude all over the country and through- 
out the Army. It said what badly needed to be said, 
and said it with a freshness and a dash that came superbly 
from a company commander in his fifty-fourth year. 
It was the best service that had yet been rendered to 
John Redmond's policy. Everybody quite naturally 
and simply accepted the Nationalist Irishman as the 
spokesman for all the troops who were actuallj^ in the 
line. Mr. Walter Long, always a generous and candid 
human being, was quick to give voice to this feeling : 

" The honourable and gallant member for East Clare 
has been in conflict, not only with one particular political 
party, but during the greater part of his career with 
every party in turn, and has engaged in bitter controversy 
with them. Does anybody doubt the fact that when 
war was declared one great factor in the mind of the 
Emperor responsible for this war was that dissension 
would paralyse the hands of Great Britain ? Ireland, 
whatever may have been our differences in the past, and 
whatever may be our differences in happier days again 
when we are at peace, everybody must feel by the action 
of her representatives, who have fought so bitterly in 
this House and in the country, has created a new claim 
for herself upon the affection, the gratitude, the respect 
of the people of the Empire by the great and proud part 
that she has played in this great struggle." 

That was the position to which Redmond's policy, 
backed by the Irishmen who supported it with their 
lives, of whom his brother was the outstanding represen- 



THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES 217 

tative, had brought this great issue. The next thing 
which brought the name of Ireland prominently before 
the world was the story of action taken by other Irish- 
men, also at the risk of their lives, to reverse the strong 
current which was then carrying us forward with so 
hopeful augury. 



CHAPTER VII 
THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 



THE facts of the Irish rebellion are too generally 
familiar to need more than the briefest restatement 
— and perhaps too little known for an attempt at detailed 
analysis. Broadly, a general parade of the Irish Volun- 
teers all over the country was ordered for Easter Sunday. 
On the night before Good Friday a German ship with a 
cargo of rifles was oif the Irish coast. This ship, the 
And, was a few hours later captured and taken in convoy 
by a British sloop, so that the arms were never landed. 
Emissaries from the Volunteers who had gone to Kerry 
by motor-car to receive and arrange for distributing the 
arms were killed in a motor accident while hurrying 
back to get in touch with their headquarters. On Satur- 
day the general parade was cancelled by order of Professor 
MacNeill, chief of the Volunteer organization. On 
Monday, against his wish, a portion of the Volunteer 
force in Dublin, including the battalion specially under 
command of Pearse and MacDonagh, with the Citizen 
Army under James Connolly, paraded, scattered through 
the city and seized certain previously selected points, 
of which the most important was the Post Office. From 
it as headquarters they proclaimed an Irish Republic. 
Slight attempts at rising took place in county Wexford, 
where the town of Enniscorthy was seized, in county 
Galway, and in county Louth. At Galway, at Wexford 
and at Drogheda the National Volunteers turned out 
to assist in suppressing the rising. Except for a serious 

918 



THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 219 

encounter with a police force in county Dublin, the fight- 
ing was confined to the capital. It terminated by the 
unconditional surrender of the rebels on the Saturday. 
The struggle was prolonged by the total lack of artillery 
in the early stages. Riflemen established in houses 
could not be dislodged by direct assault of infantry 
without very heavy casualties to the attacking force. 

The purpose of this book is to show Redmond's con- 
nection with this event and the succeeding developments 
from it. He failed to foresee the event ; he failed to 
direct its developments into the course he desired. How 
far he is to be held responsible, or blameworthy, for 
these failures, readers may be assisted to decide. 

From the beginning of 1916 onwards the Irish Govern- 
ment was warned of danger. One of its members — the 
Attorney-General, Sir James Campbell — advocated the 
seizure of arms from men parading with what were 
evidently stolen service rifles or bayonets. But the 
Chief Secretary refused to take any action which could 
be described as an attempt to suppress or disarm the 
Irish Volunteers until there was definite evidence of 
actual association with the enemy. 

Proof of sympathy was not difficult to obtain, and the 
propaganda against recruiting had now reached the 
point of attempts to break up recruiting meetings. Still, 
Mr. Birrell was in a difficulty. He had a logical mind, 
and he knew what had been permitted to Ulster. The 
fact that the Attorney- General himself had been a main 
adviser of the Provisional Government did not make it 
easier to folio av his advice to disarm men who professed 
disaffection to the existing authority. Mr. Birrell 
knew that if he took such action he could be attacked 
in the official Nationalist Press for having one law in 
Ulster and another in the South. Further, Redmond 
would certainly not have disavowed, and might even 
have endorsed, such a line of criticism. The reason 
was that Redmond, as he had never believed in the 



220 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

reality of the Ulster danger, so now did not believe 
in this one. 

Later, when Mr. Birrell resigned his post after the 
insurrection was suppressed, Redmond chivalrously took 
on himself a part of the responsibility. " I feel," he 
said, " that I have incurred some share of the blame 
which he has laid at his own door, because I entirely 
agreed with his view that the danger of an outbreak of the 
kind was not a real one, and in my conversations with 
him I have expressed that view, and for all I know that 
may have influenced him in his conduct and his manage- 
ment of Irish affairs." A later debate — on July 31st — 
showed that his strong personal feeling for Mr. Birrell 
had moved him rather to overstate tlian to belittle his 
advisory responsibility. Dublin Castle had never con- 
sulted him as to policy. Conferences had taken place 
with the Under-Secretary, Sir Matthew Nathan, but 
these were concerned with considering and framing the 
machinery to be created for bringing the Home Rule 
Act into operation, whenever the time came. 

** There was no conference at all about the state of 
the country or about Sinn Fein. When once or twice 
in casual consultation the matter came up — I hope the 
House will listen to this — I did not hesitate to say what 
in my opinion ought to be done in certain cases by the 
Government. For example, I expressed a strong view 
to them as to how they should deal with seditious news- 
papers and with prosecutions. What I did suggest, they 
never did ; what I said they ought not to do, they always 
did. And I want to say something further. They 
never gave me any information, bad or good, about the 
state of the country. From first to last I never saw 
one single confidential Government report from the 
police or from any other source. I know nothing what- 
ever about their secret confidential information." 

It is fair to add that the Under-Secretary was in com- 
munication from time to time with other members of 



THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 221 

the party, who were of course in touch with Redmond. 
But the substantial accuracy of Redmond's statement 
is sufficiently evidenced by one fact. Everybody knew 
that Sir Roger Casement was in Berlin and had tried — 
most unsuccessfully — to recruit an Irish Brigade from 
among the Irish prisoners. But neither Redmond nor 
any Irish member knew that from April 17th Dublin 
Castle had warning that a ship was on its way from 
Germany with rifles. The Navy was on the alert, and 
when the Aud came of! Fenit, in Kerry, on Good Friday 
morning, she was promptly challenged. ^ But in the 
dark hours of that morning she had landed Sir Roger 
Casement and his two confederates, one of whom was 
arrested with him the same day. On Saturday morning 
Government decided to take action against what was 
now clearly a rebel organization. But as the Chief 
Secretary and the General Commanding in Chief were 
both in London, and as the available force of men in 
Dublin was small, a postponement was decided on. No 
special precautions appear to have been taken against 
the contingency of an immediate rising. On Monday 
a very large proportion of the officers from the Curragh 
and the Dublin garrison were at the Fairy house races. 
In the Castle itself there was only the ordinary guard. 
Redmond at this date was also in London. His lack 
of apprehension is sufficiently indicated by the fact that 
his son and daughter were both at the races, and drove 
up unknowingly to an armed barricade. Had he been 
in authority and known, as the Government knew on 
Saturday, that the Irish Volunteers expected and had 
arranged for the landing of a heavy cargo of arms on 
Good Friday, and that a general parade of their men 
had been ordered for Easter, I hope that he would have 
either had troops in the utmost readiness to move, or 
have put strong guards in places of importance. But 

» The Admiralty do not appear to have communicated their 
information to Dublin Caetle. 



222 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

this ia a futile speoulation, for had he been in power 
the situation would never have arisen. 

The decisive thing which drove most of the relatively 
small number among the Volunteers who broke away 
from Redmond into their original hostility was Govern- 
ment's failure to recognize them. Their force stood in 
their own eyes for the assertion of Ireland's nationality ; 
and many of those who took active part in the rebellion 
were at the outset fully prepared to assert that nationality 
in jeopardy of their lives in the Allied cause. Redmond's 
policy, had effect been given to it by the Government, 
still more had he himself been invested with the right 
to embody it in action, would have prevented the estrange- 
ment of all but a very few. Once the estrangement 
took place, however, I think that he undervalued what 
was opposed to him, both in respect of its power and of 
its quality. He lacked appreciation and respect for 
the idealists whose ideals were not his own. He under- 
rated their sincerity, and the danger of their sincerity. 
The beauty of sacrifice in the young men who went out 
to the war, carrying Ireland's cause in their keeping, 
moved him profoundly ; and he saw the practical bearing 
of their acts on the great practical problem of statesman- 
ship to which his life had been given. He did not guess 
at the sway which might be exercised over men's minds 
by an almost mystical belief which disdained to count 
with practicalities. Redmond for fifteen years had been 
the leader, and for thirty-five years had been a member, 
of a party which presented itself — with great justification 
— as the winner for Ireland of many positive material 
advantages on the way to an ultimate goal. Pearse, 
at a time when all the world was plunged in a prodigal 
welter of destruction, came forward, demanding from 
Irishmen nothing but a sacrifice — promising nothing but 
the chance for young men to shed their blood sacramentally 
in the cause of Ireland's freedom. Redmond also was 
calling for the extreme risk, but on a sane and sound 



THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 223 

calculation, to ensure the full development of something 
already gained. Pearse preached, mystically, the effi- 
cacious power simply of blood shed in the name of Ireland. 
Those whom he brought with him into the pass of danger 
were few, but they were touched with his own spirit ; 
and even the very recklessness of their act touched the 
popular imagination. Irish regiments, after all, could 
do only what other regiments were doing ; their deeds 
were obscured in a chaos of war from which individual 
prowess could not emerge. Pearse and his associates 
offered to Irishmen a stage for themselves on which 
they could and did secure full personal recognition — the 
complete attention of Ireland's mind. 

All this would have seemed vanity to Redmond's solid, 
positive intelligence — vanity in all senses of the word. 
It would have moved him to nothing but angry contempt 
— anger against the spirit which was prepared to divide 
Ireland's effort, contempt for the futility of the reasoning. 
But one aspect of the rising dominated all the others 
in his mind. He had neither tolerance nor pity for Roger 
Casement, who was in his eyes simply one who tried to 
seduce Irish troops by threats and bribes into treason 
to their salt, one who made himself among the worst 
instruments of Germany. At the re-assembly of Parlia- 
ment on April 27th he expressed the " feeling of detes- 
tation and horror " with which he and his colleagues 
had regarded the events in Dublin ; a feeling which he 
believed to be shared " by the overwhelming mass of 
the people of Ireland." On May 3rd, in a statement 
to the Press, he denounced fiercely *' this wicked move " 
of men who " have tried to make Ireland the cat's-paw 
of Germany." " Germany plotted it, Germany organized 
it, Germany paid for it." The men who were Germany's 
agents " remained in the safe remoteness of American 
cities," while " misguided and insane young men in 
Ireland had risked, and some of them had lost, their lives 
in an insane anti-patriotic movement." It was anti- 



224 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

patriotic, he urged, because Ireland held to the choice 
she had made, to the opinion which thousands of Irish 
soldiers had sealed with their blood. It was " not half 
80 much treason to the cause of the Allies as treason to 
the cause of Home Rule." 

On the day when that statement appeared the sequel 
had begun to unroll itself. In the House of Commons 
Mr. Asquith announced the trial, sentence and shooting 
of three signatories to the Republican proclamation — 
Pearse, Clarke and MacDonagh. With the exception of 
James Connolly, these were the men most directly answer- 
able for launching an attempt which had cost five hundred 
lives and destroyed over two millions' worth of property. 
Redmond accepted their doom as Just. 

*' This outbreak happily seems to be over. It has 
been dealt with with firmness, which was not only right, 
but it was the duty of the Government so to deal with it." 

But now that example had been made, he held that 
other thoughts should guide those in authority. 

" As the rebellion, or the outbreak, call it what you 
like, has been put down with firmness, I do beg the 
Government, and I speak from the very bottom of my 
heart and with all my earnestness, not to show undue 
hardship or severity to the great masses of those who 
are implicated, on whose shoulders there lies a guilt 
far different from that which lies upon the instigators 
and promoters of the outbreak. Let them, in the name 
of God, not add this to the wretched, miserable memories 
of the Irish people, to be stored up iDerhaps for genera- 
tions, but let them deal with it in such a spirit of leniency 
as was recently exhibited in South Africa by General 
Botha, and in that way pave the way to the possibility 
. . , that out of the ashes of this miserable tragedy 
there may spring up something which will redound to 
the future happiness of Ireland and the future complete 
and absolute unity of this Empire. I beg of the Govern- 
ment, having put down this outbreak with firmness, to 



THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 225 

take only such action as will leave the least rankling 
bitterness in the minds of the Irish people, both in Ireland 
and elsewhere throughout the world." 

It is well to recall what he had iij his mind. After 
the suppression of the South African rebellion in 1914, 
one man only was put to death — an officer who changed 
sides during an action. No attempt was made to try 
accused persons before a jury ; a special tribunal of 
judges was set up by the South African Parliament. 
But their power of inflicting punishment was limited 
by the Parliament to a sentence of three years. General 
de Wet, the chief figure in the rebellion, was dismissed 
without punishment to his farm. That was the manner 
in which a strong native Government, realizing the possi- 
bilities of future trouble, dealt with an insurrection 
infinitely more serious in a military sense than that 
which broke out in Dublin. But in Ireland there was 
no native government ; and the announcement of Mr. 
Birrell's resignation meant in reality that Mr. Asquith's 
Ministry had abdicated so far as Ireland was concerned. 
Quite properly, they had called in a competent soldier 
to deal with the military exigency. Quite shamefully, 
they left him in sole authority to handle what was 
essentially the task of statesmanship. 

Everybody saw that in such a case the need was to 
prevent a rebellious spirit from spreading. Sir John 
Maxwell took the simple view that the way to secure 
this was by plenty of executions. Knowledge of Irish 
history cannot be expected in an English Minister, still 
less in an English soldier ; but it could have taught 
him how often and how ineffectuallj?^ that recipe had 
been applied. Still less could it be hoped that a soldier, 
in no sense bound to the study of contemporary politics, 
should allow for the effect of two factors which must 
certainly influence Irish judgment and Irish feeling. 
The first of these was the precedent within the Empire 
created by General Botha's Government. This, I think, 

10 



226 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

English opinion generally, and particularly English 
Imperialist opinion, wholly disregarded ; but it was 
the point to which Redmond had instantly directed 
attention. For him, the idea of an Imperial Common- 
wealth of States was a reality, and within one Common- 
wealth there cannot be two standards of justice. The 
second factor was the licence accorded by a Liberal 
Government, and the sanction given by a Tory Opposition, 
to preparations for rebellion, and acts of rebellion, in 
Ulster. This was generally recognized by public opinion, 
though I think deliberately set aside by Sir John Maxwell 
— who perhaps is not to be blamed. But the Prime 
Minister, who had been chiefly and ultimately responsible 
for the decision to let Ulstermen do as they liked, was 
specially bound to consider and provide for the conse- 
quences of that line of policy in the j)ast as it affected 
the present development. He was also, as the Minister 
responsible alike for carrying a Home Rule Act and for 
denying to it operation, specially bound in such a pass 
as this to be guided largely by the judgment of the man 
who but for that postponement would have been head 
of an Irish Government. But, under the various pressures 
of the moment, Mr. Asquith moved in a wholly different 
direction. Redmond's appeal and advice went totally 
disregarded. Yet Redmond knew Ireland as no 
Englishman could know it ; and his hands were clean 
of guilt for what had ha^Dpened. Mr. Asquith by his 
past inaction, his Tory colleagues by their action before 
the war, were deeply involved in responsibility. It is 
difficult, if not impossible, to find in Mr. Asquith's conduct 
any recognition of this cardinal fact. He judged rebels 
as if preparations for rebellion had never been palliated 
or approved. 

All that Redmond could achieve was by incessant 
personal intervention to limit the list of executions, 
to put some stay on what he called later " the gross and 
panicky violence " with which measures of suppression 



THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 227 

were conceived and carried out. He could not prevent 
the amazing procedure of sending flying columns through- 
out the country into places where there had been no hint 
of disturbance, and making arrests by the hundred with- 
out reason given or evidence produced. In many cases, 
men who had been thoroughly disgusted by the outbreak 
found themselves in jail ; and disaffection was manu- 
factured hourly. 

On May 3rd, when Redmond made his public appeal 
to Mr. Asquith, it was still not too late to prevent the 
mischief from spreading. By general consent, Redmond 
was right when he said that the rising was thoroughly 
unpopular in Ireland, and most of all in Dublin. The 
troops on whom the insurgents fired were in the first 
instance Irish troops. Later in that year I was attached 
to one of these battalions (the 10th Dublins), and asked 
them how they did their scouting work during the con- 
flict. *' We needed no scouts," was the answer ; " the 
old women told us everything." The first volley which 
met a company of this battalion killed an officer ; he 
was so strongly Nationalist in his sympathy as to be 
almost a Sinn Feiner. Others had been active leaders 
in the Howth gun-running. It was not merely a case 
of Irishmen firing on their fellow-countrymen : it was 
one section of the original Volunteers firing on another. 

Yet from the moment when English troops came on 
the scene, another strain of feeling began to make itself 
felt. A lady ordered tea to be made for one of the in- 
coming regiments, halted outside her house on the line 
of march. The refreshment was long in coming, and 
she went down to see why. She found her cook up in 
arms : "Is it me boil the kettle for Englishmen coming 
in to shoot down Irishmen ? " Yet that was still the 
voice of a minority. When I came home from France 
a few weeks later, a shrewd and prosperous Nationalist 
man of business said to me with fury : " The fools ! 
It was the first rebellion that ever had the country 



228 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

against it, and they turned the people round in a 
week." 

Nothing could have prevented the halo of martyrdom 
from attaching itself to those who died by the law for 
the sake of Irish freedom : the tradition was too deeply 
ingrained in Ireland's history. Yet Redmond did not go 
beyond the measure of average Irish opinion when he 
accepted the first three executions as just. People at 
least knew who these men were, and their signatures to 
the proclamation of an Irish Republic proved their leader- 
ship. They were given the death of rebels in arms, 
to which no dishonour attaches. But a fatal mistake 
was made in suppressing all report of the proceedings 
of the court-martial on them, and this mistake was to 
be repeated indefinitely. Ireland was made to feel that 
this whole affair was taken completely out of the hands 
of Irishmen — that no attempt even was made to enlist 
Irish opinion on the side of law by a statement of the 
evidence on which law acted. Day by day there was a 
new bald announcement that such and such men had 
been shot ; and these were men whose names Ireland 
at large had never heard of. 

Then on top of all came the appalling admission that 
an officer suffering from insanity had taken out three 
prisoners and caused them to be shot without trial on 
his own responsibility, none of these men having any 
complicity with the rebellion. This incident would have 
inflamed public opinion in any community ; in Ireland 
its effect was beyond words poisonous. It revived the 
atmosphere of the Bachelor's Walk incident ; and there 
was only too much justification for holding that the 
military authorities were indisposed to take the proper 
disciplinary action. Its effect detracted from the excellent 
opinion which the troops generally had earned by their 
conduct : it instilled venom into the resentment of those 
few cases (and it was beyond hope that they should not 
occur) in which soldiers had either lost their heads 



THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 229 

or yielded to the temptation of revenge in its ugliest 
shapes. 

The result can be best expressed by recording the 
experience of one Sinn Feiner who was captured in the 
fighting. While the military escort was taking him 
through the streets to his place of confinement, a crowd 
gathered round and ran along, consisting of angry men 
and women who had seen bloodshed and known hunger 
during these days. They shouted to the soldiers to 
knock his brains out there and then. Three weeks later 
he was again marched through the streets on his way 
to an English prison, and again a crowd mustered. But 
this time, to his amazement, they were shouting : '* God 
save you ! God have pity on you ! Keep your heart 
up ! Ireland's not dead yet ! " 

These were the effects produced in Ireland on the mind 
of common people by the action of Government in en- 
forcing the ultimate sanction of law which the members 
of that same Government by their action and by their 
inaction had brought into contempt. In England, in 
the meanwhile, a new Military Service Bill was going 
through the House, and naturally attempts to include 
Ireland in its operation were renewed. Sir Edward 
Carson, criticizing the Government of Ireland, said that 
(as Redmond put it in replying) Nationalists had held 
the power but not the responsibility. There was a note 
of angry protest in the Irish Leader's rejoinder. " I 
wish to say for myself that certainly since the Coalition 
Government came into operation, and before it, but 
certainly since then, I have had no power in the Govern- 
ment of Ireland. All my opinions have been overborne. 
My suggestions have been rejected, and my profound 
conviction is that if we had had the power and the respon- 
sibility for the Government of our country during the 
past two years, recent occurrences in Ireland would 
never have taken place." 

I think that view was at that moment very generally 



230 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

shared in England. The British Press had shown by 
their attitude towards the events in Dublin how deeply 
Redmond had made his mark. Almost without exception 
Unionist papers refrained from any attempt to identify 
Nationalist Ireland generally with the rising : they did 
full justice to the valour and the sufferings of Irish troops 
— who, indeed, at that very moment were passing through 
a cruel ordeal. In that Easter week the Sixteenth Divi- 
sion was subjected to two attacks with poison gas of a 
concentration and violence till then unknown, and under 
weather conditions which prolonged the ordeal beyond 
endurance. The 48th and 49th Brigades had very terrible 
losses. We of the 47th relieved them in the line. 

That was a long tour of trenches, some eighteen days 
beginning on the 29th of April, and throughout it papers 
came in with the Irish news. I shall never forget the 
men's indignation. They felt they had been stabbed 
in the back. For myself, I thought that a situation 
had arisen in which Irish members who were serving 
had a more imperative duty at home, and I went to 
discuss the matter with Willie Redmond, whose battalion 
was then holding the front line to the left of Loos. 

I found him in the deep company commander's dug- 
out in the bay of line opposite Puits 14 bis, which will 
be known to many Irish soldiers. We came up to the 
light to talk, and he agreed with me in my view. We 
arranged that each of us should discuss with his com- 
manding officer the question of asking for special leave. 
Mine advised me to go, and I have no earthly doubt 
that his would have said, or did say, the same ; but Willie 
Redmond never brought himself to leave his men. Next 
month, however, he was invalided back, very seriously ill. 

But in our talk that day, when we discussed the possi- 
bility of our having some special influence, he said this : 
** Don't imagine that what you and I have done is going 
to make us popular with our people. On the contrary, 
we shall both be sent to the right about at the first 



THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 231 

General Election." I think he was wrong, at least to 
this extent, that any man who served would not have 
lessened his chance by doing so. When the tide flowed 
strongest against us, in three provinces one Nationalist 
only kept his seat — John Redmond's son, Major William 
Archer Redmond. 



II 

Already the tide had begun to turn in Ireland. On 
May 11th Mr. Dillon — who had been in Dublin during 
the rebellion — moved the adjournment of the House to 
demand that Government should state whether they 
intended to have more executions upon the finding of 
secret tribunals, and to continue the searches and whole- 
sale arrests which were going on through the country. 
The list of executions had now reached fourteen, and no 
word of evidence had been published. Also the Prime 
Minister stated that he heard for the first time of the 
shooting of Mr. Sheehy-Skefiington and others by Captain 
Bowen Colthurst. Unquestionably, discussion was ur- 
gently needed, and Mr. Dillon was fully justified in 
emphasizing the mischief done in Ireland by alienating 
men's minds. But Mr. Dillon spoke as one who felt to 
the uttermost the passion of resentment which he 
depicted, and in his indignation against charges which 
had been brought against the insurgents, he was led to 
praise their conduct almost to the disparagement of 
soldiers in the field. Even in print the speech seethes 
with growing passion ; and its delivery, I am told, 
accentuated its bitterness and its anti-English tone. 

It would be futile to deny that this utterance had a 
great effect in Ireland and in England, or to conceal 
Redmond's view that the effect was most lamentable. 
But it had one notable result. Mr. Asquith, in replying, 
announced his intention to visit Ireland and look into 



232 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

the situation for himself. Within a fortnight — on May 
25th — he reported to the House his impressions. 

" The first was the breakdown of the existing machinery 
of the Irish Government ; and the next was the strength 
and depth, and I might almost say, I think without exag- 
geration, the universality of the feeling in Ireland that 
we have now a unique opportunity for a new departure 
for the settlement of outstanding problems, and for a 
joint and combined effort to obtain agreement as to the 
way in which the Government of Ireland is for the future 
to be carried on." 

He indicated that an attempt would be made to renew 
negotiations for a settlement which would enable the 
Home Rule Act to be brought into operation at once ; 
and that Mr. Lloyd George had consented to undertake 
the task of reconciling parties. But he begged that 
there should be no debate upon this proposal or upon 
Irish affairs at all. Redmond, in accepting, said that 
the request for acceptance without discussion was putting 
the goodwill of Nationalists to a very severe test. — A 
discussion would at once have produced this criticism : 
that Ireland would say to-morrow, " The Parliamentary 
party brought to Ireland a post-dated order for Home 
Rule, liable to an indefinite series of postponements : 
Sinn Fein by a week's rebellion secures that Home Rule 
shall be brought into force at once." 

In truth, the rapid growth of Sinn Fein from May 1916 
onwards is due largely to this reasoning ; but also to 
resentment against the Government's dealing with the 
rebellion, and against the Irish party's silence in Parlia- 
ment in spite of the numerous actions of the military 
power which called for vigorous criticism. 

Irish Nationalist members realized the unpopularity 
of their silence and submitted to it, for the negotiations 
appeared to offer a real chance. We held that Mr. Lloyd 
George could not afford to fail, and had power enough 
to carry through a settlement. We did not know, and 



THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 233 

could not, that the Minister of Munitions had been called 
off from his regular work within five weeks before the 
beginning of the offensive on the Somme, for which an 
unprecedented outlay of material had been undertaken. 

The negotiations proceeded, and were conducted on 
the principle of discussion through a go-between. The 
parties never met : Mr. Lloyd George submitted pro- 
posals to each side separately. Redmond and his col- 
leagues insisted on protecting themselves by securing a 
written document, so that, as it was hoped, there could 
be no understanding and the terms come to would be 
final. 

Those of us who hoped for a completely new approach 
to the problem were doomed to disappointment. The 
affair was taken up where the Buckingham Palace Con- 
ference left it. The terms to be arranged were terms 
of exclusion for Ulster ; and the two questions of defining 
the area and the period met the negotiators on the 
threshold. 

It has been shown above that Redmond regarded as 
vital the distinction between temporary and permanent 
exclusion. His purpose was to stamp the whole of this 
proposed agreement with a provisional and transient 
character. It was to be simply a war measure, subject 
to re-arrangement at the close of hostilities ; and it was 
to be adapted to a community still agitated by rebellion. 

An Irish Parliament with an Executive responsible to 
it was to be set up at once. But no elections were to 
be held. The existing members for the existing con- 
stituencies were to be the provisional Parliament till the 
war ended. 

The same considerations precluded the possibility of 
a referendum in Ulster. Nationalists accepted an area 
defined by agreement. It left out of " Ulster " the 
three counties, Donegal, Cavan and Monaghan, in whose 
eight constituencies no Unionist had been returned since 
1885. But it left to the excluded area the counties of 



234 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

Tyrone and Fermanagh, each with a Nationalist majority, 
and the boroughs of Newry and Londonderry, both 
represented by Home Rulers. 

This was a provision which no body of men could be 
expected to acquiesce in permanently as representing 
the equity of the case. It was accepted for the sake 
of peace, as a temporary expedient. A strong induce- 
ment was added by Mr. Lloyd George's proposal that 
at the close of the provisional period the whole matter 
should be referred to a Council of the Empire with the 
Prime Ministers of the Dominions taking a hand in the 
settlement. But to guarantee and seal its provisional 
and transitory character an extraordinary clause was 
added. Until a permanent settlement was reached, the 
Irish membership at Westminster was to remain at its 
original number of 103. 

The document embodying these conclusions was accepted 
in identical terms by each side, and each party of nego- 
tiators set out for Ireland to endeavour to secure accept- 
ance of it. But before he left London Sir Edward Carson 
asked for an interpretation of the terms. Did the agree- 
ment mean that none of the six excluded counties could 
be brought under a Dublin Parliament without an Act 
of Parliament ? In other words, was the exclusion 
permanent until Parliament should otherwise determine 1 
He was answered that the Prime Minister accepted this 
interpretation, and would be prepared to say so when 
the matter came before Parliament. Knowledge of 
these communications was not conveyed to Redmond. 
Redmond's interpretation was that at the termination 
of the war this arrangement lapsed, and the Home Rule 
Act, which was the law of the land, came into force. If 
Ulster, or any part of it, were to be excluded, it must be 
by a new amending Act. Had the assurance given to 
Sir Edward Carson been conveyed to Redmond, either 
the negotiations must have been resumed or they must 
have been rendered abortive. 



THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 235 

On June 13th the Ulster Council accepted the terms, 
no doubt with great reluctance. The signatories to the 
Covenant in the three western counties felt themselves 
betrayed. The whole body found itself committed to 
acceptance of Home Rule in principle for twenty-six 
counties. But the war necessity was pressed upon them 
and they submitted. 

The Nationalist Convention met ten days later in 
Belfast. Mr. Devlin had been strenuous in his exertions 
throughout the province, but the whole force of the 
ecclesia.stical power was thrown against him. Apart 
from the detestation of partition, the Catholic Church 
conceived that the principle of denominational education 
would be lost in the severed counties, where the dominant 
Presbyterian element was opposed to it. Very many 
delegates came to the Convention pledged in advance 
to resist the projDosals : and the general anticipation 
was that Redmond would be thrown over. 

The proceedings were secret. But in the result the 
Nationalists of the North refused to be any party to 
denying the rest of Ireland self-government. A division 
was taken, and consent to temporary exclusion was carried 
by a large majority. The victory was in the main due 
to Mr. Devlin's extraordinary personal gifts, exercised 
to carry a conclusion which inevitably must injure himself 
where he was most sensitive to a wound, in the hearts 
of those among whom he was born and bred. 

It must have been in the weeks immediately after 
this that Redmond spoke to me, as I never heard him 
speak of any other man, his mind about Mr. Devlin. 
" Joe's loyalty in all this business has been beyond words," 
he said. " I know what it has cost him to do as he has 
done.*' He knew well that the j'^ounger man's influence 
had been more efficacious than the threat of his own 
resignation— which was not withheld. A man of other 
nature might have been jealous of the young and growing 
power : but such an element as this was so foreign to 



236 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

Redmond's whole being that even the thought of it 
never entered the most suspicious mind. 

The result of the Belfast Convention was communi- 
cated and discussed at a meeting of the Irish party held 
at the Mansion House on June 26th. It was one of the 
most hopeful moments in our experience ; reaction from 
a depression approaching to despair gave confidence to 
the gloomiest among us. Hope was in the air. The 
effect of Mr. Asquith's sentence upon the whole machinery 
of Dublin Castle had not yet worn off. No new Govern- 
ment had been installed : the Chief Secretaryship re- 
mained vacant, the Lord-Lieutenant also had retired 
from his office. It seemed a certainty that we should 
enter, under whatever auguries, into the realization of 
a self-governing Ireland. Even those who were most 
enthusiastic for the birth of a new and glorious era that 
was to date from the stirring action of the rebels, and 
who were most open-mouthed in condemnation of Red- 
mond's futile efforts, in practice shared our view. I 
asked one such man how he counted on securing the 
necessary first step of establishing an Irish Government. 
" Oh, I suppose," was his answer, " the Irish party will 
manage that somehow." 

But soon delay began to hang coldly on this temper 
of anticipation, and to delay were added disquieting 
utterances. On June 29th Lord Lansdowne announced 
in the House of Lords that the " consultations " which 
had been taking place were " certainly authorized " by 
the Government but were not binding upon it ; and that 
he, speaking for the Unionist wing of the Cabinet, had 
not accepted the proposals. This was disturbing. Lord 
Selborne had retired from the Government before the 
negotiators went to Ireland, because he knew of the 
proposals and was not prepared to sanction them. We 
assumed that other Unionists who shared this view would 
have followed him in his frank action. Now we perceived 
that Lord Lansdowne and his friends had frugally hus- 



THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 237 

banded their force. It was expected by many that 
Ireland would do the work for them. Failing that, they 
had still the last stab to deliver. But we counted upon 
one thing : that Mr. Lloyd George, if not Mr. Asquith, 
would feel himself committed to see the deal throush — 
and that his resignation would have to be faced as a 
part of the consequences if attempts were made to go 
back on the bargain. 

Parliament reassembled and still nothing was said 
and nothing done : but the Press was full of rumours. 
On July 19th Redmond asked that a date should be 
fixed for the introduction of the proposed Bill, and next 
day he renewed his demand, urging that the constant 
delays and postponements were " seriously jeopardizing 
the chance of settlement." This was only too true. A 
furious agitation against the proposal of even temporary 
partition was raging through Ireland. Once more, the 
tide had been missed : time had been given to inculcate 
all manner of doubts and suspicions — and once more 
the suspicions proved to be only too well justified. The 
whole story was revealed to the House on July 24th. 

Redmond, in his speech, emphasized it that the pro- 
posals had come not from the Nationalists, but from 
the Government ; they had, however, been accepted, 
after considerable negotiation and many changes in 
substance, as a plan which Nationalists could recommend 
for acceptance. Nationalists had been pressed to use 
the utmost despatch, had been told that every hour 
counted and that it was essential in the highest Imperial 
interests, if Ireland endorsed the agreement, that it 
should be put into operation at once. " That is two 
long months ago," he said. Action had been taken ; 
the unpopularity of the proposals, fully foreseen, had 
been faced, on a clear understanding. 

" The agreement was in the words of the Prime 
Minister himself, for what he called a provisional settle- 
ment which should last until the war was over, or until 



238 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

a final and permanent settlement was arrived at within 
a limited period after the war. This was the chief factor 
of this plan, and without it not one of my colleagues or 
mj''8elf would for a moment have considered it, much less 
have submitted it to our followers." 

The retention of Irish members at Westminster in full 
strength was covenanted for " as an indispensable safeguard 
of the temporary character of the whole arrangemeiat." 

It was on this construction of the agreement that 
consent to it had been secured, in the face of very strong 
and organized opposition : and consent was secured to 
it as a final document. Nevertheless, when Redmond 
arrived in London he had been at once confronted with 
a demand for modifications — of which the first were 
unimportant. Yet to consent to any alteration was a 
sacrifice of principle ; but he was told that this concession 
would secure agreement in the Cabinet. Later, however, 
came a public statement from Lord Lansdowne that 
** permanent and enduring " structural alterations would 
be introduced into the Home Rule Act. Redmond had 
seen the draft Bill in which the Government's draftsmen 
embodied the terms of the agreement, and he had 
accepted this, as conforming to his covenant. In reply 
to Lord Lansdowne, he had pressed for the production 
of this Bill, but could not get it. The end was that, after 
a Cabinet held on July 19th, he was told that " a number 
of new proposals had been brought forward " ; that the 
Cabinet did not desire to consult him about these at 
all ; and on the 22nd Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Herbert 
Samuel were instructed to convey to him the Cabinet's 
decision, with an intimation that there would be no 
further discussion or consultation. That decision was 
to make the exclusion of six counties permanent, and 
to withdraw the provision for retaining Irish members 
at full strength during the transitory period. 

Redmond attacked no individual. His anger was 
beyond words. He said this, however : 



THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 239 

*' Some tragic fatality seems to dog the footsteps of 
this Government in all their dealings with Ireland. Every 
step taken by them since the Coalition was formed, and 
especially since the unfortunate outbreak in Dublin, has 
been lamentable. They have disregarded every advice 
we tendered to them, and now in the end, having got 
us to induce our people to make a tremendous sacrifice 
and to agree to the temporary exclusion of these Ulster 
counties, they throw this agreement to the winds, and they 
have taken the surest means to accentuate every possible 
danger and difficulty in the Irish situation." 

That day really finished the constitutional party and 
overthrew Redmond's power. We had incurred the 
very great odium of accepting even temporary partition 
— and a partition which, owing to this arbitrary extension 
of area, could not be justified on any ground of principle ; 
we had involved with us many men who voted for that 
acceptance on the faith of Redmond's assurance that 
the Government were bound by their written word ; 
and now we were thrown over. 

Apart from the effect on Redmond's position, the 
result was to engender in Ireland a temper which made 
settlement almost impossible. No British Minister's word 
would in future be accepted for anything ; and any 
Irishman who attempted to improve relations between 
the countries was certain to arouse anger and contempt 
in his countrymen. 

More particularly the relations between Irish members 
and the most powerful members of the Government were 
hopelessly embittered. Mr. Lloyd George put aside 
completely — probably he never for a moment entertained 
— the thought of seriously threatening resignation because 
his agreement with the Irish was repudiated by his 
colleagues. He was entirely engrossed with the work 
of the War Office, where he thought, and was justified 
in thinking, himself indispensable. Mr. Asquith, whose 
object was to keep unity in his Government at all costs, 



240 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

when it came to a choice whether to quarrel with the Irish 
who formed no part of it, or with the Unionists who were 
his colleagues, had no hesitation which side to throw over. 

I have never seen the House of Commons so thoroughly- 
discontented and disgusted. There was much genuine 
sympathy with Redmond. Sir Edward Carson evidently 
shared it, and he made a conciliatory speech in which 
he proposed that he and the Nationalist leader should 
shake hands on the floor of the House. That is a gesture 
which comes better from the loser than from the winner, 
and there was no doubt that Sir Edward Carson had won. 
But he knew Ireland well enough to realize the meaning 
of his victory, and his speech indicated disquiet and even 
horror at the prospect before us. He was quite avowedly 
anxious to see a start made with Home Rule, Ulster 
standing apart. In a later debate, when the Govern- 
ment announced its intention to fill again the vacant 
Irish offices (appointing Mr. Duke as Chief Secretary), 
Redmond referred hopefully to this utterance of the 
Ulster leader and generally to " the new and improved 
atmosphere which has surrounded this Irish question 
quite recently." 

The end of this speech dealt with one of the elements 
which had contributed most to the improvement. In 
the great battle of the Somme, which opened on Julj^ 1st, 
the Ulster Division went for the first time into general 
action, and their achievement was the most glorious and 
the most unlucky of that day. They carried their assault 
through five lines of trenches, and, because a division on 
their flank was not equally successful, were obliged to 
fall back, adding terribly in this withdrawal to the 
desperate losses of their advance. Side by side with 
them on the other flank was the Fourth Division, contain- 
ing two battalions of Dublin Fusiliers, in one of which 
John Redmond's son commanded a company ; so that he 
and the Ulstermen went over shoulder to shoulder. He 
came back unwounded ; all other company commanders 



THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 241 

in the battalion were killed. The only thing in which 
Redmond was entirely fortunate during these last years 
of his life was in his son's record during the war. 

Another Nationalist well known to the House of Com- 
mons served also in the Dublin Fusiliers on the Somme, 
with a different fortune. Professor Kettle, owing to con- 
ditions of health, had been unable to come to France with 
the Sixteenth Division, and had been mainly employed 
in recruiting. Now in these summer months he pushed 
hard to get out to France, though he was not physically 
jSt for the line. He got to France, and, as was easy to 
foresee, broke down and was sent to work at the base 
on records : but before he left his regiment he knew 
that it was under orders for a general action, and he 
insisted that he should have leave to rejoin for that day. 
He came back accordingly, found himself called on to 
take command of a company, and led it with great 
gallantry, and on the second day of action was shot dead. 
It was the fate that he ex23ected ; he, like so many, had 
a forerunning assurance of his end. So was lost to 
Ireland the most variously-gifted inteUigence that I 
have ever known. 

The Sixteenth Division were still on the sector about 
Loos, and their casualties were heavy and continuous in 
the perpetual trench warfare. With the last days of 
August they were withdrawn — for a rest, as they believed 
at first ; but their march was southwards to the Somme. 

The purpose was to use them for an attack on Ginchy ; 
but a shift of arrangements brought the 47th Brigade 
into line against Guillemont and its quarries, ^^'hich had 
on six occasions been unsuccessfully attacked. The Irish 
carried them. Three days later the whole division was 
launched against Ginchy. They equalled the Ulstermen's 
valour, and were luckier in the result. For these achieve- 
ments praise was not stinted. Colonel Repington in 
The Times described the Irish as the '' best missile troops " 
in all the armies. 

17 



242 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 



III 

The deeds of Irish soldiers helped us greatly outside 
of Ireland ; in Ireland, the news was received with mingled 
feelings. There was passionate resentment against the 
Government, and the question was asked, For what were 
their men dying ? Redmond's answer could not be so 
confident as it w^ould have been six months earlier. There 
were many who said that he dare not face the country. 
His answer to this was given at Waterford, where on 
October 6, 1916, his constituents received him with their 
old loyalty — though now for the first time there were 
hostile voices in the crowd. He spoke out very plainly, 
Baying with justice that in all his life he had never played 
to the gallery and would not now. Things had to be 
looked at squarely. 

" We have taken a leap back over generations of pro- 
gress, and have actually had a rebellion, with its inevitable 
aftermath of brutalities, stupidities and inflamed passions." 

He would impugn no man's motives, least of all the 
motives of the dead ; but those who had set this train 
of events in motion had been always the enemies of the 
constitutional movement. The constitutional movement 
must go on, he said ; but it would be folly to pretend 
that it could go on as if nothing had happened. Ireland 
must face its share in the responsibility. But the real 
responsibility rested with the British Government. 

To establish this he entered on a review of the whole 
series of circumstances, not omitting Ulster's preparations 
for civil war, and stressing heavily the mischief that was 
done when Sir Edward Carson was chosen " by strange 
irony " to be the First Law Officer of the Crown. 

Passing from his review, he issued grave warning against 
the idea of conscription : it would be resisted in every 
village and its attempted enforcement would be a scandal 
which would ring through the world. For Ireland also 



THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 243 

he had admonition. He had told them before that Home 
Rule was an impregnable position. But " no fortress is 
impregnable unless the garrison is faithful and united.'* 

This, alas ! was already a counsel of perfection for a 
country so deeply divided in opinion as Nationalist 
Ireland had come to be. The old loyalties had gone — 
and he felt it. Ending on a personal note, he referred 
to his age : he was over sixty ; he had done thirty-five 
years of work which would have broken down any man 
less robust in constitution than it had been his luck to 
be born. He believed in youth, he said, and would 
gladly give way to younger men. 

" But one thing I will not do while I have breath in 
my body. I will not give way to the abuse and calumny 
and the falsehoods of men whom I have known for long 
years as the treacherous enemies of Ireland." 

With all his reticence, he was a sensitive man ; and for 
months now he could scarcely take up a newspaper, 
except his party's official organ, without finding himself 
accused of imbecility, of idle vanity, of corrupt bargaining, 
of every unworthy motive. Worse than all, he realized 
the inherent weakness of his position. He told his hearers 
at Waterford that the Irish party would not vary its 
attitude upon the war, but that we should now become 
a regular and active opposition. He was far too experi- 
enced not to be aware that during a war — and such a 
war — he neither could nor would offer to the Govern- 
ment in power opposition in the sense in which Nationalist 
Ireland would understand the word. 

But he took steps at once for raising the Irish question 
by a direct vote of censure. On October 18th he moved : 

" That the system of Government at present main- 
tained in Ireland is inconsistent with the principles for 
which the Allies are fighting in Europe, and has been 
mainly responsible for the recent unhappy events and 
for the present state of feeling in that country." 

His speech avoided all controversial reference to what 



244 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

had preceded the war, but it reviewed with great power 
the long series of bhinders, beginning with the delay in 
putting the Home Rule Bill on the Statute Book, and 
ending with the Cabinet's destruction of the agreement 
entered into in June. Now, as the end of all, Dublin 
Castle, after the Prime Minister's description of its hope- 
less breakdown, was set up again with a Unionist Chief 
Secretary and a Unionist Attorney -General ; with a 
universal system of martial law in force throughout the 
country, and with hundreds of interned men in prison 
on suspicion. He warned the Government of the in- 
evitable effect upon the flow of recruits for the Irish 
Divisions ; and in a passage which showed how close his 
attention was to all this matter of recruitment, he pressed 
the War Office for certain minor concessions to Irish 
sentiment which would help us to maintain the Division 
that had so greatly distinguished itself at Guillemont 
and Ginchy. 

But the real pith of his speech was political in the 
larger sense. He pressed upon the House the injury 
which England's interest was suffering through the aliena- 
tion of American opinion, and through the reflection of 
Irish discontent in Australia ; he pleaded for the with- 
drawal of martial law. Nothing came of the debate, 
except a speech in which Mr. Lloyd George admitted 
the " stupidities, which sometimes almost look like 
malignancy," that were perpetrated at the beginning of 
recruiting in Ireland. The Labour men and a few Liberals 
voted for our motion. But as a menace to the Govern- 
ment it was negligible. 

I was in France during the period of intrigue which 
followed, leading up to the displacement of Mr. x\squith. 
When the change occurred, members of Parliament who 
were serving were recalled by special summons. I found 
Redmond in these days profoundly impressed with the 
strength of Mr, Lloyd George's personal position. He 
was convinced that the new Premier could, if he chose, 



THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 245 

force a settlement of the Irish difficulty, and was very 
hopeful of this happening. Sir Edward Carson dared not, 
he thought, set himself in opposition ; at this moment 
the Ulster party was not popular, while there was in 
the House a widespread feeling that Redmond in par- 
ticular had been treated in a manner far other than 
his due. Another of his brother's interventions in debate 
gave an impetus to this sympathy. 

Again in a thin House, during some discussion on 
Estimates, Willie Redmond got up and spoke out of the 
fullness of experiences which had profoundly affected 
his imagination. He told the House of what he had 
seen in Flanders, where the two Irish Divisions had at 
last been brought into contact, so that the left of the 
Ulster line in front of Ploegstreet touched the right of 
ours in front of Kemmel. It had always been said that 
the two factions would fly at each other's throats : by 
a score of happy detailed touches the soldier built up 
a picture of what had actually happened in the line and 
behind the line, and then summed it up in a conclusion : 

" They came together in the trenches and they were 
friends. Get them together on the floor of an Assembly, or 
where you will, in Ireland, and a similar result will follow." 

Then, from this theme, he passed to one even more 
moving — the fate of Irish Nationalists, who were con- 
fronted daily with evil news of their own land. "It is 
miserable to see men who went out with high hearts and 
hopes, who have acquitted themselves so well, filled 
with wretchedness because their country is in an unhappy 
condition." He appealed for a new and genuine attempt 
to set all this right ; and he eulogized once more with 
warm eloquence the conduct of the troops, Ulstermen 
and the rest alike. Raw lads, who eighteen months before 
had never thought of seeing war, had come in before 
his eyes bringing prisoners by the hundreds from the 
most highly trained soldiery in Europe. 

Man after man, when Willie Redmond had ended, rose 



246 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

and thanked him ; but the most notable words came 
from Mr. Bonar Law : 

" His name and his action, in connection with that 
of the leader of his party, stand out as a landmark for 
all the people of this country as to what is being done 
by those who represent Nationalist feeling." 

All this increased Redmond's hopes of what might be 
expected from the new Premier, the representative of 
another small nationality, whose early days in Parliament 
had linked him almost more closely with Irish Nationalists 
than with British Liberalism. I was on the upper bench 
when Mr. Lloyd George came in, amid loud cheering. 
" Look at him," said Willie Redmond (his senior in the 
House by ten years), who sat beside me : " It seems 
only the other day he was sitting over here cheering like 
mad for the Boers ; and there he is now. Prime Minister." 

But Mr. Lloyd George's speech, which had been deferred 
for several daj^s owing to illness, was long before it came 
to Ireland, and then its tone was no way hopeful. He 
referred back to the negotiations of June and July, with 
their ** atmosphere of nervous suspicion and distrust, 
pervasive, universal, of everything and everybody." 

" I was drenched with suspicion of Irishmen by English- 
men and of Englishmen by Irishmen and, worst of all, 
of Irishmen by Irishmen. It was a quagmire of distrust 
which clogged the footsteps and made progress impossible. 
That is the real enemy of Ireland." 

No one could say that the transaction to which Mr. 
Lloyd George was referring had helped to destroy dis- 
trust : and in view of the opinion held by Irishmen — 
and not by Irishmen only — of Ministers' dealing with 
Ireland, it was natural that this passage should provoke 
the resentment which was evident in Redmond when 
he rose. 

He followed Mr, Asquith, and made it clear that 
Ireland did not keep its praises for the rising star. He 
commended in weighty words the patriotism, the reticence 



THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 247 

and the magnanimity of the dispossessed leader ; he 
renewed Ireland's expression of gratitude for the service 
done in the Home Rule Act ; then, turning to the new 
power, he told Mr. Lloyd George bluntly that his words 
would be received in Ireland with the deepest disappoint- 
ment. This was to be a Ministry of quick and effective 
decisions ; but so far as our question was concerned, 
they had shown every disposition to wait and see. Was 
Ireland only to be let drift ? Two courses might be 
taken — the statesman's, of real remedy ; the politician's, 
of palliatives. Even of the latter nothing had been 
said. Martial law could be removed ; untried men could 
be released from jail. Yet there was no sign. The 
Prime Minister intervened angrily. He had been ill, 
he said. Redmond was in no wa}^ inclined to accept 
the reason as sufficient, and again Mr. Lloyd George 
rose to say that it was " not merely unfair, but a trifle 
impolitic " not to give him a couple of days to consult 
with the Chief Secretary. 

Still Redmond maintained his tone of aggression. 
A radical reform was needed, and of those things that 
must be borne in mind the first was that time was 
of the essence of success. Promptness was essential. 
Secondly, Government must take the initiative them- 
selves ; they must not seek to evade their responsibility 
by putting the blame on other shoulders (this was his 
rejoinder to the allegation of paralysing distrust) ; there 
was no use in resuming negotiations, going to this man 
and to that man to see what he would be willing to take. 
Thirdly, the problem must be approached by a different 
method ; it must be dealt with on lines of a united Ire- 
land. The time had gone bj'', in effect, for any proposals 
of partition, temporary or permanent. 

He added a caution that there must be no attempt 
to mix up the problem of an Irish settlement with con- 
ditions about recruiting or conscription. " That question 
must be left to a change of heart in Ireland." In con- 



248 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

elusion he expressed to the House of Commons — though 
in no sanguine accents — what he had expressed to me 
a fortnight earlier in private talk : his belief that the 
time was *' ripe for drastic, decided and bold action " 
by the Prime Minister. Powerful influences were at 
Mr. Lloj^d George's back — in the Press of all parties, 
in the opinion of leading men of all parties. Three- 
quarters of the House of Commons, Redmond said, would 
welcome such action : the whole of the overseas Dominions 
would be for it ; and it would have " the sympathy 
of all men of good will in the Empire." 

For the first time I noticed lack of cordiality in the 
response of the House — not from want of agreement, 
but from a profound depression. The old temper of 
bickering had revived, especially between some of our 
party and those who disagreed with them. One was 
glad to get back to France for Christmas, even in that 
grim winter. 

When I was invalided back in February, I found that 
things had not stood still in Ireland. Redmond's sug- 
gested palliative had been applied, and the deported 
persons were let back home for Christmas. But this 
produced little easing of the situation, and within a few 
weeks Government rearrested several of them. 

One, however, Count Plunkett, was still in Ireland 
when a vacancy occurred in Roscommon. He was not 
in himself a likely man to appeal to that constituency. 
He had been an applicant for the Under-Secretaryship 
at Dublin Castle, and was therefore clearly not a person 
of extreme Nationalist views. But one of his sons, a 
young poet, had been among the signatories to the pro- 
clamation of an Irish Republic, and had paid for it with 
his life ; Count Plunkett stood really as the father of 
his son. He was returned by a very large majority. 
This was the first open defeat inflicted by the physical 
force men on the Constitutional party since the beginning 
of Parnell's day. 



THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 249 

In March, Redmond desired to bring the Irish question 
again before Parliament, and Mr. T. P. O'Connor intro- 
duced a motion calling on the House " without further 
delay to confer upon Ireland the free institutions long 
promised her," 

That debate will always be remembered by those 
who heard it for one speech. Willie Redmond was among 
the oldest members of the Parliamentary party ; not 
half a dozen men in all the House had been longer con- 
tinuously members ; he had always been one of the 
most popular figures at Westminster and in Ireland ; 
and he had always spoken a great deal. Yet he had 
never been in the front rank either as a speaker or as 
a politician. The humour and the wit which made him 
the joy of groups in the smoking-room on the occasions 
when he was in full vein of reminiscence never got into 
his set speeches — though no man oftener lit up debate 
with some telling interruption. He was often merely 
rhetorical ; he had the name — though in my experience 
he never deserved it — for being indiscreetlj'' vehement. 
His early reputation, which he had never lived down, 
is not unkindly represented by a story which he used 
to tell against himself. When the first Home Rule Bill 
was introduced he had a great desire to speak in the 
debate, and went to Parnell with his request. '* Will 
you promise," said Parnell, " that you will write out 
what you are going to say, and show it to me, and say 
that and no more ? " He promised, and handed in his 
manuscript. Days went by and he heard nothing, so 
he went back to the Chief. " Ah yes," said Parnell, 
" I have it in my pocket. An excellent speech, my dear 
Willie. If I were you I shouldn't waste it on the House 
of Commons. It's too good for them." 

Later, in the days from 1906 onwards, with all his 
experience, it cannot be said that he ever affected opinion 
in the House. What he said was the common stuff of 
argument : it was all what someone else might have 



250 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

said — until the war came. Then, he was a changed 
creature. He went through in the Army the same experi- 
ence as hundreds of other members of Parliament ; but 
he and he only seemed to have got the very soul out 
of it. He took to his soldier's duty as a religion : he 
saw all that concerned him in the light of it. It has 
been told already how his two speeches on almost casual 
occasions affected public feeling : but in them he was 
chiefly an Irish member of Parliament speaking about 
soldiers and about Irish soldiers. In this debate he was 
an Irish soldier pleading with Parliament for Ireland in 
the name of Irish soldiers — who had responded to the 
call to arms because, as he said, they were led to believe 
that a new and better and brighter chapter was about 
to open in the relations of Great Britain and Ireland. 

" I do not believe that there is a single member of 
any party in this House who is prepared to get up and 
say that in the past the government and treatment of 
Ireland by Great Britain have been what they should 
have been. Mistakes, dark, black, and bitter mistakes, 
have been made. A people denied justice, a people 
with many admitted grievances, the redress of which 
has been long delayed. On our side, perhaps, in the 
conflict and in the bitterness of contest, there may have 
been things said and done, offensive if you will, irritating 
if you will, to the people of this country ; but what I 
want to ask, in all simplicity, is this, whether, in face 
of the tremendous conflict which is now raging, whether, 
in view of the fact that, apart from every other considera- 
tion, the Irish people, South as well as North, are upon 
the side of the Allies and against the German pretension 
to-day, it is not possible from this war to make a new 
start ? — whether it is not possible on your side, and on 
ours as well, to let the dead past bury its dead, and to 
commence a brighter and a newer and a friendlier era 
between the two countries ? Why cannot we do it ? 
Is there an Englishman representing any party who 



THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 251 

does not yearn for a better future between Ireland and 
Great Britain ? There is no Irishman who is not anxious 
for it also. Why cannot there be a settlement ? Why 
must it be that, when British soldiers and Irish soldiers 
are suffering and dying side by side, this eternal old 
quarrel should go on ? ... . 

•' If there ought to be an oblivion of the past between 
Great Britain and Ireland generally, may I ask in God's 
name the First Lord of the Admiralty [Sir Edward 
Carson] why there cannot be a similar oblivion of the 
past between the warring sections in Ireland ? All my 
life I have taken as strong and as strenuous a part on 
the Nationalist side as my poor abilities would allow. 
I may have been as bitter and as strong in the heated 
atmosphere of party contests against my countrymen 
in the North as ever they have been against me, but I 
believe in my soul and heart here to-day that I represent 
the instinct and the desire of the whole Irish Catholic race 
when I say that there is nothing that they more passion- 
ately desire and long for than that there should be an 
end of this old struggle between the North and the South. 

" The followers of the right honourable gentleman 
the First Lord of the Admiralty should shake hands 
with the rest of their countrymen. I appeal to the right 
honourable gentleman here in the name of men against 
whom no finger of scorn can be pointed ; in the name of 
men who are doing their duty ; in the name of men who 
have died ; in the name of men who may die, and who 
at this very moment may be dying, to rise to the demands 
of the situation. I ask him to meet his Nationalist 
fellow-countrymen and accept the offer which they make 
to him and his followers, and on the basis of that self- 
government which has made, and which alone has made, 
the Empire as strong as it is to-day, come to some arrange- 
ment for the better government of Ireland in the future. 
" Why does the right honourable gentleman opposite 
not meet us half way ? I want to know what is the 



252 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

reason. It surely cannot be that the right honourable 
gentleman and his friends believe that under a system 
of self-government they would have anything to fear. 
Nothing impressed me more than the opinion I heard 
expressed by a high-placed Roman Catholic officer who 
is in service with the Ulster Division, when he told 
me of his experience there, and when he said that 
although he was the only one of the Catholic religion 
in that Division, it had dawned upon him that they cer- 
tainly were Irishmen and were not Englishmen or Scots- 
men. ^ The right honourable gentleman knows perfectly 
well that it would not take so very much to bring his 
friends and our friends together, and I ask him why 
the attempt is not made ? I ask him whether the cir- 
cumstances of the time do not warrant that such an 
attempt should be made ? I ask him whether he does 
not know in his inmost heart that it would bring to the 
common enemy more dismay and consternation than 
the destruction of a hundred of their submarines if they 
knew that England, Scotland and Ireland were really 
united, not merely within the confines of the shores of 
these islands, but united in every part of the world where 
the Irish people are to be found ? 

" What is it that stands in the way of Ireland taking 
her place as a self-governing part of this Empire ? Ire- 
land is the only portion of the Empire now fighting which 
is not self-governing. The Australians whom I meet 
from time to time point to their government being free ; 
the Canadians and the New Zealanders do the same, 
and we Irishmen are the only units in France to-day 
taking our part in the war who are obliged to admit 
that the country we come from is denied those privileges 
which have made the Empire the strong organization 

^ This might mislead. The exclusively Protestant character of 
the Ulster Division was not maintained in France, and it came 
to include many Catholic Irishinen in the rank and file and not 
0, few among the officers — all in equal comradeship. — S. G. 



THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 253 

which it is to-day. If safeguards are necessary— I speak 
only for myself, and I do not speak for anybody else 
on these benches, because I have been away from this 
House so long that I have almost lost touch with things 
— as far as my own personal opinion goes, there is nothing 
I would not do, and there is no length to which I would 
not go, in order to meet the real objections or to secure 
the real confidence, friendship and affection of my country- 
men in the North of Ireland. 

" For my own part, I would gladly, if it would ease 
the situation, agree to an arrangement whereby it might 
be possible for His Majesty the King, if he so desired, 
to call in someone at the starting of a new Irish govern- 
ment, a gentleman representing the portion of the country 
and the section of the community which the First Lord 
represents ; and if a representative of that kind were 
placed with his hand upon the helm of the first Irish 
Parliament, I, at any rate, as far as I am concerned, 
would give him the loyal and the strong support which 
I have given to every leader I have supported in this 
House. After all, these are times of sacrifice, and every 
man is called upon to make some sacrifices. Men and 
women and children alike have to do something in these 
days, and is it too much to appeal to the right honour- 
able gentleman and his friends to sacrifice some part 
of their position in order to lead the majority of their 
countrymen and to bring about that which the whole 
English-speaking world desires, namely, a real recon- 
ciliation of Ireland ? I apologize for having detained 
the House so long, but this is a matter upon which I 
feel strongly, and I feel all the more strongly about it 
because I know that I am trying altogether too feebly, 
but as strongly as I can, to represent what I know to 
be the wishes nearest to the hearts of tens of thousands 
of Irishmen who went with me and their colleagues to 
France, many of whom will never return, all of whom 
are suffering the privations and the hardship and the 



254 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

risk and the wellnigh intolerable circumstances of life 
in France. I want to speak for these men, and if they 
could all speak with one voice and with one accord, they 
would say to this House, to men in every part of it, to 
Conservatives, Liberals and Labour men, to their National- 
ist countrymen and to their countrymen from the North 
of Ireland : In the name of God, we here who are about to 
die, perhaps, ask you to do that which largely induced 
us to leave our homes ; to do that which our fathers 
and mothers taught us to long for ; to do that which is 
all we desire : make our country happy and contented, 
and enable us, when we meet the Canadians and the 
Australians and the New Zealanders side by side in the 
common cause and the common field, to say to them, 
' Our country, just as yours, has self-government within 
the Empire.' " 

I have given the speech almost in full as it stands in 
print after the opening paragraph. But I cannot give 
the effect of what was heard by a densely crowded House 
in absolute silence. It was not an argument ; it was 
an appeal. There was not a cheer, not a murmur of 
agreement. They were not needed, they would have 
been felt an impertinence, so great was the respect and 
the sympathy. As the speaker stood there in war-stained 
khaki, his hair showed grey, his face was seamed with 
lines, but there was in every word the freshness and 
simplicity of a nature that age had not touched. In 
his usual place on the upper bench beside his brother, 
he poured out his words with the flow and passion of a 
bird's song. He was out of the sphere of argument ; 
but the whole experience of a long and honourable life- 
time was vibrant in that utterance. He spoke from his 
heart. All that had gone to make his faith, all the inmost 
convictions of his life were implicit — and throughout all 
ran the sense in the assembly who heard him, not only 
that he had risked, but that he was eager to give his life 
for proof. It was not strange that this should be so, 



THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 255 

for he was going on what he believed would be his last 
journey to France ; and when he reached the supreme 
moment of his passion with the words " In the name of 
God, we here who are about to die, perhaps," the last 
word was little more than a concession to the conventions. 

It was a speech, in short, that made one believe in 
impossibilities ; but in Parliament no miracles happen. 
Mr. Lloyd George replied, as John Redmond expected — 
declaring that the Government were willing to give Home 
Rule at once to " the parts of Ireland which unmistakably 
demand it," but would be no party to placing under 
Nationalist rule people who were " as alien in blood, in 
religious faith, in traditions, in outlook from the rest of 
Ireland as the inhabitants of Fife or Aberdeen." No 
Liberal Minister had ever before so completely adopted 
the Ulster theory of two nations. Taxed with the refusal 
to allow Ulster counties to declare by vote which group 
they belonged to, he declined to discuss " geographical 
limitations " at present, but indicated that if Irish members 
could accept the principle of separate treatment for two 
peoples, there were " ways and means by which it could 
be worked out." Suggestion of a Conference of Irishmen 
was thrown out, or of a Commission to discuss the details 
of partition. Redmond, in replying, answered to this that 
" after experience of the last negotiations he would enter 
into no more negotiations." He warned the Govern- 
ment that the whole constitutional movement was in 
danger. There were in Ireland *' serious men, men of 
ability, men with command of money," who were bent 
on smashing it. 

'' After fifty years of labour on constitutional lines we 
had practically banished the revolutionary party from 
Ireland. Now again, after fifty years, it has risen." 

The rest was a prophecy only too accurate : 

" If the constitutional movement disappears, the Prime 
Minister will find himself face to face with a revolutionary 
movement, and he will find it impossible to preserve 



256 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

any of the forms even of constitutionalism. He will have 
to govern Ireland by the naked sword. I cannot picture 
to myself a condition of things in which the Prime Minister, 
with his record behind him, would be an instrument to 
carry out a government of that kind. ... I say this 
plainly. No British statesman, no matter what his 
platonic affection for Home Rule may have been in the 
past, no matter what party he may belong to, who by 
his conduct once again teaches the Irish people the lesson 
that any National leader who, taking his political life 
in his hands, endeavours to combine local and Imperial 
patriotism — endeavours to combine loyalty to Ireland's 
rights with loyalty to the Empire — anyone who again 
teaches the lesson that such an one is certain to be let 
down and betrayed by this course, is guilty of treason, 
not only to the liberties of Ireland but to the unity and 
strength and best interests of this Empire." 

After these bitter words he called on his colleagues 
not " to continue a useless and humiliating debate," 
but to withdraw from the House : and we accordingly 
followed him into the lobby. In our absence the discus- 
sion continued, in a tone not flattering to the Govern- 
ment. It was remarkable for one utterance from 
Mr. Healy, concerning Redmond : 

" I wish to say at the outset that in my opinion this 
Empire owes him a debt of gratitude which it can never 
repay, and I wish also to say of him as an opponent that 
in my opinion, if his advice had been taken by the War 
Olfice, it is absolutely true, as he contends, that you 
would have marshalled in Ireland from two hundred 
thousand to three hundred thousand men, from whom 
large drafts could have been drawn ; and I will further 
say I believe if his advice had been taken the elements 
of rebellion would have been appeased." 

It was plain that matters could not stay at this 
point ; but our breach with the Government was complete 
for the moment. Redmond's demand was for a full and 



THE REBELLION AND ITS SEQUEL 257 

definite statement of policy, which should be made in 
the House of Commons and there discussed. On May 15th 
Mr. Bonar Law announced that the Prime Minister would 
make a communication to the leaders of Irish parties. 
It was explained that this method of outlining the pro- 
posals would be onljT' preliminary to discussion. 

On that evening a great banquet to General Smuts 
was given in the House of Lords by Parliament. Strong 
pressure was used with Redmond to attend it, and he 
consented unwillingly. He was ill — physically ill, prob- 
ably mth the beginnings of his fatal disease — and morally 
sick at heart and out of hope. Another Irish election 
in Soutli Longford had been strenuously fought by the 
party and had been won by the Sinn Feiner ; a decisive 
factor in the election was the issue of a letter from Arch- 
bishop Walsh which grossly misrepresented Redmond's 
whole policy and action. He was in no humour for 
banquetings, and at this moment the Irish party was 
nearly back at its old attitude, which dictated a refusal 
to have part or lot with the House on such ceremonial 
occasions. I But Redmond's feeling for South Africa 
was specially strong, his feeling about the war was un- 
changed ; and this was a recognition of a great South 
African statesman's services in the war. He let himself 
be persuaded into accepting. 

At the dinner he sat next to a Liberal peer, a member 
of the late Government, who talked with him of Irish 
possibilities. Redmond did not know what the Govern- 
ment intended. He was told, now, that the Government 
had written a letter to him and to Sir Edward Carson 
setting out plainly an offer for the immediate introduction 
of Home Rule with the exclusion of the six counties. 

Redmond said : "It is impossible that we should 
accept ; nothing can come of it." He was asked then 

» We had never been parties, for instance, to receptions of Prime 
Ministers from the overseas Dominions, even when they were our 
close friends and supporters. 

18 



258 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

what hope he saw. He answered, as he had for some 
time been saying in private, that the only chance lay 
in a Conference or Convention of Irishmen ; but it must 
include ever3^body, and in no sense be limited to discussion 
between the Irish party and the Unionists. The Liberal 
peer expressed great interest and proved it in action. 
Next morning he was with Redmond by ten o'clock, and 
got his view in writing that it might be placed before 
the Cabinet, who were to meet at eleven to decide finally 
the terms of their letter. 

As a result of this intervention, the letter, instead of 
containing a single proposal, offered two alternatives : 
the second was so oddlj^ tacked on that many at the time 
said it read like a postscript. So, in point of fact, it Avas. 
That was the genesis of the Irish Convention. 

His son, from whom I know this, said to me that more 
than once, when things were hopeful in the Convention, 
Redmond said to him, " What a lucky thing it was I 
went to that dinner ! " 



CHAPTER VIII 
THE CONVENTION AND THE END 



THE Longford election had in reality been not merely 
a symptom, but an event of great importance. It 
was a notice of dismissal to the Parliamentary^ party. 
There was no reason to suppose anything specially un- 
favourable to us in the local conditions. Neither candi- 
date made a special appeal to the electors ; nor was 
the constituency in any sense a stronghold of Sinn Fein. 
The fact was that the country as a whole had ceased to 
believe in the Parliamentary party as an efficient machine 
for obtaining the national ends. The organization of 
the United Irish League had lost touch with the young ; 
the main support we had lay in the Ancient Order of 
Hibernians, which many Nationalists disliked on principle 
because it was limited to Catholics. What had not yet 
disappeared up till July 1916, though it was threatened, 
was belief in the principle of constitutional action as 
against revolutionary methods. 

Willie Redmond, who never lacked instinct, and whose 
separation from party politics by conditions of service 
gave him a vantage-ground of detachment, reached a 
shrewd view of the position before the Longford vacancy 
occurred. He pressed uj^on his brother that we should 
all retire, saying plainly that we had been too long in 
possession, and should hand over the task of representing 
Ireland at Westminster to younger men. His association 
with the Volunteer Committee, brief though it was, had 
made him more aware than most of our colleagues how 

259 



260 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

wide was the estrangement between us and the new 
Ireland ; but it also taught him to believe that many 
of the men whom he had met there would be willing 
to take up the task on constitutional lines. 

This proposal never came before the party. But after 
Longford had given its decision, it was proposed that we 
should accept the verdict in general and resign in a body. 
Those who put forward the suggestion felt that some 
drastic action was needed to force upon Ireland the 
responsibility for a clear choice between the two courses, 
constitutional and unconstitutional. Redmond, as Chair- 
man, advised strongly against this. He said that it would 
be a lack of courage : that one defeat or two defeats 
should not turn us from our course. But it is clear to 
me that he welcomed the Convention as another and a 
better means of effecting the same end — of replacing 
the existing Parliamentary party by another body of men. 

On May 21st Mr, Lloj^d George's speech gave the go-by 
completely to the detailed proposal for a settlement on 
the basis of partition to which the Cabinet — ^including 
Sir Edward Carson — had consented. It dealt only with 
the alternative plan suggested in the conclusion of the 
published letter. The Government had decided to invite 
Irishmen to put forward their own proposals for the 
government of their country, he said. This invitation 
was directed to a Convention not merely of political 
parties, although they must all be represented — the 
followers of Redmond, of Mr. O'Brien, the Ulster Union- 
ists, the Southern Unionists, " and he hoped also the Sinn 
Feiners as well." But in the main it was to consist of 
" representatives of the local governing bodies, of the 
Churches, of the trade unions, of the commercial interests, 
of educational interests " ; it was to be "a real repre- 
sentation of Irish life and activity in all their leading 
branches," It was to be pledged in advance to no con- 
clusions — except one, and that was only indicated by 
implication. " If substantial agreement should be reached 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 261 

as to the character and scope of the Constitution for the 
future government of Ireland within the Empire" (these 
three words were the limitation), Government would 
*' accept the responsibility for taking all the necessary 
steps to enable the Imperial Parliament to give legislative 
effect to the conclusions of the Convention." 

A recommendation was added, amounting to a direction, 
that the Convention should sit mth closed doors and 
publish nothing of its proceedings till their conclusion. 

Nothing was said to define the all-important words 
" substantial agreement." But the Prime Minister laid 
grave emphasis on the importance of a settlement for 
the purpose of the war. The limitation upon Ulster's 
claim was plainly conceived by him to lie in Ulster's 
sense of an Imperial necessity. " The Empire cannot 
afford uncured sores that sap its vigour. The entire 
strength of Great Britain and the whole-hearted support 
of Ireland are essential to victory." He appealed " to 
Irishmen of all faiths, political and religious, and especially 
to the patriotic spirit of Ulster, to help by healing." 

Redmond, in following him, assumed that there would 
be concurrence from all sections of Irishmen. It must 
be "a free assembly " — no proposal must be barred in 
advance : it must be representative of " every class, 
creed and interest " — and in recapitulating these, he 
added the Irish peers. In regard to political parties 
and bodies, as such, be desired a very limited represen- 
tation. The United Irish League, " the militant official 
organization of the Irish party," should be unrepresented, 
and he advised the same in regard to other purely political 
organizations and societies. For the Irish party itself 
he asked a representation only equal in number to that 
given to Irish Unionists. The Cork Independents must 
have what they considered a full and adequate number ; 
and for Sinn Fein he asked " a generous representation." 

Then he added : 

"So anxious am I that no wreckers, mere wreckers, 



262 JOHN REDMONDS LAST YEARS 

should go on that body — I do not believe any men would 
go on as wreckers, but any men who would be regarded 
by their opponents as going on it as wreckers — that on 
the question of personalities, I would be very glad, if 
there are protagonists on one side or the other who during 
the last twenty or thirty years or more have been engaged 
in the struggle and who — there have been faults on both 
sides — have done things and said things which have left 
bitter memories, I should be very glad that such men 
should be left off. If there were any feeling that I am 
such a man myself, I would be only too willing and happy 
to stand down" (he was interrupted by cries of "No, 
No") "if by doing so I could promote harmony." 

In this there was a genuine expression of the desire 
which governed his whole conduct in the Convention, to 
get away from the old lines with their old traditional 
antagonisms, and refer the solution not to Irish politicians 
but to Ireland as a whole. What followed in his speech 
gave positive development to the self-denying ordinance 
which he had proposed for the party machines. He 
asked for a nominated element — first, to make sure that 
men obviousty suitable, who none the less might not 
hajopen to be elected, should find a place : and secondly, 
to increase still further the Unionist representation. 

He added once more a plea for quick action ; dilatori- 
ness had had much to do, he said, with the Government's 
late failures in Ireland. But, if prompt steps were taken 
on the path outlined, he would, in spite of all that had 
come and gone, face the new venture with good heart. 
Yet even in his confidence there was the pathetic accent 
of one who feels need to bid defiance to despair. 

" Although I know I lay myself open perhaps to ridicule 
as too sanguine a prophet, I have some assured hope that 
the result may be blessed for Ireland as for the Empire. 
. . . The life of a politician, especially of an Irish poli- 
tician, is one long series of postponements and com- 
promises and disappointments and disillusions. . . . Many 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 263 

of our cherished ideals, our ideals of complete, speedy 
and almost immediate triumph of our policy and of our 
cause, have faded, some of them almost disappeared. 
And we know that it is a serious consideration for those 
of us who have spent forty years at this work and now 
are growing old, if we have to face further postponements. 
For my part, I feel we must not shrink from compromise. 
If by this Convention which is now proposed we can 
secure substantial agreement amongst our people in 
Ireland, it will be worth all the heartburnings and post- 
ponements and disappointments and disillusions of the 
last thirty or forty years." 

The omens were not favourable to this storm-beaten 
courage. When he sat down, Sir John Lonsdale rose 
to reiterate on behalf of the Ulster Unionists that they 
*' could not and would not be driven into a Home Rule 
Parliament " — and that they relied absolutely on the 
pledges that they should not be coerced. Mr. William 
O'Brien followed. After years of advocating settlement by 
conference among Irishmen, he condemned this proposal 
as coming six or seven years too late, and as defective in 
its machinery, in that it proposed a large body of men : 
" A dozen Irishmen of the right stamp '" would be the 
proi^er Conference ; and the proposal of x^artition should 
be barred out in advance. If the experiment were tried 
now and failed, the failure would " kill anj- reasonable 
hope in our time of reconstructing the constitutional 
movement upon honest lines." Ireland is always fruitful 
in Cassandras who do not lack power to assist in the fulfil- 
ment of their ill-bodings, and this speech foreshadowed 
Mr. O'Brien's intention to abstain. Sir Edward Carson 
and Mr. Devlin gave the debate a more promising tone : 
but it was difficult for anybody to be sanguine. 

Preparation, discussion, went on in private and in 
public. It was soon indicated that Sinn Fein would take 
no part, on the double ground, first, that the Convention 
was not elective in any democratic sense, for all the repre- 



264 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

sentatives of local bodies had been elected before the 
war, before the rebellion, before the new movement took 
hold in Ireland ; and secondly, that it was committed 
in advance to a settlement within the Empire. On the 
other hand, Redmond was flooded with correspondence 
concerning candidates for membership of the new body. 
There was also the question of a meeting -place. The 
Royal College of Surgeons offered its building Avith its 
theatre, possessing admirable facilities. But Trinity 
College offered the Regent House. The conveniences here 
were in all ways inferior ; but Trinity was the nearest 
place to the old Parliament House ; much more than 
that, it was the most historic institution in Ireland. Its 
political associations of the past and the present were 
strangely blended and Redmond liked it none the less for 
that. He decided to press for acceptance of this offer. 

Then across the current of all our thought came the 
news of the Battle of Messines. Troops had been massing 
for some time on the sector of line which the Irish Divisions 
had now held since the previous October ; and the day 
was plainly in sight which had been expected since sj^ring, 
when they were to try and carry positions in front of 
which so much blood had been vainly shed. On June 7th, 
at the clearing of light, all was in readiness : the Ulster- 
men and ours still in the centre of the attack from Span- 
broekmolen to Wytschaete. Just before the moment 
fixed, men could see clearly : in half a minute all was 
blotted out. The eighteen huge land-mines in whose 
shafts our second line had been so often billeted were 
now at last exploded and the sky was full of powdered 
earth, with God knows what other fragments. In that 
darkness the troops went over. 

For once staff-work and execution harmonized per- 
fectly ; the success was complete, and the sacrifice small. 
The Irish raced for their positions, and no one could say 
who was first on the goal. News of the victory quickly 
reached London — great newa for Ireland. Australians 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 265 

and New Zealanders had their full share in it, but the 
shoulder to shoulder advance of the two Irish Divisions 
caught everyone's imagination : it was Ireland's day. 

Then came through the message that Willie Redmond 
had fallen. 

Ever since his illness in the previous summer he had 
been talien away from his work as company commander ; 
at his age — fifty-six — he was probably the oldest man 
in any capacity with the Division. A post was found 
for him on General Hickie's divisional staff which made 
him specially res]3onsible for the comforts of the men, 
in trenches and out of trenches. In the battles on the 
Somme he entreated hard to be let rejoin his battalion, 
but General Hickie issued peremptory orders which did 
not allow him to pass the first dressing-station. Here, 
indeed, he was under terrible shell fire and saw many of 
his comrades struck down ; but he was not content. 
For this new battle he insisted that he must be in the 
actual advance. If he were refused leave, he said he 
would break all discipline and take it. He was permitted 
to be with the tliird attacldng wave ; but he slipped 
forward and joined the first, on the right, where the line 
touched the Ulstermen. So it happened that when he 
fell, struck by two rifle bullets, the stretcher-bearers 
who helped him and carried him down to the dressing- 
station were those of an Ulster regiment. He was brought 
back to the hospital in the convent at Locre, familiar 
to all of us by many memories ; for the nuns kej)t a 
restaurant for officers in the refectory, and he and I had 
dined there more than once with leading men of the 
Ulster Division. His wounds were not grave ; but he 
had overtaxed himself, and in a few hours he succumbed 
to shock. It was the death that he had foreseen, that 
he had almost desired — a death that many might have 
envied him. He had said more than once since the 
rebellion that he thought he could best serve Ireland by 
dying ; and in the sequel, so deep was the impression 



266 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

left by his death that it seemed at times as if his thought 
had been true. 

Yet one asj)ect of it was overlooked by many — the 
loss inflicted on his brother, the Irish leader. It was not 
merely that Redmond lost the sole near kinsman of his 
generation ; he lost in him the closest of those comrades 
who had been allied with him in all the stages of his life's 
fight. The veterans of the old party had been vanishing 
rapidly from the scene ; name succeeded name quickly 
on our death-roll. This death left Redmond lonely, 
and sorely stricken in his affections. But it did more. 
It deprived him of a counsellor, and perhaps the only 
counsellor he had who temperamentally shared his own 
point of view. More especially now in the war, when 
the leader's wisdom in giving the lead which he had 
given began to be gravely questioned even by his own 
supporters, it was invaluable for him to have backing 
from one who had taken the war as part of his life's 
creed — who knew no hesitancies, no reserves in his con- 
viction that the right course had been followed, for the 
right thing was to do the right. Finally and chiefly, 
Willie Redmond was the only man who could break 
through his brother's constitutional reserve and could 
force him into discussion. In the months that were to 
come sach a man was badly needed. The loss of him 
meant to John Redmond a loss of personal efficiency. 
Sorrow gave a strong grip to depression on a brooding 
mind which had always a proneness to melancholy, which 
was now linked with a sick body, and which lived among 
disappointments and grief and the sense of rancorous 
dislike in men who once thought it a privilege to cheer 
him on his passing. 

Add to all this that Redmond's one hope for Ireland 
now lay in the Convention, and that he counted with 
good reason on his soldier brother's influence there — as 
no man could fail to do who had seen the effect which 
his last speech produced upon the House of Commons. 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 267 

No doubt, however, part of the service which Willie 
Redmond rendered to Ireland in dying lay in the sympathy 
which he conciliated to his leader — in whom men saw, 
rightly, not only his nearest kinsman, but the represen- 
tative of the x^rinciples for which the soldier-politician 
died. The sympathy was genuine and it was widespread ; 
yet so reserved was John Redmond that few, I think, 
guessed how deeply the blow had struck home. Still 
less did they realize how much was meant by the bereave- 
ment which followed immediately. Pat O'Brien, who 
had been through all vicissitudes the faithful and devoted 
helper of his friend and leader, was suddenly prostrated 
by a stroke. He came down to the House again ; he 
could not keep away from the place of his duty, where 
for a quarter of a century he had scarcely missed one 
division in a hundred, where he had kept watch for Red- 
mond like the most trusty sheep-dog ; but death was 
written over him and it came in a few days. He was 
the one friend, I believe, whom Redmond would have 
taken with him to Aughavanagh after Willie Redmond's 
death. Now, Aughavanagh, which had been a place of 
rest, was a place of intense loneliness. Yet to Augha- 
vanagh Redmond had withdrawn himself, like a wounded 
creature ; and from Aughavanagh he came to Dublin 
for Pat O'Brien's funeral in Glasnevin. Then, and then 
only in his lifetime people saw him publicly break down ; 
he had to be led away from the grave. 

Meanwhile, he was beset by ceaseless correspondence 
concerning the numbers and composition of the assembly 
to which the British Government on his suggestion had 
decided to entrust so great a charge. But a startling 
political event indicated only too plainly how much 
belated that decision had been. 

Directly the proposal for a Convention had been dis- 
closed, with its attempt to create a new atmosphere, 
it was put to the Government that Sinn Fein could not 
be expected to take part in the Convention while its 



268 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

leaders were in jail or under detention as suspects. This 
representation came from several quarters, and it was 
soon publicly pleaded by the Nationalist party ; but 
it was, to my knowledge, immediately put forward by 
English members of Parliament, the prime mover being 
a Unionist soldier, Major J. W. Hills, M.P. As usual, 
the advantage of prompt action was urged ; and as usual, 
the concession was delayed till it had lost its grace and 
seemed to be extracted. Sinn Fein's opinion in all these 
days was hardening against the Convention, which was 
represented as a mere trick to gain time and to conciliate 
American good will by an unreal offer. 

When the prisoners were released, a new personage 
immediately came into the public eye. It was certain 
that one of them would be nominated to contest the 
vacancy in East Clare left by Willie Redmond's death ; 
the choice fell on Mr. de Valera ; and the world learnt 
that in these months while the imprisoned Sinn Feiners 
had been discussing their plans for the future — for the 
right of association as political prisoners had been con- 
ceded to them — this young man had been recognized bj'' 
his fellows as the leading spirit. Ireland as a whole knew 
nothing of him. He was the son of a Southern American 
and a county Limerick woman ; scholarly, a keen Gaelic 
Leaguer, by profession a teacher of mathematics. In 
the rebellion he had held Roland's bakery, a large building 
covering the approaches to Dublin from Kingstown by 
rail ; he had been the last of the leaders to surrender, 
and had earned high opinions by his conduct in these 
operations. This was the Sinn Fein candidate for East 
Clare — a county where " extreme " men had alv/ays 
been numerous. 

The view was expressed that he should have been 
opposed by one who took up the cause where Willie 
Redmond left it — by a soldier who was a strong National- 
ist and strongly identified with the Parnellite tradition. 
It was decided that we should stand a better chance if 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 269 

constitutional Nationalism were represented by a Dublin 
lawyer with close personal ties to the constituency. How 
it would have gone had a soldier been put up, no man 
can say ; but it could not have gone worse. Mr. de Valera 
won by a majority of five thousand. He was a stranger, 
but he stood for an ideal. The alternative ideal — which 
was John Redmond's and Willie Redmond's — had never 
been put before the electors. The election was, rightly, 
taken as a repudiation of Redmond's policy ; but in it 
Redmond's policy had gone undefended. 

The newly elected Sinn Fein leader was very prominent 
in these days, and a good deal of his eloquence was spent 
in ridicule of the Convention. That body was certainly 
starting its task under the most unpromising auspices. 



II 

The first meeting was fixed for July 25. On the evening 
before, Redmond came up and there was an informal 
discussion between the Nationalist members of Parlia- 
ment and the Catholic Bishops. There were four of each 
group. Five members had been allowed to the party 
and as many to the Ulstermen. Redmond was not 
present at the meeting when selection was made, but he 
recommended a list, consisting in addition to himself 
of Mr. Dillon, Mr. Devlin, and Mr. Clancy, K.C.— the 
latter having been always his most trusted adviser in 
all points of draftsmanship ajid constitutional law. My 
name was added in the place which should have been 
his brother's, as representing Irish troops. 

Mr. Dillon, however, thought it better not to serve, 
though Redmond pressed him very strongly to do so. 
He considered he could best help the Convention from 
outside its ranks. Mr. O'Brien and Mr. Healy had, on 
different grounds, come to the same conclusion, so that 



270 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

we lacked the assistance of three commanding person- 
alities in Irish life, though we were thereby freed from 
some dangers of personal friction. A vacant place was 
thus left in our five, and since the Ulster party had decided 
to put in only two members of Parliament, filling the 
other places Avith local men, it was thought well that we 
should take a similar representative, Mr. Harbison, who 
spoke for the county of Tyrone. 

Of the four representatives of the hierarchy, Archbishop 
Harty of Cashel had always been a downright outspoken 
supporter of the Parliamentary party. He had publicly 
denounced the rebellion both on civil and on moral 
grounds. But he had never been prominently concerned 
with political affairs as such ; nor had the Bishop of 
Down and Connor, Dr. MacRory, a man young for his 
office and not long in it. He had been chosen, no doubt, 
to guard the special interests of Catholicism in the north- 
east corner. The others were of a very different stamp ; 
no two in Ireland had a better right to the name of states- 
men. Dr. O'Donnell, the Bishop of Raplioe, had been 
for many years officially one of the treasurers of the 
United Irish League. Since the foundation of the Con- 
gested Districts Board, he had been one of its members, 
and served on the Dudley Commission which inquired 
into these regions. His native Donegal could show the 
traces of his influence in applying remedial measures to 
what was once its terrible poverty. Dr. Kelly, the 
Bishop of Ross, came from the extreme south of the 
same western coast-line ; a keen student of finance and 
economics, he had been a member of the Primrose Com- 
mittee on Financial Relations, and, before that, of Lord 
George Hamilton's Commission on the Poor Law. His 
repute was great in his own order and outside his own 
order. In any assembly these two brains would have 
been distinguished. 

The question which was discussed among us chiefly 
on that evening concerned the choice of a chairman. 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 271 

Government had originally proposed to nominate this 
all -important officer, but having failed to solve the inter- 
minable difficulties, had left it to the assembly. Much 
trouble was anticipated by the public. On the whole, 
our conclusion pointed, but not decisively, to the choice 
which was eventually made. Redmond swept aside 
peremptorily the suggestion of himself. 

Next day we assembled — some ninety persons. The 
main bulk consisted of local representatives — thirty-one 
chairmen of County Councils, one only having declined to 
serve. Two of these, Mr. O'Dowd and Mr. Fitzgibbon, 
were members of our party. There were eight repre- 
sentatives of the Urban Councils, over and above the 
Lord Mayors of Dublin, Belfast and Cork and the Mayor 
of Derry. Labour had seven representatives, one of whom, 
Mr. Lundon, representing the Agricultural Labourers' 
Union of the South, was an Irish member of Parlia- 
ment. One was a railway operative from Dublin ; one 
a Catholic Trade-Unionist leader from Derry ; the remain- 
ing four came from Belfast. Organized labour in Dublin 
and the Southern towns had endorsed Sinn Fein's attitude 
and declined to recognize the Convention. 

The Southern Unionist Group was led by Lord 
Midleton ; with him were Lords Mayo and Oranmore, 
representing the Irish peers. The Irish Unionist Alliance 
had sent Mr. Stewart, a great land-agent, and Mr. Andrew 
Jameson (Avhose name, as someone said, was " a household 
word written in letters of gold throughout Ireland "). 
The Chambers of Commerce had their representatives 
from Dublin, Belfast and Cork. 

In the Ulster group, Mr. Barrie, M.P., acted as leader. 
Lord Londonderry as secretary. Of the rest. Sir George 
Clark, chairman of Workman and Clark's great ship- 
building yard, had been knoAvn to us in Parliament. A 
Scot by birth, with a life of thirty years spent in Belfast, 
during which time he had seen his business grow from 
two hundred hands to ten thousand, he knew nothing 



272 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEAES 

of Ireland but Belfast, and had no trace of Irish feeling. 
In this he stood alone ; but unhappily no man carried 
more weight in Belfast — with the possible exception of 
one whom few of us outside Ulster knew before we came 
to that body. Mr. Alexander McDowell was a solicitor 
by profession, the adviser of policy to all the business 
men of Belfast. From the first day of our meeting he 
stood out by sheer weight of brain and personality. He 
was to some of us the surprise of that assembly, and 
made us realize how little part we had in. Ulster when 
the existence of such a man could be an unknown factor 
to us. 

Mr. Pollock, President of the Belfast Chamber of 
Commerce, was also new to us, and was destined to play 
a prominent part in our affairs. With the Catholic 
j)relates sat the two Archbishops of the Church of Ire- 
land — Dr. Crozier and Dr. Bernard — to both of whom 
the democratic constitution of their Church had given 
great experience in management of business and dis- 
cussion. Dr. MacDermott, Moderator of the Presby- 
terian General Assembly, was the official head of his 
Church for the year only and had not equal knowledge 
of administration. An orator, with a touch of the 
enthusiast in his temperament, he was a simple and sym- 
pathetic figure ; vehement in his political faith, yet 
responsive to all the human charities and deeply a lover 
of his country. There was no better representative 
there of Ulster, of the Ulster diificultj^ — at once so 
separate from and so akin to the rest of Ireland. 

The Government nominees included, as was only 
natural, the most personally distinguished group. First 
of them should be named the Provost of Trinity, Dr. 
Mahaffy, under whose segis we assembled — a great 
scholar and a great Irishman. He brought with him 
an element of independent unregimented political thought 
— often freakish in expression, but based on a vast know- 
ledge of men and countries. In a more practical sense, 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 273 

Lord MacDonnell and Lord Dunraven were our chief 
political theorists, devisers by temperament of consti- 
tutional machinery. Lord MacDonnell's repute as an 
administrator, Lord Dunraven's as a leading figure in 
the Land Conference, gave weight to whatever came 
from them. Lord Granard, who sat with them, was a 
Catholic peer who had commanded a battalion of the 
Royal Irish Regiment in the Tenth Division and had 
held offices in Mr. Asquith's Government. He had now 
the brilliant idea of reopening for the period of the Con- 
vention one of the most beautiful eighteenth-century 
dwellings, Ely House, and making it a centre of hospit- 
ality and a meeting-place for friendly outside intercourse. 
Few more useful assistances were rendered to our purpose, 
and certainly none more j)leasant. 

Lord Desart, a distinguished lawyer, acted closely with 
Lord Midleton. Sir Bertram Windle, President of Uni- 
versity College, was another of Government's choices — 
a man of science who was also very much a man of affairs. 
Another, far less of a debater, far more of a power, was 
Mr. William Martin Murphy, Chairman of the Dublin 
Tramways, a f)owerful employer of labour who had 
headed the fight against Larkin in 1913, and had been 
mainly responsible for the character of the employers' 
victory. He was the owner of the most widely circu- 
lated Irish paper, the Irish Independent — which stood in 
journalism for what Mr. Healy represented in Parlia- 
ment — an envenomed Nationalist opposition to the 
Parliamentarj'' party. 

Mr. Edward Lysaght, the son of a great manufacturer 
in South Wales, combined like his father an aptitude 
for literature and for business ; he wrote books, he was 
concerned in a publishing venture, but he was chiefly 
interested in his farm in county Clare — where he had 
voted for de Valera. He had been chosen deliberately 
as a link with Sinn Fein. It stamped an aspect of the 
Convention that he was the youngest man there — for 

19 



274 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

he would not have been noticeably young in the House 
of Commons. We were a middle-aged assembly. Another 
link, though not so explicit, with Republican Ireland 
was Mr. George Russell, " A.E,," poet, writer on co- 
operative economics, a mystic, with all a mystic's shrewd- 
ness, an orator with much personal magnetism. Lastly, 
there was Sir Horace Plunkett, perhaps the only member 
of the Convention except Redmond whose name would 
have occurred to every Irishman as indispensably necessary. 

Two other personages should be noted. Mr. Walter 
MacMurrough Kavanagh, Chairman of the Carlo w County 
Council, was by tradition and training a strong LTnionist, 
by inheritance the representative of one of the old Irish 
princely families. He had been elected to the Vice- 
Chairmanship of his County Council while still a Unionist ; 
later, he adhered to Lord Dunraven's proposals of devo- 
lution, but finding no rest in a half-way house, came into 
full support of Redmond and for some time was a member 
of our j)arty ; by temperament deeply conservative, he 
was in no way separated by that from many of the ablest 
Nationalists, lay and ecclesiastic. As a speaker he had 
few equals in the Convention ; no man there, indeed, 
except Redmond, could throw equal passion into the 
plea of urgency for a settlement, for I think no other 
man felt it with such earnestness. 

Captain Doran, Chairman of the Louth Council, was 
on his waj^ back to France when the summons to the 
Convention stopped him. A Methodist, he was divided 
by religioji from his neighbours in County Louth : but 
that did not stop them from putting this prosperous and 
capable farmer, working his land on the most modern 
methods, into the Chair of their County Council. Before 
the war, when the Larne gun-running took place, he 
decided that matters looked serious, called his friends 
together and formed a company of Volunteers, who 
might be needed to protect themselves or to protect 
other Nationalists across the adjacent LTIster border. 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 275 

After tlie war had broken out and the Home Rule Act 
was passed, and Redmond liad launched his appeal, this 
country farmer, then aged Uliy, made his way to Mallow 
and asked General Parsons to accept him as a recruit. 
He was accepted, and very shortly given a commission 
in the Dublin Fusiliers. Out of his local Volunteers he 
took seventy-five into the Army with him. He was with 
the Sixteenth Division from its landing in France till after 
the day of Messines, commanding his company. All this 
gave him an authority in an assembly where all voices 
were in support of the war, and more particularly in an 
appeal to Ulster ; and with this advantage went an 
unusual gift of frank and eloquent speech, linked with 
a fine idealism. 

These were the main personal elements in the group 
that came together on July 23th — Mr. Duke, the Chief 
Secretary, acting as temporary Chairman and Sir Francis 
Hox^wood (soon to become Lord Southborough) having 
been brought over as Secretary. Mr. Duke having ad- 
dressed us with an earnest suavity, we were told to select 
a Chairman : and on the motion of the Primate, Arch- 
bishop Crozier, this embarrassing task was delegated to 
a committee of ten, rapidly told off. We adjourned for 
lunch, and on reassembling found that a unanimous 
recommendation named Sir Horace Plunkett. The Ulster- 
men had expressed a willingness to accept Redmond. 
This he refused to discuss ; but he was put into the Chair 
of the selecting committee. There was a recommendation 
also that Sir Francis Hopwood should be Secretary to 
the Convention. Both these proposals were welcomed, 
and we dispersed feeling that we had done a good 
day's work. 

There was, however, one set-off to it. When the 
Selection Committee had done its work, its members 
went off singly, and outside the gate of College a small 
group of ardent patriots were waiting, who mobbed 
Redmond on the way to his hotel. They were young, 



276 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

no doubt ; but the Republican party claimed specially 
the youth of Ireland ; and these lads expressed with a 
simple eloquence very much what was said by older and 
more articulate voices, uttering the same thought in 
print. It is worth while to illustrate here the attitude 
taken towards Redmond by much of Nationalist Ireland, 
for it profoundly influenced Redmond's attitude and 
action in the Convention. I take, not casual and partisan 
journalism, but a passage from a book published by a 
distinguished Irish writer who had never publicly attached 
himself to any party. Mr. James Stephens was in Dublin 
during the insurrection ; he wrote a book about his 
own j)ersonal observation of it, which as a record of 
observation is admirable. But when Mr. Stephens 
comes to emit opinions, hero is what he has to say : 

" Why it happened is a question that may be answered 
more particularly. It happened because the leader of 
the Irish party misrepresented his people in the English 
House of Parliament. On the day of the declaration of 
war between England and Germany he took the Irish 
case, weighty with eight centuries of history and tradition, 
and he threw it out of the window. He pledged Ireland 
to a particular course of action, and he had no authority 
to give this pledge and he had no guarantee that it 
would be met. The ramshackle intelligence of his party 
and his own emotional nature betrayed him and us and 
England. He swore Ireland to loyalty as if he had 
Ireland in his pocket and could answer for her. Ireland 
has never been disloyal to England, not even at this 
epoch, because she has never been loyal to England, and 
the profession of her National faith has been un- 
wavering, has been known to every English person alive, 
and has been clamant to all the world beside. 

"Is it that he wanted to be cheered ? He could very 
easily have stated Ireland's case truthfully, and have 
proclaimed a benevolent neutrality (if he cared to use 
the grandiloquent words) on the part of this country. 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 277 

He would have gotten his cheers, he would in a few 
months have gotten Home Rule in return for Irish soldiers. 
He would have received politically whatever England 
could have safely given him. But, alas ! these careful- 
nesses did not chime with his emotional moment. They 
were not magnificent enough for one who felt that he 
was talking not to Ireland or to England, but to the 
whole gaping and eager earth, and so he pledged his 
country's credit so deeply that he did not leave her even 
one National rag to cover herself with. 

" After a lie, truth bursts out, and it is no longer the 
radiant and serene goddess we knew or hoped for — it 
is a disease, it is a moral syphilis, and will ravage until 
the body in which it can dwell has been purged. Mr. 
Redmond told the lie, and he is answerable to England 
for the violence she had to be guilty of, and to Ireland 
for the desolation to which we have had to submit. With- 
out his lie there had been no Insurrection, without it 
there had been at this moment, and for a year past, an 
end to the ' Irish question.' Ireland must in ages gone 
have been guilty of abominable crimes, or she could 
not at this juncture have been afflicted with a John 
Redmond." 

Politicians everywhere need to grow tough skins ; 
but Redmond, though he was a veteran in politics, had 
no special gift that way. It was not pleasant for the 
Nationalist leader, when an assembly of Irishmen were 
called together to attempt the framing of a Constitution, 
to find himself the object, and the sole object, of public 
insult ; it was not pleasant for him to feel that he might 
at any time be subjected to a renewal of this experience 
in the streets of Ireland's capital, where he had been 
acclaimed as a hero so few j'^ears ago. It was not pleasant 
for him to feel that whenever he took up a book or paper 
dealing with Ireland he was liable to come upon some 
outburst such as the one which I have quoted. These 
things were pin-pricks, yet pin-pricks administered in 



278 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

public ; and the mere effort to endure such things without 
wincing saps a man's vitality. Behind them lay the 
definite repudiation of his policy in election after election 
— for Kilkenny City followed the example of Clare and 
replaced Pat O'Brien by a Sinn Feiner. He was repu- 
diated in the eye of the world, and repudiated with every 
circumstance of contumely. Plainly in the Convention 
he could no longer claim to speak for Ireland ; that 
limited gravely his power to serve. 

I think, however, that deep in his heart a resentment, 
all the more rankling because he gave it no voice, prompted 
him to be on his guard against lending the least colour 
of justification to any plea that in the Convention he 
had sought to pledge Ireland without due mandate or 
had committed anyone but himself. All that was per- 
sonal in his resources — his labour, his experience, his 
judgment, his eloquence — all this he put unreservedly at 
the Convention's service : but he abstained, and I think 
not only out of policy but as the result of silent anger, 
from making the least use of that authority which he 
still possessed and which he might easily have augmented. 
If in the result he took too little upon him, lest anyone 
should ever say he had taken too much, and if because 
he left too much to others Ireland was the loser, Ireland 
must bear not the loss only but the blame. 

Many even of those who most agreed "with his action 
had, under the influence and events of these 3^ears and 
of public comments on these events, lost confidence in 
him. Some weeks after the Convention assembled, a 
very able priest said to me that he regarded Redmond 
as " a worn-out man." The genuineness of his regret 
was proved by the delight with Avhich he heard what I 
could tell him. Never in my life did I find so much cause 
for admiration of Redmond as in the early stages — which 
were in many ways the most important — of our meetings. 
Never at any time did I know him exert so successfully 
his charm of public manner. At the second day's meeting, 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 279 

when the new Chairman took up his place and function, 
there were several small points to be settled, each capable 
of creating friction ; and it has to be admitted that in 
the technical aspect of his dutj^ Sir Horace Plunkett 
did not shine : business quickly became involved. For- 
tunately he was of a temper to welcome help, and it was 
quickly to hand. Archbishop Crozier showed himself 
to be accomplished, resourceful, and most tactful on all 
points of procedure : and Redmond then for the first 
time did with extraordinary skill what he had to do at 
many stages later. By a series of questions to the Chair 
he suggested rather than recommended a way of clearing 
the involved issue ; and all this was done with a pre- 
cision of phrase Avhich was none the less exact because 
it was easy, and with a dignity which was none the less 
impressive because it had no pretence to effect. His 
mastery both of the form and substance of procedure 
was conspicuous. One of the ablest among the Southern 
Unionists said to me in these days : " He is superb : he 
does not seem able to put a word wrong." 

I think that the secret of his happiness of manner 
lay simply in this, that within the Convention he was 
happy. There was a note in it that I never felt in the 
House of Commons, even when he was at his best. There 
he always sj)oke as if almost a foreigner, no matter among 
how familiar faces. Here he was among his own country- 
men, and for the first time in his life in an assembly in 
no way sectional. For from the first it was plain that, 
by whatever means, there had been gathered a compendium 
of normal, ordinary Irish life : farmer, artisan, peer, 
prelate, landlord, tenant, shoi)keeper, manufacturer — all 
were there in pleasantly familiar types. The atmosphere 
was unlike that of a political gathering ; it resembled 
rather some casual assemblage where all sorts of men 
had met by accident and conversed without prejudice. 
Everybody met somebody whom he had known in some 
quite different relation of life and with whom he had never 



280 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

looked to be associated in any such task as the framing 
of a Constitution. It was all oddly haphazard, full of 
interest and surprises ; all of us were a little out of our 
bearings, but much disposed to reconnoitre in the spirit 
of friendly advance. 

After the first day of Sir Horace Plunkett's chairman- 
ship there was an adjournment of something like a fort- 
night to give the Chairman and secretariat time for 
preparation : and in this interval a plan of action was 
formed. The object in view was to avoid the danger 
of an immediate break and to give play to the reconciling 
influences. It was decided to begin by a prolonged 
process of general discussion, in which men could express 
their minds freely without the necessity of coming to an 
operative decision on any of the controversial points, 
until the value of each could be assessed in relation to 
the possibility of a general agreement. 

The plan adopted was to discuss, without division 
taken, the schemes which had been submitted by members 
of the Convention and by others. Members would pro- 
pose and expound their own projects : for the exposition 
of the others some member must make himself responsible. 

At this " presentation stage " and at all stages, Red- 
mond absolutely declined to j)ut forward a plan in his 
own name. This was not only from temperamental 
reasons : there was an official obstacle. He was an 
individual member of the Convention : but he was 
Chairman of the Irish party, pledged not to bind it with- 
out its consent. He felt, no doubt, that any detailed 
proposal from him would be taken as binding the party, 
whom he could not consult without bringing them into 
the secrets of the Convention, 

But this attitude of self-abnegation was pushed very 
far by him, and perhaps too far. In his early utterances 
he deprecated all official recognition of sections. Yet 
from the moment when committees came to be appointed 
this recognition was claimed ; and from the first the 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 281 

Ulster group maintained a compact organization. They 
had their own chairman, Mr. Barrie, and their secretary ; 
they secured a committee-room for their own xDurposes ; 
they voted solidly as one man. All this, though we did 
not know it at first, was dictated by the conditions of 
their attendance. They were pledged to act simply as 
delegates, who must submit every question of importance 
to an Advisory Committee in Belfast — behind which 
again was the Ulster Unionist Council. They had there- 
fore no freedom of action and were of necessity extremely 
guarded in speech. 

The Southern Unionists, including the representatives 
of the Irish peers, were also organized as a group ; but 
they came to the Convention with much fuller powers. 
They felt themselves bound to consider, and in certain 
conditions to consult, those whom they represented ; 
but they were free to originate suggestions, and indivi- 
dually each man expressed his own view. But they too 
had their meeting-place and their frequent consultations. 

The handful of Labour men also met and discussed 
action, though they were not organized as a group and 
did not feel pledged to a joint course. Each, according 
to his own lights, represented the interests of Labour. 
Still, they met. 

The only group which had no common centre of re- 
union was that of the Nationalists — a majority of the 
whole assembly. This included the representatives of 
the Irish party and the County and Urban Councillors, 
all of whom had been returned as its supporters. It 
included also the four representatives of the hierarchy, 
every one of whom had been either actually or potentially 
a part of Nationalist Conventions, and of whom three had 
been most prominent supporters of the general organization. 

But a difficulty existed in the presence of other per- 
sonages who were in general support of us, but who outside 
the Convention belonged to a different category. Lord 
Dunraven was a Home Ruler, but had been no supporter 



282 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

of the Irish party. Lord MacDonnell stood much nearer 
to us, but was a power in his own right and had never 
been a party poHtician. Mr. Lysaght had voted against 
us in Clare. Mr. Russell had very often attacked the 
party on aspects of its general action. Above all, there 
Avas Mr. W. M. Murphy, who, like Mr. Heal}^ had been 
at one time a member of the Irish party, and whose 
paper had for long been in nominal support of its j)urposes, 
but who had throughout recent years done more than all 
forces together to discredit and weaken its influence. 

All of these five men were Government nominees, as 
were also Lord Granard and Sir Bertram Windle, who 
in different ways gave Redmond complete and most 
useful backing. It would have been possible to call 
together a group consisting of men who had been members 
of the national organization which would have excluded 
all these and included the Bishops ; ^ but Redmond prob- 
ably felt it would be ungracious to do this. His chief 
desire was to avoid all recognition of party and still more 
of partisan machiner3^ His conclusion was to do nothing ; 
and it was a conclusion to which he was prone at all 
times when he did not see his way clear. This temjjera- 
mental disinclination to take anj^ action which might 
create difficulties was in these days at its height with 
him. Since the spring his usually perfect health had 
been failing ; he suffered from the physical inertia which 
accompanies the growth of a fatal disease ; and sorrow 
upon sorrow, rebuff upon rebuff, had weakened the 
resilience of his mind. It was not that he lacked courage 
or confidence in his own judgment ; but he was bound 
as a statesman to make allowance for the estimate which 
others, his followers, would put uj^on that judgment 
when he declared it. Sensitive by nature, he was deeply 
aware of failure which had resulted from the most dis- 
paraging of causes — not flat rejection, but belated, half- 

' When ultimately we did meet, these were the elements which 
assembled. 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 283 

hearted and blundering adoption, of whatever course he 
had proposed. He overrated, I am sure, the extent to 
which his personal position had been depreciated in the 
minds of those who were there. It was true, as the 
event was to prove, that he could no longer count on 
unquestioning support of any policy simply on the ground 
that he advocated it ; but any opinion which he pre- 
sented would have been commended not only b}'' the 
cogency of his argument but by an old esteem for his 
wisdom, and, above and beyond this, by a personal 
feeling. Men would have inclined to Iiis side not 
for the argument's sake only, but for his sake. 

There was felt, too, precisely at the moment when it 
mattered most, the defect in his quality as leader. He 
lacked the personal touch. It was not that he would 
not, but that he could not, put himself into contact with 
the individual minds of men. He owed it, I think, to 
the rank and file to give them more of his guidance than 
they actually received. He was a genial presence when 
they met ; but of confidential discussion upon details 
I am sure that nothing passed. Had he called the group 
together, had he spoken his mind to them collectively, 
in confidence, things would in all ways have been better. 
But there was ingrained in him a sort of sh3niess, a repug- 
nance to force his view on others by argument, an indis- 
position to controversy, which was his limitation ; and 
all this was at this time accentuated by the hurt sense 
that there would be always in men's minds a memory, 
not of the hundred times when his wisdom had amply 
justified itself, but of recent occasions when he had 
advised them and the result was not what he foretold. 

To sum up, then, this criticism — what he said and 
did publicly in the Convention could hardly by stretch 
of imagination have been bettered. But outside its 
sessions he did not handle his team. On the balance, 
probably, ho thought it better to leave them to their own 
devices ; but his temperament weighed in that decision. 



284 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

As a result, the County Councillors and other local repre- 
sentatives used to hold meetings of their own. They 
were shrewd and capable men ; but in the matters with 
which we had to deal the most skilled direction was neces- 
sary ; and there was never a man more capable of giving 
them guidance out of a lifetime's experience than was 
Redmond, nor one from M'hom they would have more 
willingly accej)ted instruction. 

Discussion in the Convention itself was not of great 
value for the education of opinion, because men naturally 
were reluctant to get up and state precisely their indi- 
vidual difficulties, which in a confidential interchange 
of views might have been shown to proceed from some 
defect in comprehension. The chief value in the debates 
lay in what they revealed rather than what they imparted. 
One fact was salient. No Nationalist was prepared to 
recommend acceptance of the Home Rule Act as it stood, 
though some of its most vehement assailants adopted 
great parts of its framework. Broadly speaking, National- 
ists wanted for Ireland the powers which were possessed 
by a self-governing Dominion, but were content to leave 
all control of defence to the Imperial authority and did 
not press any demand for a local militia. On the other 
hand, there was strong insistence on the right of an Irish 
Parliament to have complete power of taxation within 
its jurisdiction. 

It was manifest that the financial clauses of the exist- 
ing Act would no longer apply. They were framed in 
view of a situation which found Ireland contributing 
ten millions in taxation and costing twelve to administer. 
Now, less than half the taxation paid the cost of all Irish 
services and the balance went towards the war. 

It was also evident that Nationalists Avere prepared 
to make concessions to the minority quite inconsistent 
with the current democratic view of what a Constitution 
should be. The Bishop of Raphoe, for instance, expressed 
willingness to have the Irish peers as an Upper House. 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 285 

Lord Midleton, however, for the Southern Unionists, 
insisted that those whom he spoke for must have a voice 
in the House of Commons — however they got it ; and 
there was general desire to give it them, even by methods 
which no one could justify for general application. 

In short, it became increasingly clear as the debates 
proceeded that we could come to an arrangement with 
Unionists if Lord Midleton represented Unionism. But 
he did not. Ulster was there ; and the Ulstermen made 
it plain that their business was to hear suggestions, not 
to put them forward. Two facts, however, emerged 
about Ulster's attitude. The first was that in coming 
to the Convention the Ulstermen had expected to nego- 
tiate on the basis of taldng the Home Rule Act as the 
maximum Nationalist demand. The only compromise 
which they had contemplated was a mean term between 
the provisions of that Act and Ulster's demand for a 
continuance of the legislative Union so far as Ulster 
was concerned. The second was that Belfast regarded 
as ruinous to its interests any possibility of a tariff war 
with Great Britain, and believed that if Ireland were 
given the power to fix its own customs duties the dominant 
farming interest would seek to find revenue by new taxa- 
tion on imports. Hence, the proposal to give Ireland 
full fiscal powers could not be acceptable to Ulster. Here 
lay the main rock in our course. 

As the discussion proceeded, one category of pro- 
posals was summarily dealt with — those which contem- 
plated the setting up of some provincial authority 
intermediate between the central Parliament, M'hich all 
postulated, and the existing local bodies in the counties. 
This jDolicy did not lack advocates. But the County 
Councillors were solid against it : evidently their private 
meeting discussed and decided against an expedient 
which they held would detract from the dignity of the 
central Parliament and from the dignity of the County 
Councils. Those who defended it as a plan which might 



286 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

meet Ulster's difficulty got no backing froju Ulster ; 
that group said neither for nor against it. In the rest 
of the assembly there was a strong feeling against anj^- 
thing that looked like j^artition or might in public be 
called partition. Several of us had thought in advance 
that this was the most likely path to the solution ; and 
looking back, I think it ought to have been much more 
fully explored. But encouragement was lacking. 

Another anticipation proved illusory. We all realized 
that in the circumstances Ireland could come to a finan- 
cial arrangement with Great Britain on easier terms than 
at any time in her history ; that to settle at once would 
be highly profitable ; and more particularly, that we 
could probably secure the completion of land purchase as 
part of the bargain. It was thought that this argument 
would appeal to the commercial sense of Ulster. We 
were met by a resolute reiteration that Ulster considered 
it Ulster's duty and Ireland's duty to take a full share, 
equally with the rest of the United Kingdom, in all the 
consequences of the war — even if it cost them their last 
shilling ; and Ulster speakers denounced our argument 
as a bribe. Some Nationalists were inclined to discount 
these protestations, yet I see no reason to doubt their 
sincerity. At all events, no one disputed that it was 
to Ireland's interest financially that a settlement should 
be made. 

It is quite unnecessary to summarize here in any detail 
the course of these general discussions in full Convention, 
which began on August 21st. One thing, however, 
resulted from them on which too much emphasis cannot 
be laid. In the process of " exploring each other's 
minds," as the phrase went, we came to know and to 
like one another. Later in the year, a friend of mine, 
high placed in the Ulster Division, but not an Ulsterman 
bjT' upbringing or sympathy, came home from France. 
He told me that the main impression on the minds of 
Ulster delegates had been made by the Nationalist County 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 287 

Councillors. They had expected noisy demagogues ; they 
had found solid, substantial business men, many of them 
with large and prosperous concerns, all of them rather 
too silent than too vocal, and all of them most good- 
humoured in their tolerance of dissent. What Willie 
Redmond had foretold in his last speech was coming true : 
Irishmen brought into contact with one another in the 
Convention, as other Irishmen had been brought into 
contact in the trenches, and no longer kept apart by 
those unhappy severances which run through ordinary 
Irish life, came under the influence of that fundamental 
fellowship, deeper than all divergence of politics or creed, 
which draws our people into a sense of a common bond. 

The desire to bring delegates together in friendly social 
intercourse had shown itself in many quarters. The 
Viceregal Lodge pressed invitations on us, and Redmond, 
though in the circumstances he himself would go to no 
entertainment anywhere, expressed his wish that National- 
ists should alter their traditional attitude and accept 
what was offered in so friendly a spirit. But the first 
place where we met as a body with informal ease was 
at the Mansion House as guests of the Lord Mayor— a 
popular figure in our assembly. 

Next dajT^ the Lord Mayor of Belfast rose at the adjourn- 
ment to express all our thanks, and to insist that there 
should be a session in Belfast, where he could return the 
compliment. Immediately, there came another proposal 
for a similar visit to the South of Ireland. We went to 
Belfast at the beginning of September, and the attitude 
of the Ulster members, which had till then been somewhat 
guarded and aloof, changed into that of the traditional 
Irish hospitality. They showed us their great linen mills 
and other huge manufactories ; they showed us the 
shipyards, in which the frames of monster ships lay 
cradled in gigantic gantries, works of architecture as 
wonderful in their vast symmetry as any cathedral, and 
having the beauty which goes with any perfect design 



288 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

combining lightness and strength. Perhaps the most 
impressive sight of all was the disbandment of workmen 
from the yards. Endless lines of empty tramcars drawn 
up on the quay awaited the turn-out of some ten 
thousand artisans, who streamed j^ast where we stood 
assembled ; and as the crowds swept along, all these 
eyes, curious, but not unfriendly, scrutinized us, and 
one word was in ail their mouths as they came up — 
" Which is Redmond ? Where's John Redmond ? " 

A fortnight later Cork completed what Belfast had 
begun ; and, perhaps because Cork is less strenuous, 
the whole atmosphere there was even friendlier. It had 
almost the qualitj'' of a holiday excursion, for we assisted 
at the ancient ceremony'' by which the Lord Mayor of 
Cork asserts his jurisdiction over the harbour waters^ — 
proceeding outside the protecting headlands and flinging 
from him a ceremonial dart outwards to the sea. This 
day, however, we accomjDlished the ceremony well within 
the limits ; we passed the narrow gateway in the chain 
of mines, but outside that, submarines were a very real 
menace, and the Admiralty cut short our steamer's voyage. 
We were none the less festive on board. 

It was not all mere holiday in Cork. One speech in 
particular at this meeting impressed the whole Convention. 
A Southern delegate illustrated from his personal know- 
ledge how cumbrous and uneconomic were the dealings 
of a government at Westminster with the meat supply 
from Ireland ; and a mass of complicated and important 
trade detail was skilfully linked to the larger issue of 
war interest and Imperial interest ; there was genuine 
eloquence as well as commercial shrewdness in this dis- 
course. A short speech, too, from one of the Ulster County 
Councillors indicated by its tone, what was in my opinion 
the general sentiment, that as a result of these preliminary 
discussions almost everybody in the assembly expected 
and desired an effective agreement. 

At least for the purposes of this book, and perhaps 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 289 

many purposes, the trend of our debates can be best 
summarized by reproducing Redmond's main contribution 
to them. He intervened on the first day when Mr. 
Murphy's scheme was proposed, on August 21st, but 
only with a few welcoming words, and to emphasize his 
view that we were all there to accept whatever commanded 
most support. But at Belfast on September 5th he spoke 
fully ; and I do not think his speech would have been 
materially different had he delivered it three weeks later 
in Cork. What I print here is based on the unusually 
full notes made by him, so full that they admit of being 
treated like a press telegram, and read clearly when small 
and obvious words are added. The manuscript is scored 
with underlining, single, double and treble, to guide the 
voice in reading from it ; it has interest as illustrating 
the technical devices which a great orator employed for 
a special occasion ; and for this speech he spared no 
effort. I thought, then as always, that he was less im- 
pressive and less effective in so fully prepared an oration 
than when he was putting his thought into the form 
which immediately came to him. But as a document 
it represents beyond doubt his considered oj)inion and 
his most deliberate advice. 

Dealing briefly at first with the contention that the 
system of the Union had been a success and should not 
be touched, he outlined the familiar arguments. But, 
as he said, the existence of the Convention was the final 
answer. The head of a Coalition Ministry had declared, 
without dissent from any of his Unionist colleagues, that 
Dublin Castle had hopelessly broken down. The Prime 
Minister of another Coalition, mainly Unionist in its 
composition, had set up this assembly, charging it to 
find another and better system of government. 

Beneficent legislation had been quoted. Yes, but how 
was it attained ? 

•' In any constitutionally governed country, once public 
opinion is converted to some great reform, it naturally 

20 



290 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

passes, surely and easily, though perhaps slowly, into 
law. In Ireland, after Irish public opinion has made 
up its mind, the reformer has to convert the public opinion 
of another country which is profoundly ignorant or apa- 
thetic, and unhappily it is uncontrovertible that scarcely 
a single piece of beneficent legislation on land, or any- 
thing else, has been passed since the Union except by 
long, violent, semi-revolutionary agitation. 

*' Are we to go on for ever upon this path ? Are we 
to go back into the region of perpetual and violent 
agitation in order to get the reforms we need ? Are 
we never to be allowed to have peace in our 
country ? " 

He passed then to the complaint that Ulster's special 
case had not been sufficiently considered. 

" The man who would hope to settle this great problem 
without special consideration of the special case of Ulster 
would indeed be a fool. Only for the special case of 
Ulster we should not be here at all. Our chief business 
is to endeavour to satisfy that special case. 

" For myself, I am one of those Nationalists to whom 
Mr. Barrie referred, who believe that the co-operation 
of Ulstermen is necessary for a prosperous and free Ire- 
land, and there are no lengths consistent with common 
sense and reason to which I would not go to satisfy their 
fears and doubts and objections. 

*' The special case of Ulster as put before us was this : 
* We are contented under the Union, we have prospered 
under the Union. Therefore from our particular stand- 
point we have no reason to ask for a change.' But they 
declare themselves not only Ulstermen but Irishmen. 
They admit that the rest of Ireland is not prosperous as 
they are, and is not contented ; and, that being so, they 
have come here in a spirit of true patriotism to see what 
is proposed as a remedy ; and, as I understand it, they 
only stipulate that in any scheme of reform their rights 
and interests and sentiments shall be safeguarded and 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 291 

respected. That is a reasonable and patriotic attitude, 
and I wish most heartily and most sincerely to respond 
to it. 

** Now let me say what are the main objections to 
these schemes which have emerged from the debate. 
Some may be regarded as more particularly affecting 
Ulster, others as more particularly affecting the Southern 
Unionists, but all of them taken together make up what 
I m&j call the Unionist objection. 

" The Archbishop of Dublin grouped these objections 
under three heads : 

1. Imperial Security. 

2. Fiscal Security. 

3. Security for Minorities. 

** On the question of Imperial Security, objection is 
taken to what is called an ' Independent ' Parliament. 

"It is supposed that what is called Dominion Home 
Rule implies an ' Independent ' Parliament. This is a 
complete delusion. There is only one Sovereign and 
Independent Parliament in the Empire — the Imperial 
Parliament ; its supremacy is indefeasible and inalienable. 
Every other Parliament in the Empire is subordinate, 
and an Irish Parliament must be subordinate. 

'* The Imperial Parliament has created many Parlia- 
ments and given to them power to deal in general as 
they wish with local affairs, but it never parted with its 
own overriding authority — it has no power to do so — 
and in several of the colonies it has exercised that over- 
riding authority from time to time. 

" Gladstone spoke of the Irish Parliament which he 
proposed to set up as * practically independent in the 
exercise of its statutory functions.' But the overriding 
authority of the Imperial Parliament would always be 
there in the background to arrest injustice or oppression, 
just as it is in regard to every Dominion Parliament in 
the Empire to-day. 



292 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

" That position was specifically laid down and accepted 
by Parnell in 1886. 

" Lord Midleton demands that the rights and authority 
of the Crown shall be preserved and safeguarded. There 
is no difference whatever between us on this, and no 
difficulty can arise upon it. 

" As to the control of Army and Navy, no one suggests 
any interference with the Imperial authority over the 
Army and the Navy. I include in that such naval 
control of harbours as is necessary for security. 

"Captain Gwynn has proposed that Ireland should 
have power to raise a force for home defence. In other 
words, to pass a Territorial Act for Ireland. My policy 
about the Volunteers is known : I proposed at the beginning 
of the war that the Government should utilize the exist- 
ing Volunteer forces ; and had this proposal been acted 
on in 1914 there would have been no rebellion in 1916. 
If I understand Captain Gwynn, he did not suggest that 
Irish Territorials should be under an Irish War Office 
and an Irish Minister for War, but that in his opinion 
a system of Irish Territorials was desirable, and inasmuch 
as the English Territorial Acts are not suitable to us, 
the Irish Parliament should be given the power to raise 
under Imperial authority a force for itself and on its 
own lines. 

" If this is his view, I agree with it. But this is a 
matter on which no one would think of breaking off. 

" Speaking generally, I think the Archbishop of Dublin 
and those who agree with him may take it for granted 
that upon all those questions which he grouped under 
the heading of Imperial Security there would be little 
difficulty in arriving at an agreement with, at any rate, 
men like myself. 

" Now let me deal with the second group of subjects 
put forward by the Archbishop of Dublin under the 
heading of Fiscal Security— or a reasonable prospect of 
national prosperity. 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 293 

" The first objection is to what is called fiscal auto- 
nomy, although, after listening most carefully to his 
speeches, it seems to me that the real objection is not 
so much an objection to fiscal autonomy as establishing 
the full power of the Irish Parliament over the collection 
and imposition of Irish taxes, as an objection to giving 
that Parliament power to set up a tariff against Great 
Britain." 

He referred then at length to the Report of the Primrose 
Committee on Irish Finance, dated October 191 1.^ That 
Committee had for its chairman a great English Civil 
Servant ; three of its members were famous English 
financiers ; another was the Professor of Political Economy 
at Oxford. Of the two names associated closely with 
Ireland, one was Lord Pirrie, whose fortune had been 
made in Belfast, and the only Irish Nationalist was the 
Bishop of Ross. They had reported unanimously for 
giving to Ireland full fiscal powers. " We tried hard," 
Redmond said, "to get the principle of their Report 
adopted in framing the Bill of 1912." Government 
insisted on adhering to the plan of " contract finance " 
which their own non-partisan committee of experts had 
explicitly condemned. 

He quoted several passages from the weighty argument 
by which the Committee had justified its conclusions, 
especially those dealing with the contention that the 
power would be used to set uj) a tariff against British 
goods. 

" Ireland is not a nation of fools. 

"If in framing a new Constitution you go on the 
assumption that every power you confer will be abused, 
it would be far better to desist from your task altogether, 
and instead of increasing the powers of a people dead 
to all sense of responsibility and manifestly unfit for 
political freedom, you had better disestablish all existing 

« His notes here are only references to quotations. I supplement 
on this page by my own notes. — S. G. 



294 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

forms of constitutional government and advocate the 
government of Ireland as a Crown Colony. But none of 
us so distrust our people. 

" Dr. O'Donnell has proposed a solution of the diffi- 
culty about imposing a tariff against England by means 
of a Conference between the two nations. Other sug- 
gestions will be made. Protection may be found for 
Ulster by giving to them disproportionate representation. 
It may be found in the x^ower of the Senate, it may be 
found in the power to suspend. If we are agreed some- 
what on the general lines of the Primrose Report, the 
outstanding difficulty will be capable of adjustment. 

" Sir Crawford McCuUagh rightly pointed out the 
terrible burden of war taxation, which is at present 
over twenty millions, and he said we cannot go on on 
those lines, and we must get back to pre-war burdens 
or the country will be ruined. How are we to get back ? 

" If nothing is done by us, and the war goes on, as it 
may, for some years, we may easily be paying thirty, 
forty, or fifty millions, and generations to come will 
have to bear a crushing load. The income tax is certain 
to be raised, and excess profits also, and no part of Ireland 
will suffer more than Ulster, and especially Belfast. 

" The highest interest of Ulster, therefore, is a speedy 
settlement whereby the increase of war taxation will 
cease and Ireland's contribution to Imperial purposes 
will either disappear or, to put it at the very lowest, be 
limited and stereotyped. 

" Mr. Knight raised the question of land purchase. I 
agree with every word he said, but what is the difficulty ? 
The difficulty is in providing the additional money needed 
at a low rate of interest. As part of a settlement I feel 
quite sure we could obtain the completion of land pur- 
chase on satisfactory terms. Indeed, I have the highest 
authority for the statement that this question would 
be regarded as an essential portion of a settlement, and 
that a most generous arrangement would be made. But 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 295 

if there is no settlement, do you imagine the Treasury 
will do anything to help us ? No. I fear the British 
Government will be more occupied in endeavouring to 
deal with the state of open anarchy in Ireland than 
in making great financial concessions on land purchase. 
Mr. Knight, if he wants purchase completed, had better 
help us to an agreement. 

" The third group of objections mentioned by the 
Archbishop of Dublin deals with Security for Minorities. 

" On this, it is impossible for the Convention to break 
down, because we are all in favour of the object in view. 
It is a mere question of the best machinery to carry out 
our unanimous desire and intention. 

" Ulster may clearly claim a representation out of 
proportion to her numbers, not only, I admit, in the 
Senate, but in the lower chamber. Safeguards of the 
most stringent character would be accepted, at any 
rate by me, in the machinery of the Constitution to 
prevent the possibility of Ulster's interest, Ulster's pros- 
perity and Ulster's sentiments being injured or over- 
ridden. 

" For Southern Unionists, the case is unanswerable. 
They must get proper representation in both Houses. 

" Some suggestions have been made : proportional 
representation ; Mr. Murphy's proposal of a special 
representation for property ; special representation for 
creeds, and finally a nominated element in the House 
of Commons. I have an open mind on them all. It 
may be none of these will be found wholly satisfactory. 
But where there is a will there is a way. We are all 
agreed it must be done, and therefore it can and will 
be done. 

" In none of these objections, and they are the chief 
ones that have emerged on Imperial security, fiscal security, 
and security of minorities, is there in my mind any 
difficulty in coming to an agreement, if we are really 
animated by the desire every speaker has professed to 



296 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

answer the appeal of the Empire in this hour of her dire 
extremity by removing one of her greatest weaknesses 
and dangers. 

" We were told by Lord Midleton to play for safety. 
What is safety for us ? What is safety for the Empire ? 
I strongly say the only safety is a settlement of this 
question. 

" What will be the certain effect of a breakdown ? 
No one could fail to have been impressed by the serious 
and solemn note upon which the Archbishop of Dublin 
concluded his speech. He reminded you this was not a 
question of Ulster and the rest of Ireland, not of Catholic 
and Protestant, or LMonist and Nationalist : it was a 
question of the necessity for all men of good will, all men 
of responsibility, all men who know that the foundation 
of freedom is the maintenance of order, to join hands to 
protect their common country from anarchy and chaos. 

" The Archbishop spoke of Mr. Lysaght's speech as 
a threat. No one here will be moved by threats, but 
let us not be mad enough to shut our eyes to the facts. 
Is there a man in this room who can contemplate without 
horror the immediate future of Ireland if this Convention 
fails ? For my part, I see clearly a future following on 
our failure in which on one side there will be an angered, 
if you like, a maddened people, with no responsible control, 
and on the other. Government ruling by the point of the 
bayonet. Between these two forces there will be no 
place for a Constitutional party or for men like myself. 

" That would be the effect in Ireland. What would 
be the effect throughout the Empire ? 

" I have close relations with statesmen of all parties 
in all the Dominions, and I am informed that twenty-five 
j)er cent, of their troops are of Irish birth or of Irish 
parents, and that they have practically joined because 
they believed the Irish problem was as good as settled. 

" What has happened about Ireland has caused untold 
difficulties in every Dominion. Mr. Holman, the Prime 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 297 

Minister of New South Wales, said that conscription was 
defeated by the Irish vote. Mr. Hughes said the same. 
Two hundred thousand troops have been lost to the 
Empire by the feeling of disgust at the failure to 
settle the Irish question. It has been the same in 
Canada. Everywhere a breakdown will be regarded with 
dismay. 

" What will be the effect in America ? The position 
of America is grave and dangerous. I have close 
relations with many Americans of high position and 
influence, and they all tell me the same. This is a secret 
session, and I can repeat what they say. There is little 
or no enthusiasm for the war. Mind, I am speaking of 
Americans, not Irish Americans. The apathy is largely 
due to distrust of England. They distrust her posing 
as the champion of small nations while here at her doors 
the Irish question is unsettled. Lord Midleton says 
the Americans are uninformed. Perhaps so as to details. 
Perhaps they only see the broad effect. But how^ does 
that help us ? The fact remains. Ireland is the only, 
or the chief, cause of American apathy to-day. This is 
of vital importance. Could we hope to win the war if 
America dropped out ? Russia has gone. The President 
of the United States has many pacifist men around him. 
Their movement is strong. Germany is abstaining from 
outrages that would raise American feeling. I say, the 
danger of peace proposals which we could not accept 
being offered to America and accepted by her is a real 
and a very serious one. 

"Hence it is that the Government, the diplomatic 
service, and all connected with our foreign affairs are 
feverishly anxious as to the result of our deliberations. 
If we break down in despair and helplessness, God only 
knows how terrible and far-reaching may be the conse- 
quence. 

" Far better for us and for the Empire never to have 
met than to have met and failed of an agreement. 



298 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

" Finally, what would be the effect of a breakdown at 
the front ? 

** We are called upon on all sides of this ancient quarrel 
to make what people call sacrifices — sacrifices of inherited 
predilections, of old-world ideas, and of ancient shib- 
boleths, of perhaps ingrained prejudice. I would be 
ashamed to speak of the surrender of such things as 
sacrifices, when I remember the kind of sacrifices our 
brave boys have made and are making this very hour 
while we are safe at home talking. I cannot trust myself 
to speak upon this matter. Only the other day, once 
again the Ulster Division and the Sixteenth Irish Division, 
shoulder to shoulder, have fought and died for Ireland. 
The full story is not yet known, but it is full of tragedy, 
of heroism and of glory. Surely they deserve some 
encouragement. No set of men living would be prouder 
and happier than they if we can send them the news of 
a settlement of this question which will relieve them 
from the daily shame they feel, every time they meet 
their Allies, in the consciousness that their country, 
Ireland, for which they are facing death, is distracted 
and disunited and a source of reproach. 

" No, we must come to a settlement. We must rise 
to the occasion — if only to save ourselves from a lifelong 
remorse for wrecking this venture — for wliat the historian 
of the future would describe as a crime against the Empire 
in her hour of deadliest peril, and a crime against the 
peace and happiness of our own beloved and long-suffering 
country." 

One result of this speech was seen at once in an utter- 
ance from Mr. Andrew Jameson, a leading figure among 
the Southern Unionists. He said at once that Redmond 
had convinced him that all the difficulties as to main- 
taining the Imperial connection and providing safeguards 
for minorities could and would be met. The fiscal 
difficulty remained. He pressed the Ulster group to 
come to our assistance and depart from their attitude 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 299 

of silence. This speech went further towards our desire 
than any Unionist had previously gone. 

In a later debate Mr. Pollock outlined two essentials 
of the Ulster demand. The United Kingdom must 
remain a fiscal unit ; and Ireland must be represented 
at Westminster. If these points were conceded, agree- 
ment, he thought, should be possible. 

On the whole, as discussion grew franker and more 
business-like, relations improved. There were small 
passages at arms, but these only served to show how 
strong was the general desire for harmony. One of my 
colleagues said that he did not know what to make of a 
political assembly where everyone applauded when you 
got up, and applauded when you sat down, and never 
interrupted you. Another said that the Convention 
was the only society in Ireland from which one always 
came away cheered up : and this was so generally felt 
that an Ulster speaker reminded us that the atmosphere 
of our proceedings was pleasant but exceptional. He 
warned us to remember that, even if we agreed, either 
side might be repudiated. Yet there was a marked 
feeling that the Convention, and the tone which prevailed 
in the Convention, had done good in the country. This 
was admitted by the Grand Master of the Orange Order, 
Colonel Wallace, in a speech which led to an important 
illustration of the mutual process of education, for it 
raised with great frankness the issue of religious differ- 
ences and alluded specially to the recent Papal decrees 
over which so much controversy had raged. The Bishop 
of Raphoe rose to reply and expounded, as an ex-pro- 
fessor of Canon Law, the true bearing of these documents. 
His speech was a masterpiece ; its candour and its 
lucidity commended itself to all hearers, but most of 
all to the Ulstermen, who applauded at once Lord Oran- 
more's comment that the odium theologicum had been 
replaced by divina caritaa ; and at a very late stage in 
our proceedings, Mr. Barrie referred back to this speech 



300 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

of the Bishop's as one of the things which they would 
never forget. 

The Primate, who in this month of September was 
one of the hopeful hearts (" My confidence has grown 
daily," he said), used words which met with widespread 
response : " We can never leave this hall and speak of 
men whom we have met here as we have spoken of them 
in the past." There was good will in the air — good will 
to each other and to the enterprise. At the close of the 
proceedings in Cork the Lord Mayor of Belfast moved 
a vote of thanks to the citizens through their Lord Mayor, 
and he closed on a note of hope — anticipating " some- 
thing in store for Ireland." 

Yet already these anticipations were overcast. During 
this week, while all seemed going so well, one of the end- 
less unhapj)y and preventible things happened. It was 
from Redmond that I first heard the news. One of the 
Sinn Fein leaders who had been rearrested on suspicion 
after the amnesty took part in a hunger-strike as a protest 
against being subjected to the conditions imposed on a 
convicted felon. He was forcibly fed and died under 
the process, owing to heart-failure. Redmond told me 
with fury how he had urged again and again on the Chief 
Secretary the possibility of some such calamity, and had 
urged that these men should receive the treatment 
proper in any case to political prisoners, but above all 
to men who had been neither convicted nor tried. 

The result was immediately seen in some hostile demon- 
strations in Cork, chiefly against Mr. Devlin and Redmond. 
But this was only the beginning. On the following 
Sunday the body of the dead man, Thomas Ashe, was 
carried through the streets of Dublin at the head of a 
vast procession, in which large bodies of Volunteers, 
openly defying Government's proclamation, marched in 
uniform ; and he was buried with military honours and 
volleys fired over his grave. With all this breach of 
the law Government dared not interfere. They had put 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 301 

themselves in the wrong ; whether they prevented the 
demonstration or permitted it, mischief was bound to 
follow. A new incitement was given to the enthusiasm 
for Sinn ' F^in, a new martyr was provided, and new 
hostility was raised against the Convention, for whose 
success Government was notoriously anxious. On the 
other hand, Ulster Unionist opinion was violently offended ; 
they were scandalized by the disregard for law and the 
impotence of constitutional authority. This attitude, 
however open to comments based on their own recent 
history, did not render them any easier to deal with. 
Above all, the Ashe incident emphasized the presence 
in Ireland of a great force over which Redmond had no 
control and which had no representative in the Con- 
vention. How, men asked, even if a bargain could 
be made with Constitutional Nationalists, should that 
covenant be carried into effect ? 



Ill 

The Cork visit marks the close of the first stage in the 
history of the Convention. At the opening of our 
session there it was decided to appoint a Grand Com- 
mittee of twenty, whose task should be, " if possible, to 
prepare a scheme for submission to the Convention, 
which would meet the views and difficulties expressed 
by the different speeches during the course of the debate." 
The Convention itself, after its deliberations of that week, 
would adjourn until the Committee was in a position 
to report. This second stage, purely of committee work, 
was to last much longer than anyone anticipated : the 
Convention did not reassemble till the week before 
Christmas. If that length of adjournment had been 
foreseen, the Committee would never have been appointed. 

Mr. Lysaght in his first address to the Convention had 
pressed upon us the view that Sinn Fein could be won. 



302 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

But he warned us also (with such emphasis that some 
speakers afterwards resented it as a threat) that if the 
Convention produced no result, or an unacceptable result, 
or provoked suspicion by delay, the result would be a 
revolution. Already impatience was growing. We could 
publish no account of our proceedings : but it became 
known inevitably that we had not as yet reached one 
operative conclusion in our task of Constitution building. 

At Cork, Sir Horace Plunkett made an encouraging 
speech at the public luncheon ; he announced the appoint- 
ment of our Committee, which certainly looked like busi- 
ness. But only when we got to detail did men fully 
realize the difficulties and the embarrassing nature of 
the position. 

The Ashe affair had done more harm than we knew. 
When the Primate was making the hopeful speech from 
which a few words have already been quoted, he spoke 
also of our experience as having been a process of mutual 
education, which we needed to extend beyond our own 
assembly. He promised his help in this, and it was 
felt that Ulstermen generally were on their honour to 
report well of what they commended in our presence. 
They were, it seems, at least as good as their word ; the 
Committee behind them was favourably impressed, and 
when we went to Cork — so I have been informed — the 
question of giving the delegates full powers to negotiate 
was under discussion. But this mood was dissipated by 
the angry temper in all sections which arose out of the 
imprisonments, the hunger-strikes, the penalties imposed, 
and the successive concessions to violent resistance. 

To this was added a new cause of quarrel. The Fran- 
chise Bill was now coming before the House of Commons ; 
and under the provisions agreed to by the Speaker's 
Conference, extension of the franchise was to be applied 
in Ireland, but there was to be no redistribution. This 
proposal was not unreasonable, since the Home Rule 
Act was now a statute and under it new and properly 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 303 

distributed constituencies were scheduled ; while over 
and above this the Convention was in existence to occupy 
itself with the matter. 

On the other hand, the existing distribution of seats 
was hard on Unionist Ulster : the great mass of popu- 
lation in and about Belfast was under-represented. 
Ulstermen said that while Nationalists professed great 
desire to give favour to minorities, in reality they per- 
sisted in keeping their political opponents at an unfair 
disadvantage. There was no more question of enlarging 
the delegates' authority in Convention : the Advisory 
Committee hardened their attitude, and it was our task 
to convince a body which could not hear our arguments 
at first hand. Decisions lay with Ulstermen in Belfast, 
not in the Convention — that is to say, not subject to 
the daily, hourly, prompting to remember that they were 
not only Ulstermen but Irishmen, which arose from 
friendly intercourse with their fellow- delegates. 

The Grand Committee of twenty, representing all 
groups, met on October 11th. Sir Horace Plunkett had 
in advance begged Redmond to undertake the presenta- 
tion of a scheme which would serve as a basis for dis- 
cussion. Redmond declined, on the ground that the 
initiative should come from someone who was not there 
as a politician ; but he admitted that the onus of making 
a proposal was on Home Rulers. Dr. O'Donnell, though 
an office-bearer in the United Irish League, was present 
as a representative of the hierarchy ; he was charged 
with the task. He had been throughout a strong advo- 
cate of claiming for Ireland all the powers possessed 
by any of the Dominions, with limitations on the military 
side ; he had also been forward in his desire to give wholly 
exceptional rights of representation to minorities. 

But when we got into Committee one man immediately 
took the lead. Sir Alexander McDowell ^ had not spoken 
in any debate ; there is reason to believe that he was 

* He was knighted for his work in connection with the war. 



304 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

glad not to commit himself in advance before the moment 
when his special gift might come into play. All his life 
he had been carrying through agreements between con- 
flicting interests : he was a great mediator and negotiator. 
Now, he advocated what was, in strictness, an irregu- 
larity. A task had been delegated to us : he asked us 
to delegate it again to a smaller group. The whole case, 
he said, had been fully opened up ; further debate would 
be no use ; we all knew all the arguments. He deprecated 
formal procedure ; it was plainly a family quarrel, and 
we should treat it in that spirit. Honestly, he said, he 
should be sorry if the Convention failed. Ulster had no 
fault to find with the Union ; but they were living next 
door to a house already in flames. 

That was the general tone, but it would be difficult 
to convey the impression of experience and authority 
which his manner left : and Redmond supported him. 
It was plain that the two men would understand each 
other. In the upshot their view prevailed ; Redmond, 
Mr. Barrie and Lord Midleton were instructed to suggest 
names, and after an interval they came back with a list 
of nine. Lord Midleton was for the Southern Unionists ; 
Mr. Barrie, Lord Londonderry and Sir Alexander McDowell 
for the Northern ; Redmond, Mr. Devlin and Bishop 
O'Donnell represented the parliamentary Nationalists, 
and to them were added Mr. W. M. Murphy and Mr. 
George Russell. 

This left eleven of us unemployed, and some days later 
we were formed into three sub-committees, the first 
dealing with the question of Electoral Reform and the 
composition of an Irish Parliament ; the second with 
Land Purchase, and the third with a possible Territorial 
Force and the Police. But the marrow of the business 
rested with the original sub-committee of nine. 

They, however, could not get rapidly to work ; other 
affairs pulled them in different directions. Redmond 
was forced to go to Westminster, where the Franchise 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 305 

Bill was coming on ; moreover, the Irish party felt that 
it must raise the question of Irish administration. 

As our leader, he was obliged to speak on both matters. 
His reply to the Ulster amendment proposing to extend 
redistribution to Ireland was that this departed from the 
compromise reached at the Speaker's Conference, and 
moreover ignored the existence of the Convention. He 
spoke with studied brevity and avoidance of party spirit : 
but the debate became a wrangle. Mr. Barrie brought 
back into it some of the Convention's friendlier atmo- 
sphere ; but his argument was that in the interests of 
the Convention this concession should be made. 

The second debate, on October 23rd, was inevitably 
contentious : it deplored the policy being pursued by 
the Irish Executive and the Irish military authorities 
"at a time when the highest interests of Ireland and 
the Empire demand the creation of an atmosphere 
favourable to the Convention." Redmond had an easy 
task in convicting the Government's action of incoherence 
and of blundering provocation — but to do this was of 
no advantage to his main purpose, which he served as 
best he could by a side-wind, eulogizing the temper of 
the Convention and specially the " sincere desire for a 
reasonable settlement " shown by the Ulster delegates. 

Still, at the best, it was impossible for him not to feel 
that the reaction of a debate which could not be kept 
in the tone on which he started it must be unfavourable 
to the meetings of the Nine which were about to take 
place. He was to go in to negotiate a settlement for 
his country while the voices of faction were yelping at 
his heels all over Ireland, and all the forces of reconcilia- 
tion which he had brought into play were neutralized 
and sterilized. 

A debate of these days gave him a happier occasion 
to intervene than the domestic bickerings in which he 
had been forced to take part ; yet even in this the note 
of sadness predominated. On October 29th, when a 

21 



300 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

vote of thanks was proposed to the Navy, Army and 
Mercantile Marine, he joined his voice to that of other 
leaders of parties, to emphasize, as he said, that they 
spoke from an absolutely unanimous House of Commons. 
He recalled the exploits of Irish troops and dwelt again 
on the presence of a large Irish element in the Canadian 
and Anzac Divisions. But his reference was chiefly to 
those Nationalist Irish Brigades, who had remained true, 
he said, to the old motto of the Brigade of Fontenoy, 
Semper et uhique jidelis. These men had known in the 
midst of their privations and sufferings a new and poignant 
feeling of anguish : they had seen " a section at any rate 
of their countrymen " repudiate the view that in serving 
as they served they were fighting for Ireland, for her 
happiness, for her prosperity and her libertj^ 

*' I wish it were possible for me to speak a word to 
every one of those men. If my words could reach them, 
I would say to every one of them that they need have 
no misgiving, that they were right from the first, that 
time will vindicate them, that time will show that while 
fighting for liberty and civilization in Europe they are 
also fighting for civilization and liberty in their own land. 
I would like to say to every one of them, in addition, that 
even at this moment, when ephemeral causes have con- 
fused and disturbed Irish opinion, they are regarded 
with feelings of the deepest pride and gratitude by the 
great bulk of the Irish race and by all that is best in 
every creed and class in Ireland." 

The Irish Divisions had once and again been engaged 
shoulder to shoulder, but this time with very different 
fortune, in the third battle of Ypres ; yet, win or lose, 
they won or lost together. In that same fighting 
Redmond's own son had earned special honour ; the 
Distinguished Service Order was bestowed on him for 
holding up a broken line with his company of the Irish 
Guards. At a happier time this news would have 
been received with enthusiasm all over Ireland ; now, 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 307 

the most one could say was that it delighted the 
Convention. 

It would be quite wrong, however, to regard Redmond's 
attitude in these days as unhopeful. The first meetings 
of the Nine were fruitful of much agreement — conditional 
at all points on general ratification. But the true spirit 
of compromise was there. So far as concerned the pro- 
vision to give minorities more than their numerical weight, 
it was agreed that there should be two Houses, with 
powers of joint session, and with control over money 
bills conceded to the Upper House. In the Lower House 
Unionists should (somehow) get forty per cent, of the 
representation : so that in the joint session the influences 
would be equally balanced. 

The hitch came over finance. Nationalists wanted 
complete powers of taxation, but would agree to a treaty 
establishing Free Trade between the two countries for a 
long period. Ulster wanted a common fiscal control for 
Great Britain and Ireland. By November 1st a complete 
deadlock had been reached. 

On that date the Grand Committee met to take stock 
informally of the position, especially in regard to the 
procedure of the more detailed sub-committees, and to 
face the fact that a grave misfortune had befallen us. 
Sir Alexander McDowell had been prevented by illness 
from attending any of the meetings. He had no further 
part in the Convention's work, and died before it ended. 

Redmond in a confidential talk spoke of his absence 
as lamentable. The two had arranged — on the Belfast 
man's proposal — to meet for private interviews before 
the Nine came together. Neither had control of the 
forces for which he spoke ; but both stood out, by every- 
one's consent, from the rest of the assembly. It is im- 
possible to say how much they might have achieved 
had they come to an understanding ; but assuredly no 
other representative of the North spoke with the same 
self-confidence or the same weight of personality as Sir 



308 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

Alexander McDowell. My own feeling about him — if it 
be worth while to record a personal impression — was 
that he was a man with the instinct for carrying big 
things through — that the problem tempted him, as a 
task which called for the exertion of powers which he was 
conscious of possessing. In losing him we lost certainly 
the strongest will in his group, perhaps the strongest in 
the Convention ; and it was a will for settlement. It 
was, too, a mil less hampered by regard for public opinion 
than that of any popularly elected representative man 
can be. He had, I think, also eminently the persuasive 
gift which is not only inclined to give and take but can 
impart that disposition to others. 

Mr. Pollock, who replaced him, was an able man, but 
singularly lacking in this quality. He held his own 
views clearly and strongly, but his method of exposition 
accentuated differences : it had always a note of asperity, 
though this was certainly not deliberate. One of the 
pleasant memories which remains with me is of a day 
when debate grew acrimonious and hot words were used. 
Mr. Pollock refused to reply to some phrases which might 
have been regarded as taunts, because, he said, " I have 
made friendships here which I never expected to make, 
and I value them too much to risk the loss of them." 
That friendly temper, combined with his ability, made 
him a valuable member of this Convention : but for the 
critical work of bringing men's minds together, of sifting 
the essential from the unessential, he was a bad exchange 
for Sir Alexander McDowell. 

Redmond said to me that he had found Mr. Barrie 
much more conciliatory than in the earlier and public 
stages. He was delighted ■with Lord Midleton, who was, 
he said, '' showing an Irish spirit which I never expected " ; 
— standing up for the claims of an Irish Parliament if 
there was to be one. In the discussion, however, one 
man. Bishop O'Donnell, had been " head and shoulders 
above everyone else." 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 309 

Argument had ranged about the question of customs 
and excise. This was the dividing line. But when at 
last a deadlock was definitely reached, the Ulster position 
was stated in a letter which refused to concede to an 
Irish Parliament the control of either direct or indirect 
taxation. It was to be a Parliament with no taxing 
power at all. 

On the other hand, in the corresponding document 
from the Nationalist side, the importance of immediate 
and full fiscal control had been put very high. 

" Self-government does not exist," it said, " where 
those nominally entrusted with affairs of government 
have not control of fiscal and economic policy. No 
nation with self-respect could accept the idea that while 
its citizens were regarded as capable of creating wealth 
they were regarded as incompetent to regulate the manner 
in which taxation of that wealth should be arranged, 
and that another country should have the power of levy- 
ing and collecting taxes, the taxed country being placed 
in the position of a person of infirm mind whose affairs 
are regulated by trustees. No finality could be looked 
for in such an arrangement, not even a temporary 
satisfaction." 

The genesis of this passage should be told, for it had 
importance in the history of the Convention ; and also 
it conveys an idea of the limits to which Redmond carried 
self-effacement. It is important because it acted on 
Ulster like a red rag shown to a bull. Obviously, if this 
were the Nationalist view, then the Home Rule Act 
could not be said to give self-government — for under 
its system of contract finance Ireland certainly had not 
control of her fiscal and economic policy. A measure 
accepted with enthusiasm in 1912 was now regarded as 
impossible of giving " even a temporary satisfaction." 

What had happened was this. The Chairman in his 
tireless efforts to bring about agreement had addressed 
two sets of questions, to the Nationalists and to the 



310 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

Ulstermen respectively, by answering which he hoped 
they might clear the air. The direct answers for the 
Nationalists were drafted by Mr. Russell, but were shown 
to Redmond, Mr. Devlin and the Bishop of Raphoe. It 
was, however, suggested that as an addendum a sum- 
mary should be added. Redmond did not ask to see 
this addition, and it was not shown to him. It led off 
with the paragraph which has been quoted. The fact that 
he allowed anything in any stage of such a negotiation 
to go out in his name without his own revision marks 
the loosening of grip — a tired man. 

His exertions for the past years, the past ten years 
at least, had been tremendous : they had been redoubled 
from 1912 to 1916. Towards the end, one resource had 
been failing him — the chief of all. A leader when he 
is well followed gives and takes ; there is interchange 
of energy. For more than a year now Redmond had 
lacked the moral support, the almost physical stimulus, 
which comes from the ready response of followers. Labour 
at no time came easy to him, there was much inertia 
in his temperament ; and the part which he had laid out 
for himself in the Convention as merely an individual 
member did not impose on him the same unremitting 
vigilance as if he acted as leader. Yet, the leadership 
was his ; if he did not exercise it, no one else could ; 
and this incident shows that his abnegation of leadership 
was not a mere phrase. 

On November 22nd the Grand Committee reassembled 
to hear the report from the Nine. Lord Southborough, 
who had presided at all their meetings, detailed the 
conclusions which had been reached or the point on 
which they had broken down. 

Then followed a discussion lasting some three days, 
in which Ulstermen and Nationalists reaffirmed their 
positions. Archbishop Bernard, the Primate, and Lord 
MacDonnell all attempted mediation. Finally, Lord 
Midleton, who described the position as "a stone wall 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 311 

on each side,** announced that he and his group would 
put before the Grand Committee certain proposals as 
a via media. These in effect conceded to an Irish Parlia- 
ment all that Nationalists claimed, subject only to the 
reservation that customs must be fixed by the Imperial 
Parliament and the produce of them retained as Ireland's 
contribution to Imperial services. 

At this point our work was interrupted by the re- 
emergence of the redistribution question. Redmond 
and the other Irish members were obliged to go to London 
and assist for two days at a debate in the worst traditions 
of the House of Commons. The change of atmosphere 
was extraordinary — and the accusations of bad faith 
were not limited to what passed at Westminster. One 
virulent speech declared that the Convention had no 
prospects, never had any, and was never intended to 
have any. This was accompanied by an attack on the 
action of the Ulster group — based, of course, on hearsay. 
Those of us who felt that at any rate the Convention 
offered a better hope for Ireland than any which now 
could be based on action at Westminster pleaded for 
the acceptance of a proposal which Redmond put forward 
as a compromise — that the proposed Irish clauses should 
be dropped from the main Bill and the Irish matter 
dealt with in a separate statute. It was so agreed at 
last, and a conference between Irish members, with the 
Speaker presiding, was set up, and quickly did its work. 
But if all this had been agreed to in October or earlier, 
much friction would have been saved and a cause of 
quarrel with the Ulster that was not in the Convention 
might have been avoided. Still, peace was achieved, 
and the proposal to cut down Irish representation was 
once more defeated. 

Grand Committee met for another session, but was 
chiefly concerned with getting ready for the reassembling 
of Convention — fixed for Tuesday, December 18th. It 
was decided that a group meeting of Nationalists for 



312 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

informal discussion should be held on the Monday night 
— the first occasion on which this had been done. 

Ill-luck, however, seemed to dog us. Dr. Kelly, the 
Bishop of Ross, who was much closer in his point of view 
to Redmond than any of the other Bishops, was gravely 
ill. This was foreseen. But on the Monday a heavy 
snowstorm fell ; Redmond, shut up in his hills at Augha- 
vanagh, could not reach Dublin. The roads were not open 
till the Thursday, and then he thought it too late to come. 
He was in truth already too ill to face any unusual exertion. 

The Convention had been summoned, not to receive 
a final report from the Grand Committee, but to face 
a new situation. An ofit'er had been put forward by 
one group which altered the whole complexion of the 
controversy. Grand Committee had abstained from 
deciding whether to counsel acceptance or rejection. 
But for the first time an influential body of Irish Unionists 
had agreed, not as individuals but as representatives, 
to accept Home Rule, in a wider measure than had been 
proffered by the Bills of 1886 and 1893 or by the Act 
of 1914. Limitations which were imposed in all these 
had been struck out by Lord Midleton's proposals. 

On the other hand, it was certain that the Ulster group 
would reject the scheme. Conversation among National- 
ists made it plain that if Ulster would agree with Lord 
Midleton we should all join them. For the sake of an 
agreement reached between all sections of Irishmen, but 
for nothing less conclusive, Dr. O'Donnell and Mr. Russell 
were content to waive the claim to full fiscal independence. 
Such an agreement, they held, would be accepted by 
Parliament in its integrity. But if Ulster stood out, 
there would be no " substantial agreement," and the 
terms which Nationalists and Southern Unionists might 
combine to propose would be treated as a bargaining offer, 
certain to be chipped down by Government towards 
conformity with the Ulster demand. In the result there 
would be an uprising of opinion in Ireland against a 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 313 

measure so framed ; the fiasco of July, 1916, would repeat 
itself. 

Against this, and prompting us to acceptance, was 
the view very strongly held by Redmond, that Govern- 
ment urgently needed a settlement for the sake of the 
war, and would use to the utmost any leverage which 
helped them to this end. An agreement with Lord 
Midleton would mean a Home Rule proposal proceeding 
from a leading Unionist statesman who spoke for the 
interest in Ireland, which, if any, had reason to fear 
Nationalist government. This would mean necessarily 
a profound change in the attitude of the House of Lords 
and of all those social influences whose power we had 
felt so painfully. Government could undoubtedly, if it 
chose, carry a measure giving effect to this compact. 

Further, weighing greatly with the instincts of the 
rank and file was the motive which prompted Irish 
Nationalists to welcome the advance made by those 
whom Lord Midleton represented. The Southern Unionists 
were the old landowning and professional class, friendly 
in all ways of intercourse, but politically severed and 
sundered from the mass of the population. Now, they 
came forward with an offer to help in attaining our desire 
— quite frankly, against their own declared conviction 
that the Union was the best plan, but with an equally 
frank recognition that the majority was the majority 
and was honest in its intent. The personality of the 
men reinforced the effect of this : Lord Oranmore, for 
instance, whom most of them had only known by anti- 
Home Rule speeches in the House of Lords, revealed 
himself as the friendliest of Irishmen, with the Irish love 
for a witty phrase. 

This temperamental attitude was of help to Lord 
Midleton when on December 18th he expounded the 
position of himself and his friends in a very powerful 
argument, the more persuasive because the good will 
in his audience softened his habitual touch of conten- 



314 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

tiousness. It had seemed to them, he eaid, that both 
in the Nationalist and Northern Unionist camp there 
was a tendency to consider dispositions out of doors 
and to conciliate certain antagonisms without consider- 
ing whether they excited others. He and his friends 
had determined to fix their minds solely on the Conven- 
tion itself, and to pursue the purpose for which they were 
summoned of endeavouring after agreement within that 
body. They were Unionists ; but they had asked them- 
selves what could be removed from the present system 
without disturbing the essence of Union ; and in that 
effort they would go to the extremest limit in their power, 
without thought of conciliating opinions outside, and 
without any attempt to bargain. 

On one point only he indicated that their scheme was 
tentative. Defence was by consent of all left to the 
Imperial Parliament. This implied, he held, an adequate 
contribution, and the yield of customs to be collected 
by the Imperial Parliament seemed roughly to meet 
the case, for the period of the war. But this was not 
absolutely a hard-and-fast proposal. In any case, after 
the war, the amount should be the subject of inquiry 
by a joint commission. 

Apart from this, the offer was their last word. It 
conceded to Ireland the control of all purely Irish services. 
This included the fixation of excise, because excise on 
commodities produced in Ireland did not touch the treatj^- 
making power. Customs touched that power, and there- 
fore customs, like defence, must be left to the Imperial 
Parliament. But, he argued, Irish Nationalists were 
not asked to give up anything which had been conceded 
to them by any previous Home Rule proposal. 

To all Unionists he said : These proposals keep the power 
of the Crown over all Imperial services undiminished ; 
they keep representation at Westminster — a corollary 
from leaving the Imperial Parliament powers over Irish 
taxation ; and by accepting the suggestions already 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 315 

agreed to, they give a generous representation to Unionists 
in an Irish Parliament. This special representation of 
minorities was, he thought, suflScient to give a guarantee 
of " sane legislation " while it lasted ; and he suggested 
that the period should be fifteen years. These concessions, 
in his opinion, sufficiently protected Southern Unionists. 
To Ulster he said, " We share every danger threatening 
you — we have many dangers you need not fear. Yet, 
we have no sinister anticipations. Are you still deter- 
mined to stand out ? " 

On the other hand, when so much of the full demand 
was conceded, were Nationalists insistent, he asked, on 
demanding what they had never asked in the discussions 
upon any Home Rule Bill ? Nationalist leaders had 
now the chance of leading a combination of all sane 
elements in the landowning and land-cultivating classes. 
No Irish leader had ever before been able to present such 
an appeal to Unionist opinion as would come from the 
man who represented a Convention Party. 

It was a speech which Redmond, if present, must have 
replied to, and could not have replied to without indi- 
cating profound sympathy — for he was in agreement 
with its main lines ; and his expression of opinion upon 
it must have influenced strongly the views of the rank 
and file at the moment when they were most open to 
suggestion. 

In his absence, men's minds were greatly affected by 
the fear that if we adopted these proposals, our decision 
would be exposed to attack from a combination of three 
forces — Sinn Fein, which would at least officially con- 
demn anything less than complete separation, and would 
furiously assail a proposal that denied full taxing powers ; 
the Roman Catholic Church, which would take its lead 
from Bishop O'Donnell, who set out in an able memor- 
andum the reasons why Ireland must have full control 
of taxation ; and finally, the powerful newspaper whose 
proprietor, Mr. Murphy, at once gave signs of his hostility 



316 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

by putting on the paper an amendment to Lord Midleton'a 
resolution which amounted to a direct negative. 

The reassembly of the Convention was fixed for 
Wednesday, January 2nd. Redmond came to Dublin 
on the Monday. He told me that he was inclined to 
move that while we thanked Lord Midleton for his sub- 
stantial contribution towards our purpose, we could not 
accept his proposal, unless it opened the way to a settle- 
ment. What he meant by this was not merely that if 
Ulster agreed, we should accept ; for that would certainly 
open the way. But he had also in his mind the possi- 
bility of a guarantee from Government that an arrange- 
ment come to, as this might be, by four-fifths of the 
Convention, and repudiated only by the pledge-bound 
Ulster block, would be regarded as substantial agree- 
ment, and taken as a basis for legislation. In that case, 
also, the way would be open ; but he had no written 
assurance of such an understanding, though I gathered 
that he was urging the Government to give it. We were, 
however, told on good authority in these days that 
if the Southern Unionists' proposal was accepted by 
the Nationalists and other elements outside of Ulster, 
the Prime Minister would use his whole influence with 
his colleagues to secure acceptance of the compact and 
immediate legislation upon it. This would mean, we were 
also assured, that the whole thing would be done before 
Easter. 

On January 2nd the resumed debate for the first time 
brought the Convention face to face with concrete pro- 
posals for a settlement. In tone and in substance it 
would have done credit to any Parliament that ever 
sat. I shall not try to summarize the arguments, but 
simply to note certain outstanding facts. 
^ Lord Midleton modified his original proposal that 
collection of customs should be an Imperial service through- 
out. He agreed that collection might be done by the 
Irish Civil Service. Moreover, he admitted that Ireland 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 317 

must have full means of checking the account for these 
taxes, great part of which must necessarily be collected 
at English ports, since tea, tobacco and the other dutiable 
articles were seldom shipped direct to Ireland. 

But he made it plain that the essential of his proposal 
was the maintenance of a common customs system, 
leaving the fixation of customs to the Imperial Parlia- 
ment for Great Britain and Ireland, If this was denied, 
as it would be by the acceptance of Mr. Murphy's amend- 
ment, all Unionists would be driven once more into the 
same lobby ; all chance of uniting elements heretofore 
divided would disappear. 

This was the fact against which we were brought up. 
Insistence on the full Nationalist demand as it had been 
outlined in the Convention meant the refusal of a new 
and powerful alliance which now offered itself, and the 
destruction of anything which could be called an agree- 
ment. 

In the close, Lord Midleton reinforced his appeal by 
a solid material argument. The sub-committee presided 
over by Lord MacDonnell had reached unanimous con- 
clusions embodying proposals for the completion of land 
purchase within a very brief period. Landlords, agents, 
tenants, representatives for Ulster as well as from the 
South and West, were parties to this plan. Lord Midleton 
now looked back on the past as one who had been in 
the fight since Mr. Gladstone's first Home Rule Bill. 
Every fresh settlement had been wrecked, he said, by 
standing for the last shred of the demand. In 1885, if 
Gladstone had abandoned the identity of democratic 
franchise for both countries and had made to the Irish 
minority such concessions as this Convention was willing 
to make, he would have carried the Liberal Unionist 
element with him. Then, as now, a great land purchase 
scheme depended on the solution of the main problem. 
To-day land purchase stood or fell with the Convention. 

He was backed by Lord Dunraven — who waived his 



318 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

preference for his own original proposal — and by Lord 
Desart, in most able argument : the latter declaring that 
the proposal to give Ireland a separate customs system 
could never be carried in England. But the speech of 
the day came from Mr, Kavanagh, who, speaking as a 
Nationalist who had been a Unionist, ended a most moving 
appeal for agreement with a declaration that he at all 
events would vote for the compromise. There was no 
mistaking the effect produced by the earnestness of this 
speaker, who knew as much of Ireland and was as well 
fitted to judge of its true interests as any man in the 
room. That effect was felt, I think, in the tone of a 
private meeting of Nationalists held the same night. 
Redmond, with the art of which he was a master, indi- 
cated support for the proposal without forcing a con- 
clusion. He dwelt on the fact that if we did not agree 
we not only lost our chance of immediate and complete 
land purchase but left ourselves subjected to the entire 
burden of war taxation. Other speakers pointed out 
that we ought not to let ourselves be lured into driving 
the Southern Unionists and the Ulstermen together 
against us. Mr, Clancy said in his downright manner 
that he would not as yet express his view publicly : but 
that he was not going to reject this offer for the sake 
of fixing taxes on tea and tobacco, and that when the 
right time came, he would say so. The strongest argu« 
ments used against this view were that in surrendering 
control of customs we lost our management of the taxes 
which pressed upon the poor ; and further, that even 
if we agreed, no one knew what would result. We had 
no guarantee that the compact would be expressed in 
legislation. But on the whole the tone showed a dis- 
position to accept, and especially to support Redmond 
— who had spoken of his political career as a thing ended. 
Next day the debate in Convention continued. Arch- 
bishop Bernard, speaking as a Unionist, said that the 
proposal was a venture beset with risks, but the greatest 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 319 

danger of all was to do nothing. It would be a grave 
responsibility for Ulster to wreck the chance of a settle- 
ment. Lord Oranmore dwelt on the composition of 
the proposed Legislature Power was to be entrusted 
to a very different Parliament from that which they had 
feared. He and his like were to get what they desired 
— an opportunity of taking part in the government of 
the country. It looked to him as if the only possible 
Irish Government under this scheme must be Unionist 
in its complexion. 

Perhaps there was an echo of this in Redmond's speech, 
by far the greatest he made in the Convention, when at 
last he intervened on January 4th — the Friday which 
ended that session. 

He dealt at once with Mr. Barrie's often repeated 
view that the proper object of our endeavours was to 
find a compromise between the Act of 1914 and the pro- 
posal for partition put forward by Ulster. On that 
basis the Convention could never have been brought 
together. The Prime Minister's letter of May 16th which 
proposed the Convention suggested that Irishmen should 
meet " for the purpose of drafting a Constitution for 
their own country." On May 22nd Mr. Lloyd George 
had said, " We propose that Ireland should try her own 
hand at hammering out an instrument of government 
for her people." The only limitation was that it should 
be a Constitution " for the future government of Ireland 
within the Empire." 

Then he turned to the argument that all the sacrifices 
were asked from Unionists. Let us weigh them, he said. 
What sacrifices had been made by the Irish Nationalists, 
since this chain of events began ? — Then followed a 
passage which I recapitulate, not necessarily in full, but 
in phrases which he actually used, and I noted down : 

*• Personal loss I set aside. My position — our position 
— before the war was that we possessed the confidence 
of nearly the entire country. I took a risk — we took 



320 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

it — with eyes open. I have — we have— not merely taken 
the risk but made the sacrifice. If the choice were to 
be made to-morrow, I would do it all over again. 

*' I have had my surfeit of public life. My modest 
ambition would be to serve in some quite humble capacity 
under the first Unionist Prime Minister of Ireland." 

As to other sacrifices, in the way of concessions, he 
recited the list of what had been agreed to — proposals 
so strangely undemocratic — the nomination of members 
of Parliament, the disproportionate powers given to a 
minority. " Shall we not be denounced for making 
them ? " he asked. 

On the other hand, what sacrifices had been made by 
the Southern Unionists ? These were the men who had 
had the hardest battle to fight in the struggle over Home 
Rule. They were not, like Ulster Unionists, " entrenched 
in a ring-fence." but the scattered few, who had suffered 
most and who might naturally have entertained most 
bitterness. Yet Lord Midleton's speech had been instinct 
with an admirable spirit. The speech of the Archbishop 
of Dublin had touched him deeply. 

*' Between these men and us there never again can 
be the differences of the past. They have put behind 
them all bitter memories. They have agreed to the 
framework of a Bill better than any o£fered to us in 1886, 
1893 or 1914." 

As for us Nationalists — he emphasized that each man 
came here free, untrammelled. 

" I speak only for myself. But even if I stand alone, 
I will not allow myself, because I cannot get the full 
measure of my demand, to be drawn to reject the proffered 
hand of friendship held out to ur. In my opinion we 
should be political fools if we did not endeavour to cement 
an alliance with these men." 

As concerned the Labour men, Mr. Whitley, who had 
always been a Unionist, had declared willingness to agree. 
But the Ulster Unionists — what sacrifice had they made ? 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 321 

" The last thing I desire is to attack Mr. Barrie and 
his friends. But they are not free agents. I was shocked 
when I heard that a section here openly avowed the 
need to refer back to some outside body. If we had been 
told we were going into a body which would consist of 
two orders of members, it would have been difficult to 
get us here." 

On the essential point Ulster had made no concession. 
What did Mr. Barrie say in his formal document ? ' We 
are satisfied that for Ireland and for Great Britain a 
common system of finances with one Exchequer is a 
fundamental necessity.' If they denied the taxing power 
to Ireland, any proposal on these lines must give Ireland 
less than any proposal for Home Rule ever put forward. 
This was Ulster's original position and they had not 
budged an inch. 

" This is their response to the Empire's S.O.S. Is it 
worthy of Ulster's Imperial loyalty ? I don't believe it 
is their last word." 

Lord Londonderry, however, in replying, did not add 
any ground of hope. The last speech of the day 
announced that of six trade unionists five would support 
the compromise. 

Redmond that evening put on the notice paper a 
motion adopting Lord Midleton's proposals provided 
that they " be adopted by His Majesty's Government 
as a settlement of the Irish question and legislative effect 
be given to them forthwith." 

On the day before this motion was tabled, a party 
was given at Lord Granard's house which everybody 
attended, and which marked the most festive moment 
of our comradeship. When we separated on the Friday 
most men were absolutely confident of an agreement 
covering four-fifths of the Convention. 

Unhappily, the motion could not come under con- 
sideration for a period of ten days. In the following 
week Lord Midleton thought it necessary to attend the 

22 



322 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

House of Lords. It was settled that we should spend 
the interval discussing the land purchase report, for 
which his presence was not essential. Redmond, whose 
health was still bad, did not come up to Dublin. All 
this gave time for agitation, and agitation was at work. 

Still, during that week there was no sign of any change 
in tone. Members of the local bodies who had gone to 
their homes at the week's end came back just as much 
inclined to settle as before. 

I met Redmond on the night of Monday, January 
14th. He had seen no one in these ten days. He told 
me that he was still uncertain what would happen, but 
asked me to get one of the leading County Councillors 
to second his motion. Next morning I came in half 
an hour before the meeting to find the man I wanted. 
When I met him he was full of excitement, and said, 
*' Something has gone wrong ; the men are all saying 
they must vote against Redmond." Then it was evident 
that propaganda had been busy to some purpose. 

When Redmond came in to his place, I said, " It's all 
right. Martin McDonogh will second your motion." 
He answered with a characteristic brusqueness, " He 
needn't trouble. I'm not going to move it ; Devlin 
and the Bishops are voting against me." 

He rose immediately the Chairman was in his place. 

" The amendment which I have on the paper," he 
said, " embodies the deliberate advice I give to the 
Convention. 

" I consulted no one — and could not do so, being iU. 
It stands on record on my sole responsibility. 

" Since entering the building I have heard that some 
very important Nationalist representatives are against 
this course — the Catholic bishops, Mr. Devlin — and others. 
I must face the situation — at which I am surprised ; and 
I regret it. 

"If I proceeded I should probably carry my point 
on a division, but the Nationalists would be divided. 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 323 

Such a division could not carry out the objects I have 
in view. 

" Therefore, I must avoid pressing my motion. But 
I leave it standing on the paper. The others will give 
their advice. I feel that I can be of no further service 
to the Convention and will therefore not move." ^ 

There was a pause of consternation. The Chairman 
intervened and the debate proceeded, and was carried 
on through the week. During its course a letter to the 
Chairman from the Bishop of Ross was circulated to 
us, most dexterous in exposition, most affecting in the 
tone of its conclusion. It can be read in the Report 
of the Convention and it cannot with justice be quoted 
except at full length — so admirable is the linking of 
argument. It need only be said here that it was an 
appeal " to my fellow-Nationalists who have already 
made great concessions " to yield, for the sake of a settle- 
ment, this further point, and that the appeal was signed 
" from my sick-bed, not far removed from my death- 
bed." That eloquent voice and subtle brain could ill 
be spared from our assembly : but the letter came too late. 
It is plain that the writer had no inkling of what would 
happen till it was actually taking place. 

No one can overstate the effect of this episode. 
Redmond's personal ascendancy in the Convention had 
become very great. I am certain there was not a man 
there but would have said, " If there is to be an Irish 
Parliament, Redmond must be Prime Minister, and his 
personality will give that Parliament its best possible 
chance." The Ulstermen had more than once expressed 
their view that if Home Rule were sure to mean Redmond's 
rule, their objections to it would be materially lessened. 
Now, they saw Redmond thrown over, and by a com- 
bination in which the clerical influence, so much distrusted 
by them, was paramount. 

I These are my notes, jotted as h© spoke. — S. G. 



324 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 



IV 

A new stage in the history of the Convention now 
opens. In the interval between the meeting which began 
by Redmond's withdrawal of his amendment and that 
of the following week, Sir Horace Plunkett went to 
London and laid the situation before the Prime Minister. 
Redmond had also written to Mr. Lloyd George stating 
that no progress could be made unless Government 
would declare its intentions as to legislation. The 
Chairman came back with the following letter in his 
pocket : 

10 Downing Street, 

Whitehall, S.W. 1, 

January 21, 1918. 

Dear Sir Horace Plunkett, 

In our conversation on Saturday you told me 
that the situation in the Convention has now reached a 
very critical stage. The issues are so grave that I feel 
the Convention should not come to a definite break with- 
out the Government having an opportunity of full con- 
sultation with the leaders of the different sections. If, 
and when, therefore, a point is reached at which the 
Convention finds that it can make no further progress 
towards an agreed settlement, I would ask that repre- 
sentatives should be sent to confer with the Cabinet. 
The Government are agreed and determined that a solution 
must be found. But they are firmly convinced that the 
best hope of a settlement lies within the Convention, 
and they are prepared to do anything in their power 
to assist the Convention finally to reach a basis of agree- 
ment which would enable a new Irish Constitution to 
come into operation with the consent of all parties. 

Yours sincerely, 

D. Lloyd George. 

Before acting on this, Sir Horace Plunkett allowed 
the debate to continue during two days. Since no move- 
ment towards agreement manifested itself, but only 
evidence of widespread and various divergence, he laid 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 325 

the Prime Minister's invitation before the Convention. 
There was considerable difference of opinion before a 
decision was reached for acceptance. Groups separated 
to select their representatives on the delegation. 

It was agreed in private conference that only one view 
should be presented from the Nationalist side, and that 
the view of what was at this point clearly the majority. 
Redmond, in agreeing to act as a delegate, agreed to set 
aside his own judgment and to press the claim for full 
fiscal responsibility — which, like other Nationalists, he 
regarded as in the abstract Ireland's right. But illness 
prevented him from attending when at last the delegates 
were received by the Prime Minister on February 13th. 

On the 5th he had asked a question in Parliament — 
the last he was to ask there. It concerned the starting 
of a factory for the manufacture of aircraft in Dublin 
— one of the things for which he was pressing in his cease- 
less effort to bring Ireland some industrial advantage 
from the war. I saw him towards the end of that month 
in his room at the House, and he commented bitterly 
upon a raid carried out by Sinn Feiners, in which some 
newly erected buildings were destroyed at one of the 
aerodromes near Dublin which he had helped to estab- 
lish. But the main thing he had to sa,j concerned the 
course of the Convention. Everything, in his judgment, 
was wrecked ; he saw nothing ahead for his country but 
ruin and chaos. 

He spoke of his health. A bout of sickness which 
had prostrated him at Christmas in Dublin had left him 
uneasy. He was at the time, I thought, unduly alarmed 
about himself, and I believed that the continuance of 
this frame of mind was simply characteristic of a man 
who had very little experience of ill-health. I left him 
with profound compassion for his trouble of spirit, but 
Avithout any serious apprehension for his state of body. 

The Convention reassembled on February 26th to 
consider the result of the delegation, which was summed 



326 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

up in a letter from Mr. Lloyd George. This well-known 
document begins with a definite pledge of action. On 
receiving the report of the Convention the Government 
would give it immediate attention and would " proceed 
with the least possible delay to submit legislative pro- 
posals to Parliament." — The date of this pledge was 
February 25, 1918. — Mr. Lloyd George pressed, however, 
for a settlement " in and through the Convention " ; 
and he declared his conviction that " In view of previous 
attempts at settlement and of the deliberations of the 
Convention itself, the only hope of agreement lies in a 
solution which on the one side provides for the unity 
of Ireland by a single Legislature, with adequate safe- 
guards for the interests of Ulster and of the Southern 
Unionists, and, on the other, secures the well-being 
of the Empire and the fundamental unity of the United 
Kingdom." 

Ireland's strong claim to some control of indirect 
taxation was admitted ; but it was laid down that till 
two years after the war the fixation and collection of 
customs and excise should be left to the Imperial 
Parliament : and that at the end of the war a Royal 
Commission should report on Ireland's contribution to 
Imperial expenditure and should submit proposals as to 
the fiscal relations of the two countries. 

For the war period, Ireland was to contribute " an 
agreed proportion of the Imperial expenditure," but 
was to receive the full proceeds of Irish revenue from 
customs and excise, less the agreed contribution. The 
police and postal services were to be reserved also as 
war services. 

These provisions were laid down as essentials. A 
suggestion was made of an Ulster Committee within the 
Irish Parliament, ha-ving power to modify or veto 
measures, whether of legislation or administration, in 
their application to Ulster. 

Lastly, Government expressed their willingness to accept 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 327 

and finance the Convention's scheme for land purchase 
and to give a large grant for urban housing. 

The question now before the Convention was whether 
it should or should not accept this offer, which differed 
from the Midleton proposals in that it withheld the 
control of excise as well as of customs, and that it 
retained control of police and Post Office for the war 
period. It also adumbrated an Ulster Committee, which 
had been an unpopular suggestion when put forward 
in the presentation stages. On the other hand, it offered 
great material inducements in the proposed expenditure 
for land purchase and for housing. Some of the County 
Councillors who had been most vehement in their opposi- 
tion to the Midleton compromise were now disposed to 
think this too good an offer to let go, but believed it 
could be obtained without their taking the responsi- 
bility of voting for it. It was necessary to point out 
that the Irish party could not lower a standard of national 
demand set up by the Nationalists in the Convention, 
and that if they did so they would be hooted out of 
existence. 

The main argument of those who advised against 
acceptance was that Ministers had pledged themselves 
to act in any case. Let them. We could best help by 
enunciating our own programme. Then they would 
know the real facts of the Irish situation. If a majority 
of the Convention accepted the proposals of the Prime 
Minister's letter, there was no pledge that the Bill would 
be on those lines. We needed to keep a bargaining 
margin in what we put forward. It was even suggested 
that the Government proposals would be more likely 
to attract support in Ireland if put forward as a generous 
offer from a largely Unionist Government than if pub- 
lished as a compromise to which Nationalists had 
condescended. 

Our reply was that the essential thing was to make 
a beginning with self-government, and that by refusing 



328 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEABS 

to accept the Government's offer, on which alone we 
could combine with an influential Unionist section, we 
gravely increased the difficulties in the way of carrying 
Home Rule. If, as we held, the main need was to unite 
Ireland, the last thing on which we should insist was 
the concession of complete financial powers. When the 
lack of those powers began to prove itself injurious to 
Ireland's material interests, Ireland would certainly 
become united in a demand for the concession of them ; 
and the history of the British Empire since the loss of 
America showed that every such demand had been 
granted to a self-governing State. 

At this moment interest centred on the discussion in 
private councils of Nationalists. The debates in full 
Convention were animated, but somewhat unreal by 
comparison. Lord Midleton's motion had been dropped, 
by consent, for a series of resolutions tabled by Lord 
MacDonnell which were in substance an acceptance of 
Government's proposal. 

But neither in the private councils nor in the public 
debates had we Redmond's presence. His illness had 
grown serious ; an operation was necessary ; it passed 
over hopefully, and on Tuesday, March 5th, when the 
debate resumed, Mr. Clancy had a telegram saying that 
he was practically out of danger. 

It was plain in these days that we were nearing a most 
critical decision, and Nationalist opinion was profoundly 
uneasy. Many men were drifting back to Redmond's 
view, and recoiled from the prospect of dividing the 
Convention once more into its original component parts 
■ — Nationalists on the one side. Unionists on the other. 
It was proposed that on the Wednesday Nationalists 
should meet and, if possible, concert joint action ; if 
not, determine definitely each to go our own ways ; for 
a painful part of the situation was that all of us had 
been used to act together, and none now felt himself 
free of some obligation. This had to be cleared up 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 329 

When we came down to Trinity College that morning, 
the news met us that Redmond was dead. 

The Convention adjourned its work, although time 
pressed most seriously, till after the interment. Ireland 
is a country where a public man can always count on a 
good funeral. The body was brought to Kingstown, 
and thence by special train to Wexford, where he had 
expressed the wish to be laid, in the burying-place of his 
own people and in the town with which he had been 
most closely associated. Hundreds of men came from 
distant parts to mark their sorrow and respect : what 
remained of him was carried in long and imposing pro- 
cession through the streets. Over the grave Mr. Dillon, 
who had been chosen to succeed him in the chair of the 
Irish party, spoke eloquent and fitting words. Some 
day, no doubt, a monument to his memory will be set 
up in the streets of Wexford, where his great uncle's 
statue stands, and where will be placed the memorial 
to his gallant brother, subscribed for from all parts of 
the kingdom and from all Irish regiments in the Army. 

But I say without hesitation that the first and most 
striking endeavour to put in lasting shape a tribute to 
John Redmond was made in the Convention, not by 
great men, but by the ordinary rank and file of Irish 
Nationalists, who went back from the graveside to the 
work which his death had interrupted. 

Those who had been inclined before to accept his 
advice — still standing on our minutes — were now more 
than ever determined to follow it. That advice was 
not to refuse the hand of friendship which offered itself 
from men who by alliance with us could take away from 
the Home Rule demand all sectarian character : who 
could bring for the first time a great and representative 
body of Irish landlord opinion and Irish Protestant 
opinion into line with the opinion of Irish tenants and 
Irish Catholics. In order to act upon this advice men 
needed to face a powerful combination of forces and 



330 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

much threatened unpopularity : they had to encounter 
the hostility of an able and vindictively conducted news- 
paper ; they had to separate themselves politically from 
the united voice of their own hierarchy ; they had to 
break away from the politician who for many years now 
had equalled Redmond in his influence in Ireland and 
surpassed him in popularity. All of them were repre- 
sentative of constituents, all were living among those 
whom they represented ; not a man of them but knew 
he would worsen his personal and political position by 
what he did. Yet, for that is the true way to state it, 
they stood to their dead leader's policy. 

It needs not to follow out in any detail the steps by 
which we reached the end of our labours. In the upshot, 
the Ulster group of nineteen dissented from every- 
thing and joined in a report which renewed the demand 
for partition. The Primate and the Provost signed a 
separate note declaring that a Federal Scheme based 
on the Swiss or Canadian system offered the only solu- 
tion which could avoid the alternative choice between 
the coercion of Ulster and the partition of Ireland. The 
remaining members, sixty-six in all, accepted one common 
scheme. I Their number included ten Southern Unionists, 
five Labour representatives (three of whom were Protestant 
artisans from Belfast), with Lords Granard, MacDonnell 
and Dunraven, Sir Bertram Windle and the representa- 
tives of the Dublin and Cork Chambers of Commerce. 

The scheme on which we concurred recommended the 
immediate establishment of self-government by an Irish 
Ministry responsible to a Parliament consisting of two 
Houses, composed on highly artificial lines. For a period 
of fifteen years Southern Unionists were to be repre- 
sented by nominated members, while Ulster was to have 
extra members elected by special constituencies repre- 
senting commercial and agricultural interests. The 

Subject to the pviblication of a Report signed by Bishop 
O'Dpnnell, 9,nd these in agreement with him reaffirmed their view. 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 331 

Parliament was to have full control of internal legis- 
lation, administration and direct taxation. The fixation 
of customs and excise was to be from Westminster, 
but the proceeds of these taxes to be paid into the Irish 
Exchequer. There was to be a contribution to the cost 
of Imperial defences, and representation at Westminster, 
but a representation of the Irish Parliament rather than 
of the constituencies. All of this was agreed to at our 
last meeting, and nothing could have been more pleasant 
than the atmosphere of good will which prevailed. But 
this was after a critical division — the most critical in 
which I have ever voted — in which those of us National- 
ists who were for accepting the Government proposals 
voted with the Southern Unionists and those who were 
against with the Ulster group. The combination of 
Ulsterrnen and extreme Nationalists was thirty-four 
strong ; those who adopted Redmond's policy and Lord 
Midleton's were thirty-eight. We had in our lobby 
sixteen of the Nationalist County and Urban Councillors ; 
they had eleven. 

If that vote had gone otherwise, we were told plainly 
that the Southern Unionists would be no parties to the 
rest of the compromise. They were willing to recommend 
self-government only if the Convention recommended 
the reservation of customs to the Imperial Parliament. 
This point had become in their minds important even 
more as a symbol of the close union between the two 
kingdoms than by reason of the economic advantages 
which they attributed to it. 

Once the sticking-point was passed, the divided 
Nationalists recombined, and we were all at one in our 
mutual felicitations on the harmony which prevailed at 
the close. But as one of our rank and file said in my 
ear, "If we had not given the vote we did, where would 
be all this talk of harmony ? And mind you now, it 
was not easy to give it." 

He was right, and within six months it cost him the 



332 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

chairmanship of his County Council. Others paid the 
same penalty, I am sure, without grudging it, for most of 
us were prouder of that action than of any other in our 
political lives. It may be well to set down the names of the 
local representatives and Labour men who voted as 
Redmond would have advised on that first crucial division. 
They were : W. Broderick, Youghal Urban Council ; 
J. J. Coen, Westmeath County Council ; D. Condren, 
Wicklow County Council ; J. Dooly, Kings County 
County Council ; Captain Doran, Louth County Council ; 
T. Fallon, Leitrim County Council ; J. Fitzgibbon, Ros- 
common County Council ; Captain Gwynn, Irish Party ; 
T. Halligan, Meath County Council ; W. Kavanagh, 
Carlow County Council ; J. McCarron, Labour ; M. 
McDonogh, Galway Urban Council ; J. McDonnell, Galway 
County Council ; C. McKay, Labour ; J. Murphy, Labour ; 
J. O'Dowd, Sligo County Council ; C. P. O'Neill, Pem- 
broke Urban Council ; Dr. 'Sullivan, Mayor of Water- 
ford ; T. Power, Waterford County Council ; Sir S. B. 
Quin, Mayor of Limerick ; D. Reilly, Cavan County 
Council; M. Slattery, Tipperary (S. Riding); H. T. 
Whitley, Labour.^ 

In so far as we were led by anyone, Mr. Clancy, ful- 
filling in public what he had privately spoken, was our 
leader and spokesman. 

We were along with the Southern Unionists and our 
natural allies. Lords Granard and MacDonnell and Sir 
Bertram Windle. Archbishop Bernard and Dr. Mahaffy 
voted with us in that pinch, so that both the late Provost 
of Trinity and the present one did their part to secure 
an agreement. 

In the other list, the Archbishop of Armagh and the 

^ The following, though unavoidably absent at the critical 
moment, joined with us : M. K. Barry, Cork County Council ; 
J. Butler, Kilkenny County Council ; Patrick Dempsey, Belfast ; 
M. Governey, Carlow Urban Council ; M. J. Minchj Kildare County 
Counoil, 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 333 

Moderator were grouped with the Archbishop of Cashel 
and the Bishops of Raphoe and Down and Connor ; 
the Lord Mayor of Cork and Lord Mayor of Belfast were 
together ; Mr. Devlin was with Mr. Barrie. This list 
represented no unity except a common refusal to agree 
to any compromise. Those who voted in it followed 
one or other of two trains of cogent reasoning ; but 
the reasonings led to opposite conclusions. These men 
were beyond doubt as honest in their convictions as 
those who went the other way ; but they took the easier 
course, whether they were Nationalist or Unionist : 
they swam with the tide. 

The troubles which Nationalists brought on themselves 
by supporting Lord Midleton were answered by the 
troubles which his group met for supporting Nationalist 
demands. The men who refused to make the compromise 
possible have the laugh of us. Neither section of us who 
voted for agreement achieved anything by facing the risk 
of unpopularity. We had followed Redmond's policy and 
we shared Redmond's fate. We had done our best to 
help the British Government and that Government itself 
defeated us. 

By the Prime Minister's letter Government was pledged 
to legislate for the better government of Ireland, not 
upon condition of our reaching substantial agreement, 
but in any event. Yet the letter emphasized the " urgent 
importance of getting a settlement in and through the 
Convention." We had secured a report for a scheme 
in which sixty-six out of eighty-seven concurred in the 
broad lines ; and of the twenty-one dissentients, nineteen 
were a group sent to the assembly with a pledge which 
they construed as giving them a special position, in that 
no legislation affecting them was to be passed without 
their concurrence. The agreement which we had reached 
enabled the Government, when it undertook legislation, 
to quote Unionist authority on the one hand and National- 
ist authority on the other for many wise provisions which 



334 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

otherwise a Coalition Ministry might have found it most 
difficult to propose. 

But no legislation followed. Once more an Irish issue 
became involved in the wheels of the English poHtical 
machine. 

We have ourselves in part to thank for it. We might 
in January have taken Redmond's advice, and Lord 
Midleton's declared view that legislation would follow 
might have proved correct. Yet, what use are might- 
have-beens ? History is concerned with what happened, 
and our work in the Convention dragged itself on till 
the great German offensive had been launched and the 
Allied line pushed back to the very gates of Paris, and 
Government was at its wits' end for men. It is hard to 
blame a Ministry for what harm was done in the frantic 
rush to cope with perhaps the most critical instant in all 
history ; but what was done produced infinite mischief 
and no good result. Immediately after the Convention's 
report (signed upon April 8th) had been received, Govern- 
ment proposed to apply conscription to Ireland. 

It is said, and it is not difficult to believe, that without 
making this proposal they dare not have come upon the 
British people with so extreme demands for compulsory 
service as were made. But by making it Ministers tore 
up and scattered in fragments whatever results the Con- 
vention had to show for its labours, and by legislating 
for conscription in Ireland they gained not one man. 
The proposal, as Redmond had always told them, proved 
impossible to carry out. 

I do not believe that if Redmond had lived this would 
ever have happened. His record in the war gave him 
an authority in Parliament which no other Irishman 
could possibly claim. It would have been impossible 
for Mr. Lloyd George to take such a step without giving 
him notice ; and once that notice came, Redmond could 
have insisted upon the significance of the report of the 
Convention's sub-committee on questions of defence. 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 335 

This committee consisted of two civilians and three 
soldiers. Lord Desart, a Unionist, was in the chair ; 
Mr. Powell, K.C., a Unionist (afterwards Irish Solicitor- 
General and now a judge), was the other civilian ; the 
soldiers were the Duke of Abercorn, an Ulster Covenanter, 
with Captain Doran and myself. Nationalists from the 
Sixteenth Division. We found unanimously that if an 
Irish Parliament existed, whatever might be the claims 
of the Imperial authority, it would be impracticable to 
impose conscription without the Irish Parliament's consent. 
This unanimous finding was bound to influence the view 
of any Ministry, no matter how hard pressed. But, as 
debate revealed, Mr. Lloyd George had never heard of it. 

I believe that Redmond could have persuaded Mr. 
Lloyd George to adopt in April the course on which — 
but after the harm was done — he fell back in June, when 
Lord French asked for a large, but limited, number of 
recruits to refill the Irish Divisions within a specified 
time — at the end of which time, failing the production 
of the volunteers, other measures must be taken. Here, 
however, we are back in the region of speculation. Con- 
scription was proposed and anarchy let loose in Ireland. 
Redmond's words, " Better for us never to have met 
than to have met and failed," stand as the final sentence 
on this notable episode in Irish history. 

That is the Convention's epitaph as, I think, he would 
have written it. How shall we write his own ? 

No attempt has been made in this book, and none shall 
be made, to represent him as a hero. But there are 
certain attributes which malice itself can scarcely deny 
him. All his ideals were generous. His love of country, 
the master-motive in his life, had nothing in it exclusive 
or tribal or partisan. His was a policy forward-looking 
and constructive ; without narrowness or jealousy, it 
aimed to bring the destinies of Ireland into the hands 
of Irishmen, not greatly caring what Irishmen they were 
— indeed, if they were in a real measure responsible to 



336 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

Ireland, not caring at all. In this spirit he grasped 
masterfully at the chance which the war offered ; in 
this spirit, he went out to meet his fellow-countrymen 
in the Irish Convention. 

And not only towards his countrymen was he mag- 
nanimous. His love of Ireland was free from all attendant 
hates. His resentment was never on private grounds, 
and it was without rancour. He spent his whole life in 
opposition, and was not embittered ; his mind remained 
constructive after thirty years spent in criticism. His 
experience of political life and of English Ministers had 
rid him of any credulous faith in mankind ; yet his 
instinct was always to perceive the best in men. The 
friend who knew him best in Convention, and who had 
seen him in his darkest hours then and long ago, said 
this of him : " He was always an optimist." The speaker 
did not mean — he could not have meant — that in those 
last months Redmond was sanguine. He meant, I 
think, that he had faith ; that in a country where sus- 
picion is the prevailing disease, he credited men with 
honest motives and with his own love of Ireland. 

If he went wrong at any time, he went wrong by too 
generous a judgment of other men, too open-handed a 
policy. Perhaps, too, he may have erred — it was his 
characteristic defect — in not pressing his policy upon 
others with more vehemence. He had not the tempera- 
ment which, when once possessed with an idea, rests 
neither night nor day in pursuit of it and spares neither 
others' labour nor its own to carry the conception into 
effect. There was an element of inertia in his nature, 
and of the ordinary self-seeking motives which impel 
men not a trace. Ambition he had none — none, at all 
events, in the last ten or fifteen years, during which I 
have known him. As for vanity, I never saw a man so 
entirely devoid of it. His modesty amounted to a defect, 
in that he always underestimated his personal influence. 
A man less single-minded, vainer, more ambitious of 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 337 

success, might with the same gifts have achieved more 
for Ireland in thrusting towards a personal triumph. 
A man with more love for the homage of crowds might 
have kept himself in closer touch with the mass of his 
following. 

The way of life to which he was committed was in 
its essence distasteful to him. I do not believe that 
history shows an example of a statesman who served 
his country more absolutely from a sense of duty. 

All this might be admitted without conceding great- 
ness to him. But he was a great man, unlike others, 
cast in a mould of his own. Without the least affecta- 
tion of unconventionality, and indeed under a formal 
appearance, he was profoundly unconventional. His 
tastes, whether in literature, in art, in the choice of 
society, in the choice of his way of life, were utterly his 
own, unaffected by any standard but that which he 
himself established. Without subtlety of interpretation, 
his judgments cut deep into the heart of things. You 
could not hear him speak, could not be in his presence, 
without feeling the weight of his personality. 

A statesman, if ever there was one, he was never given 
the opportunity of proving himself in administration ; 
he can be judged only by his gifts in counsel and by his 
power of guiding action. As a counsellor, he v/as supreme. 
He had that faculty for anticipating the future, that 
broad, far-reaching vision of the chain of events which 
can proceed only from long, deep and constant thought, 
and which is truh^ admirable when united, as it was in 
him, to a sovereign contempt for this or that momentary 
outcry. In these qualities of insight and foresight I 
have only seen one man approach him, the late Sir Henry 
Campbell-Bannerman, to whose credit stands the greatest 
work of Imperial reconciliation accomplished in our day. 
But Redmond had supremely what the wise old Scotsman 
lacked — the gift of persuasive speech, to win acceptance 
for his wisdom and his vision. 

23 



338 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

He could persuade, but he could not compel. Hi« was 
not the magnetism which constrains allegiance almost 
in despite of reason — the power which was possessed by 
his first and only leader, Parnell. Redmond's appeal 
was to men's judgment and convictions, not to those 
instincts which lie deepest and are most potent in the 
heart of man. That was the limitation to his greatness. 
He could lead only by convincing men that he was right. 

If in the end it is true he failed to convince his country- 
men and failed to carry them with him, this book has 
told what difficulties were set in his way, not so much 
by those who desired a different end than his, but by 
those who desired the same end. Yet admit that he 
failed and that he fell from power. No man holds power 
for ever, and during seventeen continuous years he held 
the leadership among his own people with far more 
than all the personal ascendancy of a Prime Minister in 
one of the oversea Dominions ; and he held it without any 
of the binding force which control of administration and 
patronage bestows. He left his people improved in 
their material circumstances to an almost incredible 
degree, as compared with their state when he began 
his work. 

Yet Ireland counts his life a failure, and he most 
assuredly accepted that view ; for he died heartbroken, 
not for his own sake but for Ireland's, because he had 
not won through to the goal. His action upon the war 
was his life's supreme action ; he felt this, and knew 
that it had failed to achieve its end. By that action 
let us judge him, for all else is trivial in comparison 
beside it. 

It is said by his critics that he bargained badly. If 
reply were made that he believed the Allied cause to 
be right and desired to lead his country according to 
his conception of justice, we should be answered that 
he was in charge of his country's interests, not of her 
morals ; and he would have admitted an element of 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 339 

truth in this. Yet, as in the Boer War he had led his 
countrymen to support what he conceived to be the 
right cause, even with certain injury to their own, so 
now assuredly he would not have acted as he did, had 
he not been convinced that Ireland's honour was to 
be served as well as her advantage. 

But when there is talk of bargaining, it is well to con- 
sider what he had to bargain with. No one in August 
1914 anticipated the course of the war. No one foresaw 
the need for the last man available. It was more than 
a year before Great Britain could even equip the men 
who pressed themselves forward for service. All that 
he really had in his hand to give or to withhold was the 
value of Ireland's moral support. Could he by waiting 
his time have made a better bargain ? 

When that critical hour came, Redmond knew in his 
bones the weight of Ireland's history ; he knew all the 
propensities which would instantly tend to assert them- 
selves, unless their play was checked by a strong counter- 
emotion. He knew that if Ireland said nothing and did 
nothing at the crisis, things would be said of Ireland 
which would rapidly engender rising passion ; and with 
the growth of that passion all possibility, not of bargain- 
ing but of controlling the situation between the two 
countries would be gone. In plain language, if he had 
not acted at once, his only chance for action would have 
been in heading an Ireland hostile to England. In this 
war, with the issue defined as it was from the outset, 
he could only have done this by denying all that he 
believed. But apart from his judgment of the merits, 
there was his purpose of unity to be served. Ulster was 
the difficulty ; all other obstacles were disposed of. How 
could he hope for an Ulster united to Ireland, if Ulster 
were divided from Ireland on the war ? 

Everything depended on an instant and almost desper- 
ate move. He might have left the sole offer of service 
from Ireland to lie with Sir Edward Carson. What he 



340 JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 

did actually was to offer instantly all that the Ulstermen 
had offered, and more, for he proposed active union in 
Ireland itself. It was a bold stroke, but it was guided 
by an ideal perpetually present with him — the essential 
unity of Ireland. To set Irishmen working together at 
such a crisis in the common name of Ireland was an 
object for which he was willing to jeopardize the whole 
organization which stood behind him, at a moment when 
he could speak of full right for three-fourths of his 
countrymen. And, when he is called a failure, let it 
be remembered that in this he did not fail. 

This fight is not yet ended, the long battle is not lost. 
Had Ireland from the first stood aloof, had she been 
drawn at the war's opening into the temper which she 
displayed in its closing stages, then indeed we might 
despair of any hopeful issue, any genuine peace between 
these two neighbouring islands, and, what matters in- 
finitely more, between the strong yet divergent strains 
that make up Ireland itself. 

But as the mists of passion clear and deeds rather 
than words come into sharp light, it will be seen and 
realized that for a thousand Irishmen who risked their 
lives to defeat Redmond's effort there were fifty thousand 
who at his summons took on themselves far greater 
hardships and faced dangers far more terrible. By 
them we take our stand — we who followed Redmond, 
who believed and still believe in his wisdom. We wish 
no word of his last years unspoken, no act undone by 
that great and generous-hearted Irishman in the supreme 
period of his life. In his defeat and ours, we accept no 
defeat ; we shall endeavoar to keep our will set, as his 
was, for a final triumph which can mean humiliation 
for no Irish heart. Tangled as are the threads of all 
his policy, he leaves the task far nearer to accomplish- 
ment than he found it ; and if in the end freedom and 
prosperity come to a united Ireland, they will be found 
to proceed — however deeply overlaid by years and by 



THE CONVENTION AND THE END 341 

events may be the chain of causation — from the action 
which John Redmond took in August 1914, and upon 
which his brother, with a legion like him, set the seal 
of his blood. 

To have served long and faithfully without reward — 
to have given all of life to one high purpose — to have 
faced a great crisis greatly — these are claims enough 
for Redmond that the allegiance of his comrades and 
followers may be justified when it is judged. The grave 
has closed over him, and the rest is for us to do, that 
a coping-stone may be set on his life's labours, and that 
reparation final and conclusive, for what he suffered 
undeservedly, may yet be offered to the dead. 



$ 



INDEX 



Agar-Robartes, Mr., 68-9 
Ancient Order of Hibernians, 259 
Army — 

Irish Brigades raised for the 
War- 
Sixteenth Division, staffing 
of, 174, 187-8 ; develop- 
ment of opinions in, 188 ; 
10th Division made up 
from, 194-5 ; proceeds to 
France, 200-1 ; in action, 
230, 241 ; Messines, 264-5 ; 
Ypres, 306 
Tenth Division, 195 
Tyneside Battalions, 190 
Ulster Division, 201 ; on 
the Somme, 240; Mes- 
sines, 264-5 ; Ypres, 306 
Irish Nationalist attitude to, 

140-1 
Irish recruiting — Redmond's 
efforts, 154-5, 158, 176-9, 
185, 191-2, 199, 202, 207, 
211 ; efforts handicapped 
by Government, 163, 
175-6, 177, 190-1, 206; 
letter to Birrell, 160 ; 
Sinn F6in propaganda 
against, 219 
Irish Regulars' achievements, 
150; in Gallipoli, 195 ff. 
Ulster sympathies of, 83, 99, 
104 fi. ; the Ciu-ragh in- 
cident, 105-9 
Ashe, Thomas, 300-2 
Asquith, H. H., struggle of, 
with House of Lords, 
43-6, 50 ; on indivisi- 
bility of Ireland, 69, 72 ; 



Ladybank speech, (Oct., 
1913), 85 ; War Minister, 
109 ; response to Red- 
mond's National Defence 
offer, 138, 143 ; on Ulster 
preparations for resisting 
Home Rule, 148 ; fails 
Redmond, 153, 167 ; re- 
cruiting speech in Dublin, 
155-7 ; the Coalition, 
192 ; Redmond's letter 
to, against conscription, 
208-9 ; the Rebellion, 
226 ; reports on his visit 
to Ireland, 232 ; breaks 
faith with Redmond, 
239-40 ; displaced, 244 ; 
estimate of, 87, 93 ; men- 
tioned, 30, 34, 41, 73, 138, 
139 
Aughavanagh, 37-9, 267 

Balfour, A. J., 55-6 

Balfour, G., 23 

Barrie, Mr., 271, 304, 308, 321 

Beatty, Admiral, 158 

Bernard, Dr., Abp. of Dublin, 
272, 310, 318; three 
points of, 291 ff. 

Biggar, Joseph, 6 

Birrell, A., Redmond's letter to, 
on the Volunteers, 160 ; 
on Kitchener's attitude 
to Irish National Volun- 
teers, 162 ; Appreciation 
of Redmond quoted, 162, 
194 ; the Rebellion, 
219-20 ; mentioned, 31, 
69, 139, 198 



343 



344 



JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 



Blake, E., 24 
Brade, Sir R., 203 
Budget of 1909-10, 42, 47 
Butler, Sir W., 5 
Butt, Isaac, 6 

Campbell, Sir James, 219 
Campbell -Bannerman, Sir H., 

34, 337 
Carson, Sir E., the Covenant 
demonstrations, 72; 
moves exclusion of Ulster, 
76 ; on Ulster and the 
Army, 105 ; on possibility 
of persuading Ulster, 114 ; 
the Speaker's Conference, 
121 ; attitude to Home 
Ride enactment, 148-9 ; 
joins the Coalition, 192-3 ; 
interpretation of exclu- 
sion proposals, 234 ; re- 
fuses joint platform at 
Newry, 200 ; kills Volun- 
teer Bill, 208 ; on con- 
scription for Ireland, 210, 
211 ; final victory against 
Redmond, 240 ; tempera- 
mental attitude to Home 
Rule, 96-7 ; quoted, 67, 
71, 80-1, 83, 100; appeal 
on Ulster's claim, 97-8 ; 
mentioned, 89, 229, 260, 
263 
Casement, Sir Roger, 116, 221, 

223; quoted, 115, 118 
Castletown, Lord, 24 
Cecil, Lord Hugh, 50 
Cecil, Lord Robert, 115 
Chamberlain, Austen, 102 
Churchill, Winston, Belfast 
speech of (1912), 62, 67 ; 
devolution proposal, 71 ; 
Bradford speech (1914), 
103-4 ; the Larne gun- 
running, 113 ; mentioned, 
77, 84 
Citizen Army, the, 180, 183 ; 
the Rebellion, 218 



Clark, Sir George, 271-2 
Clarke, — , execution of, 224 
Clancy, J. J., 269, 318, 332 
Coalition formed, 192-3 
Coercion, 8-9, 16, 82 
Colthurst, Capt., 228, 231 
Commons, House of, Parnell's 
obstruction in, 6 &. ; pay- 
ment of members, 52 ; 
scene after passing Home 
Rule Bill, 152; disgust 
of, at Redmond's defeat, 
240 ; Redmond's esti- 
mate of, 12 ; his famili- 
arity with. 111 
Congested Districts Board, 28 
Connolly, James, 183 ; the Re- 
bellion, 218, 224 
Conscription, Redmond's oppo- 
sition to, 208 ff., 242, 
247-8 ; application of, to 
Ireland, 334 
Convention, see Irish Convention 
Craig, Capt., 51, 70, 105 ; quoted, 

95 
Crooks, Will, 152 
Crozier, Dr., Abp. of Armagh, 
198, 272, 279, 300, 302, 
310, 330 
Curragh incident, 105-9 
Curzon, Col., 187 

Dalton, Miss (Mrs. John Red- 
mond), 14, 20 

Davitt, Michael, 8, 19 

Davitt (young), 116 

de Robeck, Admiral, despatch 
of, 195-6 

de Valera, E., 268, 269 

Desart, Lord, 273, 318 

Devlin, J., in Redmond's " inner 
cabinet,'* 25, 36; his 
supporters* disappoint- 
ment on compromise, 109 ; 
recruiting successes of, 
177, 179 ; indispensable 
in Ireland, 183 ; carries 
Belfast Convention for 



INDEX 



345 



Devlin, J. (continued) — 

exclusion proposals, 235 ; 
on the Irish Convention, 
269, 304, 310, 322 ; esti- 
mate of, 21 ; Redmond's 
estimate of, 235 ; men- 
tioned, 48, 84, 155, 263 
Devolution, 28, 71 
Dillon, John, relations with Red- 
mond, 25, 36 ; on coer- 
. cion, 82 ; an Irish Vokm- 
teer movement, 115 ; 
speech on suppression of 
the Rebellion, 231 ; de- 
clines to serve on the 
Irish Convention, 269 ; 
mentioned, 16, 100, 109, 
121, 129, 155 
Doran, Capt., 274-5 
Doyle, Sir A. Conan, cited, 131-2 
Dublin strike (1913), 90, 273 
Duke, Sir. H. E., 240, 275 
Dunraven, Lord, 27, 28, 77 ; on 
the Convention, 273, 282, 
317-18, 330 

Ewart, Sir S., 108 

Field, William, 24 

Financial Relations Commission, 

24, 75 
Fingall, Lord, 174 
Forster, W. E., 79 
Franchise Bill (1917), 302, 304-5, 

311 
French, Sir John, 107, 108 
Friend, General, 198 

Gallipoli, Irish troops in, 195 ff. 
General Elections — 
1906, 43 

1910 (Jan.), 43-4 
1910 (Dec), 49 
1918, 231 
George V, King, 121 
George, D. Lloyd, non-Irish pre- 
occupations of, 41-2 ; Con- 
ciliation mission after the 
Rebellion, 232 ; agree- 



George, D. Lloyd (continued) — • 
ment with the Irish, 234 ; 
agreement thrown over, 
239 ; Redmond's hopes 
from, as Premier, 244-5 ; 
on Irish distrust, 246 ; 
supports the " two na- 
tions " theory, 255 ; the 
Convention, 260 ; letter 
to Plunlcett, 324 ; con- 
ference with Convention 
representatives, 325 ; pro- 
posals to the Convention, 
326 ff. ; quoted on Ulster, 
73 

Gladstone, W. E., 11, 17, 42, 130, 
317; breach with Parnell, 
18-19 ; retirement, 23 

Gladstone, W. G. C, 66 

Gough, Gen., quoted, 105 ff. 

Government, delays of, 185, 
236-7, 244, 247 ; general 
attitude to Redmond, see 
under Redmond 

Granard, Lord, 273, 282 

Grey, Earl, 78 

Grey, Lord (Sir Edward), Ulster 
proposals of, 85, 86 ; 
speech on outbreak of 
War, 128-30 ; quoted, 
66 ; mentioned, 30, 108 

Harbison, Mr., 270 

Harty, Abp. of Cashel, 270 

Hay den, Mr., 38, 130-1 

Ilazleton, Mr., 14 

Healy, T. M., returned for Wex- 
ford, 7-8 ; attacks on 
Redmond and Nationalist 
Party, 34, 273 ; opposi- 
tion to county option, 
100, 111-12; declines to 
serve on Convention, 269 ; 
quoted, 256 ; mentioned, 
15, 16, 47, 49 

Hickie, Maj.-Gen. W. B., 201, 265 

Hills, Maj.-G«n., 268 

Hobson, Bulmer, quoted, 115, 159 



346 



JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 



Home Rule Bill (1912), demon- 
strations for and against, 
62 ; National Convention, 
65, 66 ; Ulster's attitvxde, 
65, 67 ff. ; exclusion pro- 
posals, 68, 78, 84, 99 ; 
devolution proposals, 71 ; 
Unionist converts, 73 ; in 
Committee, 68, 74 ; finan- 
cial arrangements vmder, 
74-5 ; Report stage, 75 ; 
Third Reading, 77 ; in 
the Lords, 77 ff. ; third 
Introduction (1914), 99 ; 
inadequate private dis- 
cussion of, by Irish Party, 
lOQ-1 ; the Amending 
Bill, 121, 126; the 
Speaker's Conference, 

121 ff. ; amending Bill 
postponed, 126 ; opera- 
tion of, to be deferred, 
148-9 ; Royal assent, 
151 ; Asquith's move to- 
wards securing immediate 
operation of, after the 
Rebellion, 232; O'Con- 
nor's demand for, 249 

Hopwood, Sir Francis, 275 

Industrial depression in Ireland 

under the War, 184 
Irish at the Front, The, quoted, 

201 
Irish Brigades, see under Army 
Irish Convention — ■ 

Committee of Nine, 304, 307, 

310 
Financial considerations, 285, 
286, 293-5, 307, 309 ; 
Lord Midleton's proposals, 
312-23; Lloyd George's 
proposals, 326-32 
First meeting of, 271 
Fraternization between repre- 
sentatives, 286-7 
Grand Committee of Twenty, 
301, 303, 307, 311 



Irish Convention {continued) — 
Inception of, 258, 260 
Intermediate Authority pro- 
posal, 285-6 
Land Purchase Sub-Commit- 
tee, 304, 317 
Personnel of, 271 ff. 
Preliminaries, 269 
Procedm-e adopted, 280 
Reports presented by, 330 
Sinn F6in attitude to, 263-4, 

267-8 
Spirit of, 279-80 
Ulster representatives, atti- 
tude of, 321 ; attitude to 
Redmond, 323 ; Report 
presented by, 330 
Irish Council Bill (1907), 31 ff., 

78 
Irish Independent, 273, 330 
Irish Party, discipline of, 12-13 ; 
personnel of, 59 ; Red- 
mond's relations with, 
59-61 
Irish relations with Eng- 
land most cordial (1916), 
213 
Irish suspicion, 189-90 
Irish Volim,teers, Redmond's 
policy repiidiated by, 
155-6 ; collisions with 
National Volunteers, 180 ; 
Rebellion of 1916, 218 ff. 
{See also National Volun- 
teers) 

Jameson, Andrew, 271, 298 
Judge, M. J., cited, 132 

Kavanagh, W. M., 274, 318 
Kelley, Dr., Bp. of Ross, 270, 

293, 310, 323 
Kenny, Dr., 38 
Ker, S. P., quoted, 202 
Kettle, Prof., T. M., 14, 93 

recruiting work of, 186 

killed in action, 241 

estimate of, 185 



INDEX 



U1 



Kitchener, Earl, attitude of, to 
Irish Volunteers, 138-40, 
153, 160, 162, 175, 181 ; 
Redmond's interview 
with, on recruiting, 198-9, 
205 ; letter on Irish recruit- 
ing, 199 ; estimate of, 138 

Knight, Mr., 294-5 

Labour Party, 44, 87, 108 

Land Act (1909), 41 

Land League, 8 

Land Purchase, 17, 27-8 

Lang, Dr., Abp. of York, on 
Ulster, 78-80 

Lansdowne, Marquis of, 29, 236, 
238 

Larkin, James, 90, 183, 273 

Larne Gun-running, 112-14 

Law, A. Bonar, speeches of, on 
Ulster, 65, 70; Ulster 
policy, 77, 83, 87, 99, 
163 ; protest against 
enactment of Home Rule, 
149 ; quoted on Major 
Willie Redmond, 245 ; 
estimate of, 55 ; men- 
tioned, 132, 178 

Liberal Party, 13, 29 

Lincolnshire, Marquis of, Volun- 
teer Bill of, 205, 208 

Liquor trade in Ireland, 42 

Local Government Act (1897), 24 

Long, W., quoted, 216 

Longford Election, 257, 259 

Lonsdale, Sir John, 263 

Lords, House of. Veto contro- 
versy, 42 ff., 50, 52, 57 ; 
Conference, 48 

Loreburn, Lord, 84 

Lynch, Arthur, 129 

Lysaght, Edward, 273, 282, 296, 
301-2 

McCarthy, Justin, 13 ; quoted, 

26 
McCullagh, Sir C, 294 
MacDermott, Dr., 272 



MacDonagh, 201 ; the Rebellion, 
218, 224 

MacDonnell, Sir Anthony, devo- 
lution scheme of, 28-9 ; 
supports Home Rule Bill, 
78 ; in the Convention, 
273, 282, 310, 317 

McDowell, Sir Alexander, 272, 
303-4, 307-8 

MacNeill, Prof., promotes Na- 
tionalist arming, 93 ; vol- 
unteer following of, 180; 
the Rebellion, 219 ; cited, 
164, 180-1 ; mentioned, 
64, 116 

MacRory, Dr., Bp. of Down and 
Connor, 270 

MacSweeney, Capt., 163 

Mahaffy, Dr., Provost of Trinity, 
272, 330 

Maxwell, Sir John, 225-6 

Meath, Lord, 158, 169 

Midleton, Lord, 271, 273, 286, 
296, 304, 308 ; Customs 
proposals, 310 ff. 

Mooney, J. J., 21, 38 

Moore, Lt.-Col. M., 159-60, 203 

Murphy, W. M., 273, 282, 295, 
304, 315, 317 

Nathan, Sir M., 220 

National Volunteers, establish- 
ment of, 91-2, 94-5, 99 ; 
Redmond's adhesion to, 
114; formidable charac- 
ter of, 114-15; com- 
mittee difficulties, 117 ff. ; 
Bachelor's Walk affair, 
123-5 ; Redmond's offer 
of, for National Defence, 
134 ff., 203 ff. ; general 
response, 136-8 ; demand 
for recognition, 153, 
159-61, 202-3 ; refused, 
153, 162, 167, 181, 203, 
207-8, 222 ; secession of 
Irish Volunteers from, 
155 ; Asquith's pledge 



m 



JOHN REDMOHD^S LAST YEARS 



National Volunteers (continued) — 
regarding, 157 ; Review 
of, in Phoenix -Park, 204 ; 
Bulmer Hobson's History 
of, quoted, 115, 159 

O'Brien, Patrick, 38, 267 
O'Brien, William, attacks by, 
on Redmond and Na- 
tional Party, 34 ; opposi- 
tion to Budget (1909), 42, 
47 ; to Home Rule Bill 
(1912), 74; to county 
option, 100, 111-12; to 
the Convention, 263 ; de- 
clines to serve, 269 
O'Cathasaigh, Mr., cited, 91 
O'Connor, " Long John," 38 
O'Connor, T. P., Canadian tour 
1910, 48 ; recruiting suc- 
cesses of, 190 ; motion for 
immediate Home Rule, 
249 ; cited, 203 ; men- 
tioned, 25, 100, 130-1 
O'Donnell, Dr., Bp. of Raphoe, 
270, 284, 294, 303, 304, 
308, 310, 312, 330 ; speech 
on Papal Decrees, 299-300 
Oranmore, Lord, 313, 319 

Paget, Gen. Sir Arthur, 105 ff. 

Parliament, see Commons and 
Lords 

Parnell, C. S., 6-13, 17-19, 92; 
property of, 7, 37 ; power 
of, 58 ; anecdote of 
Willie Redmond and 
House of Commons, 249 

Parnellites, 19-21, 23-25 ; fusion 
of, withanti-Parnellites, 25 

Parsons, Lt.-Gen. Sir L., 170 ff., 
200-1 , 204-5 

Pearse, Patrick, speech of, in 
Dublin, 63-4 ; Limerick 
speech, quoted, 94 ; se- 
cedes from National Vol- 
unteers, 118 ; the Rebel- 
lion, 218, 222-3 ; execu- 
tion, 221 



Phoenix Park miirders, 14 

Pigott, 18 

Pirrie, Lord, 293 

Plunket, Count, 248 

Plunkett, Lord (Sir Horace), 
Conference scheme of 
(1895), 23; the Conven- 
tion, 274, 302, 309 ; as 
Chairman, 279 ; Lloyd 
George's letter to, 324 

Poe, Col. Sir Hutcheson, 145 

Pollock, Mr., 272, 299, 308 

Primate, the, see Crozier 

Primrose, Neil, 68-9 

Primrose Committee, 270, 293-4 

Protestant Ascendency, 86, 96, 
101 

Raymond Le Gros, 2-3 

Rebellion, Redmond's attitvide 
to, 3 

Rebellion of 1916, 218-19, 221, 
227 ; denounced by Red- 
mond, 223-4 ; suppres- 
sion of, 224-9 ; Govern- 
ment's fomentation of dis- 
affection, 227-9 ; com- 
parison with South Afri- 
can Rebellion (1914), 
225 

Recruiting, see under Army 

Redmond, John Edward, 4 

Redmond, John — ■ 

Ancestry and family of, 2-4 
Career — education, 5 ; clerk- 
ship in the House, 6 ; 
returned for New Rosj?, 
8 ; Parliamentary debut, 
9-11 ; Australian and 
American mission, 14 ; 
marriage, 14 ; second 
American mission, 17 ; 
imprisoned (1888), 17 ; 
chosen leader of Parnel- 
lites, 19 ; returned for 
Waterford, 19 ; attitude 
to Roman Catholic 
Church, 20 : widowed, 



INDEX 



U9 



Redmond, John (contimied) — 
20 ; second marriage, 
21-2 ; work with Plun- 
kett, 23-4 ; on Com- 
mission on Financial Rela- 
tions, 24 ; Chairman of 
United Irish Party, 25, 
58 ; his inner cabinet, 26, 
58, 100; attitude to 
Irish Council Bill, 31-3 ; 
campaign for Home Rule 
(1907), 34-5 ; House of 
Lords controversy, 45-6, 
57 ; " Dollar Dictator," 
48 ; the Nottingham 
Meeting (1912), 73 ; Home 
Rule campaign (1912) 
following Carson, 84 ; on 
proposed exclusion of 
Ulster, 85-6 ; attitude to 
National Volunteers, 92 ; 
speeches on the Ulster 
position, 98, 99, 102, 
109-11 ; the Ulster gun- 
running, 114; relations 
with National Volunteer? 
thereafter, 114 ff.; the 
Speaker's Conference, 
121-2 ; speech on out- 
break of War, 132 fi. ; 
offers the Volvinteers for 
national defence, 134 ff. ; 
Recruiting manifesto, 151; 
refuses office in Coalition 
Government, 192 ; inter- 
view with Kitchener on 
recruiting, 198, 205 ; Con- 
ference at Viceregal 
Lodge, 198-9 ; visits 
Irish troops at the Front, 
201-2 ; opposes Conscrip- 
tion for Ireland, 208 ff . ; 
letter to Asquith, 208 ; 
Rebellionof 1916, 219 ff.; 
Government breach of 
faith, 238-40 ; moves vote 
of censure, 243 ; criti- 
cizes Lloyd George, 245 ; 



Redmond, John (ccntinued'y — 

renewed opposition to 
conscription, 248 ; the 
Smuts dinner, 257 ; the 
Convention, 258, 261-3 ; 
death of his brother, 256 ; 
death of Pat O'Brien, 
267 ; in the Convention, 
278-9 ; relations with 
Nationalist representa- 
tives, 283-4 ; speech in 
Belfast, 289 ff. ; at West- 
minster, 304 ; speech on 
vote of thanks to the 
Forces, 305-6 ; Meetings 
of Committee of Nine, 
307 ff. ; ill -health, 257, 
282, 312, 322 ; attitude 
to Lord Midleton's pro- 
posals, 316, 318-21 ; 
tables motion condition- 
ally accepting, 321 ; with- 
draws owing to Nation- 
alist opposition, 322-3 ; 
illness, 325 ; operation, 
328 ; death, 329 
Characteristics — 

Ambition, lack of, 40, 336 
Caution, 282 
CoTirtesy, 26, 35 
Eloquence, 41, 88 
Lucidity, 41, 53, 59 
Moderation, 3, 11 
Modesty, 36, 336 
Optimism, 74 
Peaceable temperament 

and tolerance, 21, 26, 

26, 35, 88 
Rest, love of, 38 
Reticence, 37 
Romantic strain, 37 
Self-abnegation, 278, 280 
Sensitiveness, 243, 282 
Tact, 88 

Trustworthiness, 194 
Comparison of, with Campbell- 
Bannerman, 337 ; with 
Parneil, 338 ; position 



350 



JOHN REDMOND'S LAST YEARS 



Redmond, John (continued) — 
Comparison (continued) — 

compared with that of 
Botha, 158, 172, 184, 212, 
224 
Estimate of, 335 ; Birrell's 
estimate, 194 ; Healy's 
tribute, 256 ; estimate as 
leader, 59-61, 283, 310, 
338 ; estimate of his 
work, 338-41 
Government sHghting of, and 
disregard of his advice, 
153, 163, 167, 175-6, 190- 
1, 220, 226, 229, 238-9 ; 
^ instancesof bad faith, 153, 

239-40, 246 ; recruiting 
efforts handicapped, 163, 
176-6, 177, 190-1, 206 
xiouse of Commons life of. 111 
ImperiaHsm of, 15 
Irishmen, attitude towards, 

27, 63 
Military sympathies of, 107-8 
Oratorical style of, 5 
Recruiting efforts of, see under 

Army 
Status of, in Ireland, 171-2 
Social isolation of, 13 
Stephens'- attack on, 276-7 
War policy of, 132, 216 
Redmond, Major " Willie," 
Australian mission and 
marriage, 14 ; impris- 
oned (1888), 17 ; returned 
for East Clare, 20; War 
service, 182-3, 185, 
213-14, 230 ; position in 
his regiment, 188-9 ; 
speeches in the House 
quoted, 215-16, 245 ; ad- 
vises resignation of Par- 
liamentary party, 259 ; 
last speech in the House, 
249-54 ; killed in action, 
61, 265 ; estimate of, 249 ; 
mentioned, 4, 13, 19, 38, 
118, 128 



Redmond, Major William Areher, 
4, 185 ; on the Somme, 
240 ; wins D.S.O., 306 ; 
returned as Nationalist 
in 1918 election, 231 

Redmond, William Areher, 4, 5, 
7 

Richardson, Gen., 163 

Roberts, Lord, 176 

Roman Catholic Church, 49, 187 

Russell, George ("A.E."), in 
the Convention, 274, 282, 
304, 310, 312 

Sclater, Sir Henry, 204-5 
Selborne, Lord, 236 
Seely, Col., 108-9 
Sexton, Th., 16, 24 
Shaw, Mr., 6 

Sheehy-Skefifington, Mr., 228, 231 
Sinn Fein — 

Convention ignored by, 

263-4, 267-8 
Demonstration by, at funeral 

of Thomas Ashe, 300 
Electoral successes of, 231, 

257, 268, 278 
Growth of, from May 1916, 232 
Propaganda, stispicion fostered 

by, 189 
Rebellion of 1916, see that 
heading 
Smith, F. E., quoted, 95 
South African War, 24 
Stephens, James, quoted, 276-7 

Taylor, Capt., J. S., 27 
Tennant, H. J., 198, 206 
Thomas, J. H., 108 
Times forgeries, 18 

Ulster — 

Administrative autonomy pro- 
posal, 85, 86 

Arms importation by, 81, 94 ; 
Larne gun-running,112-14 

Asquith's moratorium conces- 
sion to, 149 



INDEX 



351 



Ulster (continued) — 

Belfast Convention (1916), 235 

Churchill's speech (1912), 62 

Convention, the (1917), repre- 
sentatives at, 271-2, 285 ; 
their attitude and pro- 
cedure, 281, 299 

County option proposals, 77, 
85, 99 ff. ; difficulties of 
the scheme, 101 

Covenant, the, 72 ; military 
covenanters, 83 

Exclusion proposals, 68, 78, 
84, 233-4 ; embodied in 
the Bill, 99 ; time limit 
discussions, 101-3 ; Coun- 
cil of 1916 accepts exclu- 
sion proposals, 235 

Favouritism applied to, 95, 
120, 123, 125, 164, 169, 
170, 174 

Friendly relations with Na- 
tionalists, 51 

Home Rule, resistance to, 
65, 67 ff. ; Parliamentary 
majority for, 77 ; distri- 
bution of Home Rulers, 101 

Inseparability of, 69, 76-7, 84 

Lloyd George's scheme, 234 
Protestant ascendency, 86, 96, 
101 

Provisional Government 
formed, 80, 83 



Ulster (contintiedy — • 

Rebellion preparations of, 148 
Redmond's efforts to concili- 
ate, 76-7, 109-10, 114 
War, attitude on outbreak of, 
130 ; mistrustful of Irish 
Volunteers, 142 
United Irish League, 58, 259, 

261 
University Act (1908), 41 

Vatican Decrees, 49 

Wallace, Col., 299 
Walsh, Abp., 257 
War — 

Outbreak, 126 ff. 

Redmond's policy regarding, 
132, 216 ; Nationalist 
criticism of, 216-7'^X^ee 
also Army, recruiting) 

Ulster's attitude, 130, 142 
Ward, Col. John, 108 
Waterford, 19 
Wexford, 3 
What the Irish Regiments have 

done quoted, 202 
White, Capt., J. R., 90-1 
Whitley, H. T., 320 
Wicklow surroundings, 37-9 
Wimborne, Lord, 198, 199, 205 
Windle, Sir B., 282, 330 
Wyndham, G., 27-9 



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